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Executive Summary:
This report summarizes the Phase I analysis activity of the SpaccShuttlc Probabilistic Risk Assessment
and is submitted in partial fulfillmem of the requirea-aents of contract NAS#25809 Task Order 25. The
purpose of this analysis is to update the summary r_sults of the I989 hdetmndent Assesssment of
Shuttte Accident Scenari_ Probabilities for the Galileo Mission (the GaliLeo study) [1] to reflect the
current (April 1993) test and operational experience base of the Shin-de. It is expecmd that this analysis
will be the first in a series of periodic or event driven updates, to provide a continuously updated
benchmark for the catastrophic failm¢ frequency of the Shuttle.
The results of this study are the probability distributions of failure frequency for the Space Shuttle,
summmarized in Table 1 below.
Table 1: Risk of Catastrophic Failure for the Space Shuttle, post STS 56 (April 93)
' PRA Phase I Study results- Base.d on 484,932 se.ctm_ $SME'tesL 55'fltglas - 0 SRB failures _sumcd.
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This analysis differs fro_ _!:_er major analyses of Sp_ Shuttl,e reliability, notably the on-going
analyses of Space Shuttk'. :,:ii_i:_;Engines (SSMEs) [2] l_," t.-:.Safie of Marshall Space Flight Center and
Roeketdyne's internal SS_' ill!:,r:.._liabilhy studies [3] ba ._. _"er:d _portant respects. First, this is a risk
assessment, not a reLiabEi5 ,' ;,:tudy -- the difference is c:.:)torext _elow. Second, the focus is on the
Shuttle as a whole, not th: '.:;!:;MIE. Third, this study is li_rLilefl zo assessing the probability of
catastrophic faiime of the: i:i'_:,_t.',le(Ic.ss of vehicle, loss .:f ,:rew). Finally, while this study draws on the
test stand experience of fi:,:_ _SME as due best avaiiabI: "n,'3:a-_ight) indicator of SSME ha-flight
performance, it doe, s not _:::L,:i_er te.,t stznd experience ',3 be a perfect indicator of in-flight
performance, arm does n,.', h,_:._:fore direc_ay combine. _. :_!_'.: and. rest experience to determine the
probability of SSME faiY: ,::.
The principal conclusion:; J:f' this study are: (1) The Spz :;e :!_ha_.fle-is demonstrably one of the most
reliable launch vehicles t,;.'Ja_,, and _:mder reasonable, as:.:'_r3pt_ons may be considered the most mXiable
launch vehicle today. (2) :: :;pace Slautfle Main Enu_'r,::. (_S),$E) test program has had a significant
positive impact on the re3::_i]ity of the Shuttle and has ::,-,,rnbu.ted greatly to demonstrating flight
reliability and crew safer.? _3) The Redesigned Solid _ ::,:_::etBooster (RSRB) is currently the most
significant contributor to r_:.• _.s_imamd residual risk of ,-:_,:Iz_trc'_plxicfailure of the Shuttle among the
major elements consider,: :_ i:r:_,'.his study (RSRB, SSMIT, E_.ternal Tank (ET), OrbiteL and Prelalmch),
and will probably con_, :_ _ clominar_; the estimated r:_],:in ,he future since its reliability is
demonstrated only throu._;:_ flight successes.
inlmaumiam
In April i989 the Safety _i v{sion of the Office of the :, _:;ocia_: Administrator for Safety, Reliability, '_#'
Maintainability, and Qua I!7/Assurance (Code QS) puh_._s,_ed Ihe .Lqdependent A._ses_ment of Shuttle
Accident Scenario Proba: i?ii:i._ for tkc_g2cd//ea.Mis_qr.: (_.he Galileo study) [1]. The Galileo spacecraft
carried a radio-isotope th: ;]:io_dc generator (RTG), at, d 'h_ Office of Science and Technology Policy
(OSTP) required thatan '!,:_,::.._:;mentof publicriskarisS:r:._fro'c_l,U.S. space launches involving
radioactive materials be i:,.__t!_s_ed prior to launch. Th_. Gab;I.eo study was performed in response to
that requirement. One w i_-_[ _/distribu_d result from t_,z Galileo study was the set of catastrophic
failure frequency distribu i, ms for the Space Transport,':_-_on System (Shuttle).
A_ part of the Probabilis_: : P..:,.skAssessment of the Sp'_'.-:e: Shuttle (Shuttle PRA) [5], Office of Safety
and Mission Assurance (,i I'.I!;_,'IA), and the Oftice of Sp_ .':e Flight 6il_te, d Science AppLications
International Co_oratior) 'i'__,.IC) to update the Gallic: stt_dy msults to reflect the current (April 1993)
test and operational expe., i_x.cc base of the Shuttle. It i: ,_:.xpec_ed that this analysiswillbe the first in a
series of periodic or ever !W,,en updates, to provide _ _:or:tinuously updated benchmark for the
catastrophic failure freq:_,., cy of the Shuttle.
This study is a risk asses. ;: _ent_ maanizg primarily tha_ _.t_:pur._ose is to facilitate the making of
decisions under risk. In .; :::ticdar this assessment is d_--e.::ted at understanding the risk to the crew and
to the payload associated ,.;i:h _he use of the Space Sh,"_e a_; a launch vehicle. This study does not, in
and of itself, make the S_: _:_t!.e =y less "risky" or cont:"bt_e ,_ir'ectly to demonstrating the current level
of risk associated with tl_, 7:v_:.ttle. It does however d_-::me, d_::scribe, and quantify the risk to the Shuttle
and payload while the Sit :_'t_.: is acting as a Launch veh_t.z. "._'his information is potentially useftil in
making decisions regard! ,i_ _I::.cfuu,re role of the _......
........ ,.mu_, ::::;":h_ ::el_five effectiveness of design,
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engineering, or operational changes; or to determine what future changes might be _lUi_e& and
whether the current level of risk requires any changes in the risk management strategy.
Decisions are characterized by uncertainty.. Uncertaim7 is gcnea'afiy associated with the subjective
elements of a problem: uncertainty in the ability to accurately model a problem, or uncertainty in the
appficability of various data to a problem, for example. A basic tenet of ____ assessment is that
uncertaintym datacan be quantifiedand treatedmathematically using the "logicol_Uncertainty."The
quantificationof an uncertaindecisionelement (datum) isaccomplished by expressingthe datum as a
probabilitydistribution.Distributionsare alsoused to model variability--the physicallymeasurable
differencesbetween elements in a populationof items or events. A "pure" or classicalreliabilitystudy
deals only invariabilhy.Subjectiveuncertaintyisdealtwith ina reliabilitystudy by establishing
ground rulesor making assumptions which remove uncertaintyfrom the modeled problem --the
uncertainty is still there, but it is removed from the scope of the analysis. Another approach which can
be employed by the reliability, analyst to account for uncertainty is the use of conservatism. Adopting a
more "conservative" approach reflects that a more negative outcome is postulated than that which might
be verified by additional data or modeling. In either cue, it is incumbent upon the decision maker to
understand and assess the uncertainty implicit in the ground rules and assumptions of a classical
reliability analysis before applying the results of that analysis in decision m2_.g.
.Probability theory (8] permits the combination of tim uncertainty and variability distributions associated
with a given parameter. Variability in classical rcliabifity analysis is generally expressed using
confidence intervals - a measure of the likolihood (confidence) that the specified interval will coo)2in
the actual mean value of a quantity subject to variability. Another aspect of uncertainty is tolerance -- a
measure of the applicability of the parameter to the specific problem (e.g., hardware configuration,
application) at hand. R;_i_ analysis uses analogous "uncertainty intervals" to express the distribution,
which combines both the tolerance of the estimate and the variability in the quantity. The expression
"confidence interval" is re,served to apply only to variability.
This report contains a brief overview of the objective of this study and the analysis methods employed,
followed by a summary of the results of the analysis. The analysis process is then defined in depth,
including sufficient discussion of the data, assumptions, statistical methods, and tools used to allow
audit or replication and extension of this analysis as new data are generated.
Objective:
The objectiveof thisanalysisistoproduce an up-to-f!__*_e.setof probabilitydistributionsfortl/¢launch
and ascent phase catastrophic failure frequency of the Shuttle. These distributions will be generated by
updating the original data used in the 1988 Galileo study, and wig preserve the assumptions Used in tho
Galileostudy.
This risk assessment is intended to provide the decision maker with realistic estimates for the current
probability of catastrophic failure (failure involving loss of vehicle and loss of crew) of the Space
Shuttle, The application of the logic of uncertalnty [8] and in particular Bayes' Theorem in this study
permits the incorporation of relevant engineering information which could not be included in a classical
reliability study. The inclusion of this information produces results that, in our opinion, are a more
accurate reflection of the engineering realities of the Space Shuttle than a classical reliability study,
which must rely on relatively sparse data. Finally, by explicitly quantifying uncertainty in critical
assumptions and ground rules, it provides support for defensible judgments and decisions under
uncertainty. (Even if the decision maker disagrees with a particular assumption or ground rule, the
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quantification of uncertai,_ Ii'__-ovides some basis for u_d_'t'st,'mdiag tim impact of the assumption on _e _
quantitauve results of the,._ _'.,:.,J,_.)
Scope:
This stud}, is m_,'ndcd to : .,'c,cle high-le-:: _ !=sight into r_l:te_current genexal catastrophic failure
probability of the Shuttle !=:>rthis reason: me focus of kis study is not on particular failure scenarios or
mission phases, but on th.: :_ _iGr functiomai elemems of th:' Shuttle. Moreover, this study is meant to
updam results from the e,.-.:I:!_,: Ga!ileo study, not m be _ :'1i.t;_d+:pendent assessment of the risk. The
underlying assumptions _: !.it_ Galileo study, ,and the d:;, ,'_ ;:tsecl :in that study, are not re-examiaed here.
It should be noted that th._: .i:,'.,!ileo s_.u;_y h_ several li_-_ it;_tJ.ons wbSch am not addressed in this analysis:
because it was in,haled t_ .;_.::'_,'eonly as, an input m the _,;:;_:._ment oft he nuclear safety of the Galileo
mission, it _alt exclusiv,_= _' u,i.th catastrophic fai.lu _ d-_.rit_g pre-launeh, launch, and ascent phases of
flight, it considered neitl: : r.'.i_sion abort situation.,; no' t['-'.,_;o_-orbit, reentry, and landing phases of the
flight.
.... Overview of the Anab, :_,'!_!_::
Process Overview:
"I have but one la:' _::_._y which my feet are guid:.'._, and that is the lamp of experience;
I know of no way _:_ :.;.'dging :he.future but by r,_:_:p,zs_. "
Patrick Henry
Speech in the Virt,, :;: i_ Convention; Match 23, :!_75
A broad introduction to t_: :_:_.:_',aand processes used to _b!:a:in the failure frequency distributions is
provided in this section. ': '::+.i_:.i.nformation is pw.z,ented ;;._.g:_ater detail later in this report, and in
reference 1, the Galileo s.: +::!:_,_I]nal report. The approac_ used to determine the overaU risk of
catastrophic failure of the i_+_:_tr2ein the 1988 Galileo sz :dy w;_s to analyze the system in tetras of its
principal risk contributo_ '-!.etermiae the distribution of b_il.ure frequencies associated with each of the
risk contributors, and corn :It:r+_r.:those distributions to det_;rm.ivc r.he overall catastrophic failure frequency
distribution associated wi.tl-+th,+.::Shuttle.
This assessment is based +:_::_::J,;torical data. If it were b+_s,.:d sclely on historical data without any other
considerations it would iv, +_::;:_tehow the Shuttle has perfc, rrae, d in the past, but, since the Shuttle has
experienced numerous de:! i i): _md operational changes _:_n<;eit_ first flight, it would not indical_ how the
Shuttle is expected to per_! ",++.mtoday and in the furore.._./.{._:tv.over, the amoum of historical catastrophic
failure information dixeet._ _ i?::_inen'; to the Shuttle is (i!a:Ifi_flly) sparse. To make a realistic estimate
of the current carastroph_t :r_ilure proba.bility, thi._ anal:,s_s must therefore deal with two limitations in
the available data. It mm;t ,;._:_:w.how modify or f'dter tb,.+_:dzta m reflect the operational and design
changes in the system (in_:: T_orate _.liability growth); "__'._ _t must supplement the sparse dam with
relevant information from ::_?:_r sources. In general, re!!'ai>flity growth can be accommodated in one of
two ways. The approach _+:.e,l here is to segregate (film.') _:l-teurtderlying failure data into sets containing
those failures which wouh + r:cur on the current Shuttle- _n.d those which would not. An alternative
approach is to modify the.., +:,;_ysis model to reflect gro'_'th t'e.g.: to weight the failure occm'ence, s based
upon their currency).
The principal risk contrib. _:_,."_(risk elements) in the Si,,Lrtle zre the Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) pair,,...8
the Space Shuttle Main E: !;_+:.c(SSh,_) cluster, the E,x_:::1::taIra.nk (EI3, the Orbiter, and Prelatmch
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activities. In this anaiysis SSME start-up failures are included as part of the SSME cluster risk clement,
rather than as part of the Prelaunch risk element. The SRB pair and SSME cluster contribute on the
order of 90% of the total risk.
To derive f-,dlure frequency distributions for each of the risk _o/ltributors, a prior distribution of failure
frequencies is found based on the performance of surrogate components or systems. Bayes' theorem is
then used to update that prior information with the operational flight performance of the elemenL As
applied here, a prior distribution refers to the best awil:_ble indicator of in-flight reliability performance
of the risk contributor, short of the actual in-flight experience. The term surrogate means a system or
component sufficiently like the reference system or component in form, function, application, and
environment that the failure frequency of the surrogate is a reasonable indicator of the failure frequency
for the reference system.
The Bayesian update process used in these studies has the general property of reducing the range of
uncertainty associated with a failure frequency distribution, relative to classical statistical methods. This
method is employed based on the belief that there are data available - other than direct flight experience
of the Shuttle -- which allows us to determine the catastrophic failure frequency of the Shuttle with
greater certainty than flight experience alone would allow. For exam#e, we believe that SSME test
stand experience provides useful information regarding the catastrophic failure potential of the SSME.
At the same time, we do not think that test stand experience is a perfect indicator of in-flight SSME
performance, so it would be inappropriate to pool test performance directly with operational experience.
Bayes' theorem aLlows us to supplement the relatively scant flight experience of the Shuttle by imilding
on the infrasuuctnre of confidence established by test experience. The objective is to find a prior
distribution that is the best available indicator of in-flight performance, and combine that prior
knowledge with actual flight experience to produce a result in which we are more certain than would
have been possible using flight experience alone.
The prior probability distributions for each of the Shunle risk-contributor elements were selected to be
the best available indicators of Shuttle in-flight performance (other than actual Shuttle flight
experience). The prior distribution for the SRB was obtained by aggregating the performance of U.S.
solid rocket systems. For the SSME, the prior distribution was obtained by examining SSME test stand
performance. The prior for the Orbiter was obr_,ir_,_l by combining Auxiliary Power Unit (APU)
information from the Shuttle Probabilimie Ri._k A._se._._ment Proof ofConceot SttKly [6] with generic
component information for other, non-propulsion, Orbiter systems. For the Prelatmch prior, generic
component information was used as surrogate data for the failure modes which would contribute to a
pad fire or explosion in Launch Support Equipment (LSE), or in_rivertem destruction of the Shuttle by
Range Safety Equipment (RSE).
The prior failure frequency distributions are combined with the actual flight experience of the Shuttle
using Bayes' theorem to produce "Bayesian Posterior distributions. Because it combines significant
failure-related information about the system (in the prior distributions) with flight experience, the
Bayesian posterior generally provides a more useful and accurate indicator of the actual failure
frequency performance of the system than a distribution derived from flight experience alone. In the
summary charts throughout this report, the distributions reported am Bayesian posterior distributions.
A rigorous treatment of Bayes' Theorem is provided in Appendix B and Appendix C.
Note that Bayesian updates were only performed for the SRB and SSME in the 1988 Galileo study.
The objective of this study was to update the results of the Galileo study to reflect current operational
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experience,so a Bayesia:t:_:dateusing the operational_-xp,,_c:nc¢(no failure_in Fiftyfiveflights)was
performed fortheOrbimr, I!:T.t.J1dPrciauach riskclc_z:.;Frrs.This constitutesa minor change to the
ground rulepreservingtl:,!_:,,_ hod of theoriginalGa/i_,_o s_udy. Since thefailurefrequenciesforthe
Orbiter, El', and Prelaunc :_;k eternenls are small, _e _;+:, ::._i3n update resulted in little change to the
prior distribution, and h_,:l _.:_: :mtially nc) el'feet on _he s: .s1:e:m level failure frequency.
The Bayesian posterior d.i: t:i )',;tions for two mdividuaI :qF.::as r_nd three individual SSMEs were
combined using a Monte.4:::,::ha simulation to dcterrninc _hc, f_d.hjrc frequency distribution for the SRB
pair and SSME three engi,--luster. These distributior_: w,_r_-_then combined (again using simulation)
with the Orbiter, ET. and 'J':/'_aunch dksmbutions to pm-!u::e _he STS system level failure frequency
distribution. It should hr. : ::,:_d for completeness that r '_Le am Galileo study contractor did use Monte-
Carlo sampling in their sft :__a_:ions, the current study t.'.::r..,:_!t_e. I.,a_in-Hypereube sampling method,
which provides somewha: _._::.::'eaccurate results in the :"i, s c_f distributions. A discussion and
comparison of Monte Ca:?-. :rod Latin Hypereube se_.t-'5:_ g methods is provided in Appendix E.
This study makes extensi', ': rse of the lognormal dk_u'i'.: I15on to express the uncertain quantity "failure
frequency." Risk analys_:; _ ve found the lognorraal di.,:l:ribufion well suited to conveying uncertainty in
failure frequency distribut: .r_s in a v,,idt: spectrum of ap.d i,::z.tions.
SRB Sensitivity Case:_ :
The only in-flight catastr_: '."!aic failure expcrience¢l by _!:e .¢,htLttle was the STS 5 I-L (Challenger) SRB
,. ,_ the rime of the GMilec, m_dy and today is that the failure mode whichfailure. The prevailing bc _'"
caused that accident was - :;:r_c.vexi it.. the, Redesigned Sc !it._Rt_,'.ket Booster (R.SRB). At NASA's S_direction, the base case fl', "-."• _:,ore did not include the C'7__"enger SRB failure in the calculation of
failure frequency. To det_ '. r ine how inclusion of that _:_'_i!_r,_would effect the system Ievel outcome, a
sensitivity case was added "lq_.iscase is labeled Sensit_' i_y 1,
At the time of the Galilee, ,!!_:;dy theze was insufficient _'R._; u_._t or operational experience to derive a
practical and meaningfd !' 4 _J.e:frequency distribution ':_ _:,'d on SRB experience alone. Based on the
experience of one failure: _:, f:ft'y SRB launches, classic_' 1 _',,:zti__r.icalmethods yield a mean SRB failm'e
frequency of 1/50, and ni.: ,'_71_percent certainty botmds :ff ?,tl 1. and U975. The knowledge that we axe
ninety-percent-confident t :::tt _he SRB failure frequev.c_ :i:"bet,_een (essentially) one in tea and one in
one thousand may be smr.i:, i,::ally meaa'mgful, but is of' ittle pr:a.cdcai engineering value.
The SRB prior distributic: '_,'a.s the_fore (nee.ess,'Lrily) ,le_ived :from solid rocket sources not directly
related to the SRB. Give::' _.t_.r.bucre_ed e_perience no,," ,.wail_ble, it is appropriate to question whether
such a prior is sdli "the k.._ :;_::l.,ailabie indicator ofin-fi?Tr,.tp,:_ormance.' I To determine the extent to
which the SRB prior imp: :;:':.,;r.he Shuttle system-level f-_il:are f_queney distributions, two additional
sensitivity case, s were an,-.. -,._,.,.d without using the solid ,r_'ke_. prior. The Sensitivity 2 case retains the
STS 5 I-L failure as a va]! i! :.r:ernber of the RSRB fellah= :lir.y data set, and a RSRB failure frequency
distribution is calculated ! _c.d on one failure in 110 S;'i!I_: ,' I_SRt_ flights. The Sensitivity 3 case
discounts the STS 51-L f_; .i _,.e _ having been fully eo_ -e,':'ted.. _md the RSRB failure frequency
distribution is calculated : _: _:_suming one-third of a fafm_: in 109 (counted) SRB / RSRB flights. Note:
justification for the use o:? _ r_e..third of a failure is discr_ _red more fully in AppendixD.
Results of the Analy_' _,:
Table 2 below shows the, :! _.tributions derived directly iir_;m the published Galileo study results. Tab_
3 shows the Galileo-era i: ".,-::::c.-.nediateresults of this st_r:'y Table 4 depicts the April 1993 updated
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results. The Galileo-era results in Table 3 were produced and presented because minor differences in
the tools and statistical methods employed in the earlier study relative to this one resulted in slightly
different results, pardcnlady in the tails of the distributions. These differences and the reasons for them
are discussed in detail in Appendices A and H. The differences between the original Galileo study
results and the Galileo-era results of this study, shown in Tables 2 and 3 are process-oriented. Both
studies used the same data and underlying assumptions. The difference between the Galileo.era results
in Table 3 and the April 93 results in Table 4 ate due entirely to the experience acquired since the
Galileo mission.
Table 2: Risk of Catastrophic Failure for the Space Shuttle. STS 34 (October 88)
Ori_n" ai Galileo Study Re, suits
Galileo Study results - Based on 294,230 seconds SSME test, 31 flights - 0 SRB failures assumed.
(5I-L failure nul included)
,,, (1 out of ...
88 SSME Clusw.r
88 ET
88 Orbiter
(1 ant of ...
(I out of...
(1 out of...
_8 Pretaunch
............... 80_ostb 2om% som 
7.69E4_ 'J.6oe-o3 3.601_-03 5.49E-03 8.06E.03
I I 1 I 1
) 1300 624 278 182 124
8.33E-04 2.18E-03 5.85E-03 1.09E4)2 1__6E-02
I l I I I
) 1200 458 171 92 64
1225E-0.5 3.45E005 1.00E-04 2.00E-04 2.86E-04
I I I I I
) 8000O 2900O 10000 500O 3500
1.09E-04 1.89E-04 3.45E-04 4.LTE-04 62_-_"
l 1 I 1
9200 5300 2900 2400
95th%
1.72E-02
1
58
lip
3.85E-02
1
26
7.69E-04'
?
1300
i
1.11E-03
l 1
1600 900
2.94E-04 3.85E-04 5.26E-04 7.14E-04 7.69E-04 1.43E-03
I I I I I 1
(1 out of ... 3400 2600 1900 1400 1300 700
ii
_8 STS (Base) 2.86E-03 $.gb'Eo03 1.28E-02 I_2E-02 2.78E-02 5.g6_02
I(51-L failure not Included) 1 1 l I 1 l
(1 out of ... 350 168 "/8 5S 36 18
88 Reliability (Base) 0,997 0.994 0.987 0.982 0.973 0,9445
Galileo Study Sensitivity Case 1 - Based on 294,230 seconds SSMB test 31 flights - 1 SRB failure
I It II
88 SRB Pair (Sensitivityl)
(includes 5 I-L}
_I out of_.
88 STS (Sensltivltyl))
(indudm $1-L]
(1 oat of., 1
I I I
1.8_:_03 3.9gI]-03 9.17E-03 1.54E-02 2.08E-02 4__5E-02
I I I I I I
555 251 109 65 48 22
4.9fE-03 9.goEdl3 2.0fiE-02 2.78E-02 4.17E_2 7.69E-02
I 1 1 1 1 1
202 102 50 36 24 13
0.995 0.990 0.980 0.973 0.959 0.926
• I88 Reliability (Sensitivlt3, " 1)
Tables 2, 3, and 4 show the failure frequencies associated with each of the risk contributors at the fifth,
twentieth, fiftieth (median), eightieth, and ninety-fifth percentiles, as well as the means of the failure
frequency distributions. Also shown for each risk contributor are the mean flights between failure
(mfbf) associated with the failure frequency. At the system 1eve1 the reliability associated with the
failure frequency is also Listed.
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,Ks they axe used here, the, _r.:entile rankings should be ntc:rpm*_ed as follows: "We are 95% certain tha.
the actual { failure frequem :i : re2iabitity } is better than. ::7,e,',,a2ue ._hown in the '95th%' column."; or "We
are 60% certain that the zc i:_:i [failure frequency/relizl: !dity } l_lls between the '20th%' and '80th%'
values."; and so on. The _::_:l:x and the median ('50th%'; ',_',*._b_h widely used indicators of the central
tendencies of these distrit:,. !:or, s. They are not equ',d be,_:a_,::e _.¢.se distributions are slccwecl - for the
failure frequencies, the dJ, :: bulions are lognormal or ne_:_:riy tognormal, m_aning that the logarithms of
the failure frequencies are _.,tm,'dly diswibutecl. Histor_: _,.t:!;. _c median of the Galileo study
distributions has been user: :s: _he "poim esd.mat_ of ,.hc.i se" when referring to these results using a
single value.
Table 3: Risk (,i _C_ta.strophic Failure for the !;I:,.'t,:e Shuttle, S'IS 34 (October 88)
P._ :_!:c t Shuttle PRA -- Galileo ::t_a.L'_rmediate Results
Galileo era (l.nterrnec_tar,!, .'es,='_;'.s- Based on 294,230 see_w __ :;5.,V,T.7:est. 31 frights - 0 SR.B failures assmned.
0!_" _.:;r::fitet. a_d Prelaunch disu-ibut_ ,_t:_:_J_:t._e ._mzrteas Table I)
5rE % 20th % ,',,"0 th % bl_n BOth % 9Sth %
88 SRB Pair (PRA Base) ( !.56E-03 3.28E-C)3 C,:llE-03 9.90E-03 1.411_.-02 2.B3E-02
(51-L failure not intruded) ) 1. 1 _L._ 1 1 I
(1 out 0._ . )1 642 305 147 I01 71 35
88 SSM:E Cluster(PRA) i 2.49r:-04 9.,_5E-Q4 2J:[4E-_33 7.38_-0_ 8.35"E-03 2.C_5_-ff2
I) _1_ I ..3._. 1 1 1
(1 out of :::2[. .a020 1060 :)52 I36 120 38
8SET [ 1.25E-05 3.45E-05 i..,,_)0E-0_1. 2.00_-04 2.$6E-04 7.alE-O_ _
. 1. I _.L_ 1 1
,t 80000 29000 1ITS)0 $000 3500 1300(Iouto_ .::.;.i - _-....-- _ " :....
88 Orbiter t 1.09F-,-O# 1.89E-34 3 '_5E-04 4.17B-04 6.25E-04 1.11E-03
I
___I.... t ...... i._ 1 I 1
(I out o_ .......)) 9200 5300 2900 2400 1600 900
l_launch
, 2.94E-04 3.85E-04 5=).t_.O4 7.14E-04 7.69F.A_ 1.43E-03
_1- ! _1_ I l I(I out o_ , ) 3400 2600 1900 1400 1300 700
'T:,',l:._,.._-..... n----.-- q'_ _.,k.._., .".':_._;;::;.-_'..'
r ,t_59E,-03 7.70E-03 L 3fi.I_-.1_7. 1.86E-02 2APE-0288 STS (PRA Base)
(51-L failure not Included) I _1_ 1 ....L._ I 1 1
. (1 otit of ,, )] 218 130 74 $4 40 2,188 Rehablltty (PRA Base) 0,995 0.99_, 0.987 0.982 0.975 0.953
Sensitivity ;i!.__',i 1- Based o:n 294,230"_n--_' i_._.. 'till flights- 1 SRB failure
88 SR.B Pair (PRA Scnsidvityl _ 5.88E-03 9.92E-03 1.71.E-02 2.11E-02 2.96E-02 4.9gE-02
(includes 51-L ._1__ I ....L._ I I I
fiailta'e)(l outo_" :;.,,2:_. I70 ........... I0I ...... ,.-,-,..,,-...-,58.., 47 34 21
88 STS 0PRA SensitlvL: .,_ 9.70E.03 l_IE-02 14"5E-02 2.95E-02 4.01E-_2 6.68F_2
(Includes $1-L failure) 1 . i ....1.-- l 1 l
(1 out o_ ,, 103 66 41 34 25 15
88 Reliability 0PRA Sensltlvlt_ ! 0.990 0.985 0.976 0.971 0.961 0,935
L.
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Table 4: Risk of Catastrophic Failure for the Space Shuttle, post- STS 56 (April 93)
STS PRA Phase 1 Study Results
tim i • It • lint il _ '' I
PRA Phage I Study results - B_d on 484.932 seconds SSME _ 55 flights - O SRB failntes as_m_-d.
• n . _ nun
_th% 20th% 50th% Mean 80th 95th%
.................... ,93 RSRB Pair (Base) 1.28E-03 2.58E-03 5.35E-03 .80E-03 tAlE 2.23E,-02
(51-L failure not included) 1 ] | l t |
(1 out _ ...) ,, 782 388 187 I28 90 45
93 $S ME Cluster 6A6E-04 1.35E-03 2.92E-03 4.69E-03 6.53E-03 I')I1E-02
I I 1 I l I
(10uto(,.r) "'" 1550 741 342 213 153 .. 71
93 ET 1.16E-05 3.14E-05 8.9IE-05 1.92E-04 2.53E-04 6_5E-04
1 1 1 1 1 I
•,, (I out of ...) 86400 31900 11200 5200 , 3950 14450
93 Orbiter 9,89E-05 1.7512-04 3.19E-04 4.10E-04 5.80E-04 1.03E-03
I 1 t I 1 1
(1 out of...) I0100 5710 3140 2440 1720 974
.... ii iiii ii ii I i ii
'93 Pretauneda 2.15E-04 3.50E._4 5.84E-04 7.02E-04 9.73E-04 1.58E-03
I l 1 1 1 l
(1 OUtOf..._ 46f0 2850 1710 1430 1030 631
B Im r B I III i
93 STS (Base) 4.48E-03 6_3F.,-03 I.IIE-Q_- 1.38E-02 1'.86E-02" .... 3.20E-0_-
(51-L failure not Included) 1 I I l l 1
(1 out of ... 2.7.3 146 90 73 54 31
93 Reliability 0.996 0.993 0.989 0.986 O.982 0.969
III _e I I I I I IRSRB SonsRivityl - includes the 51 Cailumto update lhc Galileo study surrogate prior.
I II II I I I II I I i It It
93 RSRB PaLr(Sensitivityl) 4.63E-03 7.80E-03 135E-02 1.66E-O2 _-33E-02 3.92E-02
(includes 51-L failure) 1 1 1 1 1 1
(1 out of... 2t6 128 74 60 43 25
93 STS (Sensitlvityl) 8.4&E-03 1.27F_2 1.94E-02 2_2.6E-02 3.04E-02 4.TTE-02
(includes 51-L failure) 1 | 1 1 ] l
(1 out of... 118 79 52 44 33 21
93 Reliability (Sensitivity 1) 0.992 0.987 0.981 0,978 0,970 0,953
' ' ' i_i_ty ' m'll0"S ' 'RSRB Seas 2 - No prior, I failure RB launches
i I i iiii93 RSRB Pair (Sensiaviry 3.I4E-04 1.18F.-03 4.70E-03 '1.82E-02 1.88E-02 7.03E-02
1 l I l I I
(!.,gut of...) , 3180 850 ..... 213 55 53 14
93 STS (Sensitivity2) 3.31E-0a $._7E-03 1.IZE-02 2.42E,-02 2.67E-02 _7.7_1_412
I 1 1 1 1 1
(1 out el'_) 302 176 89 41 37 13
93 Reliabtil_ (SemlOvRy2) 0_q97 0.994 0.989 0,976 0,974 0.926
II II I I IL _ ll IllL I I IIIRSRB Sensitivity3 - No prior, 0 failuees i 109 SRB Launches
I i iiiiJ I i i
93 RSRB Paix (Semidvity3) 1.06E-04 3.95E-04 1.58E-03 6.11_-03 6.3 IE-03 2.36E-02
I 1 I 1 1 1
(1 put of ... 9480 2530 633 I64 159 42| i
i i i |
93 STS (Sensitivity3) 2.54E.03 4_11F.-03 7.44E,-03 1.21E-02 1.48E-02 3.38E-02
(1 out of.. ] 1 1 | l |
394 243 134 83 68 :30
93 Rellsbillty (Semitlvity3) 0.99'/ 0.996 0.993 0.988 0.985 0.967
I IIIII II 1 Ill I I I II II 1
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This analysisconcludes d:._;:,with ninetypercentr.e._rry: th,__currentriskof a catastrophicfailm'e
leadingtolossof a ShuR[; :l_:ringthePrelaunch, Launch,,and ,.&sc_ntphases of a mission is.benveen
one-in-thirty-one(I/31),I:,:"nnc-in-_'o-hundred-_'cnr.:'-._hre_(I/223),with a mean riskof one-in-
sevcat3,-tb.r_(I/73),and ,_.;qianof one-in-niaety(I/9£".,.ThL_ isan impmvemem inestimatedmean
flights between failm'e of !_.':_'!_.at the mean and 72% at l'"l_,_,v(lr._t-case end of the _ty interval (95t.h
percentile) over the eom]:_:'_d risk for STS-34, tb._ Gal? "e::. _zission. (In terms of cstiraamd failure
frequency, this is an imp:r, •c:n:,ent of 23% at the mea._ "_:..54 t% at the 95th percentile). The principal
source of this improvemcl ': i:: ._.nem_ed cord._dencc in :,,c 5i:S:._IE. The SSME dam gathered since the
Galileo study includes: I :,i.",::__rc'in I90,70t seconds of !,._;_operation (the equivalent of 122 Shuttle
flights); 473 test starts (e:l ': !,,zlent to 157 launch starts) and ?..:_Shuttle flights. This me.ans that the
SSME has been accnmul_):: ;_L,'szatistic_ly relevant exp__i.m:tce at the rate of 4 or 5 equivalent flights per
mission. This "experienc_ __.u__ltiplier" has the effect of :_'x_t:,roving confidence in the reliability of the
SSME much more quick:!, 'k_n if the SSME were expo _ed tc f',dlure only during actual launches. In
contrast, the RSRB is on],.: ,_:,-Dosed _o failure during a 5:h_:,:fle launch, so the confidence in its reliability
performance buildsrelati', ::_y :!;lowly.
,, ._,!!i:!_.m'_l _..Shutde Fail ure F_ _ ue_ c __Distributions
_ $ ht.dlePRA$ l.d/
0.1
0.01
v
Ct001
ID
O.ODOI
OJ00O01
_=ttl=PRA Phas¢I-_ S_y Urea=
Revi_o_t
The Orbi_r, ET, and Prclaunch riskcontributionsremain insigni_cantcompar_ tothe SSME cluster
and RSRB pair.Currcntiy,the RSRBs account for between 29% and 70% of the overallrisktothe
Shuttle(57% atthe mean). The SS_s contributebctwe,cn 14% and 44% (34% atthe mean),
Prclaunch contributesabout 5%, the Orbiter3% and the ExternalTank I%. The non-propulsion
systems contributelessthan 10% of the totalaunch and ascentphase riskto the Shuttlesystem. The
contributionofeach riskclement to the totalShuttleriskisdepictedgraphicallyin Figure2.
Figure 2. Risk Element Fractional Conuibutions to STS Total Risk
U
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Discussion of the Analy_i _;=
Solid Rocket Boosters
As discussed in the prccc,d :[L section, a base case and ILr._:_ s_:,'_sitiviry cases were used to calgulam the
failure frequency for the ]! !:[_Bs. The bas¢iine case. u_ :: 9riot distribution comprised of the aggregate
of U.S. solid rocket cxpei:i:_: .t,:c.2in launch vehicles, and ":pd:_,ted that prior with actual Shuttle flight
expmencc, discounting tl_ ;'.!;_:'_: 51-L SP,.E fa.;lure. The: _,r!;t ._e.nsLtiv]ty case (Sensitivityl) used the
same prior distribution, b i--¢!._lded the: STS .51-1. fa.ilr_'_ i:a the. update data. The second sensitivity
case (Sensitivity2) used z:t: _:i_ior dist_bufion and cMcu] __:._:dt±.e f#dur_ frequemoy distribution directly
from the operational expel _;:rce of one fallure in or, e-h'-_t_d-ten 0R)SRB-Iaunches. The third
sensitivity case (Sensitiv]:: '7::)used no p,dor and c_,lcut,a:_:_ the RSRB failure frequency distribution
based on no (0) failurea i2:: ::;_:_.,hundred-.nine (R)SI_Y3-V, :Lt_c:hes. "ftm nomenclature (R)$RB refers to the
combination of SRB and ii !]?.L_.experience.
As of the time of the GMi, ::._ ._lxtdy, them had been twer_'._;-:[_ve STS launches, or fifty SRB exposures.
The Galileo risk estimate :':_+ based on the inclusion of _b,_ e_:l_erience of six successful. Shuttle flights
prior to the Galileo missi,: : 7,%is was appropriam for r_,_;" _:.staatation based on the existing launch
schedule. If there had be._: _:z.J:ailum in one of those six -ni,.;siot_s, the assessment would have been
revised to reflect the true : :'?;_:_rience up to Galileo taunc.Ja r:Lm*...The total SRB exposures used in the
Galileo study and Galilec. _:'-:_Jr_texmediate analysis of ?,_is ,_t_dy is therefore 62 SRB-latmehes. The
current study ineorporate.._: ::::_,:rzdona2 data through ST5'_-..';6, fifty-f'tve Shuttle launches. The total
exposure is therefore 109 :!t_,-!.aunches (discounting th _;Y._TS51-L failure), or i 10 SRB-lamaches if t.r _
failure is counted. It shot:.' :! L',-:.:no_] that the SensitiviE'2 c_e di_cotmts the STS 51-I., failure both as_,_lll
failure arm as an exposing: The Galileo study retained _h,: 51-L failure as art exposure in calculating the
failure frequency distrib_:. :;:,,,,_,xad this _pparent oversig'_.._ was ;_tained in the Galileo-era results
calculated for this study (i '_ tde. 3). For the Galileo stt_'.,._, fhe magmtud_ of the difference (at tim system
level) was appmximamly :!_:{:.not significant when eo_L:_rzd i:o. the overall size of the certainty interval.
In the current study the _:_:::i _fitude of floe difference is ,.7::.taler2%.
The failure freqtmncies fc: ,t_._;SensitivityX and Sen._iti_4_:2 c_.se, s, and for the surrogate solid rockets
used in the prior, were cog.: :_::_ted as discussed in the sut'.:_qur:nt Treatmem of Demand Related Failures
section of this report.
t'Note: The mathematical _:::r_ressions presented in the b,Ay of th£_ report are i_tended to allow the
interested reader to follow :_:r',5verify the major cflcula.'.!ons, U.awieldy or extensive caleulatiom
required to completely re._:_:,-.ate this study are presen_ i r_the appendices. The mathematical
expressions used here and _:!a;r_ughout the body of tb_ z_::port ,lse verbose variable names and
mathematical operators a:: _it,'_y would appear in eomput':r l:,rc_ram or spreadsheet. This convention was
selected largely as a re.s_t ,_' _hc difficulty experienced :',epl:_:luchag the Galileo study results, which
was in part due to non-st_.; 'ned (or different standard) ,'__zd:|emar.ical nomenclature. The convention
used here sacrifices a litfl_ :.:. _.-adability, but ensures t_t d'te resets cart be easily replicated.
Mathematical functions a ,:! ,::o_nvenrions are from Mica-,,.,_,:.,:':tE_CEL ru v4.0 and are shown in
Boldface.)
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Treatment nf Demand Related Failures (SRBs and SSME Start Failures):
I. The means of the failure frequency distributions were set equal to the maximum likelihood
estimator (MLE).
_:.akN = lvtI.,E = Failures / Exposures
1.a.In the RSRB Sensitivity3 case there were no failuw, s. Given the experience base for this study,
it was felt that a moan based oft the assumption of one-third (1/3) of a failure was justified.
Specifically, since the exposure accumulated by the SRB to date (110 SRB-launehes) is well within
the range of mean trials to failure (mtff) predicted by the surrogate expea'ioncc, art assumed mean is
both justifiable more informative than basing a distribution
Appendix E contains a lengthy justification for this assumption.
2. The fffth-percentiIe (LOWER) and ninety-fifth-percentile COPPER) of the distribution for
demand rclate, d fai.lurc frequencies wcrv calculated in terms of the F distribution.
LOWER = (Failures*(FINV(0.95,2*Pailures, 2*Exposurcs-2*Failure,s+2)) /
Failttms*(l_'lNV(0.95,2*Failures, 2*Exposures- 2*FaiIures+2))+(Exposures-Failurvs+l))
UPPER =((Failures+ 1)* (FINV(O.05,2*Failure.s+2, 2*Exposures-2*Failures) /
(Failures+ I)* (FINV(0.052*Failur_÷2, 2*Exposures-2*Fails))+(Exposures-Failures)))
(FINV is the inverse F distr/bution function with arguments "percenti]e", "numerator degrees of
freedom", and "denominator dcgrr, cs of freedom".)
2.a.For the zero failure case (Se.nsifivity3), the F distribution LOWER is 0.00, however, when the
distribution is converted to a lognormat (Step 6 below), the relationship between the MEAN and the
UPPER arc used to set a lower boundary on the distribution.
3. The MEDIAN of the distribution was found. (This calculation is tedious, See Appendix C.)
4. The lognormal error factor (EF) is found.
EF = UPPER / MI_IAN
5. The distribution was converted to a lognormal, preserving the MEAN and EF.
see Appendix¢.
6. For the surrogate distributions contributing to the prior, the resulting distributions were tl_n
aggregated using CARP TM (Comput_rizr_ Aggregation of Reliability Parameters) or CARP2 TM.
See Appendix C for a discussion of the aggregation process.
7. The aggregate prior distribution is convea'tod to a lognormal, preserving its mean and median.
8. The converted (lognormaD prior updated with the flight exposure data using Baycs' theorvm as
follows (sc¢ Appendix C for detailed derivation of tim mathematics involved):
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8.a.The (failure-o_idll _]-:::)prior is conver_l to a -.,,.,.,,<lisuibution preserving me mean (M) and
tim variance(V'). The: :I _;._ :_armneters n o and x 0 aT_ obmi_a_,_d.
nO=(M*(I-M'I "_:-I
xO=M ^2*(l-F[ "V.M
8.b.The mean (M') ar r,_ance (V')of the Bay_ :t:,.s,.e_mrare ealculate_based on fobserved
failuresinN new den_ _ '(J.$.
M' _- (x 0 + f') / (n(_
V' = ((x0 + f) * (rJl
9. The Bayesian pos::
complimentary. The _
EF = EXP(I.6"44fi
Note: The ctuantity 1__.!
rO
• N - r.0 - f)) ! ((no + _,_j .... : (3_0t" N + I))
,.i:,rdL_tributionis:[ogn.oxan_l_Lc_ theBeta and lognorrnaldistributionsare
,!_::_ormal error factor of flae F a,,,-e.sia:,a posterior is determined:
: ,:: !!;QRT(LIN(fV,/M_2) + ,..),,
....L, .. is z value (nuraber ::,:i;:A.anda.txl deviations) at the 95th percentile.
At several places in this pt _:_::_'ss.a conversion is made :_"om "rnw" distributions of failure frequencies to
lognormal distributions. 'f trese conversions are done m !'_,::iii,,_.te calculations, and conversion to a
lognormal distribution w_ :t,:ed both for ease of caletfl:- :.;.,_rt_n.C!because the lognormal has long been
accepted as well suited to, _'.:.:_r;_cteriz2ng failur_ rate. (f_i ;o:_': frequency) distributions. In all case, s, this
study uses the default cot:" ::rdons of the Computerize_ '.S_ggt_'..e.:._lionof Reliability Parameters
(CARP TM) aggregation a:...r_'_3._yn...sianupdate algorithm._., which have been developed and used
extensively in Probabilisl2 : -7.isk Assessments for a. wide_ ,,_trie, ty of applications.
The process used here w_! :lesigned to presto're the me_._ _nd rJm relationship between the mean and the
worst-ease (ninety-frith F". r::','.mJ.Ie) value in the original 5_i_r:dbution as much as possible. It is believed
that the Galileo study rest:' ::; _iffer from the Galfleo..er:: .i:_terLm results of this study largely because a
slightly dLfferem process., .t:,:;igned to preserve both of _,_ cxrJ'eme valuea (fifth and ninety-fifth
percentiles) was used in tt-_; :_:l:ady. As noted in Appem!L_: H, the disadvantage of that process is that the
centraL tendencies of the o-T.nal distributions are lost. '3:: 9t_serving the means, "natural" and
"expected" relationships 1-,;!::,.,_.on point value calcutati_ :t_:using the mean values of the distributions are
preserved. For example, ::!:,_.:_nean of art aggregate, dist::'i tindon is the average of the means. This result
does not hold true if the nt ::::t-_is not preserved in convc:_ing distributions.
The exception to the rule : !' Fret, erring the mean and thr: v_lationship between the mean and worst-case
values is in aggregation. ""_'_c raw distribution resulting. :.'Trc_m_.ggregation is generally irregular and may
be multi-modal. (In eont_ :_ ,. _.he ott_er "raw" distributi_,_.'; wtdch are convermd tend look like the
tognormal, right skewed, I ,: trod by zero, and long-tai/_! _.)]g. t_e mean and 95th percentile are used m
convert an aggregate distt: !:,: _ion, the information in rh:: c,her tail of that distribution may be tmfairly
discounted. Since the put;', : .';_ of aggregation is to rem:::t a readily-used distribution which accurately
reflects the experience of t:' _. set: of aggregated surrogat:.' _:_:_ _. class, and since the raw aggregate may
not look as much like a It. if c.r',._aI as, the o_her distribut? :_._.,_bei_xg converted, it is impor_t that both
rain I_ equally repmsentc :i i:. the converted aggregate. 5L_!:r_buti.on. For this mason the raw aggregate
distributions are eonvem,.: i:.:,:_:serving the mean and m_,5i an of the distribution, the median being the '_,_
midpoint between the two :_:rz_.mes.
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The Solid Rocket Booster Surrogate Prior:
The surrogatedataused togeneratethepriordistributionforthe Gcditeostudy isshown inTable 5
below. A homogeneity analysiswas performed forthe Galileostudy todetermine whether a betterprior
could bc arrivedatparamctricaUy,based on thereliabilityof the surrogam systems with respectto
diameter,length,and thrust.No statisticallymeanin_ relationshipbetween theseparameters was
found,so a simple aggregateof thesurrogatefailurefrequency distributionswas used tocream the prior.
A more detailedparametricanalysisofsolidrocketmotors was subsequently performed atBrookhavcn
National Laboratory ("NASA ReliabilityDatabase and SRB FailureProbabilityAssessment") [7].This
analysisdid findweak but statisticallysignificantcorrelationbetween length,diameter,average thrust
and failurefrequency,but did not providea statisticallyusefulrelationshipwhich might have improved
on theaggregate priordistribution.Rcfexcnce7 alsoshowed that,for the data they had,therewas no
significantcorrelationbetween burn time and failureprobability,indicatingthata demand-r_lated,
ratherthan time-relatedapproach was appropriatefor SRBs.
Table $: A_-t:_ation of RSRB Surro_ams
U.S. Solid Rocket Motor Experience prior to August, t988
5(h% 20_% 1 5Orb%
Castor. 2 failures in 1640 flights (No sofzgoods in design)
Star:. 9 failures m 1887 flights (No softsooeL5 m design)
Star _ 2.36E-03 3.21E-03 I 4.43F,AY3
Minuteman: 12 failures in 806 flights (Softgoods in design)
Minuteman [ 832E-03 1.08E-02 I 1.41E-02
Poseidon I Trid_C 4 failttms in 380 fllgllts (No soRgoocls in design)
Poseidon / Trident [ 3.10E-4}3
Titan: I failure in 52 flights (SoRgoo_ in design)
Titan [ 2.65E-04
Aggregate SRB Prior 3.03E-04
5,11E-03
8.01E-(M
[ 8.64E-03
I 2.55E-03
f 5.08E-03
Mean
t 1_2E-03
I 4.77E-03
I 1.49E-02
I 1,05E-02
I 6.58t/-03
[ 7,59E-03
80th%
1.72E-03
6.12E-03
1.86E-02
1.46E-02
8.13E-03
95th%
3.84E-03
8,33E-03
2.40E-02
2ALE-02
2A6E-02
2.11E-02
The data inTable 5 are presentedgraphicallyinFigure 3 below, along with the 1993 RSRB failure
frequency disu'ibulionsfor the baseline and various sensitivity cases. Note that as the mean value and
uncertainty of tim distribution associated with tim RSRB (in particular, SensRivity3) arc reduced due to
failurefreeflights,the probabilitythatthe Minuteman missileisin the same statisticalpopulationas the
RSRB decreases.This factissignifr,,antbecause the Minuteman distributiondrivestheaggregate
distribution mean down, and increases the uncertainty associated with the aggregate prior dislzibufion.
Currently we include _ Minuteman experience with the other surrogate solids because them is no
compelLing engin_ring or statistical mason to believe that the Minuteman is a less appropriate surrogate
than any of the other solid surrogates. If them were a su'ong statistical justification for removing the
Minuteman experience from the set of RSRB surrogates, both the mean and uncertainty associated with
the RSRB prior would be significantly reduced. Determining how many failure frc¢ flights of the
RSRBs am required to ensure that Minuteman missiles am not a valid indicator of RSRB performance,
then assessing the effect of that knowledge on our understanding of STS catastrophic failure and
relative contribution of RSRB risk versus SSME risk, is recommended for further analysis.
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Hgare 3: FaJ:- r:'_ Frequency Distributions _'t_r the RSRB and Surrogale..s.
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RSRB and $i.!'r.'._,_a't_,,_
Failure Freq,Jen_:' !i!!:i:_butto.,
l'Jot_ *J_at line Minutarnlan
•_;,lrr_cJ_is May not be Indi,_tlive
of _ _RB PopulalJon Givm'1 ,,
r:_ _-ora _:.SRB Successes
,1, , I 1 _ ',
Space Shuttle Main Engim:, ,:;_i:;'_qMF_)
The SSME is a contirmousl? _ ,cdving yystem. To date, th::r_: have been four major implementations of
the SSME: the current, Phas,: !_ er_gine., used on STS-26 _: _:ts't_sequent flights; the Phase I engine, used
on flights 6 through 25; the _:;.._ P_lanned Orbital Flight (_",'ii,:3F') engine, used on flight 1 through 5; and
the Pre-FMOF engine, whic!: :,_::_,never flown. The test e:: :po:;u;_ of all engine configurations is used,
and major failures that have r ,:,:_rred are examined on a c_,_;e-by-case basis to determine whether that
failure would have occurred: __._<:trP.sulted in catastrophic c__rn_ge, _n a current flight (operational)
system. The Pre-FMOF engi ::; is considered sufficiently _;.if_._nt from the liter versions of the SSME
that no Pre-FMOF failures a; ._'.t:sc:d to d_tcrmine the ,._S_....I_;.._,flt_.... frequency prior distribution
SSME catastrophic failmes ;_.':: ¢::::)tLsidered in two groups, :!_t.rl:-Ul:, failure.s and m_in._tagc failta'es, Start-
up failures are those which _ _i:ee.-.:to be. demand-related, z:_d mainstage failures are time-related. The
SSME failure history follow: _:; well-known "bathtub cur',e' of i_ffant mortality, random failure, and
wearout, but the existing S$:1 'i:i__t.'st program appears _o be: doing an adequate job of preventing infant
mortality or ",vearout failum_ i;. :gperational engines. Spe_:;:-tll:_,, ,.he "Green Run" program appears to
weed out i.rffant mortality fa!:_: "_:.sbefore operational e:cpo.'._._r_:, or_d the "Fleet Leader" program
identit"tes wearout failure mc,_:-:_; _.nd at:erupts to ermtm-, the, _.,_:?e'.r,_.tional components are not exposed in
the wearout regime. SSME i_: b tt:es are. thP.refore treated _'" razdora events, and the associated failure
frequencies (per start for su_' _;:_f_lure_, :per second of n_:t r._me :f,_r mainstago) are treated as constants.
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SSME Exposure:
The test exposure of the engines is listed below in Table 6.
Table 6: SSME Test Exposure
" (_onfigurati "Engine on
I
Pre FMOF
Ground Test
Seconds
II I
64,359
:MOF 38,764
• hase I
Phase II (Galileo,Study 1
Galileo Study Total
Phase II (since Galileo Study)
98,191
92,934
2941248
190,702 _
I
Number of
Starts
ii
I
789
471 *
i
............... i
• Excludes tests terminated in less than 4 seconds.
Total [ , 4.84..950 . I i260
The exclusion of lest starts where the test was terminated in less than 4 seconds was to ensure that only
those tests which exposed the engine to the full start-up cycle were included in the count of ata_
exposures. In most cases the short terminations were the resuh of a test-relat_ed problem or error. In no
case was a catastrophic or potentially catastrophic failure excluded by rhiF Edter.
SSME Failures:
There have been no catastropldv fa.ilut_ of aa in-flight SSM]_, although one major incident on the
eleventh mission (STS-41C) could have resulted in a catastrophic faiIum ff a programmed normal
shutdown of the SSME had not occurred in time to prevent it. All catastrophic SSME failures to date
have occurred daring testing. To determine the c_tastrophic failure frequency of the $SME, a prior
failme tYequcncy distribution was generated based on the SSME rest performance, then updated with the
operational experience of the Shuttle. Like the RSR3s, only catastrophic (uncontained) failures, or
those failures which could have led to catastropkic failing ate included in the count of failures.
At the time of the Galileo study there had been 37 test and flight failure events, of which 3 were
ultimately considered to be applicable to in-fright failure frequency determination:
During test 750-160 on 12 February 1982, a blockage of the fuel supply as a result of ice
formation occurred during start-up. Both high pressure turbines, the hot gas manifold (HGM),
the main injector, the main combustion chamber (MCC), and the nozzle were burned as a resulL
This failure could recur in flight, but only during starmp.
During the eleventh flight (STS-41C) on 3 February I984, the augmented spark ignitor (AS1")
chamber experienced erosion due to a drill chip lodged in an ASI orifice. The engine was cut
off by pre-programmed command at the nominal Main Engine Cutoff before the failure could
propagate. An A$I fuel filter was subsequently added to the supply line, so the probability of
recurrence of the incidemh and of i_ becoming catastrophic, is diminished but still not zero.
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During test 902-4;: :', :_n l July 1987 a crack in th__,,:,:ddi_zr pre-burner (OPB) intcrpropellant
plam resulted in t_.:,, i'crmatioa and buildup of ice... I',/ock_g the fuel supply, which altered the
OPB exhaust flow _ _:_.ribution _ad burned throt-_:b the liner causing faceplatc erosion and high
pressure oxidizer t': :!:.,3,.-pump (I-]POTP) turbine ,_:n,5 dz,z,aage. The failure was caused by creeks
in the interprope[i_ ' : i:_late_t_-element braze joi.r_._s. '1"he cracks allowed propellant mixing and
caused ice contami : ':;rion to tbrm in the _e] ma-:_hfl4. "/'he failure was determined to be the
result of poor bra_r_ c:__nlsran.tie du6mg ma_x_t;-_(', .l_.._..
Since the Galileo study tl:_ :' z._ have been three additiona_ !_l_jor incidents, of which one is considered to
be applicable to in-flight f': ' :_._:',.:frequency determinauc_::. The complete text of these incidents is
included in Appendix F.
--- During test 902-4:' o_. 2 June 1989 an. in_rnaJ _:,re.'ssure restraint in one of the flex joints in the
I.,Pt"l F discharge ::_:::i f_dled, releasing a half pc_Tz.'j bal.t into the flow which ruptured the nickel
plating of the duc_, ,: _._'.,;ing _t fire'. Thi._ failure i ,: c¢_m_;d _ an applicable failure event.
During test 904-0'i ::i _r, 23 June 1989 a HPOTP :'err:._ang gaffed during a 109% rated power level
(1LPL) extended d,: ....,:ioo burn.. "Vh_s f_.il_e is n_ _:.::_:_u:,a_:e.dbecause it occurred afmr 1270
seconds of contim:. _: :: operation and at 109% R_: L.
During test 901-6f): _t_ 24 hfly _991 a secoztd s: )._:,_turbine blade in the HPFIF failed
(disassembled) at : ::,:;!seconds into the test and i!,::_rs_._an I00% RPL. This failure is not counted
because the root c_ ::_.:: (internal microshri_.age :_e-r:)sity allowed hydrogen embrittlement insid
the blade) is age n: !':'.'t::d and the HPFTP blades ", ,_:re "fleet leaders" and had accumulated 61 _
starts and 25,143 t ::::ends of exposure, well bey_ n,:l th_ limits aliowed for flight components.
To compute the prior faih_ '_ frequency distributions ba_.-_1,3n this test data, the start-up incident was
treare..d as a demand relate, i ?._ilure and the remainlug fz_.'_.a_:_-_were treated as time-minted random
failures _.WIainstage failu_! :(. q_ae two M,in_.,age fai/ur_,':._that were counte.xt in the Galileo study were
treated parametrically, ba'.__:it :_n the conditional prohab:.t_ty of a c_ttastruphie (loss of the Shuttle)
accideut given that the fai! .',_..l.'vadoccurred. This tre_':_ e:,x-tis described in the Galileo study as follows:
"The two Mainstali _: (?bases i and 2) OPIq. f_Iv:: :,:_iderntiIied as major incidents ... were tmamd
as follows. The u;: _::tr_tin condirionaI probabili;/,.:,17 the', _eurrence in flight of each incident
resulting in a cats:: :__phic failure was assigned ?. _trame_tc values of 0, 0.5, and 1.0, giving rise to
an effective aural:,,:_: .:,_ catastrophic failures of C 1, and :2, respectively .... A Poisson
distribution was d_ ::_-rr.nined for each ease."
"The l/nee cases bl _: :n:._,_ the expert judgment t.._.t the t_vo oxygen preburner failure.s during
tests could have bt:::::: :::n_,strophic if they [tad oc.'-:v._:rexlduring flight; i.e., they bounded the
modeling uneertai.:: _.', _'or the Main.stage eatastrclpb;c f,'_ilam probability."
"The three distrib=; _.,,:_were thc:n aggregated inio an a',zerage distribution assuming that each
case was equally t.:i'-_:_]_;to be true." [1]
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Thetestfailures (including the potentiaI faiture on STS-41C) were combined with the test exposure to
generate prior distributions which were then updated using Bayes' Theorem with the actual flight
experience. The start-up failure frequency distribution was t_eamd as an on-demand failure, using ±e
process described earlier. The mainstage failures were treated as time-t_lated using the process
described in detail below:
Treatment of Time Related Failures (SSME Maitt_ta_e Failures):
1. The two Malnstage failures from the Galileo study were combined with the new Main_age
failure using the aggregation method from the Galileo study. The conditional probability of
cara_tropMc Shuttle failure given tim new Mnin_tage failure (the LPF duct failum) was
conservativelysetto I. This resultedinaggregatingthreedistributionsbased on 1 failure,2 failures,
and 3 failures,vicethe 0, I,and 2 failuresof theearlierstudy. The accumulated testtime used was
484,932 seconds.
2. The threedistributions(correspondingto I,2, and 3 failuresin484,932 seconds) were
determined assuming thatfailuresoccurredfollowing a Poisson processwith a constantfailurerote
X.
2a. The mean, fffth-pcrcentile (LOWER), and ninety-fifth-percentile (UPPER) of the distributions
for time-related failure frequencies were calculated in terms of the Chi-square distribution.
MEAN = Failures / Exposure
LOWER = CH ! INV(0.95o 2*Failures) / (2*Exposure)
UPPER = CHIINV(0.05, 2*Failures + 2) / (2*F_xposure)
CHIINV isthe inverseChi-Square distribution,with the parameters "percentile',"degreesof
freedom".
The derivationof theseequationsinprovided in Appendices B and C.
3. The resultingdistributionswere convertedto Iognormal, preservingthe mean and errorfactor
(seeAppendix C).
Other risk contributors:
Them were no significant new data source_ or other indications that th_ failu_ frequency distributions
calculated for the Orbiter, External Tank, and Prelaunch in the Galileo study required recalculation. For
the sake of uniformity a Bayesian u[_date of these distributions was performed using the Munch
experience to dam, although this updam had little effect on the STS system level failure frequency
distributions.
Combining risk contributors:
The failure frequency distributions for the major risk contributors were combined to produce the overall
STS failure frequency distribution using a Monte-Carlo type simulation. A commercially available
simulation tool, Crystal BaLlTM by Decisioneering, was Used to perform the simulations within the same
ExcelTM spreadsheetenvironment thatwas used forthe othercalculationsin thisstudy. The starting
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failurefrequency distribu,'.i.'.:1,_foreach of the riskclemcat.,;(R,:qR_B,SSMIL Orhimr, El',Prelaunch) _
were convertedto l.ognon1___>facilizatesampling frorc%: dJsuribution.The actualsampling technique
used was theLatin-Hyperc :'_:,._zs itw_ found thattbd.sr;ckaique modeled the tailsof the distributions
more accuratelythan Mor_l_.C.__r!osampling. Appendix. !!!;,.Jescribesthe differencesbetween Monte-
Carlo and Latin-Hypereu_'_ ._:-'.ml.11in_. "r%e simulalJ.on r,. <:.c_:.tis de,scribed below:
a reliability value - " '""squ,: _, .;t. The resuiting RSI_33 __'_-) reliability was then converted back to a
failure frequency. In :T.:_.!it_ulation these calcutatic,_ s ,_0'e:_:--:repeated for each sampled value from
the input failure frequ.': :'__y"J_stribufions:
RSR B - E"XP(-SP,;I :: ?._ilure Frequency)
(Probability of no SR]!I ?:_lure)
RSRB-Pair = RSp,t;I * ]:LSRB
(ProbabiLity that nei_,_-..::?,.B will fail)
SRB (Pair) Vai/u_ :':.:quencv = -LN(RRsR.B.p_ _.!r
(Frequency of SRB f,_.i .,__ i.n flight)
2. The failure freque_ ...... 5._stribur2on for the SSME_- _t:_ctSS):IE Cluster were found by ra_r_ing a
simulation in which tt_:, _t_:.de.tedfailure-on-demand (:i;l_tr,t) at:._d(updated) time-related-fai.lttt_
(lVlainstage) frequenci,'.,'., were sampled. The sarnple: _fn_quencies were converted to rt-.ilnhi.li, ty
values. The reliabilit3, , _ft._e-,_were combined (muttS: _i.ied) ._.sindicated; and the corresponding
failurefrequency calcu!;_ _:,d.
RStar t - EXP(-St_:" !_flure Frequency)
(Probability of no eamr ::_c!phic SSME failure at sta_.,:.p)
RMainstag e = EXI: :i,l,,._:_instage Failure Frequerr.y * 5:29 seconds)
(Probability of no caut_ ,'_phic SSME failure durin_ ,', ....
RSISME = RStart_ !;']!_nsta_e
(Probabilityof no car_t__:_,h_c S_,_IE failure)
SSME Failure Freq ::-;ttc.y= -LN(RssME)
(Frequency of catasla'c"!_ic.SSME failures(per SS/,:".E-.f'tight)
RSSME Cluster= I;,.ii,,,!:_iE^3
SSME ClusterFai.!"::_if'requency= -LN(RssIv _, Cl'__..r)
e. ,.3. The updated failur:.!requenciest'oreach of the.r:.-&elements were then converted toreliability
values and combined :::_ifiplied)toproduce the ST::!.,:atastrophicreliability.STS Reliabilitywas
converted back intoa f_i_,_"efrequency As above, t.t,e::_ecak'.ulat/onswere performed foreach setof
samples from the inpt;::'"'_ilm-efr_:quencydistri.bt_ti.c;:_,
RSTS = RSRB (P:-.' :_RSSME (Cluster)" Rch-'i_i!:_r_'RET * Rprelaunch
STS Failure Frequ,! ':;i'7= -LN('RSTS)
4. The resultant (STS ii_.:_:.,re frequency) distributi.-:_.;; _uere not converted to lognorrnal since no
further ca/culations w!! ii:,_!?I_:edi,_d_bu_-_._0n.._s._wa_.s__!'!!!!_!,!e.a"
Combining Failur' '..'_"requendes from the R_is:: Fh_.ments., The Simulation Mode/
The failure freque:_ :' .' ?-:_rthe RSRB pair w_-_ fo_::.! by converting tim RSRB failure frequency to,
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Mathematical Tools and Methods:
ALl of the calculations in this study Were performed widdn die_amcwork of a protoq,'pe Space Systems
Data Workstation (SSDW TM) being developed for NASA by SAIC. The calculation of prior
distributions, the aggregation of distributions, and Bayesian upa_rlag were performed using CARP2 TM a
prototype version of SAIC's CA.RF TM (Computerized Aggregation of Rcliability Parameters) which was
developed for use within the SSDW TM envirunmenL The core mathematical engine was Microsoft
Excel version 4.0 with a variety of enhancements (add-in functions) developed for the SSDW TM.
Decisioneering's Crystal Bail TM, a commercial (off-the-shelf) simulation tool for use within ExceI TM was
also used extensively. @Risk TM. an alternative simulation product from Palisades Software was used to
ensure that no systematic errors were introduced by the use of Crystal Ball TM. Appendix A contaln._ an
annotated copy of the spreadsheet in which all of the core calculations for this study were performed.
The simulations used throughout this study used 20,000 trials. This number of trials was found to be
sufficient to ensure convergence at the mils of the resultant (forecast) distributions. Specifically, it was
found that 20,000 trials was sufficient to kccp the standard deviation of the 5th and 95th percentiles to
less than 5% when performing multiple runs using the same input data and different random number
generating "seeds".
Conclusion:
The principal conclusions of this study are: (1) 2"1¢ Space Shuttle today is demons=ably as reliable as
any other hunch vehicle, and under the reasonable assumptions of this study, more reliable than any
other. (2) The Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) test program has had a significant positive impact on
the reLiability and crew safety of tlm Shuttle. (3) The Redesigned Solid Rocket Booster (RSRB) is the
most significant contributor to the e,stim_red residual risk of catastrophic failure to the Shuttle among
the major elements consid=red in this study (RSRB, SSME, External Tank (ET), Orbiter, and
Prelaunch), since the only opportunity to demonstrate reliability improvement in the RSRB is through
flightc,xpeficacc.
Comnarison of STS Catastronhie Reliability with Other Launch Svsmms:
The scope of this analysis was m determine the catastrophic failure probabil/ty of the Shuttle system
during prelaunch, launch, and ascenL _ this is not the same as mission reliability (the probability
of successfully completing the mission), it is essentially equal to the probability of either completing the
mission or returning the payload intact for another launch. The unique ability of the Shuttle to return a
payload means that, for most purposes, the catastrophic failure probability is the correct value to
compare with the mission reliability of expendable launch vehicles (ELVs). This study concludes that,
at ninety percentcertainty,the currentcatastrophio wh'_bility of the Shuttle is between 0.969 (1/3I) and
0.996 (1/223), with a mean of 0.986 (1/73), and median of 0.989 (1/90). The same quantities, when
calculated based on a simple binomial for 1 failure in 55 launches are: 0.917 (1/12) (Lower) to 0.999
(i/I 11 I) (Upper) with a binomial mean of 0.982 (1/55).
The Shuttle results are compared with other launch v_hieles in Figure 4, based on data in the letter from
P. Rutledgc to W. Frazier of Code QS [9]. The failure data was Used to derive a binomial which was
then fit to a lognormal ELVs with no failures were uIXtaugt using Baycs' theorem as indicated.
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In Figure 4 the top axis s) ;:v.:,; _e number of failures / r(:_r_b,::,' of exposures, and the "as-of" dam for
data. The left-hand axis !)._ws the f_.ilurc frequency, _ r,d l:he :fight-hand axis shows the corresponding
reliability. The Sth porch: :tile, meari, and 95th percen_,'e t_rc shown for each launch vehicle. The first
two entries compare the :!7;_._:tdc rctiabZLiry as analyzed _;a thi_: soady and the Shuttle reliability
determined using the bit.,,: _:t:,._.] -> iognormal convcrsio: based on t failure m 55 launches. The
Pegasus launch vehicle c ._:::.r_bufion reflects a Baye, sia_ ul)da_ using the Minumman missile, the core of
Pegasus. Smcc the Pegc. _ '_' ilxtud¢,_ some new hardw_r,:_ arid must be successfully deployed from a B-
52 prior to engine igniti¢_: 1_i-¢dismbtxfion shown proV.,_hly t_,flccts an oprimi._tic assessment of the
actual uncertainty. The _::_:t)ch vel_.cles are Listed i.lto_.t_._r Of' i_:_crcasing mean failure rate. The Shuttle
has clearly demonstrated _,hi#tcr _tiability than any _'h_.r active, orbital launch system.
It should be noted that re.).i,4:,i]ity grow was not mod.,-:,"ed fcr the mature Munch vehicles in this list, as
that was beyond the SCOl; '. ::' fl_ study. However, a t;_,;'.i.,7_:ch_k of the Delta Iaunch vehich_ using tic
AMSAA (Army Materi_t :?:;stems AnaJysis Agency) _'o*vth model parameters derived in
Reliability Growth [10] _,: ::H.-...a mean reliability of 0.9 ;_-r(ir_st,antaneous failure probability of 0.023 per
launch), based on the 21:! ;_ _nchea as of 2/92. This is _¢ii] wt_ll short of the 0.986 reliability computed
for Shuttle.
Imn_ct of the $SMF. Te_ri,-;_: p_-
The principal source of,:', : v::_,::nstratcd reliability imprc ,emeni. m this study relative to the Galileo-era
results is increased cold'_; ;,: ri,::c in the SSME. Because :_f the r_st program, the SSME has been
accumulating statistic_)_, _;_evant e_:pe, ricnce at the _:,_,_ of 4 or 5 equivalent flights per mission. This
"experiemcc multiplier" h,:¢.; iJl¢ effect of improving cc, r t_._,rtce in the reliability of the SSME much
more quickly than ff the.' !; I'.4E were exposed to faih_: ordy during actual launches. In contrast, the _'_
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engines in an ELV are only exposed during an operational launch, so (like the Shuttle RSRB) the
confidence in their reliability performance builds relatively slowly.
Although the test program has served to improve stadstical.cert_nty in the SSMEs, this is a relatively
minor secondary benefit. The primary benefits of the test program, and its principal objectives, are to
"weed out" infant mortality failures in new components, and to determine what components are subject
to wearout or life limits, and set operational limits well short of the wear-out region. It is because this is
the primary purpose that the SSME test data is not pooled directly with the SSM:E ope_tional
experience for this study -- SSME testing is deliberately more strenuous than the operational
environment.
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Appendix A:
Annotated copy of the spreadsheet "RTGUPDT2.XLS"
All calculations used in this report were perfol'med in this
spreadsheet.
-, A_dix A
prI"GUPD2..X_
4.1161 5.091
U
PRCs usa of an aacmmaltt onlr mleml_ ...... n_ab(e bL_ lll_r input ¢llSldl=;_L__ : d_'ll ,*tj_.ear to m=t_ the data.
Note that llle mean va_u_ are not oveP_,_I_,:..i_lto MLE valu¢_ !or 0 (l/3_r_,'2X .! mnc _'t<_u!ot 229861.
A_gr _r_r _PRC t_ _1 I
.. ,,,, :..,._.i
1.50_i<:!;I
I
_10E-06
9.57_ '!;.cE_
._y___:,:_:_=.'.!.... ...
_. 10.=.05
ZTOE-05
t. 10E-0$
j I
:el _11
tO._l _._
4.1SI ¢33
5.24 30.4_
8.3_ 8.34PRC,-CARPA_glt, prmr t 3"201_i":Y_'_ 9.P.A_-D7 ' __trJ_-,.o6 6.1:!:;i._.,:_.'._ 7.90E-06 _2_0S
NOTS: It ts not ¢Iear how PRC Ilcc¢_]! ,,:.-!=_.rhmra_cLr_j_t_n'-_ut it"d_lt_'_; :i "i;_'i._i_,2=i__-''tro_ _e GARP Iiq_Fl_lllt_l.
do_s not match the average of !_,: ,' ;_;..':_;._of _o _]C_m_a_e_ aistn_r_ ...............
........ .L .L__ ....................
K,=0{0|n;_2_16"ltf_ I Z4_E ::'il_ | 3.74S-07 t"_'_'_,_'#.':-:;i_i"T .... S.61E-06 t 15.001 15.0_
r _o=o_...II ................... l "_ i _;i_i_ "_"l;;:_,__,_ I I
K= (1 In229861s) j 7.48_i._::._ I 1.12.E-06 I 43_1_:_; J I 1.eg_--05 t 15.001 14.97'
( _outof,..)1 .........I -- i'7"Ei_i_'"i::_7_"_se;J ii 'I '
__._'_._,_ .=r_. = _ _ F_: ..!!:i,_ _a_d_,®, 9_,_ L_j__! _..!!!:_!.::m___m_ _" _. I
mo Ba.ymn Po_om= ero _ by,: _ !_! !lE_nIt_ PHoto wi_ 0 tailu_ m _R ::,,,':,__cc_'_L_ (30 flk:Jht=) l I I
p_ min,,1_Z,,.pd==_ _ i_:i_ " ----7'----_I ...........'I"-- I II I '
C___.,__ c_' ,_-o,_._, K.__: ii::.'iii_._'_ ,,_=,._ I ........ .-i ..... t "t . t
Illigll _
RT_LrPt)2._L8
Detemnmtng ,SSME hilum/rn_oncv i P I 1 _ I
Thm a_Em_ur_ons am fo_n0 usmq lathl-hyp,erc_be mmuts_on (20.000 ldaJs) solvir_, lot _ne following, for lam0_a (SSME):
20.000 tdals was Iouna m bo st,1_ont to recttmDtho smnctara ¢_=Maban Of the 9St_ oercsm_o on muttioiB mrs to < 10%
All irmut disail:vl_or=.s were convened to lognorm= p;osennn(j moan ar_ error _ctor.
S.qME (Cluoler_ m -_rt(Rdumter_
SSME. -_n_Rm_ 1
Roluster ==Rmmm'Rmmm'Rmrrm
Rm,, R=t_
Ran: e'_-,.q_lrt_ t q
S_sE-¢3 i
I#1
Rmaln=mq.- _-Msln=age'c.mmm=9=
I
Fiat tho 0eat appro_on of PRC In_,_l= I can determm_
Means _)emw am ¢W=uJatsd ,_mct_f. meomn. S_, 95th an= Imm =dmulatior¢
SlautPRC 4.0_--04 r 7.,9E.O4 i 1.471E.O3 t 2.01E-O3 ?_BSE-03 I 3.(_M lnstago PRC 5.40E-08 .60E.08 i 3.70 -06 1.10E-05 6.88LmlJnsm .=mPRC I _ 440
Note: it was neemma_ to usa 440 seconds vioe _20 seaonclS to mee¢ PRCs final SSME (C_uster_ mesh usin? their failure mm
It w_s aJr,o rmoess_r_ to use an error t_¢l:or 04 29.6 _mecbim/Sbl_ vit:= 8.88 _5b'I/WtEK_anl to qst c_osa to PRC ta_
 s-n PRC t" PRC I 0. S0 I
Rrn-instsgo PRC _--e_'-Mainstago PRC'I/namsla_e PR_ 0.9984 1R==r,e _RC J- _ J=_C'R..msmqo _ I o.ll_4
;R<:_uster PFIC !,, _ PRC'Rssme PRC'Rssms PR 0.9891 I
SSME PRC P-74E-04 a.SaE.O4 2.10E.O3 3._1C-.03 ¢.3._E.¢3 g._E.03 I 4._
SSME fClust_ PRC 8.21E-O4 2.SSE-03 6.31E-03 1.0gE-02 1..50E-02 2.aTE-02 I 4.ES
ntPd ( 1 om or,.. 1218 877 1S8 G_ 77 35
v=¢..e
SSME (_,__.-__.PIN=Ta,m_ U_=-04 P_mE-03 _._;C---03 _.09E--O7. _.SaE.02 3_S_E-02 e.sa
ran:t( 1 ouz_ .. 1200 468 l"n _ e4 • 26
Start CARP 1.96G.05 7.34C-,,.0_ 2.9_-.,04. 1.'t3G..03 'L17E.03 4.3gE.4_ ] 14.96t
J_e CAI=fi=I _(_E-08 8.11E-07 2.54_--06 9.7_=-06 1 1g.081
Rme.in_o CARP ,, e_-Idainmqo CARPt.,_ C. 0.9987
I:is_no CARP • Palm1 GARP'1:lmmnsmqe CARP 0.9976 I
Rdumor CARP = P.mme GARP'I=._me CARP'Rssrno0 0.g926 (
SSME CARP 9.04E.05 3.34G-04 9.6"7E-04 I 2.46E-03 2._E-03 8.81E-03 I _.11
--E (C[=n CARP _4GE-04 0.48G-04 2.84E-03 j 7.38E-03 EL= 2.8_=.O2 i 9.37mft_ _ 1 out ol .. 4O_S 10_ _2 1:36 120 38PRC "Target' vldu_
4m J e4 m I
9
iSSME dodvat_n _,;.:-,_;_ Them w_ msu_em infomudo_ in the PRC report to reptiea_ _eir lindinc,le_ in qonemJ.
the centni! tsmder_im= _mmm & median) of file _isl_bulkxls _ed by PRC were not _tc_c_m ol Ina m ikidihood
The SSME ('oiusm'_ CARP dL_,_.dion above preN,wee =1 PROs inptn e __,__,n_.Ions. but uses stat_ rne_ w_k:h
the mean and an'or factor ot Ifle _lpUl disufl=ulions. I t _ i i l
7.iS8
7.681
7.0_
I_.g6
19.07
10.70
11.41
7.02
I i;........_,]-=Io= o+ .....I
re,p2. I P_7.1+,,Z]2_-J. ,__ Z"ZZTII2E..7 -_ t _95_1
R_ p.cs_,=,,....,-,- ...........-I ,L................. L--..-
I ..........j .. L.-................. !.... t
G=nm_-r.tmm =,_t, em r'E'f'e._+.r_:__L__._...................!.....
_Castor 1,421_,:,,_. I 3ASE..04 7.38E-04 1.2..2+_.-'._,_ I 7_I_-03 3.84C--03
Minuteman 8.321".'i:::I ' 1.08E-O2 1.41E--02 .._I.4._._.._-:¢!j_.... ;!.86-=-02 ?_40E-02
Poeeidccl/Tddent 3.101:'.:.,::! .=5.11E.,33 8.64C--03 , ¢_?-"rl"a ' '1,_6g--02 2.41E-02
Tilam 2.65l.:.::;:,, _.01E.,3+ 2.55E433 _.Et'II;;.G3 :' B,13_.03 2.46E-02
Aqgreq=te 8RB Pmar" ' 3.g3(!:_::. 5.08E-03 7.5_F.'._3 _ 2.11L=-0214.16
ns,m up=m=,_+mgm,,e=.m_.'_i:.,+,+ _ L...
The CARP / SAIC base _ _II tam I_;..,! .+,!_l!_._:.+,"J.p_d_cr.ultl_r_ f_tto a i_:_._:,_nml/ol'_ewincj mean nr¢l em0r lacmr.
PRC_S_B(p,_=_.a_ t a_.':,_ _ rzm_+=_ .-_._i_::?..i_-i- ¢,o_.o_ _! _
Not=- It _srm! clear how PRC_ertorme_r !:' _r 8a_ uL'_ata+=L(¢Jtdora no: :i+_{_,_rsn=_',ad_=_¢ uOdalt_ 11105
Wtth0/62 WOUldylllld 1/303 it UI.-me_,;', ,.l._tyemlmu_zt_ convortm_'__'_t;; i_;:!i_;'[_i',_-r"._.lVmq mun and ,el'o, (actor
is=_o,mtm+ow, j " = i }" - ,,_ .i_.._ " ] I I !
B'I_e_Up¢IPRCP41ilpld01'E)='I_ 1"511T_:::I':::I[['." '--.! _'_'= ] ";':S+++_:.+it...t._. I ==S-m it 0.14 +..+_
,,JL,Jl.,l'<1 out0# .. 11 68+,t ; 81, 1 I+1"+1 + + I_0 II I
....;i7;"..... + ....... ..
m,,.=,= m.., m++ ++=+;::;•+_++.ow+c .m _=_=. _+; +;++;;_. =,=, _.=- = _,_wm,=_+
_O Prlor(p4_ ..... 2.11E-02 4.18t re.T/|
u+e°":'_om"o"<'"+R +-_;:.i::i ii Z] "'___ 1. _iii_i[ i_ _'n'_--= ,,,.',+ 4.16
LNlltolR,_tBPdor<+) I+3"_+:;]++.......... ..J.S.,S71_03 I .7'._Sg.F:.+_;+]}+__. P_IIE-O_ 3.g0 3.1_
_,,,_wnaifftS_t. 98thofp47 3.0_+.:+,i I 2.53_03 t 5.Bl!?..G'II: 2.11E-_ 8_34_ 8.34,
I'.7,,ZZ --7- l Z-Zz'..
I_i.n u_lat_a of Ilqe._t,7A,+On_g_t_!.ii'.i!-_'",-_x_mmml t:.or m I._ +rammer,,+,_+m:t+_m £c. (S, .'-._mivi_l is "+_:IB lailum _
PRC RSRB Sen_/_/y/ 8.0OE:, ;,': &.00B-03 8. 60_i 0'.._ P.40E-02 4.80 8.2.51
RSRB Senmlzviz'yl 2...9,_E,::: 8.58E-03 1.06_ 70,i_'--" 2.4_E.02 2.gl 2.S)1
..... ,,,,,._i_i::::r. __.._ uj_.y.L. __ ..................Rmdo ['/E s g.g5_1!.",01
n,=rb (l_r) ,,,,Rmm.,.:;: =.ao_;.¢.'_
RSRB p_dr) CARP I.B6E:! =:i.........:3.28._._ S.=.81__03_ _.90_._3 _.4,1E.,02 2..8_02 4.1e 4.,17
rrlff_( 1 OUt01'_ )1 64;! 305 / 147 1C_+.- ?*? 35
mm s.,.mm_ l--'_i! ii'.]i;._,,_: + I _m+_:'_i......
,IRraml=' flpallr 1 ,_It'l,o:jtl_l'_ _.=_..rlll'_.. " ' ............ l]:+_ g_+ _" " + *_ ....................... l @.79l!i!01 .
RSRB pair) 8+m#d_.'tyl .C;.ARI=IS.a0G+.:+ + +.92_J,3 .I,.+1.71E"02 L___'_.{::i+_i+.__.2..:.g(_"02 1 4mm.o_.. zm= zst
_o_<,=_+.....,! ,,+.. ,o, j = t _. ..... 3+ 1 =' '
._ _ :_ ....... ___ ......
i., I.,,
$20_
1'.m!!
1.70
2.7g
9.62
16,77
,_m===,==.z=
26.3_1
8.001
URTGUPD2.XL_
t IRewoa._ngPR_--mmrv: .... _:_ • I JI
The numt=ens0e_owem caJc_atl_:lfrom PRC,s flr_.lsvs_m revel dbltlbutions. ¢onver1_gto I.H oresm_ mean and SF,
an_ ¢omptmn,g8TS c_sm_._c=nsas orodu¢_ of retia_tv in =nUauon.
GaJileoBase Repro
RSRB tPatr'_
mrS(1 out of_
SSMS_ch_._,=_PRO
m/_( 1 outof ...
El"
,'.f_ ( I out_ ...
:Oltf,0er
mr,_r I out,_...
=nlllaunch
mmtf I outot ...
C,Jlkm 6ese Repro PRC
rnl_ f I out m ...
Galileo Base Or|olnal
mint _1 out _ ...
7._E-04 1.eoE-0_
1900
8.21E-O4 Z6b'C-._
1218 377
1.2SE-05 3.4aL=-06
8OOOO 9g000
1.0gE.04 _.$9E,,4)4
92O0
2.g41S.04 3,BSE,,.04.
34,100 :26O0
3.48E-03 7.54E-03
287 133
2.86_.O3 5.gSE-03
3S0 168
_60E-0a
278
8.31E-0_
168
t.0OB-04
1O000
3_04
2g00
_2eE-O_
t900
1.32E-02
75
128E-02
78
r
s.,me._ I e.oem._ [ _.72[..02182 124 5_1.0gE,,,O'2_ 1.30E-02 2.87E-02
92 1 77 i 35P..OOE-04 _.8_=-04 1 7.6gE*04
SO00 _ 36O0 f 1300
4.17E-04 _ 6.2SE,434._ 1.11E-03
2400 1 1600 t _00
7._4s_ _ 7.s_s04 ( _.4aE-o3
1_00 1 13o0 ( 7O0
1.77E-02 ¢ 2.17E-02 I 3.98E,,02
5_ _ _6 t 2S
_._2_-02 I 2.78E-02 I 5.56E_,?.
55 ' 36 _ 18
!
IRek_tmy
GJltlJ_ 8m
4.7g 4 RRI
466 7_¢1_
7.60 _r_
3.22 3.17
. 3.79
_ ,¢.4g
I I '
Repro Gaille_ RI_ Study _dllvRy1,8mm¢l on 294J!_ _ -SSI,IE t_t. :11fll_h_ - 1 SRB failure
R_RBSe_zIPakt ,_0s_ j 3.._0a i s.17s_ ; 1.54E-02 i 2.08E-02 t 4.85E-02 4._S,,,,|M [ 1 _ut(d ._ p 5._ 2_1 100 6_ i 48GalilemSanml/v_ Remm PF 4.13E-03 9.48E._ I._6E,O2 2.78E-02 t 2.72F_-02 .'L0gE.02 3.,-111
_ _ lout,..., 242 _ 108 , 64 _ 38, 3'7 , 20
GailleoSenmltlvtt_Ot,'t_m= 4.95E.Q3 t J°.S0E,,._ I 2.00E,,02 2.78E-02 I 4..17E-,02 I 7._ZE,02
;;-,_-,_(I 1 out @It,, i 202 I 102 I 50 _ 35 I 24 _ 13
CARP Galileo Bm_'m _- --
Thl_ _ ;.. cmeu_ed usingPRCs =_,__.... _ ix_ GARPeelqonem_ and p_ mere an_ EF when _n_ _:,: _____P_--._
Thll m _he°as° aqllm_ v'llk:h mmucF_ (eq: updi_ I° g31"_"'_'*;"_ _ b° __ t IOrbiter, ET. em_Pretaunchcli_ are mo ume as PRC
CARP Geltle_ i_m . I
RSRB (Paw) CARP 1.56E-03 3._£--_1 6.81_-03 9.gOE-03 1.41E--0Q I 2.83C-,02rnrof f I out of ... 642 306 147 _01 71 3S
S,_ME (clust_q GAFIP P-4gE-04 g.48E-04 __84E-03 7.38E..03 8.38E--0S I ::'SEE-02
rnfl_ ( 1 out _' ... 4018 _058 _ 13B 120 L 38
I
BaJileo 8s=e Rmxo CARP 4.59E,03 7.70E,03 1.36E,02 1.8_E-02 2.48E-02 I 4.88E412
rntt_ ( t out _ .. 218 130 74 64 40 _ 21
0,998 o.,9_ 0.987 O._ O.g/5 J 0,953
2.86E-03 5.9_3E.08 1.28_-,4_ 1.82_--O2 2.78E,,4_ ! S.56E-02
mlm_ 1 out or... 350 168 78 $5 _6 I 18
I
CARP GMIIeo RTG Stu_ 8en._evitvl - Blud on 294,230 s,_,,;,,-,,.l.s8SME tm_ 31 flloh_- 1 SRB _tltaeI
' mlv0t! 1 outot... 1(_ 66 41 I 34 , 25 15 I
0.gg0 I 0.986 0.978 I 0.971 i 0.981 0,935RMlabillty
GMIleoSen=dtlvtt_l OH_tnll 4,gsE-03 I g.80E-03 i 2.00E-02 t 2.7BE,.02 ! 4.17E-02 7.69E-02
,,, ml_t_ 1 outo__ 202 I 1(_ I 50 I 3S , 24 _3
3.881
t
I
----t----
5.0g
3.71t
4.C_..
4.1@: 4.87
9.37[ 11.41
i
433 _aa
I
_91
2._ 2.5112.7'4
I
I
3.8S 4.0_._
I
!
RTC-_P, :.,<,LS
CARP converts Aaqr priorto Locnor,;',!':...i_!r_set"vtnemaam _n¢lm_cliazr,i
93 Mainstao_ePrior t _'4'_!! : :; !_.r_ l .... T, 2-_ "_ r_-_ ii_i:_¢_ -" J ' i
Lm__,_.,u. t===._ I _-'!' _::__!:':_ t '''_s_6 '1 '- 'T-'.'."!:;&_,:.,. r,_:.i...... "
ca==== _:zu_, ' .,¢,cii:iiiii;:_"q
P_=ulate _ _SME _lB
Rmn
RUo
Rmo
_Rduster
93 SSME (Ctuster)
_( _ _ut_ ...
{
,,,.,, ........]
e4,.i,_!:!!,!:..! 1.a_.,os
O._I_7
0 r.ll_!;;e
(1.g_'[.
9./'1_--0¢ 1._8_,'._
_._ _. :_._!....
1.30E-05
1.60E-05
1.32_-05
,,° , I
I I
4,71,.E@_.
n
5.2'!
4.m
i
' lS.O_,
__l&_
!'_._
3,'_.
5.48
I .521
': 4,1_
4._
%
RTGUP02J¢3
e/
Psgo7
RTGtJPt3-_',."',L3
RSRB u=date to SS
RSRB Pnor
93 RSRB
Rmrb
Rmrb mawr1
RSRB IPsir_ .......... _.-
,,,IL,t(1 outot...)l 7'_i:........i._ 38Lq I 167 I.... -!!i;!::_.. ......'..... gO I
RSRB 8onoltlv¢_ can tncduolu _!_ !!,i!::.;!!_J!.urot_ upclato tl_ eaEl¢o n_?;v _unc_qece prlc,r.
9,3 RSRBSer'u_cMt'yl 2.32_;!] ! ] E:.74E..03 8._,'.-:1!'.--C_._r
Rratb SensilP,tit_ 1 9._:11.'...[t".,i ...
Rmrb (pair)Sensil_#cvl , ....
i 9.o_'.--_+', _.s=s.o2RrmrbSen_r4it_ t ..... I......................
Rra_b rp=,q s,m,_i_ly'2 1 ...........! I O._i _
RSRB/Patr)Sens=ltvi,ty2 /, 3.14_i.;:l; i 1.18E"03 f '=f.,70E"03 1.a----_;:_,_'i-'i'.-'38L¢'O2 I 7.03E,.02
_.mmBs..=.++_ =.. No _.=+, o. ii:_i;;;;_ i. ;cg s_e, -..=_,. +_n'-'_il+:_:.,,_,...m.m +o_MU_
B3 RSRB Sensith/iW3 S.2BF._;;+; _ 7.gOE--O4 3.0(?.g';,-3:._I 1.18E--02
Rr'JtbSensi'dvity3 ........ I 0.£-_t_ L.
Rtscb(pn,t) SInadzvity_ ) Ot,_!;'+i_,....t -
RSRB(P_,_S_t_ _r: i =;ms_+ I _reSo_ s_i _ ___+S_L!
,,,u ( 'to,.,to_... _ .=s=_._ _ oa_.__. _1 ] ,.,
I ii.......I .= teftef
64_ii::;! i'j" 1--___6"_____. I'_3_:!i:_!_ / ' + 1.1,2:E-0_ J l ,4,..17 4_71
...........l" I -_- _ ,.._;._s_ , t _+ t
I ............ -- __
............[ l T _++i+:+_+-_-
t 1..28E.l:3 t 2.58E'-_3 i 5.35E,-_ .... 7_..:._j_lt_i::.(,.'!,_._L '[.11_'02 I _ I{
" tt
1.9(_'4_ II
4,171 4+1G
2.gl ?-gll
t
i 14.08 14.g_
I =
14.g6_ 14.91_
L
• =, • i I
I
_4._.! _4..__
= , , ::
_l 14._ i 14.._
i!
RSRB Sumnam/
:astor
81at
Minuteman
Poeeidon / Tddllm
Tltan
AO0te_aC=SRB Prior
832E; I:
310F1: ; _tlE03
__8_,,,1:: i, 8.01E--04.
3.09E. l:t,.
93 RSRB 6.41E, ':l:
, _--_E, ",ll
1 1.S'7E,':,:
=3 RSRB Sen,ett_,
93 R_RB Sensm_ly2
_3 RSRB Ser=_d_ty3
2-'L¢_--03 I s._;,o:_' ' =+t.+3E-o3
L
S.O_. t 7.5+_.,o::
_ ..... L ,
-- 2.87E-03 3.90E .03
e,74E,.03 8+32E..0,.':1
2.3._3 g.09E ,()3
7.g0E.04 3._ ,_;t
[
Ji
_.t4E._ ]. 8.91E-0S to9_.,,.-,0=_, ;L_I .SgE"_l _ 3.4SE-04 ,t._'7"_.,.",_,_- 6.2_:-O4
3.50E..04 S.84,E.04 7.02E...;,_, , g,?3E.O4
$_.8E. ', +
ET_Ort:_r. Prolauneh upd_l_ to S_ ¢ !+it+m
ET 125I_ :'.:+
_ _ I I 1 16E :+d
Ot_ter 1og_ !
93 Orbiter 9.a0E.-,:;;;
Pr_=u,,,m_ P._. :;,!
s.3aE-03
_41_
2,_
2.11E-02.
1.t2E.02
1.96E-02
H m,
1.i8E.-02
" '7.SgS-04
1.11E-03
1,..4,_-_
I
I J 1J_l
tl l_;ml
II 4.16! 18.7"/
.,=.'_7i +.17
+'_,l ++.m
+,_.mt +t=e
I '7.6_ _.00
7.e_ 7.S9
3_2 _._7
3_ ,, 3_
I 2.71 1.79
V
V •
RTGUPO2.XLS
..... ml i
1
........ i ,t
m
Mum _ e__n_,%. I 9Sl:h%
s.3s_ r ,"soc-,o,_.,.!..,,_:_,t=.,o2r 2.__=.,o2"' I
_s7 ! 12s I m ' 4s ,
,, ,,,
=-- ------ ,,, , ,i I
CLINH,_cNT _P3 ASCENT VEHICLE LOSS PR()HABILITY
=_u_ Sth'A, 1 20U.r% I SOft'W,,, I
O=biiw
m_u(1o_tof...)
93 RSRO Pnir
.m_(1o.t =.:._ -,,az
SSMECluster ..e._.E._ ,. 1:3_=:m
mfbf (t out Ot ..-1 1548 741
_ET 1.18C--06 3.14E..05
m_(l_t%_l s_r_ ' _1_
9.8_--0_ 1.TSL=-04
10110 ,b"[lO
PmV,ur,_._ ..2.._sE-o4 _._E-04
"I
._.2sE-.o3u 2.,,_E.-0,.,3.
342 , 2,_3 I 1_ _ 71
3.1gE-04 4.10,,,_04. ! 5.80_-04 I I.,03E,,,03
31_ _,4_, _ 1"/24. I _4
s.s,_--o_ 7.02_04 ! 9.7_E-04 ! _,__r--03
.,;;; 11out= .! 484= _ 171S _,,_s 1 i__,':,__ i s31
I_.$1_,(BSBp _ I 6._3E,4)3 1..1,11E,,02 1;.__u___r,,.O2I 1.86E-02 _ 5_nr..02
mtbf (', put ¢_, '..".i 221 .l 146" i go ' 73 i U _ ! _ "'
RelillOilitv W/OIX RSRB J .............. t'! _O.=9°_g3"Z733i,,,l • JNI • II
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Appendix B:
Bayes' Estimators -- Introduction
(SAIC Wor_ng Notes)

BAYE._ E_,_rA_4. ATORS
[nfrotluction
'C'la._ic_s_lic$ forpo_nt-es[irnationpro_m.s ns_urnc thaiine I_ndofn v_abl_ l_p_sen_g me
oul_ornc of the Qi_¢_nt _xperirnentscome from some dc_sity_(. ; 9,),whel_ _h_ f_n¢l_onf is
_sumed known. Additionally, it is assumed that me px_-amctcr e, for which an es_ima_on ks
dcsized, is a fixed constanT., unknown to us.
In many situations, however, there is additional information available about the unknown
paz"_n=I_ 9. For cxamp|m, one may have the evidence (e.g.. through cotzsidex'abt= expm_) thaz
8 i=el_ acts as a ranaom variable for which a realistic demi_ funcdon can be postulated, provided
that the pa_ expeciencc is believed to be relev-znt for the or,.sent situation or oopuladon. TI_
following sections will address a method to incorporate this _tcldidonal information in the e,,srim,_n
proce__s.
ORIGINAL FAG[: IS
OF POORQUALRY
• If the parameter t? is fl_c ','at::..._ of a random varial0ie 8, :imn the d_.nsitv function of a random
•variable X i._f(x [0), Sat is, _, ,:::::;¢Ji.tionat density, the cen:' c,: of ,Y given _ -- O.
Let us assume tha: the densi ,.. Function of 9. g(O) i:__kn:: ,;,,n a)_.d c,'_mplete_.y specified with no
uaimown parameters and let 2; 'c !: random sampie of size :',': Xt..g__ ...... _'N- The oN_tive i__to
find an esl2mate for O. Fo: :._::ampte, ,_ can represent l:hc: f:_,ilure Fer demand of a certain
component, and the sample :"., ;_'z..... X,v, _e ou:cm'm: _::' .'._'._cndemand trial that is failtu-'_ or
mc=e.s_, The cla,_icat _tim_: ..... :,!0 is a single expression , :__:mcl;_des the observed saz_aple xt,x2,
....XN and the form of the s_):_!,-:dens_:y[. Now a pr_-:ed_zr_isneeded _ contains allthe
inf_atton that the classical ..::_.i::_,te contmns plus the ne _., :_:fc,rn_ation of the known density" of
O. g(O).
Prior to obtaining the sampt'. ::'.! the information avait,',_-Ic about 8 is that it comes from the
d_s_butioa gIO), :herefore ,::i_d prier d istriou_ion..-X;,c._r r.:t:ing the random sample (e.g.,
utilizing faiture records 1, a nm, :! !_:rtbut:on _s needed. ,,vhict _.':nmmzes the _rior dismbur_on and
the outcome of the actua_ sam : _:: :_rm it is cal!ecl posterior _}_:t::ibutic, nf(O/x_._ x2 ..... XN), that is,
the posterior dismbution of _i' ._tven X_-.r_, Xz=x*_ ..... X_:,=-._),,,.
For random sampling, this m:':., r.tistriburion is given by :]_::,'e.';' theorem, as follows [Rd, I,
pg.34 I]:
N
[ _:T.:,::Io) 1 g(e)
ffxi ::::...... x_lO) g(e) i=,
f(Olx _,x_..... ._) = --..:,, ........
I,;:_!,;_2 ..... xN) i N
[ l-[l:<,'_ie) t,., g(O) de
Aft_ this posmrior dis_l_ation
• e mean value of O, chat is:
(I)
:; ,:;brained. 'he cormspondir_ ii; _! a.y(,,s estimator can be compu_d as
m
0
N
O [rlf'(x_le) i ::_)dO
i-l
N
[ I=[l'(x_lo) ) ,,i:_.t:,de
i.-I
(2)
%9
it is s_ssed _ht_r r_ B_yes ,uroccdur_ [i=s in the _:omotcte _'c_cifi=_on of the t3dor _sa'ibm_on.
the past experience is su/fici_ntiy extensive, then a reasonable prior pruoabitiry d.ismbutioct c=.n be
•assuxt_d, provided that past expenenc_ is relevant to me vrcscnt c_sc. If past ¢xpc_emc¢ L_no_
available, en_neering knowledge about :he design, fabrication, material, cnva'onm=n, of the
componems can bc used to select the prior. The choice of :his prmr d_smbudon often involves me
addidonai conmd_ion of mathematical co_enience. A flexible dLswibudon f_iy which is
to handle and which can appzoximat¢ n:ts_ exp_'nenc0 by choosing _he aopcop==¢ p_, Ls
often s¢icc=ed as a m'_or dis_bunon. The fact that a particular _rrior is s¢Icctcd, genenflly doe= not
_nvolve th _ belipf that the pazamemris actually dL_mbuted that way, bur it does rr_cq that such
fits the dab rcasonaOly weft and is mamermdcaily conveniem.
A common s¢tecdon for prior distributions arc the so caJted conjuga=e priors which have the
p¢opcr_, that ¢h¢ posterior and prior dismhutions am memDe_ of the same family of dis_'ibudom_
The-crete, the poste._or function has a ¢iosea form =naJydc_[ ret_'cse_non. Now, one que._ion
arises: How is a. conjug_:_ prior identified? The answer depends on mc problem being solved. A
msthemaucai procedure exists, "which finds pairs of dis_nbmion (for the prior and. random
expcr_mem) that produce a posterior distribution of the sam= family as _e prior. For the c_e
b_'_g studied m =h_sreport, the disn'ibudon of _he random vnriabIe which describes the e,_pc_mumr.
is known (gemouili for failure.on-dee=rod _,rtd Poisson ,"or time failure m:e.s) and d_er=fom tl_
appropriate conjugam p_or dismbution has to be found, keeping in mind tha_ such priors should
represent the failure rates fairly weft. The following se_ions discuss two cas=s of conjugm=
priors.
ORIGINAL PAGE IS
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Beta Prior Di,_r_b_trion
The most widely used prior' _:i'i_i!::nbution for the f.',ilure-:_n.-,:i_*u'_.nc_ orvbabilities p is the Bern
distribution. Tha'v _re _wo r:_;_ir, ,_.nsons fc.r this cho_.cc. - _-'!::_::, me. Beia aismbudon has _he s_m__
ran_ as o. that is, the interv_:: '{%_), givin_ fle×ibili:v to r_._:)_"_:.-.:_._.my failure ct_ar'ac_e.'_d_, within
this range. Secona. its ma_h_"_=ticai tn_c:ability, be.ln_ "l .:or:jugat_ p=or. as this section will
demonswaz¢.
Let us mstat_ tho problem to :_:::',__. An E.-stima'_o t'or faiiu.r_. :)n-.de:'_:..nd p_babi/ity 'p' is nveded for
a particular group of compo::_ :'.:_:cs. It is assumed. _'crrn _a.'._.::,_;,:pc:_enco or expert opinion, that the
co_ponenL_ am part o£ a lazy; ,.:, ]::_pnlar_cm whose t'aflaz'_-_ ,n..de:nand pmbabilkie.s ate di_i__-____
according to the Beta dismb._ i,.)n_ com._letely sp_i_d ::/an:,, two param_tvm (genetic data).
Adc:IidonaIIy, a random sa::::]: h.. was obtained from _h: _r¢_t_!:_ of co_ponent_ (data _c_d._
analyzed) so that the total n_:'"'_!'.:_rof fail_re_ is kno,_n, -_.'i; ..-ell as t_¢ number of demand t_l_
(pI_t specific data).
The prior dismbution g(p) is ::c :)nly inform_,tion avafiat, i:_ !:.¢for¢ th¢ sample is obtained. _ is
given by :he Bern c_slz'_bution: _:_,:_A.vpenczx, equation _A... _I"
| ) ._.1. ,_ I
g(p) = B(x_.no'Xo) P ,..-.P)n°'°" (3)
where 0<.p<l, n_z0>O and B :' ,, ,.; is the beta function gh,':r_ by [See Appendix, equation (A.2)]:
Bfz,w) = tz'z ic
#0
The mean M and va_nance V _::: d_is dismbudon are given l,y [see: ,Appendix. oquadons (A.7] .-_
(A.I I)]:
X0
no (4)
V - xO (nO" xo)
2
no (no+ t) (5)
From equation (4), it is seen :_ ;_t _:_ can be interpm:e.d "as fi: ilur_:_ for the prior distz_budon and no
demanas, themforv c_led "::; ,_._:)_dofniluros" and "pseudc :Ie_nand_." respectively.
The pnor dismbution is usuafi :, .-...pecifi_d by a mean and _.Lr-:,_mce.. rather than the paz'amet_'s
andxo. A conversion is nece_:_;_:,,_to obtainno and xo given rr:c_ and variance.
From equation (4), :,co = M '(_
Insertingequation (6)inzo(5):
OPJGINAL F._,GE IS
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U
Vu
M no (no-M no)
no: (n0+l)
?,/CI-MI
noel
Now, solving for no:
M (I-M)
no-- V -1 ('/)
So ¢xtuaaons (6) and ('7) allow tae conversion.
Let us analyze th= _ random experiment performed co update :he prior disa'ibution.
Assuming :hat the failure-on-demand pmbability p for each component is consmn: a_ each dem,A-ri.
if X_ is me oumome of the im demand trial, th=t is failure or success (numericzt values I or 0,
mspecdv=iy), th_n X_ follow._ the Bernoulli dismbution. Theveiom, m_ den._ty function for X i,
given a f_lure-on-dcmand probabiIity P is:
f(xiip) -- p"(1.p) t''+
Now, the joint d_sity of an inclependem nmdom sample of N of such trial demands is giv¢_ by:.
• f¢xt,x2....:._Nip)=" ,-z.,_I'I f(x_lp) = p_'* (l-p) - pt(1-p) N4'
ira! (8)-
wher_ f = _ is the total number of failures observed. Note that f, being the gum of Bezuoulli
vaxiablcs, is di.scribum.,d according !o the Binomz_.
Th¢ denominator of equation (l) can b¢ calcuiamd:
= .... dp. p'<,-,,>"**8O,o.'oo. o ;"' ¢*+;''""*"
I [+ o'.,f-t (l_p)n_+
= B(xo,no-xoO.., P' ,..,,--Idp
(9)
This integral can be solved using the detinition of the Beta function, with the fol[owing
sub._mdons [S¢¢ Appcndk,¢, equation (A.2)[:
gO+ f--z
no+N-xo-f=w
Rewriting cq_tion (9):
I f ] ,
f(x,,x_.....xN)= B(xo,no- xo_oP""
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",v-I
(I -p) dp
.,.
Now, :he int=grat is the i' :':.:,,;.t'un:uon BC,".,w;. So su t_'i::L;:in .r;back; z = xo+[ and w = n0+N-xo - t':
_',(:':ct+ f. ,_n-,'- N - _o" D
f(xl,x2 .... ,._,0 =.............."_C×o, _,_- ._,_) -" (10)
So finally, th¢ postmc: :!i_¢:dbution is obtained by ir_._=-rur;g equations (8), (3) and (I0) into
eqmmon (I):
f.. .H,t" x0._
p (i.!::.,... _ (1..p) '_°'="'l l P'_*r't (l.p) n_+U-=+-+-z
=:_(_ ,;",:"t_7_'_,2+ N - ×o" 0
(11)
Comparing equation ( t I ; ,,:ith equation (3), it is nc_te_! :hat. _hc poste_or distribution is also from
the Beta fatuity, w;th the ! :_r:,-_-nete_ rnoaiEed :is _ollov.-+;:
x0 _ xo-_f
..'10 _ no÷ N
Thm'_om, the postcmor rrt :_::_:r._Bay_ estirriatc for p) =u_.r!pnst.=rior v_ =re abmizted by rn_Id_5 U
the corresponding rcplac,. ,:._,_mts in _he expressions of :b,: p:io.x" mctm mid variance, equmiotm (4)
and (5), th=t is:
M' == x0 + f
no + N (12)
MAP t
(xo +O (no + t,.! -_.:_ -t3
(no+N) 2(nc,, ;'_+ I) (t3)
It is nottml from equation _ ' .'._+ that the po_t=rior mean. hm: i._:, the Bayesian update is the quotient
between the pseudo-fail :! :,:, _lus obscrv,d failurns :_.r,,'t r.heps=udo-dcmands plus tee trial
demands.
UU
Gm_nrne PriorDisrribu,.ion
. The genc'n_ly used prior dismbudon _'or th_ time _iatect _ailures_.is the Gamma diso'ibudort.
: disWibution is adequate to represent failure: rates and it is ma_er'z_icaily convenient, being a
"conjugate prior, as me following dcrivmions wiiI prove.
The probiem to solve is analogous to the previous one, but here an cstimam for the dmc _!_t_j.
failur, is needed, and therefore = Gamma distribution is chosen as p_or (genca'ic data). AIso, a
random sample was obtained from the _._uo of corr,, oncnts of interest (analyzing faitute _ds),
so that the tataI numbtn" of failures is known, as welt as the total exposure corresponding to tho_
failm'c,(#ant specific data).
"l'he prior distribution g(._. ) is her_ given by the G_tmma distribution (See Appendix, equation
(BA)]:
g(M = B" k _'' e-.8x
(14)
where ,_#0, _ 1_>0 and F (_x) is the gamma function and is given by [See Appendix. eq_mecnu
(B.2)]:
I'{z)- _t z't e'tdt
Th¢ mean and variance of this distribution are given by [See Appendix., equations (B.5)
(tt.9)]:
M--_ (15)
Fr_rn equadon (15}itisseen thata (zcan be interpr,:tedas failuresforthe priordistributionat=i#
as demands, therefore called "pseudo failures" and "pseudo demands," respectively.
The prior dimibtztion is usuatIy specified by a mean and variance, rather than _e parameters c_atzt
/_tomeanamvariance:
From_uadon (15): _ = M B (17)
In_mng Equation (I7) into Equ:mon (16"):
M
So now:
OI_IGI_ pAQE_S
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MM"
cc=MI) = V- (19)
_ns (18) and (19) sll_: :, v.>ob_._ ct an_ fl_v_a rn,_ _Lr_M _c[ variam:e V.
Lt_t us now t¢olc into th¢ pi: ;.._:.,=_;of _Lz.ty=ug the f_,it,,,m: : :._,.:-c_z'_t:;,'_a,,'xdom expt='imtmc) to _rin_ r._
prior distribution, if fail¢_:l ' :m:s. in :he !_oup cf compc_:_ _,_c_s _d¢:r st-_ay, art _piaced or
"inamtOLRt_ly" aft_ failtw_:. :_:..:!_ssurrnng tl_at failu.n_ oc u:," tn_.et_cndently and at a const_tram m
time _cross different it,ms ::".cri for any gxven item (and :':_ _:ozr_sponding _pia:e.nmnt, if it falls) a
Poisson prtmess is genera: :"._..vitn pararneter 2.r,A bci:_ 5',t:,_ constant fatiur_ ram and r th_ ri_,
leng'da. Defining a random l ' .:_:.:bte "_l: repr_sentin_ the. T_rnb{:r of fai!ur_.s for the i_ item, tb,nxi
follows the pmsson disrobe'.: :;;_..r.hat is:
xi!
Now. the joint density of _'... : .c!eper.den: random sa_r_te _f ,_'it_.rns is given by:
t: (X0 ,:_ t,'.O
f(xt, x2,,..,x_ IX) = [".[:!'ti_i!X) = ...... = .............
rlxi., iTlxi.'
i_i i,t_ (2O)
whm'_/= T.._iis the total nut; :::.':c of fail,arcs observed. N,::,_:e,:_atfis also Poisson distribution.
The denominator in F._uanor _ .'._.:Rnnew be caicu.k_:_d:
i t )Illf(xt,xz, ....x_) = _Y(x_,x_, ....x, i3.)g(A.)d2 =:
• "13
f" e'_ _)r _ :._,"'._._:_ .:
= aO l-ixi! F (a)
,, ¢, ....,..,
" l'_i! F(ct)- e _'dX (21)
The integ_ can bc solved us;:" =, m¢ definition of the Garv:-_ fire,ion [See Appendix, equation
(A.4)], so equation (2I) ha:T : _e re_.rranged to an eq_:i,.'m¢:::lt form as a Gamma. ftmction.
ORIGINAL p_0_" IS
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Multiplying and fliv_ding by ([3 + m) = _-r. t •
f"r a_ ÷f lffx_, x:, ... x.) - _t f(_+ tn)_.l_ "" - ['Ix+i 1"(= _ (_+tn)_,*r._
- l'lx_ {_ ÷ m) = *tl" .o
c--6I_+ m)_.d(D+ tn)k
Now', substituting inside the integat:
itis nomd thatme integralis the Gamma function l'(z).
substitution_uations.
w'h_'(: z = or. +-
_', a¢corfling to fl'_
Then t_e integralcan be solved.
tr B=
fix t, a2, .... x0 ,, ---- r'(=÷0
Had rca) (.B + m) _ (22)
So finally, the posmrior d_stirbufion is obtained by inscrdn!_ equations (20), (14) and (2.?.) into
equad_ (l):
f(Xl xz,x2, ..., x. = ¢'x" Xr_:"x c_)'(13"_n)=_-
Hxi! I"(=+0
(_+m) =_ e._#$+m)_=_-s
= I=(=+n . (23)
Cort)p_ing _u_don (23) with equation (14), it is note_ th.')t the posmrior dLstribudon is also from
the Gm family (a conjugate prior) wi_h the p_ modified as follows:
a=a+f
where 7 = ntis the the total exposure time,
Thea'_for_ the posmr_ormttm (Rayes _timam for _,) and posterior varianc_ ar_ obtained by m_,_-$
the corresponding rgplacem_nm in the cxpresmons of th= prmr mean and varianc=, cq._rions (15)
and (16),tha_ is:
a+f
_V[t I=
t_+ T (24)
_+f
(_ + T'I-
It is noted from _quazion (2.: i_ :h;_t the _os:_rior mean is ::i:!t:._med as pseudo failure_; plus obs_'rv_i
failures ciivid_d by pseuao _ "i:_: _'um _i'_s c_ser,'ecl ex,oosE r_,
• I
v
Iltll
A Proeedu_ to Perf'r_m a Bave._t_. I.]_datc
This see:ion dcsc=b=s a step by step proccdur= to obtain ,', Bayesian Upda_,d =sdmate of r;m,,
i f_ rates and fai]un:-on-dcmar_[ pmo:ubflities, g_vcn a lognoz'malty dis_ibuted gcnm'ic
•specified by i:s mean vaJu= and =n'or factor.
Step L: Find variance V for r,h=lognorm.',i.
It'_o _n=-ic dnmis togno.x=aitv dismbuted, and is given by its mca_ va.[u¢ M
its va.--mnce V is given by [See Appendix, ¢quadon (C.I?..'_]:
V =e _')_÷° I¢¢. l)
aud error factor _F",
(20
where /j. ando2 arc the mean and va.nance for the _sociat¢d normally discibutcd v_,h_!e.
According to ecluztion (C.'_ in me Appc_iix:
2
M- exo (_ + T )
Inser_ng log to both sides and multiplying by 2:
2
21J. + o" = 2 Iog M (-z'O
The vmanr.e 0"2is mlamd m the error factor tS¢¢ AppcrM:lL_ ¢quazion (C.15)]:
O = lof_(EIB
L.645
The error faczor is r.he ra_o o£ the 95th pc_cndle m me median of' the Iognon"nal distribution.
Now, replacing Equations (2T) anct (28) into equation (26):
V=M 2 xp_ 1.645 I "i (29).
Step 2: Conversion to a Beta or Gamma Dismbudon
a) FaiIu,'-c-on-demand:
Convcrm the lognormal distribution to a Bern, p_serving the mco.n and vaxiaace, and oh-,+- the
parc_¢te, rs xo a._ ,'to as given by equations (7) and (6):
M(I -
.l[tO-'- V
M2(! - _ft
-MXO= V
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b) Time R_lamd F_Jlu_,._;
Conw'z'z the iognormaJ a ',:i ::ii;_l:nbuttonto a Gamma. ,":,,__.,',,,,- _. _..............the meez_ and variance,ar,d obtain
• the paraz'ne:== _ and _ ;_: i;i_te,n by equat;ons ( l _) an0 1L91_
C_-- V
M
• Step 3: Perform ._.;;'_i!,'._.';:anupd_m:
a) Fai!urc-on-demand
With the observed faitur:'.:_; ._:in N c_cmands, c:_,¢uhtt¢ _;;_..:_o_te;rior n_esrz M' and vaz'iancc V' p¢¢
_,r_Hons (12) ants (Z3):
• xo÷!
M-
no +'i::"
V' = (x° + =:'1_no + :_ - xq. f)
(no+ '.r:'"(no+ N _-L)
b) Time Rclazed F_ilu_s
With the obs=v_d failure:_ ' _:._zdtot_.l ¢_,posum 7", _nd ..... _.¢¢,_;osr_rior meaxz M' and vazi=_ V' pcz"
equations (24) and (253:
" o_-t- f
M,,,
+ 1"'
V'- (x+!
+ "i',,"
Step 4: Conve_ _ _ i:::_.riburionback into to_no_:_.t, ¢_.Lculal_ng _he _,,=u, f:zczor
TI_e u'ans'formation is mad=: n'_,serving mean and v;zria_: "..e..'I'_¢ postcz'Jcrre,,'ror factor 5F" cazzbe
obtainer using cquazion (2!; ".. r_p:acing aH variables wzzh. the: corresponding posz='_ors, and so[vizzg
for the a,-_-o=fac;0r EF":
The _ir_d updated ¢sdmate : :_v.,_ _iw:n OF its mc:u'_ M' r,;._.Ce_:_" _'_.c_orEF.
A. Oem D_str_.burion
The Bc_a d./sn'_bur_onis _ven by the following func_on: (Ref. 2, pg. _8]
l I -xo I
g (P) = it (xo, n o- x_ px°" (I - p) nO " (A.I)
where O<p<t, no_xo>O, and B(.,.) is the Beta fmmcdon, dcfinc_i as:
t z
B (z,w),,,So_ " t(l.,)w..,.._ (A.2)
Tl_ Bcm funclion is retamd to _e O_m_, function as follows (Ref. 3, p{. 2_8, F.q. 6.2_]:
B (z,w)= F(z)l"_w>
r(z + w_
where FC) is2e G_m_ run.ion, given by [Re£ 3,pg. 255, Eq. 6.1.I]:
r(z) = ]'o tz"t ¢"d:
A _ for_ can be obm_ by compuun_ r(z÷l) and inmgr_nS by parm:
r(z+ I) = S_"_ze"
(A.4)
Now defining u---_zand dv = e_ d_,aml ca1_ulanng du - z _.t dt _nd v = _he integrationby
pans can pmcee& using _ _¢m_: 7
_U dv_ uv -Jvdu
m
r (--+,>= 1o_ Io(-,,")
Now _ (t_e4) goes :o zero in both lirni_when t goes m zero and t goes to int=miv/,_em_om
_¢ ft_tW_m inu_e righthand sidevanishe_
r(z+l)=z_o tz'_ c "¢d1
The ime_rai obt_'t_ is the Garn_ Rmc_ion F(z) and the mc,.m'enc¢ fo._'_alT_is obtained:
r (z+ !)= z r(z)
A-I- Mean tea'the Beta Di._!i _j "..!....liO_
...... •" , E[p]=-p _and is a mem%ure of cenm_t• The mc_n is the expected- '.,_L.u, of _he vat, dora _ ... _abl.. :_
• location of the density of p, !s: compu_e_ a._:
{ i I I
_= Rip]= oP g_.P:::' _", om_,,._.,q)-'_",7_'°(: " r,,
! ,L .,f'_---
=B(xo, no- , ;,._ J0 P'°(t " p>'_O'x°'l_.......d;
dp m
(A.6)
$ul_drndng variablesinside "_.' ,_tem'_,.t:
XO----Z-I =_ Z= X.O ",, }.
%-
P'O" Xo -- W
Now _'Iuanon (A.6) can be ":,.,_/_-.,.tten,,i_:
1 /i _.t _-Ig'= B(xo ' no" x° ) ; ;: (I - p) dp
L.., J
The integral now is the B_rr ',Jr_ction B(z,w) as d_fined i_: .-.qg.ation (A.2) where z = x0 + l and
w m no - ,'cOas defined by the :: :-,.,n!lc of variables. TheretT_re:
w
p=
B(xo+ l,no- xc,_
B(Xo, no- x o)
/
Using dm¢relation with the C _.:;:.'n:) function giver_ by equ::)%::,r,(#,.3):
m
p-,
F('xo+ l) V(ar)- :,'r.O
["(n o + i) r'(no)
r(xo) r(n. - x,,: r(n,) ÷ l)
rod
t"fx o + t )
F(x.)
Now making use of the recur '.::_'.:'::;formtzJ:t (A.5).
F(no) xo l"(x,,i; 'h
nor(no) F(xo; ,Lo
So the mean value for the Be_.:/:li:;,ribution is:
_4
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_=xo
no (A.7)
• A-2: V_rinn_ f_r_he B_m Dimr}b._- n
The variance V of a rav_m variable p is the meast=c of the s:r:ca_ or dispcr_on of its dcr,_it 7 anti
is e,,._csscd as the following _p_-,_i value
_g thffisquared u:rm:
--.2= E p:] - p (A.8)
So E[p2] no.is m be c'_tculated:
= B(xo, no- xo)
! l
= B(_,o,_o-'x_ fo p,o-*-_(I .p).O-,,o-Lap
(1 - p) nO'xO" t dp =
(A.9)
Agai_ cnangmg variabl_ inside-,heinmgr_.:
xo÷l=z-I _ z= Xo+2
II0- XO "_ W
E_.:_on (A.9) can b_ _wriue.a as
E[p2]_ 1 f_pZ-, ,
Now the inmgral is the Bern functionB(z,w) as defme_i in equation (A.2),whcn_ z = xo + 2 _nd
w = no - xo as defined by thechange ofvariable.s.Hence:
B(xo, no- Xo)
_. poor _UAUT_.
B
Using themladon with the i]:T:_:r'lat'tinc;<uon_.,v_nby e:.,>:r.:_,_:,ionIA .3),
r'(xo ..i._f":nc_-.<._.0
EfP21{j= F (L',,_-_...2_, ._ r(x¢__ ;') ;":.rz,9..
F(x_) '."?-. ,'-_l) F" (_o) [" i'no _" ?-)
I",:_el,,)
Now using the reeuz'_nce t':m'r:i._irt[A.5):
EfP211j (x.o,,+-1)r':':-: ..:,.t) I-(._
P (r',,.::. (ha+ l_ P(no+- t_t
(xo+ I) xo F(×_ ; l"(n_)
r" (Xo) ,71o+ 1) n,i r-(nr_)
xo(xo+ l_
n o (n o + i)
_sm'nng equation (A. t0") in_ .:: c;..'-!uation ¢A.<',I), the ,.,:lriaric_ :_ ol_tained:
V=Ep -
II
rloxO (xl.i-i-l) - x¢:'I_r'i#l-i-l)
no2 (n o + "'
xo(no- ×<',)
•J_ ii
noZ (no + I)
2
x 0 ,:::.(s-i- I) x_l
l
1311
_Xo + _0_0 ° r'lO ';0
no :z(n o -_. F]
2
-X 0
.E
Hence. the variance for the El_:.:',+:tixrribtltion is ,.z,iven _y:
xo (no- xaJ
V=
no (nO+ {)
(A.IO)
(A.I1)
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.B - Gamma Di._bofion
The Gamma dizmbution is _ven by the following function [Ref, 2, pg. 658]
F =
whcra _t>0, ct,_0 and 1-(.) is the Gamma function, d_med as
F(z)-fotZ- l _'_
A _nce formula for the Gamma functionwas found in S_fion A (eqt_.ffon A.5):
(B.I)
(B.2)
F(z, 1) = z F(z) (B.3)
B, 1: Mean for.the Gamma l_srribu'tiQrt
Tho mean isth_expecze_valueoftherandom var/ab_ _, (E[X]= _ )and is_Latr, d.as:
" r(a)
z . xdtpX)
r('a)Jo e
Changing ver/ables/ns/de _/nr_-al:
_X: t
Oc:z-[ = z:(:÷l
eqmadon (B.4)cartberewrittenm:
_': _F_ j"_ t'" t e"dt
The integ_ is the Gamma function I'(z) as defined in eq,,.',_on(B2,), where z ,, cz + l, as ciefim,i
in thc above change of variables. Horace:
Using the racurmnce of formula (B.3'):
_ aF(oO a
or.Pooa OuAu,tv
VSo, them_an vaiu¢forth,_.:_mm_ dismbufioa is:
-- (g
_.=_
B.2: Variance for th _ Gan_ :i:!.t.._i..3._,.._._Lr_.
The variance V can ix: =xl: ,::_;!:¢,'.das:
(B.5)
as found in Seedon A-2. c:i ad:n (A.8). so E[_.x] h= tc be: zcr:nputcd.
(B.6)
• _ _ " ,(3/% ::"E k = g[',,;d%.=.o F(ct.1%_ ÷l .,3_,
, !
= .._x d(r3%)
Now changing vm/ables in! i !c the in:e_uh
_X= t
iX4-1=z--i =_ t:::,:o;+2
(B.7)
Equa_n 03.7) can be m',_:i_:::',_'tas:
k = - _i c'id:
_2F(a)
Now. the integral is the G_ ::,:_:_:::.:::_function F(z) as dofin..':,:t it:.. equation (B.2). where z = tz + 2 as
defined by the c,haag¢ of w,: i:',.J:;k;s. "_mrefo_:
Using the _.curmacc form_.i'_,""_ _"
(_t-i- t)r(_::- t.) (_.,:- l)liF('a) _{_:i#- t)
_2 r(o:_ _2F(oO !32
Inserting equadon (B.8) int,, :::_ _.:=ion (B.6), tho varianco i!; e_btMned:
(B.$)
2] 2 2 2V=EX _2 at'.:_.-_,i) e_ _ + a - a a
I1" 1_ " p" t_l-
FIcace, thevariance for the Gamma dismbucton is given b,,,:
W==--
_z (B.9)
C, Lo_or_al Dis_b!.:. :i:>.[,,
Let us define two rancl :: _ variables X and Y .:;x.lch i'_.at: Y" ::: /og X. If Y is normally disu'ibute, d.
• with mean t,t :.nd ray :: ;_¢,,: c2, then th_ ra.ndo_ ','._ri_b!e X is said to follow a [ognormal
dismbu tion.
The prot)abiih3, :: ,:=,'.si_ function (pg/) for tnc; ilo_;no:I-m_t disr.ribution can be obtained from
rJ_ norrn_ _s_ributkm :::,-;',':Igha ch:mg_ ofv_Jn.n.blc.:_:_::'o_)ca.vs:
"/'heour_d_rive :!i_,:r:._;_z_functionforX is:
FfX._x) -- F tlogX g loi:: :x:)
burY ---logX, t::.: n
F(-X ',F(X_'¢) = F (Y '.; _:._._:¢) = _t < log x - _t
Y-g .._
=Z.,
but,. o i! :_e standard norm_ vo_nzble. _.h_t i_. Z is normally distributed with mean
0 and vananc_-r_,cref,: .',.::
log x - _)F, (X.C_x_= F z ':il :if ..- o (c.l)
To obtain th_ pd.f, the de : r;:,.',tvo of equation C.I is co_::::i:m_ed:
d ,:IFfz)dz_
f_(x)= _. F(x)',:',_..
(c.z)
But z _ the smnda_ no_: :'_:d;:'_nablc,_hcn:
log -' / z
=_ .
(C.3)
Substituting equation (C, !'_',into _C.2h
1 I (Io_x-t.t)2}f_ (x) = _ ,',:':,_ "_....[ 2o _-
Equation C.4 is the pdf f,,:: '.:_::_ _.ognommi distribution.
for x > 0 (C..4)
V
C. I: Mean o¢ the, lo_orm_! Di._mburior_
•The mean of the tognorm_ d2smburion is compu:=d as me e,.xpcc:_d valu_ of the random variable L
- as lot.lows:
" 1 { (logx-R)2}dx" [° _exP " 2a:
Changing variables:
X=¢ y
dx = eY dy
Then°
fm- _y
_'*,j...._exp
= -. ¢xp
"¢2Za
. (Y - _)z 1
20'2 f dy ==
'Iy2"2_Y÷_ ÷y ,dy=2G 2
y2.2u.y + _ 2_ 2y 2
2a 2 f dy (C.5)
To solve the imegr_. ,2=is necessary to add a.,m sub_ cons:an= terms m._id= d_= exponent, s!= so
that it ¢_ be expressed as (y-b)2.
The term 2go'2 + o'4 has to be added and subwacmd in equazion (C._) for this purpose, so now:
2¢_2
2c_2
ORIG._ALPA_E IS
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" ![
i dy
)
M_ieiag another change ',':ldable_ inside :he inte ,_,..i :Ln(C._
?
u = v - (Is+ o-)
¢2"0
d
Th_II°
2,
÷a'12, "' .u:
x = ,¢_ o" .......
Any mbt¢ of integrals _, ::..; ::i",.e.foilowmg result:
_2¢Jdu =
So finally:
C.2: Varian¢_ of the. Log;: :i:';7.q.,lI.Di_r.d_b_qign
The wwiancc can be c_c::..::::das shown inEquanon {-,*.8)
x"was ah'eady catcula:ed, :::::only E[x2] is needed.
.r; f"
Making the following suO_ ':!_:_:q:!.oninside the integral:
y
dx = e' dy
(C.6)
(C_3
(C.8)
VThen:
I II--L- e×p v- - 2;zv + u, 2y= - " " ' + dy=v2x_ 2c_2
-- f y2 2 .
2a 2 /
r2. i _ :I v -2vfa+ _-u." _ ; exp " " ' • dv
(C.9)
Anaiogally as befor=, ac_din_ and subn'a_ting (41.to2 + 40,*) inside the exponential, equatiomC.9)can bc written as:
= f y2
2_"_a" / " 20"2
I='_'_'x_ f- exp - 4"21.1.+ 20 .2 dy =2a 2
"_'°"_2o_,/,[y"_"_°"]_)_,_o_
Now, changing variables inside the integral in (C. 1 {3):
-- 4tj.O 2 _ 4ff 4
• -- dy =
(C.lO)
u = Y "01+ 20 "2)
"ffa
dv
du= 2_'a=dy = _/_'odu
Them fore:
Oi:ZtGJNAZ.PA_ m
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V[.] r_ :..... ..j= ,, ', :_! {:,_" e du
E x Y2_o "
The integr:_ is the snmz as : til,_: pr_viaus sec:ior_:
e _ du = {'E',
So Now:
_ [x?] = CZ(M..#o:I
Inserting equations (C. t l) :,,:_ (C.7"_ :nco equation (C.8"):
[21 :,,,+°, _.°_:V=g x -_':e - c; .I
e".2°'- c ".a' -: .,,:_""°"(e"'/-t)
So finally:
V=e2_÷e+(e e2- +)
(C.I1)
(C,.12)
OF POOR QUALITY
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C.3: _.-r_r Fnc_nr for -he Lo__n_rrnn! Di._rriht_rinq
"t"hoE,,"rorFa:'tortEF) isdefinedas th,,rmzo between the 95th percentile:md the rn_ian or 5Oth
•_tiie.
El: =
X._o (C.13)
The _'rorfactorisa me,arc of v_'i=_ionabout a ccnlrattendency and isusc_ more: oftenthatzh=
variant=.
A relationcan be establishedbetween theerror f.-,crorEF and the varianc_ o"of the ass_iaze,.d
no_mal variabl= as follows:
Taking log inboth sidesof equation(C.13):
log EF = log(,x95!
ix._01= io_ x.95" tog x.5,.,
but tog x = y, then:
log EF = Y.95-Y._o (C.14)
But recallingdmt y = log x is normally distributed°_tchange of variablesoan be made to the
standard norn'mi variable:
z= Y'_" == y=_ + crz
o
ReFla_ng intoequation(C.14):
logEF=g 4-o z.g s- (It + o z._ 0) =
= o' (z.os - z.,_0)
But the 95:h pcrccn:iie of :he s_andard normal disrxibution is approxirrmt¢ly 1.645 and lh¢
percentile is zero. Then:
log EF -= o 1.645
$o finally:
o = log EF1.645 (C.15)
: . :. _ ,.
• , . : . -,
•, . •- _ .',....
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A.I: DEMAND RELATED FAILURES
• When a cctxai_ population of components is selccte.d m p_'m a piant or vehicle-specific data
• _n_lysis for dern,,,,_ rciatr_l failm'cs, a gcattai21y us¢tl memod is to count the number of failmcao
within m_ ,¢icctr, d population, that occutTed as a r¢suit of a number N of total d_trmnd trials.
Assuming that the faLiurc-on-dtmand probability p for e,acn component is constant az each dcmsnd.
and defining a random variable X; rep_scntmg the outcome o_ the #h den_n_ trial d-,at is _ or
success (wrrn_ical values i or 0 respectively), then Xi foLMws tttc Bccaouili distribution, that is:
p (Xr=x) = Px (l-p): "_
U
After N demand ¢_._s, a random sampte Xt, X_ ..... X_Ls obrxi._--,L The objec_e is m esdm-_'-
the failure-on-demand prooability with aLsingle valtm (point est_,rz) using the in_ormnHqn
provided by the random sampie.
Several mchniaues can be usea to accomplish this desired result. The method of maximum
likelihood is here chosen among the other memods becau.sc it gives ¢stitxmtors with desirable
properties and az_ fairly c=y to obr____ The _ox, dm_ of this method follows ( i]:
Let X/, Xz, .... X,_ be the random sample obr.{nt-.d from n dem-nd trial obsm'vations. Eae& of
these n random variableshas a density function(probability distribudon)f(Xi; O), where 8 is the
urdmown _ to cstim_. Then the joint density _on for the mmimn sample is:
f(Xi, X2, ..., Xn: 8) = RXt; 8) f(X_; e) _ f(X,,; O)
si_ Xf, X2, ..-, _ axe muvm!!y ind_cmdenr.
After the sample is obtained. [ is a function of 8 orgy. This fimcdon is called tim Likelihood
functionand _ indicaw.dby L(8). The tr,_thodof maximum likelihoodconsistsof findingtim
value 0 of 0 which ma=_r_-_ the likelihood fimmion. Such 8 is calle.d the maximum likelihood
esumamr of 0.
Returning to the original random sampie Xt, Xz, .... Xet, each variable being BemoulU
distributed,tim_ funcuon is:
N
L.(p)= I=[P" ( "P)
i,.!
t-e, I_-F_,
= pZ='(1.p)
oEeooaQwu.m ,,
• |
._:.
A-1
......... . ]H I r
whea'e_ x_represents'.!'L,:_T.:mof Xi from.z= / :cl_=,",__:._d.L,ir.h_.mfca_,me totalnumber off,i!,-'es
obr, m'vea.
Ma_miv-_ng/, is eqtav_ri,:::_ _.oma_/mgzi_g _ log_z_rJ:,.'::n. :i.e: .r_o_(L), ±cn:
" .... _ (N-T_ xO * Tog (1.._,)Log (I.) = _ x_ ...._, =(p) <-
A byproduct of this is d:: 1.1:,:_matht_matics is sLtnpiifi:: :i.
To obtain the maximm_ _::: :[._:,gIL/, the: derivagve wtfi" -,'_:_!_e:.,*.m p is _',,*,,'_ to zero:
6LogU) _ _:_ N-Z xi
6p P i-p
And solving for p. uhc n::_' imvm likelihood vstimator _- c I._r,_in_:
That is. the point e,_rirr_._:::_:"".'or/v is obtained dividing "i_e _o_21 v.rnher of faitmes observed, by the
total numb_of dmttarw, :'t::._d._,N.
It is noted that fin is fi:_: :"...."_,,,then/_ is a random variat:,t..,,:_ _,._[ being tim man of Bernoulli vatiabl_
it is _btned .___,:wdin i ::)t:hc Binomial with paras::-;::,-,_: p and N.
Now a nume_'ical inmrv_.] i:_;.:ie_itv2 to bound the un!_aowr_ parametm" p with a certain degrt_ of
confidencm. The idea is :::' ::_nd two f_nct:ons. L(.) ai::,d ,!7(.). of the random samp/¢ Xi, X2, ....
X.$o that, prim'to ob.ea_', "i:'qll the sample., thea_ is a c_7:,ain known probability that the parameter of
inmr¢_ p is _v_i-_i _,, _:'_t mmrva! LL),U(.), T/nat i:i
P [L(.)<p < U[ : ]el -y O_cl
After m= santo, le is obj..': ',, x:i,. the fimcuons _'/.) and U',,) yie:ld uvo number% I and u that mratimm
ills confidenc, interval o:t ':_vei (I-y).
Some corduzion arises n: !;:,r_ng the inu_emicm of*.:!-_i_;:c,r._-xd_ce inrm'vak Its intmv, vmd_,m is
as follows: Prior to obtai. _;i:_: the sample., it can be., sra,:: .:. Lh._)tt_e probability that the _r_ obtained
will yield an mtmrv_ (l,e, :c'.nratniag the unknown par_!me.r._" p is (I._. Nora that a_crth¢ .¢=r_Io
is obtained, the vaiue_ l _,:_',i_,_are fixed and the inte%-_ (_',u) e.ithm" cot)tal.._ tim point p or not (i.e.
probability 1 or 0). Anot"_ :r way of ioolcL-ag at this wc_: _,l_:![he _o obtain _¢vea-ai random samptesX/.
X2 ..... X. and genm-_:t_: c_ne cvnfidenc, interval ¢_i"_,_ve! (!-y) for each s___r__=[e. Then. it is
expected, on the average: i_.:_,:ti.n the tong run of sampt<_'_,. '.,l_:il:100(1-7)% of the obtained intmvais
will contain _e actual vat !t,:_,::,fp.
A., 2
Severai memods are avails_hie to esmbi/.shconfidence/_mi=. The so c_!!_,_ "stad=ical m¢_hod" [1]
is used for this case in which r_= prooabiliv/dismhution, of the _,.,_tor is known. The method
consists of finding two funcnons L(.) and U(.), ftmcuons of the random sampie. L and U are
found by solving for 0 the following equ_ons:
-_ - Solution e = U(.)
'fl(u 8) & = p=
" Soludon e = L(.)
wh_e T is d_e esr_r_, function of the random ._,mple. If :he variable is discrete (i.c. k can only
tal_ discrete values). ;he ime_s in the above equations wouki need to be replaced by
S_ ;-.-.,, :_a__OnS.
Pt anat P= can be arbia-_nly chosea. _ough they are as_,ly chosen m gez certain desirable
proper_le_, for example they may be _e_ so that _h= _ui_g in_al (I, u.) ha_ mi_.__rura
lenrLh. For the preaem sim-_on _ey. will be S_ so tha_ Pl = P= = _f2 for a (l-T)[O0%
confidence inmwak d_ is "¢qmt _i1_".
Odng bark m the pcdm_rim,,.,,-
P= N =_
an ripper bound forp (p,,) can be obad.mxisolving the following equaaon for p.:
f
zj ' p_ (l'P_)_'%_
A Binommi ruble could be used to find p= given N znd j¢, but it is more convenient =o m_ a
man_orrmdon into a continuous variable F-diszz_._.. =ing r.hefollowing relazions:
_) The Biao_,' is z_lazedto the Incomplete Be= Fuzz-zion as follow=
:i A-3• • :(
I
b) The [acompic: :::3 :::_LFunction mi._ms _o "d_ !;-_iL_nbution as foIIows:
V ._ 'u,' N
Q(!:i r,, . v.9 - F_b[.P'>+ F] = I_-:..-, _v
" ,t', a-
Vl
with x =
v,+ v : t.= [R_f. 2, p. 945, 26.5.28]
wh=m ,F is a random w.,: '_hlP.F-dis_.ihumd wi_h v ! _1.1d.'./:! cle_'_s of f'_l_m, and Q:I-P, P
Merging tim above mla_:; :.! i;:).toone:
R
Z {snip s (I-p)n'"! ; (:)()'-L-p N-I-i-la _/VI, V2) =_ ]_ .... _,_.*_._ 1_[-11"4,]_ _VI, V2,)
Smll.
with v,,,, 2(N-a+I s.nd v _: 2a
N
N
!
p(Y/v_, v :9 = Y/2
when= Y = ]'P" r÷i
--.: ..... ,. 2N-2f aria v:= 2f÷2
P. N-f
All that is nct_le.d is a vT,,;_.:_.:i' from th_ F-distributiqr, ('/_ _)_gi _2 degrees of freedom) whose
_.i,mwla_'q'O _ _.q ?, '.ii I:ttal: is:
LL 1Y = F..(_-2f;2f+:::: .....
/I" Pu N-f
A-4
Now, soivingthe _uanon for p_.
(l+f_
Pu"
(1÷f) + (N-O F,/_2N-2f; 2f÷2)
Maidng ttse of the known recitm_-al rotation for the F-discribulion:
1
Y'_,,,;,,0 =
So the fmat vahm forpu is:
P U ""
(N - t) _-(_._- f) .F_.,/_2f+2 : 2N-2t')
Now an analogous procedure is followed for _¢ lower bound ofp (Pt).
equation has to be solved:
Q0'/v =, v:) = l-p(Ylv=, vz)=Y_
[
where Y=-_.: : vz= 2N-2f+2 and v:= 2f
P, N-_4.1
Solving for Pl:
Pl =
f
f ÷ (N-f+l) ._"i.,/i(2N-2f+2:20
Or equivalently, using the mziprocat reJarlnn far-,,he F-disa-ibtnion:
pl m
Cf ._'_:f; _-2f+2)
(N-f÷l) + f .,¢',_2f;2N-2f+2)
In d_ case me following
A-S
...... ._11.... ....2 ... --'"
V.- f
P=R"
Pt"
f &::.!!.,
..... ,"' .- 2N..=r+2)(N-f+t) + f .v ;.,v_-f:
(N-
,(2f+2 : 2N'-2f)(I +f) 3:'_ .,,:
0 + (1 + :!:::it-"l.,A(2f+2 : 2N-2f)
where:
A
P
f
N
Pt
&fv,, vz)
-- fd......,'*t.. on-del:Ia,a,-_ DfODaJaJli_ uc.i_l.l: CSt.i.,.r_te-
= ml: :'.:1_,." o1:dea:r,.and;r_latodfaSt'ft.. :".s
= rl13;:i;i_e,',°of dean,",an_ over which _he f f_litures occun'_
= _i. i ii'_::..._n-derrm_d tx'obabigu_ It.. ',_tm"cor_6dence hotrod
= feS. ;:!:.'::..on-demmm probabil_ _._,pae" ce,t'zfidence Ix_,z,,,_d
=, ptt, ]:,?_xa:rll:iie of an F dtstribut/.o_: _:,,dth _:t and v2 degzx:es of freedom
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A.ffa TIME RELATED FAILURES
For the earn of _ ;tim failu_:s, a ¢on_m,_n practi_ to =er_orm a plant or vchi¢t_-sp_-ific ct_
• _nt*ysis is to count _. vt_mt_- of fzih--ts, for a era'tam pop,arian of sire n. that occmxm during a
cm-r_,_ ffxtd pm_od of time., if failed items art r_. lar_ or _pairett "imm_e[y" _t= faih=t, ar_
_as_n-ning that faitur_ occur m_ntiy and a_ a constant rme in _ across differmtt items, thin1
for any given imm (and i= corres!_onciing reptac,m___ts if it fails) a Poisson proceas is gener,_t__
D_A,_;_nga r_nan,n w,4-Mt Xi reptt_erning tit, r,,w-t-erof .e-ailme.s for th_ i_ item. XZ-_otlows tt_
poisson distribution, that is, :-_"
X a,_
O, t)
P(Xi = x) = ._t .._x! •
% P
,- /
With the numb_ of faLtur_s for each of theniter_t, a ratadora sample X 1, Xz, .... X. is obtained.
To _rim_rc me failur_ rat=-t fi'om me reformation v,,_,ide.d by the samite, tht m_thod of m,_mm=
likelihood, is used. The ti_eiihood function is:
Nov/finding the maximma for LOC,(LJ:
LoS (L) = -. _. t+ £ x ilog (X t) -_ !og (xi!)
i=l i"l
8 ,L°g(L) = -n t+
8X
_,dti
-=0
tllg _t
.t T T
So thu point _'stim-tor for k is obtained dividing the total aumbct of failures by the totaJ tirng
exposure, i.e. a t = T.
It i$ noted that & is also a random variable, and being th, st= of independent poisson processes
and assuming n a,d T fixed and known. X is l:_sson c_u'ibumd also.
:i
A*7
OF POOR_LA_
The ¢,u_c,_'ponding con:i! _:.:m,7.e mmTv_j can bc f,=_md :_:.-..a.._m.-..ilar fashion as for p, _he faiImc, on-
• For th: .pp_ bound A=, _i!:,-. _:_1owing _l_mcrn has to _:c soived:
_. ( _.,T ) ' c'X'T = :_,"
_0 S| " ::'.
Usiag the following z-.._:: i,:_._t:etween tho Poi_son am'l ::!_e:Ch[-Sqtmmd cUs_'ibudo= with n degz_s
of fxe._om:
V
2
V
- 2
_ca_g this miado:;r i,_ :he'. on_iaal e,quamm:
Q_XaT/v=2 f_ ' = I- P(2 XuTIv=2 f+.2}=_'.7
p(2_,_T/v=Z f* ,',,-_.l-
Now solving for _,:
X t-._ ",_: f'+ 2)
_, ,_[.:
For the lower bo.nd _, t/:,i:::v..:lm_tionto soiv¢ is: •
|
 xT
Using the _t_ti__. to _a CI ,,.:-_.,'q_m.,_:
Q(2_.tT/v=2f) ::: ! .....P(2,% t T/v=2f)-- I -'_y2
P(2 X! T / v=2f) = ,..
[Re.f. 2, p.941, 26.4.21]
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Solving for 2_:
2T
T
2T
2
2T
wheze:
ORIGIN_,L PAG_ I$
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A_: CARP ..A Corn_::tte_-Tool
CARP (Compumrized A :
, t'a.i/ur_ d_ £t was desire'
ff_raanalysisp_jec'm T_:
:__!,,';is of Reli_flit7 Pm'_m_: :::s_ is • computer code for manipulating
::_ ;:_vSA_C _ has evoiv_ _ver s_verct years in support of reliablli_
: ,n._l._ fc_Imcs of CARP imci;: ,:i,:::"
1, Tdezance :!::F,:.'._rfnn of
2. Der.ez_in_.:i _,.l of piam:-sp¢c_t_c f,-d.h._:-_ :.:':xz_:s(point _srirn_r_.s for maximum
4. Bayesian _.'q':,T:"a:m_gusing conjugams
5. Aulc_a_c !:: ::I:_;_w a gc_.cric
Fcan_es 2 and 3 are pe_: ,:i:_:'_.:d.following the met.bod.:,k)!.,yexpla,incclia d_ta.flin _¢ pr_,vious
sections.The onlythingthi_t:_._wortt_mentioning ._.sr._,"'_-'ne_ev_ _e number offa.ilu,tcsob erves:[
is zero, CARP uses rmmi_.: "'_ f_iture_ f'--0.33 to ObmLi=m..-'_pcint ¢srim_.es,
Fcgmre [ was extensively '. :;_:¢:tin dd_; ncpor_ and desc_,,:s speci_ azren_m
TOLERANCE AGGRF, i:',i.,!:.TION
Aa aggregation _ is _:_'._:;-,'.dto combine _,,;dple dz_a s;c,t_._ into a single _tim,,_. CARP is
ab.l_zo pcK?,._ flds aggre_::r!r.>n into a composite esti_,_: :_:__'.xumg a.revhrdqu¢ which preservesthe
wxerance oz me mdividu_l :,:-:._ sources. This agg_g_. _._,_:i_cb_iqn¢ consists of _ szeps as
follows:
Fit _nd/,4dv,:_/,.__._,.._,_.es
Each individual d.m sourc_ '.',: a given component typ_ _.md._z_lt_ mode is fiucd _ a log-nomi
dislribubon described b,: ':.;.:':_e, di_ and logarilhrr_i:: '_:anctzr.d deviation. "t'be log-normni
dLsmbudon isused becau_:: :il;_ easy zo dea_vim concFr,:-a_ior_zLLlyand is welt suimd to ex'__.___'_ng
umu:rmnty bounds (via ¢_'z._:,.,,::,:,"hinge fac_rs).
tndividtml dam sources pro,"i,t_: ._r_fica_ izd'Ot'n_or, iz_ _t '_.ariP.,ry of styles which form two broad
(1) somc¢_ thalp, ovide; :.'I;.._:!._.'ibudorm.iinfon_rinn
(2) som'ccswhich _,,.,,¢i_ i;.,_t!_dIur_ cotzr_ and,e_omz'r.;_s
The methods used to fon._: :J:c log-normal unccn:ainr! d_stdburion depend upon the v2Te of
inf,,,,,,_ion provided.
Dismbufionai In;_,:m_iom H,..,'Te, distributional infmr_.:_.rJon i_ specified. (e.g., mean value., poim
estimate, upper and lower ::::,:'_::_.'.'.ntflcs.c_c.). Such infc:i:mte.nonmay be d/fficult to assess s/nc_
sometimes generic dam sc. _:'_::_ do not provide sd_qua",= informanon to interpret me supplied
A-tO _P
ml., • f'
vnlucs. (For axam_tc, do me suppRrai vaiues consider bo_ rt_r:_ co_fide.ncc and tot_2 Is the
poim value a dismtration mean, m_-- or racx_? W'b.sx dismbutionat type is used?)
F_I-_ Coum _ Exposure: This s_ie provides thc to_l _.mt_- of faflu.._s that have occun'ed
over. a spcci/_ed time pcrimi or n,,m_x_- of de_._ts (or. a_mmanvety, cycles or m_is). Them are
three issuea of concern in using this styte of irdo,-m-_on:
a. It is not possible to ascer_i- whvfl_" or noz the inform_on is consisw, nt with an
aS._i_,,!_otz of constant f_ih_ rates _.rt co_ ¢.;1-'r_.-on_ pmba_llri,_ as
the _m_ (orcte,-.-,4__? betweea failm-es is given.
b. Geaer_ rhm somces v/pically do nvz .=_,, ff _ ,4_m has been _t_]ly ce,_.
If tim last faLiurc _ exa_y at tim en_ of the exposure period. _¢z_ the ti.t= is
uammsared. If failures were coumed until a preset muff f_ih,-c con-t was reacJu_
• _t the dam isType I cenmrcd. If failureswere countcxt for a preset t_m_.period.
d_ea the dam is Type LI censored. Knowiedge of the censoring scheme usezi m
ccdl_-'_",,he_ is necessarym provide m_n_-g_ul _ty esfi,m,_-s.
c. Only failure ancl exposure minis may be _ven even though the accompanying
explanatorymxt of a genmc f_,'_so_ may __m thatthe po_._!_on is
hct_gcneous. In suca cases, the inform-r_on appem's to have a high inform_,_on
_..- content (due to the Lm'ge number of failme_; however, there is no way to sepm-am
the,h,= cortfidcnce _m the ei_ to_.
Form Aeem_am Di.va-ibuHqlI
The,4.,.so_c_ can be combined intoa single es_i-_-- by form/-S the wetS;hind sum of _ input
g_ a_m mmce'$ diswibmion aragon:
N
p[xaxl= m e(X ax]
b,,t
whem:
N - n,,-.-he_ of b,Cnoric _.,_ sourcm
P [X _; x ]= a_ __,m'ibution _nc_ion of d= agSrega= _,.beiv/
ea_= weight of the i_ generic d_.__ mtm_
P [ X i £ x ] = distribution fua=ion of the lot gem:tic ,4,,m mutr.e
aggn:gation method, developed by SAIC for EPRI duriag the Component Reliability
Parameter Studies and based on me work of Stone (3] a_ W'mkkr (4], ensures that r_.,t toleran_
is preserved. By "smearing" the uncertainty of all input generic data_ sources, an aggregate
uncertainty bound is created which properiy encompasses Uhe entire range of unctmamty. Eaeat
input generic d_..m_isassumed to be Iog-normally distributed.
A-11
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aggmg-sm distributian it "h._: weighted sum of the mi::_: _n,.'._,_., De___,_ntt of the aggrcgas=
dismbunian pe_cvntiies .: i: c..a.lly r_qui_s a numbs' .._,.._Iu_._n. Using me vr=vious assu,,,iJdons
•(i.e.,.,log-normnlly dis:r:i':::_:eainl:mtdam sour_=s a::_:i=::Tz.a.i,,v¢ights),rlm following eo2m,_'on
whelm
l,=mc_i_,nofr.h=i_ inptlq:la_a.sourc=
= logazi_mie,sr_Fd,_._:I:.:_dafionof the i_ input,dm;; _;c.._1)J,.'¢¢
Lattvr cqu,ltion is ._:,l _::_:_(i.=., the value, ofx_ d_:_.;_.:zk_='._ for a given value of p) for dm ith
pcm=ntit¢ (p=O.05), the. _':¢:d.ian Ip=O..'50), and t_= 9:;;_:I_pex_er_e (pffiO.95). Them t_ounds az_
suk=_:lu=_tiy convvrn=d :. ] ::_ a log-normal dismb_mo_
To f_lff.__ t_ of d_ a_ili;:i_'t'.l_.Zmldislzibutionsin.rr'_:.'ic¢_d.PRA un=='mimy ¢al_,,l_,_ons,_ is
c_r_,__i m a tog.r,o_-=0._ ,list'ribmion.
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1990
_w
FOl_-_ro_ ._
sevm'al years in suppo_:'t :_I!_tlr r_Li_LE_. _rz az',_:,,_._ :_roi,_rs. S._IC will not be responsible
for any probiems res_,i,i_!i,: _m _e: use of CA_,_J: ::at ,_4IL it ensure r_ CARP user_ are
su_ All rcason,_,,: '!_"t_ques_s for help wfl_. b_.: h_:acz'cd in d_e inz_'es_ o£ _zrr_ner _n_,_
C,_,.P, it's ldgodrhrn_%. ,' _:l:._.__n._.y._,'isin gel_._d_
OF POOR.QUALITY
UrNWODqCr ON
CARP was d_vetcrp_l by SAIC for _ _n_+ysis Of f_.tm'_ _._ ci_u-ing PRAs and other _l+:_h'_]_/
smcLics, tn r_ cur_r_ version, CARP can ag_ u_. to 20 goner= tt_t_ sources, assuming t_a_
_11 input sout_..s are Log-noem_l or Paissan c_m.. sc(s and that =he dcsizecL output is log-nacm_
Additional fean_s mc4uda:
t. Dem'-_,.n__on of pla.m-sp¢_c _ rams. given Poisson d_t__sets("t,,-'-_,,-_-
d_-_-,,_ _'in£_:,,,_-'_nn),int..ladingunc=rmmty es*irn_,_ using Z = or F-
distributionbounds:
2. Baycman nvd_ng using conjugams.
3. Aumm_rir.,_y access a generic d_ base.
CARP is writtenin thedBASE M Plus prong langu,_=, and was compiled using C._ppcr _
(S,rmm_ '87 Vernon).
CARP REOUIREMENT S
I. IBM PC, X'f, or AT (or I00_ cn _mp_afibl=)
2. PC-DOS or MS-DOS, vczsimt 2-0 or hi____,
3. Mast have 384K of RAM avail_hl¢use the DOS cc....... and (CHI_b"K tnfindout
ff you have enougL
4. The CONFIG.SY$ fde should have the foIlowing (as a mlnimnrn) ._rnm_s__tS:
Fff.FS = 20
baff=_ =, 8
5. CARP must be able to find COMMAND.COM. Use SET COMSPEC Lfac=am=ry
to identify the concct pad= and d.dv=.
6. HP _et pr_,tm CARP witt _,obabty not work as weU on other priam's since
as k sends ESC s_uc=ccs m sere= f_n:s. However, CARP will pmvid_ ph_ mx_
f-de our_ :ha= can be sen¢ to any prinmr.
7. Ifthe generic dam base isto be astalwith CARP, a hard d_b isreqt_ed.
oF.  oos qu w
' .. ,2.' " "
_ALL ,ATTON
Six file, s co,._t_,_se r_.;: T:A._P sot'w_.m:
3. SAIC_I :Jttl_', "..heg=m_ic ch'tr.,_,b_,;c.
4. COMTI'_, _E.F.NTX, CODP, SI,IqYX _Lnd._:D."T].NTX,inde,xcs for SAJ2C.DBF m
".-.;..u L"!?,
CARP OPERATIOi)) i
CARP is me_-drive_ __:::,._intended = be r.t%v to _se. C_f course, software is never reaUy user-
_"_!._. hem are so:tH: ,;(_des through C._R.P. C_%!_.Puse.= 3 b,_c in_.r_es to allow your
comro/. _ _c keyi:,:-:z_d.All _:_nd heavily c_ t.h_cursor. The posiuon of _¢ cursvr is
11= _rs'r and mast _ii::_::_!,/type of f_r_._ =s the .,__._Lhble m_u. You will be _ w/_
saverai choices _n_ s_;:_:::_tf,_,s z_p_ying i_fma_r!._n,, l_=e am _'_-y ways to m_i_._ a cho/ce,,
t_e sir,_|_c being to _!.,_)_._:the fn-_ _m=r of d_i_ c_ s_:!e:cfio_. In m_u wi_ no _ fi._
<Eam-_ key_m_,e, ".¢'::._:_can z_so scull thron_+ r_,._,:;_.':m_ar_ using r_ _',,.,,¢s or a w-=_ of
OrbS' k:ys fl_scfibed i: [':_b[e I.
The second _ ....... _n i::::)::f_tc_i used to answer ._i_i_ _csrions _ghou_ the code.. I£ the
answer = it= que,_ior, i,:, _'es, simp_ s_'gr_ _,¢ 'Y_ k=y _r if r.h¢ _sw_r is no, the 'N" key.
Tim _ inw.i:L'_= mq';::i;"_,_.;th_ inpm of dsm. T_ _:'_,e./nwhich to type the da_m_is/_;_,r__ by
a _h_,!_g¢ m b_p'o'.u_.::,:,::d.or. CARP has nurn_'or:: chm,_s and babm(:_=sto m,.._.zre_ _ data
B ¢mt_-d cm_-cfly, (: ..!{.., :h_a_-_s are not =c._'::,:_d. :_ nuzn_ _) buz it cmnot l:¢=vem
$cTeen I
F,,.,.,_ DOS, type CAI;):::' t,::, ;;ran exe:eution of CA_;I I._. I _.takes some dm¢= to load CARP/rim
m_e___ry, so be p_c_t_:ii: i_ e.ny k=y to leave rh=: ,.,,,=tc:ome screen, once it is displayed.
CARP also h_ a quick ,:_:_:..."y.nux_.. TyI_ CA_r'v_ .::fil¢:._r_> and if rbe file exists you will be
in the _ mem,i (S_:: =_:i_). R"CARP does nol;fir_ _hc ill=,you willb= ,*_d ff you waat to
cr=a_ ti_ ill= (Scr_ .'.' ::).
Screen 2
After _¢ wetcom_ _, you vnll be _k_d to c_oose one of ch_ following:
bo Entc¢ a oro_ect nn_*, You wffi be provided widl spac_ to enmr or edic
drivt/pafla sp_c and a _le _¢¢ for eith=r a n=w project or an cximiug project.
Nora mat th_ sp=:: am in DOS fo-_, "-.gr
d:XP£AXDATA\
Ftle PRA_CR3 is not necet:a_
will add _DBF
Note: This could be_-c_lcm if them are other dB=¢ fil== in the drive/par& you entt_d.
If the drivedpath/filo qm= you enmred alreatiy _x_t$. CARP will load it. Otherwise. you
will be 8-qke-dto verify that you want to cream a n=w fiic with the sp=c you enttmtL
C= Con_nue _,_,k on an L,as_e _rofecr:- Upoo sc_=ug d_ option, you will b=
_ovid¢_ with a =cro,,b_. m_ of CARP _ Mo_ th= tumor m the dedr_
sn_ _teet using the ¢_m,r icy.
You ere now in CARP's m,,i, _ wC_t, is _own in Pi_tc t. F, om the menu, you =c.__c_s_
ali the _.-_.s of CARP.
a.
be
C.
d.
e.
The first two choices, a_ena ana edit, allow you to add a record and edit an
_g recozti re,pectivety. The edit option wiU provide a s=ro, thle list of
_._onen= that have et.,x_y bee= ex_ into tim _,_._.. The append,option
will :cqui_ that you enter"component type anti failmc mock: codes.
Note: _ in CARP =re keyed to tt:= compo_emt type cod=; mat is. oniy one
mc¢_ may be cntmcd for _ type code.
_.;_.* opuon will send you to Scrccn 4.
Tim d_/a¢ opuon gives you the capability to dete= selected compommt
typejfa_ure mode comb_-.rions from the ---!ysis. _,-on d_e,_d in this step
is not _covcrabl¢.
The generar_ report opdon send= you to CAI_s report writ=r (Scr=m 6)
The Load generic t_,,,e option scads you to the @n=ri¢ d=r. base - $=eeu 7.
The renwn to pro)ect _eieczfon menu tctm_ you m Scmett 2, f_m which you can
st_ !:_m'.:w _jcct or _ to F::'_S, All :_liysis is sav_i (or d_tm_i) az mis
poi_l:
Scz_ 4
CARP's rl,,_ _n_!y.!:i_ :_ conmo_-..d from mJ_ sc:'..:_'._:_ a_fm'md to as t_ 'Ge_' s_ The
scrim= shows _-d al: _::._t_ cd.i_t_ of the compon_T_: ::_az_r._O, _ rood=, accspts plato ._F_
,_=-, mad =n,_ws th,:: :,_;:.rto c_am_t soma of rh-_:_;_m;dc_l _-_!yscs. To =hL% CARP into the
t_itiag =md_ s=l=c_ ]!'.:.-'.':'_:from th_ gz=tm. =:.e.z,mm .hf.: bm_om of the screta. Defatdz choiGss have
bee== pt_.__d m the ._!_:..:/_::.,,ia_Up&_g arm F'maI "::_,,:.-vm:_of the scr=sn. The Baycsiaa LTpet_fing
. _,.m .,,,a Bay_sia_ Upd... _ ca/¢nla-_'onsho_section _qu=_s a si:: :[::i.,,Y or N CEcs or No) for. _:" " " '-"
b¢ pm'fu,mtcL The "" t:,ice,.s for _.c finaI basi.% c,' *.he :x_c_,_=_ad_d fin_lsra__tdc m_:
p - pl,,t Sp_: :.::tic
0 - Gc===_
B - Baycsi=:,
The Pn:_ ._a_:,, :_r fia_, vtdu_ to a iogt_::t_.'..d di,_'rnbution (MN-EZ_ prcsc_,cs da= ¢=nu-4_
mmt=acy of da¢ di=_,i!! _r_ort. The optional sch=m_: (u,., ._ Immm'a_ t/as =pttmi of t.h= dimzibmio_
Them= schc=_'J am :I:_:,.c:dbmi i_ Appendix 2-L 8r'!3"_i.ng ,d'm lmy F2 v_uvidea sore= harp.
'I_ _a bar at r.h;=:bottom of the same= pt'_":id.¢.'¢ _,_e _ca_amj" program comzot opting.
t,_,my, CARP is _ _1_._disptay mode Bad d_ o;,_.ie..,:=iock_ G¢_-__*_'aLfive t-_mh,'atmi s=z=m=.
and Sa,,'=. $_;_:-::::cn o_ or= of d_= fi_ mc_,'_:s you m th= sc=t== con_g tho_
,I,,-, somc=s, w_e._,. .. :,......,...,,._._crJb=du_=r Scw, tm ._:,. SeJ_mg Edit shifts CARP to tim s_-_=
mode., _n__ s=i_-'tion :'.,!a at-,mh,:md scr=_ or ti_ ,Ge:nt,_'=dsc'c_'a ,;;,,ws editing of ,h,. scx==_.
Th_ Save option sav:..!_:i._e.data to di_ ann.r_t_:,:_,you tn tim main m=nu, Sc_.au 3.
One= in tlm _ moo,,:., '_,",. ,.._cmtm-to-sctt_.move.rr',n',.:i._=as d=scz_bed above. Edi_g tim g,'.-____'al
scrmn is de,s_bed b_i,'_u,'.. Two new optiom_ :ov_ a_m': AG Clq'I'L _nr_ CALC. AG
comxoLs the agB_ga_.i '.:::t :_r_ods from the _ _v_i]_,a]:_[c choice:
T - Toleranm_
A - AdtHm_;:
O - Geom_m_:
_,rt the weig, hri-g m'=::l:,s.d.._wid, choices:
Lls= su.t_li_ =:,,:_:it#ts (CARP willnorm_'ir,_::h_,sr,.)
V_.a.,'imc¢-rc_ ,:! w,_ighra(Inversr, iy pr_c_ir, r_).
C,_G.,C option be! ::i::_ din =tgBx'¢gation. Bay¢=si_'_:_ updating tu_ od_ n_.c=ssary ca/m,l._io_.xt_
Upon com#mion of ::'_.:,"'_cuiationoy u will be,_:,.,:_.x_:=,,..,,,4to tim Oe.u==_ scz=_ in d_ display
moda. ..
LJ
Screen 5
an: 5 sc_em, tabclcd I to 4. 5 to 8, 9 to t2, I3 to 16, a_L 17 to 20. These show each
generic 8ate_ som'cP., aad can be assessed by f-,z'st locaRng adc, siz'cd sca'cen with --_ or (-- keys men
•.L These scrmas opcrat= idcadcatiy.
Fnch gcnm'ic tam'co looks ]i_.
D MEAN LOWER M'I='r_L_N' Ut'_'P.K EF
I
;-_-'_ I 5.65-07 4.04-07 7.35-07 [.000
5.55-07 4.22-07 5.57-07 7.35-07 1.3
Note: NUREC_.1740; DATA FOR AT.T. REACTOR TTI_S
Note: Fa_]m'erazesa-d paramr-tecsMUST BE enu:acd in the fom'_,
e.g. 5.876 x 104 _ 5.87 - 03
In order to edit dm 'No_' field, you m,_ move the cm'sor m the area and sacks FS. This wW
allmv you m type aotes doc'_-,_=ing your _-,,lys_. S=tke <_..z_/.> W to exist _,a save f_o_
dmno_ field.
TI_ report wrier ¢ontrol scraea provides a series of Sczvilnhte menus to comml tim :apoct
opdo_. Tim options selccmd are contiaaoasty displaytd. The initial amnu aiimws you to select
one of tim following:.
Options
-Go
-gcmm
,O_ons: Sehmtiag options willlead you m a sexes of choices on how m cong.gaz¢ your report.
The fu'g choice is between ",he s,....... _y and de-rai!t_2 _F'._ (shown in Figuz¢ TBD.) The
s.;,--...-,7.._ a/ways covers allLs'pe codes, bat you will be n=pziz_ m choose a scope (final
sm_!__dcs oniy or aLl stazLsdcs) for goat report. The d=m_]_d raport wiR al/ow you to report on
all type codes or a single, setcctcd ,--yp¢ code _ it wiLl provide a chc_ce o,_ :he scope of the
report. The 0-_! choice is whether you want text (Figu_ TBD) and/or mtcrvai bars (F]gm-e
T_D).
Prim The p, Lat=r options allow you tO _ out'put m a I-Icw[_R P,_,d (HP) L=_et+, HP
Laser Jet, OK'lCrpl_ or a fi_. T_ Lasa_-I- opdon rcqui:_ that you writa a bamh fi_¢ to
dowt,Joad soft fonts. The HP t.,_e_,_+ and [-_ La.serjet support bot_ test and inmrval bars
(graphics).Other _ gcn_-aUy can be confie;,_.dto printoat the eext.but willnot support
the/n_'v_ bars. Poszsr.,',:k:z l'._._'t_"s arc no_ suppc_-r_, Thc,_outpu: ¢.- also be d,/zeen_ to a
You can use your own _,_ :::_.]:_occss_" m" _m:L_:: ._',:_:i_._:,'_.-c_.._d 17r'_tcr to produc_ m:l_.cUv¢
OUtlet..
__-' T__; you to dry: :_:'._Lin:cnu
base. (SAIC.d_f) The i_i
Search sn'a_g-j I asks yc,
arc titled, m _ d=,_ bas_
coding sch_n_
scheme is estabH._h_ a_J
7, 8 and 9 am d_ '._::Ln:_._.:tto assist you in _,:_i ::nt_y :Vmd/ng genre'it r_/n d_s
::::_ I_ner_: d_ sc_cb, s=:_:_:_ _:_,_._ h_, S_ for accessing lh_ ,_
_. ;_:',.input a _e cede and. e _..._h_ raod_ code.. The appro_ fields
: '_r. are not _guiafl7 upda_'r_d_ T_esc fi0Ids arc b_cd. on an _._iysts
:._d arc your r_sponsib_U_' _:_ a_n.r_irl lT.1_e_a ri_,_ coding
_-..::_,,_monr types. Cho0:,,_.: _:__orn_oneuc He and. yc,l: '_x'i[_ be _'_'_,d to choose _,-,ia.i aw, fl-h1_
f_nm-e modes. You witI rt::,.._ ,_ir.h_ be given zl_ op_,_, c_f r_g the _,4_'m_,-,,_.,n by r..hoosmg
G,...u a smlecdon of conzp:_:_ _:.::,:_:subtypes or. in some c_ _. ,Vo_,_will be _y pl= ___ i.._ Screen
8 for choosing subtypes,
Screen 8 A!!ows f'u_"/d,_,,,n _i_icm:ion ofdze _on=_.. u_:i_: _ compumm_ type anrib,.___:
&wi1-_ks ch__- appear it:_,L_scrollzbl_zncnm in th:_box c,n th_ 1¢f1: _ of r_ sense.. The:
<e.nm_ key is _ _o mt _",_,;s_Ic_/ons inw and out _,:"_he box on _a_ tighz _ of rJae
When the box on the ri_:_:::,_r_ainsthv.pio_ _aztr_._:_,_.ci/_,.the Fl0 key to move to zhe next
scr_n, screen 9.which di_!_]_y,_the gc.ncrindata sour_:._:.
Screen 9
$_'_n 9 is designed to di:;!:: _c._"_he g,_n_c _ so_m:c_ _h_t:t_v.oct the critcri_ speci_d in scnseus
7 ..d 8. This is the final _::n::_nbofoze lo_ding _e _._ _.m_:.c_n,. into ,he caimflzfion pordons of
CARP (Screen 5). No_e _....r,.,,_:..,._.._g the righta_c_w key ,_'o,:,__,n view .d_._-nat infar-._._-and
a=m from r.hesoi_c_c £:_:i._!,_,_scac_n, the dclc_ kc_. _,_.__gglc source.sinto a_._out of the
m_._ys/s.Deleacd or rcm_.:,.,_._ourcr_arc maziccd with a_'_a_',r:zr/._Ic.Onc_ you i_tveselecmd
desi_d sources,scri]m'L' ._:,_ ,_Ithe dar_.intothe caic_':.:ariocz.lporcio_n__of CARP. Acl,.li_.l;y,
the 'R' key is availableu:,_"_r_:m_re $cr_n 6 and.srazr_bth_ daza base.
Uq.
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APPENDIX A: CARP
,d,___st always bcues _,_ s_,,_n_ for one sourc_ 1+,,,, cc_,,4 b_ co___,_'sd _,,i A
crcd_Io _ of _,_,',u mu_ PJ'_,.,- ,.,,,-_, of r.he foIlowinlp
• Dam ¢onfide_
• Dam relevance
Dam miu_....,_-__deals wid_ d_ ,_i_ in laca_n (i.e., one sou¢o gives a bi_- v_
often comes _,:_u., s_!y di_ '¢_i_dng Or S_.-_,-_ as., ..... :._ -,d r,,_-,. ,,,.,4 by in
and bo,,,,,_$ values ¢o_.-_._ d:_ pom,_,d ,__ Inc_:asing e:e sample size will nu_
redme _ _ mlerazce, a.ud_a,,,,_!y co-ed only iucrem_ it..
The dam co_ dv.,ds with _he ,,,_e__. errm" sssocia_d wid_ haw wetl the
The ,_ rctcv_..___ deals with the _,_,e,uv,_; of dam. _uz_'icalb], sourc_ can be
w__,,4 based on _ pm'ccived _ievanc¢
CARP _ the percem:iles from d_e input cm',_t_ve dis_bu_on func_ns (C_Fs) to _.,_
at the perce_}*_, of the agszegam _udom B_ ag_,_'x, tl_ input disa.ibmims
have beea fit to tOoT,,'..... _1 for__: The method wou_ work for any CDF wi_ a _ f,._m
miudmt or a,,m,_: appro_---_,_., but _-,"_ to_. ...... ._ is zhe most cu ...... m fom_ for
pub_hed 8_.u_z'h::eb,m. _ has only been prolp',,-,-_,-,'d to h,,,',,_e the togno,'.__,-___
dislri_ CARP will imral_,ely de_'_- a p_ of the agg_gam dismbudon using
a recumve se__g____witheach inputCDF. A Newmn-P _,,_ph_ntype imrationisused m solve
the fol_wing _m.r__n for the _kaov_ _ as foIIOws:
PRECEDING PAGE BLANK HOT FILMED
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The pos_¢ _ __ _ _ _!_l_:ed by:
wlse_
K_
The posmrtor d._zibzzzion is dzen_ ¢oa logno,.,._ cfisu'_ucion.
T_ransformmion and _n_r of DZswflrauon,_
In scvez_ ,m_,-,,-mzpordom of the code. CARP neexis to _,.,,,_ a C_F inzo another
fmzczioaal form (logn,.,.... _,*) which prcsex'vessome gr.nczal propc_=s of ±c orJ_n_1 CI:_.
GA_.... ,' m Lo_!
Following a Bayesian up_,.,, a ER.'.... ., _._c_a (I"(a,l_)) is a'-ansfotmai into -, lom-_-_--_
(_t,_ as follows:
U
7
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Two p_,,-',,,+_ (any 2 ':',.:_:+, m.e_+ _ el, va'_i_.+l_+_,or pet,'ce_zi_) are _
Upper, _ocus_ on the e:::,_.:_d.i_gvaIue_ and allows +!:_;_:=_rrat e._h,_,_ to shift. As ,twin in
_-I_ 3. t_, _ pti,++z,,++,a lm'i<_W toward =.+_g +_,.'+,boumti,_g valnes or'l_ m'x'_ '_m;£_.
Note ttmt ff the bouad_ _::+uc_tavailable., ,.hLsmcd_¢_.,+_tl:_ s_f+ m the logic encc,_assed
_bown i_ I_glm_ 2.
Ui! i
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Appendix D:
Estimating the Exponential Failure Rate from Data with No Failure
Events
Au_sr, 24, 1990
V
TO:. Gary D,___m, _v,,_ _._
FROb_ Dr. Ma,-_:.. __,,_ PeteAp_---:
SUBJECT: Zero Fmn,,Pes
We reeenrJy used CARP to an_._yze some inr_., v_ f'_,, .-e rar_ dam where zero
failures had occurred. The purpose o_" t_;= ,_,_ is to explore r_he _-tA_,_*_-
b_-_-d how CP, RP apparently trea_a such a s'_n_.
The basin _ work on ¢o-_,_. __ 1;;._::_ for test da_ _om an
exponen_i d_stribu_on (_z hnu_d) _ 8n,,_ by Epstein =_.&_Sobel z, _.ey
showed _._e_ i_the var_.b_ _r
2r .. 2nT_ (I)
where,
r = n,_,_her 0£ _'a_ures.
n - number on test,
T = tes_ hours,
1... f_ mm
},,,,4_ an Z 2 di_txibution with _r degrees o£ freedom a_ _d_e lower confidence bo_m_
_nH (_r÷_) degrees of Ereedom at the upper co_,,_ bo_,,_.
l_'oblem Wit_ Zazo .E':::.i!:;:t:r_
{.,. • . (_)The problem with ze:r ::, ,._].._]uxe._.zs _a= _he m,_:=_::::._.:_:. _.5_.eli_ood es_r,e goes
to zero and _e lower _::,:ct:_._.dence :,ound is no io:n_e.z' _._.ned si.uce r,he number of
degrees offi'eedom of :.i:_,_.'._. d£_tuffbu_on is ze.r.,:_ ':_'_ upper eonSdence bound is
s_l] clearly d-i_ed., zl _.:_ ':t:i_. upper 95% boum_. _ :t '_he var_-_,_e 2nT'_. for a ;(_-
distribuuon with 2 d_l';': _:_.:'_of£:eedom is 5.gSL I !_ir'_i_"_'_" value, the upper bo_,__d
on (;_] is given by,
k < 5.991 :i,!';:g;_ 3
.....-= (m
Since we are _eble tc :!._::_.:.inea iotyRorm_ dis_r_b_.:tL.ic_ with a single da_a point,
there is a di_cuicy _ ::::fi.r._._C_I_T_. Sozne a.u_;_+l:e; s_y ¢o assume one _aHure and
I.
_ate a point esCi_..i!_::,-:,of. the: failure rn_;e u_,,',._ _,_"'. _'elh---, "_a Lipow _ haws
prb_pIes they suggee:: _b_; one use as rJ_e pomP: _:_:b_._ara _-
=TI (s,
U-;"_ r.he vatuu givezl. !: :7'_]quar_ov._, (2] az_ (3_ !i,,_ _..h_. upper co-iqdence N_,_. and
the mean. we een de_,_,: _.:,,iistr_budon.
°
EzperLmenr, s wir, h CAI:I: ::_f_r a spe_ic e=_,,_pie )._. t_ _,he cone_Hon _._,,e, CARP
{1.!also uses the value z _;.[ for the mean a.ud _:i;" I:_ _he upper 95_ conSdenee
The following e_-__ple _;,;.-,_::enmred into r,he CA_.-_:P9r:_'zm_..:"
The input d_. :..i :_r the: first run we.s;
Number of :i_ih_xes =- 0
Exposure ti :_:_,_,-.:67832 hours.
The results are shown i_: '_?a.ble i a_i hand caic_,.._i:c_n_ veri£y tbst the upper
confidence Limit is com_::: _::_._om _- and _e n_.:_:L is from z
L.#
One can also verifs, by r_Iri_ r/:e ra_io of t/Is 95% pom_ to the 50% point orthe ra=io
oftt_ 50% poin_ r_ the 5% point, t2mt t_e error fact.or for a iognormnl]y distributes
distribu_on determined by these two points is appro_r-=r_ly 15. ""
was also repeated by using as input the upper 95% confidence limit and
mean caicuIated from aT and x , _r] CARP computed the same results
which are show., in Table 2 which are iden_m.i with Table 1. Therefore, we
conehuie that in the zero faiture case CARP uses gq_ri_us (2) and (3).
V
References:
(I) Epstein, B. and M. SobeL '_,ife Testing '', J. Am Seatis_. A_soe., vol. 48, no. 26S,
pp. ¢86-_02, September, 19fi3.
(2) Welker, Evere_ and Myron Lipow, _Es_r--_g the E _rponential Failure
from Data wi_h No Failure Events", Procee,1;=-_ 1974 ,a_,,,,.| Re ll.hflity and
Maln__ai_"h_ty Sympo_n_, pp. 420.427.
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CARP -- _A=A X.::!,tv.'.-_IS_.ETI_rL_- P_OY.._
C_nen_ T'/p¢_:i'"__"..,,,me.. A
Failure M_ue .....:,: :Code: 2
Elater-specific.
_ragaEecl gen_.:::..:::
Bayesian up-_at_!::i
CCn_.::.!'.n::,:aJme:Z__'_OFAILURES TRY
_..42-05
4.42-05
2 ,.95-06 4 .42-05 15 ,O
D :/ZAN LOWE_.,
L 4. _I-06
L 1.14-05 " .96,-_:';'
final L 4,91-06 .=°45-(_:'_ " .27-06 i. _0-05 15.0
PLANT-S__ECIII: ;:.:['A
Uni_:s iN _,:,::lemanc__. H for n.=_-_,
_a_sian u}_.::a:;.4n_perf.ommi_: N
e::(:.) :
67832
FINAL
Final bui:_ <,"::,G,BI :
LOqn_zmull :::i-.c:L_almethod uze_h
AGIIREGATI_ DETh 7::,5:
,4_.,l,_:....un_mer_o_ [E,Z,P,U, S) : E
95TH _ EKRCR ILL;_,'>'_.?-. 4. '_.-5 15.0
i,,:i...051.96-07 2.25-06 4./L2-05 !_=.0
F_
1.000
TABLE
Resuhsd"u.._'ing"CA_.t: .c;!h a to_ormsJ disu'_u_=_. _.r t_e ,roseo_'zemfailuras in 67832boux'_
ORIGINAL PA_'E IS
OtF POOl QUALI.'P/
© !li
c_T_en_ Type COd_: A r.'..'.._-.-..,enc. _=,,,_- ZERO F'_'rr_ TRY"
Fa.LI_e _=de _1_o Code; 2 Failure Y_=_: U._._._ _an anct
P!a_u-spscific
In_ez_m agg_u91rc _
A_%,wqZU_¢_ generic
_ayesian up_aU_
D _ _ _ _r_
L
4.91-06 4.42-05
5 4.91-06 8 .44-08 1.2'7-06 I. 90-05
F_n_l L 4.91-06 8 .44-08 1.27-06 1.90-05
15.0
15.0
PI_NT-SPEu_ rC DA2_
OniCs (N for _*_S, H fa= hc_So euc-J :
Number of failures:
ExposuEe (_-_..e o= nua_r of 5mmu:,=s),
E_ZAN _E21ETZNG
Bare,an u_ting pezfo_--_: N
F2_L
AGGREGA2ZCN
M_&N u_1_ 4.91-6 4.42-5 I.OOO
4.91-06 8.44-08 _.27-06 1.90--05 15.0
k_ZO'_: Mean and. _ were calculat:sct Dy u.,_ nff (,-.-.,,..-,. - ( (7.13|/T) ann OLeo: - (3IT) !
ORiGInAL PAeE iS
ORI_',,_AL PAGE IS
oF P_R QUALL'TV
l]g_
RATE FROM DATA_ NO FAILURE EVENTSESTIMATING THEEXPON_TIAL FAILURE
E_cretT L. WtIk_r bly,_n Li_ow
TRW SYstems G_up TRW Systems Group
Redc_,_a 8ezra. Califorme Redonda Bea_. C_d_fornia
D¢_'z'_wn: 411,422, 410
1194
_nm_g_ion
Assume an exOonentm| _allure I_r_llm with unknown oomt_t
failunl rats _. SuPl:Qsethat them am n failures in T o!_ellting l_l't
houfL Th0 maximum likefihood _ unb_lm:l _tlrnaM of X is _,
_ by tee formula1
- niT, n- 0,1.2 .....
This _tim_e is routinely _ ex_01 for the zero failure cam. If no
_il-res occur in t_e tl_, th_ _tirnMe
_-0/T- 0
is mua_|v con_c;e_m_to oe Uhla1_I/_aclorVin so_teof the _ict tha1_it IS
an unoiasu¢_VllUedefJve0 ov the ma:qmum likelihood method. This
poim o! view mflec=l me ;u(_ement W_It I norl-zlm l_lliJUmrate rosily
doesolo_V t=ut_na_the t_t lime. T, hasby chan_ _en too short t_
exhhblt a taih.lnl e,_mlr. Them is no generlllV _l_eO meUiod i_r
hen_ngti, dsarohdh_reproblem, mttm I_l_e, wewfli
• _ome snem_ive approaches, with (mmhm_, on mwh_ modlh'
he maximum likelihood formuk_ whm n ,, ObUt tewe it und_m(j_l
whenn ;_ 1.
The limit Mmt_-_mlmt Rel_onmim tnvoiv_d
In E_rirnat0nqmeCo,,o_,_ Failure tim
Consider first an e;]prolgh in which the mlximum ilk_lhood _ti-
mateJsmo_ified h_r_ _, 0b__torn _ I. Theel_irnl-
_on formula (_n _ wnttlm N
- f_Tl_r form -0
= n/T Jorn - 1,2,...
The ¢*Y-'_;lity o_ n fail_wm in T operating par_ houri is
(X'rl%-_T
f(n,T) " _ , n - 0. I,2 ....
nl
Number of Failur_l
0
nml, 2....
Return to a =onsidaration of _e I_ive _oprom:h in whim d_e
mma.rmnn _ikoJihoob utin'mte is used for ml _ ,Jxoe_ the one in
wh/_h no Jailum o(=ur in a tat tim MT _a_ hours. The Is_nl_r
for _ fli_lrll LIgimn by _. - kiT m k Is the _liue of f(T1, |imm-
a commm tm"nil T or _ value ol_ain_l by sU_ilutinQ the Ipoc_ic
wiue of T in the h_rc_on fiT).
The m'Ol_bH_tim for me _ifform_ valu_ of _ are m foIk_/L
I k_r e-xTn/'r {XT)ne';kT/n I
The mm_ge _ eXl_=md valueof themt;,;.l_' is
E[_| " _ • -xT + X.
"_m wmkmrmeof _ is
¢_= _T2 [ XT.21r_Te ";_T * k2e"XT -k2e "2_T •
,%
Tf_ mmn arm va_ien_e of the maximum likelihood _tinwtor, _, are
o_ainul byilmmgk., Olntheaboveu_ Thls_Wl
where n is the number of hlilums oblfved kl tllSl t_mo 1". Thaa the
modification in the hx_r_e is e_ m- _ _mm taro in m_
ntammtor to fiT). We will d;_', .,_. _ mm_oor of moWfi_miom in which
ffTI is _,gneO e contain v_lue m_enOe_ of tlat time. tt iso_viOus
thzt we m:,uiO _ fiT) by the ine_lmtiW
o < f('_ ( I.
el;.1- x .rid
The bias m the modified mtimaRor i_
_ e-_.T.
Tlha lower bound amurls that the imim_to is pO_tlve. The uPPer
lx)unO nnumatr.n our failure _ w1_m_ for mm faill.wu il not
_Mtl_ than the I_llimMl wi-.(m mfoilb'nee_n'0t --"_--.'_.
_. Whh m_c_ m me _io_. u_e fo(_,,n_g _rmum m OerO-
,_. The _ime to failure dm'4iW _ln=m Js
uit[I - Xe°_-t 0 _; t <
=0 -.,< t < O.
Two Commonly Used Constam Replaem'n_'_
For Zero in Estimmin WF_llur* I_r,_
The fltm'mm_ _omei_ n_mm'ou_ instan©e9 in which the _ foil,-
uro Dr_b_fn _ _ mlndled by uting • ,Jo._ grbJtrlrily
numl_r of hlilure_ in lieu of U_ _ nl,_tmw, _em. The ,,_;,_Lfirm-
Clum_y mmounmnm _10mlom are unity enO one roll Th_
am _ on the bnis,,f very Imilnr logic. In a mnl
the _ f_ilum _ We hove atrmo_ olnm_i mm it woul=l be _-
,m_1_ _ am fei[um by _ _n m_ _iium, _o u_t|ty iSin, lid
420 i:_Fl_l:_.r)lN_ P&T=_ III INK NOT I:'ILNI_D
an upper bi_Jnd from thl ¢ommun mnle viewl_iT, l_,_ use ()( line
hmit il B direct mDi_limiiQn of _ Yirt_ ¢orreolior !_: " c:_r_nuit-v.
ObliP4ed dlul yield onty inulllnll numtxlri at taill : 'i: _:c_one i n_rl:l_l_
the occurrence of n failurll lui ¢¢Wlltlnil a i'l'ltl _l '1' :_ .. 0.5 ¢O n _- 0.5.
Thus, we would say _hat n -,O coven_ the r_nll _rr, '- _ ,:]0 uO to I_ "0.5
and thel_#o_ n - 0,5 is a to!tiasi uDDer tloulli to -! !! _lt :l:Itirliaiii_g the
faiiunl rats in the zero failure ¢_li.
Evmiultions of these two estimlllmS w*l| De pH .;:: _c; lager ir_this
paper, l-lowiRmr,we would like to ¢omrr_ni hen_ :_:_li_one i:islc
y_Iknui in the Useof a constant reDi•csmen_ fol :t__ i+l_eDenit_Tl_ of
the tTme ¢iuration of the _el¢ SUp4)oSe two sepaf_r _ _._'n_;il_ve ff_e_
perfi_ri_cl w_lil n_ failurlli in T i hours, i - I and ,_. ! h _,_; _ q_ne_..
a_ hlflure r_te esttrns_ _ = ni/T t. Now ooniicl! ':-_: i:_im_to g_n-.
orated tl¥ CO_0 ning the ilXOerllslce from me two: ;_!'"tL
T1 ÷ T 2
_pUo_ _I < )'2" It is law u_ show _h_ l_1 < " : _2" Thai k_to
li¥, oDmbining _ ctltll fixim two |_ givesan [,',r:_, '_:,% inl_rw%_iat_
betwee_ :t_e eltinlml for [hi llliimte _ Nm_* _:::n ."_r tile c_e m
whicil n 1 ,, n2 _, 0 and lw lnme I conlilmt k whi: ", ;_:_lifilii 0 -< k
(; I indeed of zero. W_ then have
;,_ = k/T 1, _k2 =, kP#'2_ld _k - k/{T_ =. I;_].
In this_lsa, )k is not between _t and _2 - rathe: i! _ _:_-_'_iier_lM1
eithlrr. This is rlo_ a serious problem, Out it ¢loel r.: r] '.'I:'13.1teII ll|i{'ti¢
in¢olilil-llmly.
_efilre we llllat lilll limb)let of the _ of i _i, .l:; :el;l': replllclmer_
for _ in the fllilurl rate llihllliml l_Irlim/, w_ :,,__li.¢llike to _er-
one othm" III0111niIcZl which il limiilr to the ,J: _i_:_[ r.].5 el disi_emed
adbOVL SuPpO_ W_ isgrl_ 10 recor¢i teilIJll rlltes t_ _ _; : :'b._mn'ml_al_li_
Prot:qr rounding prO=_il.lr_would yield interomte ': m_ tl_ fotiov_'il, if
_k ii .000002,
we would irit_ _iil_ t11i$ lO llllm
.o0ooo_s < _ < .ooooo_,i
Wi WOUI¢i lily, tilt;refofe ttlli in fill ZllO flilurl _ :,
_ - ,000000
lilitly _llll
oooooo < _<< .0_,
ln_ the sev_m Oecimal upper ilound would be in II ':; '_nlv approo_tm
estimate,
T'hlt _ of an Uo_er Confidence Limi'l ii . ._l_Of a
Point Eitinli. in tl_e Zero Fall"p; :lilieS'"--
llrhel!, the molt ®mnln illil_;i_ in th, ;: i n; (;;:ilell ci i_.
nil_tli_ me )_ - 0 point Ininlltl lily in Ul=ll_ col _i,:i :_i_:1},iimil. Fo"
n - f failurw in T houri, an upplr infldencl lim, i ' =_ ;:i,_Ilfidltncll levll
iil I I. _. vii3.
2
x 2f + 2/2T"
Therel_,e. fo: :_'r_ .;;,liiu_,_. the use of _h_ uoPer ¢l_nficten_e limit for
2
+ " X¢,, 2!2.
There rl no ao3-__rnent _)_ a amf_ confidence level, _, bui tl_ _tues
S0 I)tm_r_ _n_ 3_ _rr;e._ _ to or_tominele, Table 1 ti_owl the
nlpi_lc_ v_l!,.lf_i;O._ '; for thes_ two coflfld_nce I_vei$ anti _0r thrae
te._.e_l w'_: .':h _f,,,iti I:,_ n_<llld in lhe di_'-...__.orl to follow.
.I£1
5O
60
i'_,3.2
2
.5
.511
.593
,916
1.000
TABLE 1.
The lilu_?:- oe _ indud_i in Table I ¢ovl- m rlnl_ tram onlllillf to
one m the nur:"_e_ _t f ,il ells wliidl ire ulld in lillcl Of zero ill _ fill-
ure = Is'l=r_s'_ol.,, _¢,n.uill. 5in¢1 X_. 2/2 inch!mill wilh li, it woukl bt
illogh=mi to mir_'_¢i_r an_r ._ ilirlllr than 63.2 pllr_nt. Az the Iowlmd,
el 1_'_ tllil_J 'll s etllil!lllnl vslueof D,S. The t It_'lR _ i
shown i :t V-!t:he i:_Sltl,X telltl tO _ which hi lllldily Miilbb in"
MlilJ tlilol_ Of-.',l_e _._. _ilm"i_iorL Indeed it hal I I
llil_ll l_lle 1_ .Oe:'";)irr t I SVcHill oftsn Us_cl t)e1:ausl it is liable in puDlimect
inn it il i_;_ mth, _ _ - 63.2 _ whi_ti yiellttit m-
IOdll_lelililtli O_ .'-!':'il'l f'.lt IIPlilt:_.
I! !_.l._li_at tO Use • Confiden_ Limit
t Point _tinmle?
Th_31_ Is ,_r_unO;:lm_nuli diffm'lm_ belwllm I Doint e_imlte snd •
Infil:ierl_le limit:,, r:ie,_fo_, ii is •opnllmm to conider _ illica-
• tiOt'lll Of i;t'lili _ii_::'ltl'i!lll.'l_ _ t_(l I Of II lrjlltdefll lilii •l In astlrnm
of lltl tlUlim _,'._ein [h,._ :_ro flilure Ca_. We n_ognize 1*un Imy asb-
nllli=m rniq21oL'l _s :_c:=lrn;,_tlte if it _ gooO snl'vv_ mglrdlaslot
the liu_ _.',' _,_icil i-r was ltevlllOtll_. However, enlllvliNof
origin•i D_l_Cl._ _ i_nci elf tl_, lioil_illi of lhe estimation _ iimif
lldinliori. Fc:' "iz:'J'l-_Aim of i_ •llO _ we will (IvMidnlllify
lt_t_ diiin.
A _ _:'.-in'_ i_ nn I_wlr m _ following questio_ Bamli on
! li!_i¢_C Sli O¢ qlll'rvIII G_lll_ll_tOllli, wrist is the _ 9_m I _ln •lice
• ill thl_ llillgl¢ _lll,il, _(if il llrtiillr DOPUl•tlorl lieranlslfl In our I
plrlrr_eir _. :n_ I=:lri:._tlnt failure rllll, On the other hand,a mnfl-
denm limit In+,>,,,_._; lirl el-_,irety diff_rmlt question. For asch Immibie
po_lhriion i:_r_! -I_Ji_Ti;_L"vllus. _ ask till following quiltiol_ If thi$ well
the _ i_oo-dt_': "!o_-i pe.r:lsre,m_, would a sample a_ lazstas good II t_e
ObSl'veO one c._: lilcilV clr unlikelyl _ The I11_ tor ell DOtllibll pMlim-
T_ljlrli_ ah vlliur_" _or _i_iich ti_ll otissl%qKi lilnlple i$ likely ind _ mt_
,-smUiinil_l line ,,=_I_.l_ "it r whim it hi untiklly. A I_ bltV_len thin
two grouIllf _l _ -'or-.fiOetl_;_ limit. A umtul Ipll_xinlil _ ill aS
fOIIow_ _ ©oi._' tt:_i_m_ it in anlwlrlO _e queltion, IliVln • llnlllle,
v_ _n I lly ._'_,K=_l_:i1_t _,l_labon? A _nfidence limit,on till
hind. is ci_ri_v:! _'._t"o,_r:;il=ringilil pmllbllittm ot ol0mlinin9 i_rtmn
slnl!_ll from rz'. :l_0,'::_:i_ D_ionl. We ilOUl01 note thlt tl_ 1litre "belt
Sums" must I:i (_dina_ tot o0tiining a lmim m; .... inci _MmniitatP_
levels _or likely and unlikely muir tii i_lld in oblmming e om'iti-
dsnm limiz.
The con_ el miini liimlIi and _nfi_i_ Immli Ire illulim_
in Figure.1. A _ mr T houri vietO_ two taitu,_ giving i ooint era-
mate ot _ - 2/T. The 60 llr_ unpef confide limit is 3J 1/T. A
s•mDle It )ellli el i_xllt In @1i$ _ it one wiltl lee, _ or two hlilumlM
The promDiliW ot luctl • simple is it leSii 1-0.80 - .40 if It 4;;3.| 1/T
and ix t; no more tilen 0.40 tf 1_ i. 3.1 |FI'. Thus. ell tlluel of 1_in
zirQ m 3.11/T are_fiN al_ iikeIV and m_pl llxllll
3.1 !/1" ire ltalli_m_l iI uni:ketv it the 60 llroem ooi_icience livel. Of
omnil lne lint estimate imlioirl II Ibltle lint, the l _llll of
ill vuiult ot It I_iea on tl_t mu_rwli ltrniie.
It is JOll*i emit, ,11 lo_lid_ timii il rnlly (luim dit-
flrent from • ooint _ Indmit. it much m_l :ot_lil io t.-mti_
cr mix: the lint .l.._tl I the entirl int_l. 0 < I _ 3.11Pr,
rlitli_n_ to focus lttmmion on ti_i ulpplr limit of this Small We
migix weii oonmOermml lint within t'_ mllmm: al I more amimpri-
in lmaiollue ot tl_l point elt;;.-.,_i, is, h_r IximlDio, tit midlinT,
1,555Pr, We w_shto tmlillllie, howovlr, ttwi in Illtm of the _nda-
rmmmt diffonm_ I_m_m me (_lml_ of o l_m istinumtind in
u_er co.(idlmol timtt, it i, enti_ iq_ltmlm lo ms me infililn_
llmil to li_i e lloirrl _llte for the li_ Ill:furl _ if the mnmlll
It i _ imlgmled in Ioml ml_rll _ the 60 _ uDlier
l_ticier_l limi_ il _ in lllu ot • l(iinl islimili Ill iiil
50 l=on_m timex is lult is ill{Iv to lie I Inl m_l to I I it.
1111s rills_,'_ing liallMi 1_ De • It I Inlell I_f
III bill© oonfiOeni mmmll o0_llllt. Coniilier ttw totlowinl t_q_
_on for t_e oomtsnt tliKml rite ul;I.i.i_ For I _lluiliion with
fli:url rate 71,ii_e proOebititV of n _lillmm in I horn im
IXTl'llr IT/hi .
Uiit m lximum ti_eilh_od tm,,.t, il
_m fl/'r,
I10 tile Ulllr Confidlmi iimii on 1t, / III llUo at I_ li is
s
_" _,_ +2_, n "0, I,2 ....
We in _ let ltilll Ule lllilMlillly o# obmintrlg am upn_ oonfidlnlcl
limit of
k
2
X u "x_, 2n. + 2/2T
o.'r)ne')_T/n:, n - O, I, 2.....
:t _ Oe _own mat I is the ll_oiliIiiv mlri Iki ) X.
Now_lick_ me 50 lii;_--.z ltl. :t is true tllli, mnli¢iiig all
ml_lNliof t_ilurei, n - O, 1,2 ..... SO_otmeupporoon-
fi¢;_._ iimi_s would 0e eXlleCm¢lII mmlo¢l _ true Oopullliml rite,
" _lS00e_emwout¢_m, Whlnii_mlmltmtilum.llte64)lier-
ulilat mnfiderlel Iin_t is .593/T, ins ell is me / ooini
I when usinl _ Ulllllr mnttdmlll limit in tlIU Of _l -
_anici_ _wo emsllmis of I_oml_e va:ue* of the true poputalio_
l"mlm
I. If _ < ._t_rT. II"le ilroll_H_:V of zero faih.qlS in
time T is l,ui_ _ 0.6 m _ - 6.9_f ixmleli
)imole mm if ot the llme.
2. el)_ > ._u'r, the Ix=_. il_ of zero+milurisin
lirrlT isl(m _ 0.5 i_ _u " ,egbertexcmedmX
lei__ nmlfof thg drm.
In o_i_rI_ _i the _ IR_Iitof contkleni:8:emil3--one-lllmlfmi:,llloa l,_i
o_f below -- we _mutd _ io mctuil confid_a_l hmm mrthe
oaslow_ hsiiu_m mong with me zero tailumvnme. Therefore,
ot xt_e_ _. If wl um me 50 llmem upper _nfl4en_ Iirrdt
_s • llomt uurnm oliv ior _lhl zlm _ilum i:_i. we l_o _ turn in esti-
mator wiich is is likely m Oe leo nlgh al too low.
,It Solution i;or me Z_o Feilunl Cill Ulinq a tltodHi!!_,_
ot the Upper Contidtnol L:mit
Let us now mmidli rome of the rMaliomd_:m llei'welm _ llmxi,-
mum Iikelihl_d liOint estimlte _ the ulli_r h_nfiden_ limit for thl
0o;.i;i,L tnilum _ lie:
I_lnl El_li_lltlt _ ,, n/T tn - O, 1,2
)Upplr Confidenl_ Limit: 2•, 1_, 2n + 2/2T
Cerlln ei_mil',mnxtl¢l Iboui _, a_¢i _u are _imied in the fotlowirig
Numtl ot
Flikllle __
n _T I o .40
lii I
0 0 .51
1 I I..11
2 2 _m
I 3 3 3.21
TAIl I,,1_2
XuT
4".50 =-.60
I ni in
._ .g2 "_
1.58 2.02
2.67 3.11
3.67 4.18
For Iml_m_on_. wl live llxitltlll liT end l_xT ra_her tlian ).and )'u-
upper _onfiOsn_l I_mh _ in_lnnl wire t_e confi_enee tewt I
fllr llmn n milletit also intr,-____with n tar each lk We It (lli_nmthe.
huilumlmL
me_ _ _ 0oim utimml, _, and tim
lnttllil limit, ½ for I lli0al0il volue of li -nit for vlrii_i
9f_fllklrlls. n, We firlri wle_ed = - .00 Ind wi mrnlxl_ X,j#1tand
_%1 for n O, %2 ..... 10. The i_lmtlsimllistl_tiliTlbre 3.
An lilli,_mmlm of the rati_ in Table 3 imt in Io mrllidlr _
_b:t_ of mooitvin!i the m tailure estimaie by son_ Will of
l:mton tit _ ratios for the cam with Mitures. The meiho(t is
illusliln_l il_ Fi_ll_l 2, Coniidm- flnit 1tie _ _ whi_t_ Ihowt the
mtiO_Ifarn " 1,2 ..... 10wtltill_h_ll'_¢o_-_lhe
lioimltnlnln - 21_n ,, 10. ltorn- O, ldle¢lit_ewouldal_
'llrilcll I_lil II ml I_ _ the ntmlimum likelifloo¢t zlfo toil-
__:n uouel _,.,, ._/m to.lei-.xim,_,,,io,',ot
ll_ to the _w"z't_ axi**find the imlm_l_, Ind _ornlxU_
n mlifkldemmlrm torthetailure mie for n-- 0. l"l_curv•M_m
llrilgi_ llne exalllollmon, ulinli the line lllough the pmntl _ir n - 1
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0 ,o
1 2.522
2 1.553
3 1.322
4 1,3I_
6 1.258
6 1.224
7 1.1B9
a 1.171)
9 1.184
10 1.152
;t/X._
,, . ; ;_r 1_m,wWm,'FwmF_n.,w
0
.4I)4
.644
319
354
395
.817
33_
.BSg
Jml_
aelwe_ PoillR EJTD_ :i _'._:+Jirili
UlmPiP l_nfidenm LimPl+ ?.'. =,.+.;O
TABLE 3
ana n ,, 2. This line in_e'mcll the axis in _f' :_>l:in+_(O. 231. The
plrcel_ _ 4_Inf_ limitfor n - .:: i ; ._I_<_I/T. Them_ni, a
nxxlHild X for n - Oil oCrll,rm¢ by solvino !:' + ._ultJon j16;t'T_
" 2.5 giving _ ...::_dl_L P, Uling lmltll_ti¢ I+rL: +_:,cl_iOn thr'ougll 1='141
pmnti +or n - 1,2. a_d 3, _i Icimmm is _, ' .;:::?.7£T.._; wli ¢ncR_
Shl_ Ofthe tiirvll, we ii_UiliiMillmilCi'i!"_ r-;_ximumlikdihaod
litilllmill {k *, Olllllimit. WedlOlllooon+i::l,-:,._,?,l,# ' ma Hn_roxm_
_n _r^_fnlldi¢iIv.The _ mr_ in t i_ ..,r,+'_ _ _ mdp-
rocll rlltio, _ __ _ ,,i,m" IXml=id,:,' ,.+ t-;,i_ olrvll livllo Imm -
tailum lli;?;,i;i of It - .316/T.
If till nvxiiflmikm _ i to Jill li_, .'ik,/of Immn
tirol II • nollibill I, llzillmm_ _ _ Milue, : rfl:gem, wit _ llltilb.-
lilil llinat it dol hive llmml_¥ luiudile lit+, :,,i t::ll,. One immel:llm
0ullliom rettl_l to thl IIl_iS_cy of tttl Ira+, ,,, +, t.':,Phi ¢o._l_nm
IIMd. To check on role we mlnlltll¢l nlmaiI +,.:,.:._Ziineml hmrVlrmUS
v_tmof_bvbomr_i_,mownin Tibl, P +:
El+'',i '.,+o+_t On
Confld*,_ml.m_l,
&
,40
.SO
.SO
.63
._,
.34
TABLE 4
i
.30
I
32
rhlill _iilnlill lilt emir Jill rlililCv Irl_ rl:rl:iiPfrom _ ,, .30 I_
* .38, m smiti_'y to ti_llbcbon O1_, ',:._i .zm'_iilem't'o bll I
ll'_litnm. Wlwill dilmll_ proplriielc .....'i.tm'tirnltl lltl_.
Thr,Jt:; ira: torm, lta Of the Bavmian me_lod adam_l to 1_11f_il.m
rli_P,flllt_m:'+Ci.":oi-o_m eli
P(n ,, f03 w(Xt
,#,_[;i.ir:", f) ",
Pin - ii
n
f
_t
wlt.i
_(n-I 'X)
Pit" fi
wlitl r t)
iml (J_nerllt Ivmbot Forthe number of
liiiixti in I pi'_houm
i$ till numlxlr of failure_ o_erv_ in a l:_n]cuit
1:_,_of T mri houri
is tit unlmolm cmitlnt _ failure
is ill re'mr dil_bUl_O_ or t_ aimed
is itl _._ndilionai ombliilk-V of obm, idllj t
'_lilurtl. fpvlm me viii Of )..
is _ umloil:lilioilli IXOtlabiliw oF oi_
•F_;_i1_._ i _n the alsumelt prior.
is tti Iri liillibution of )_,¢iindiliollt
mi 1_ ollllllilxl of f fiillunll, lllllmig nil
m,i_, wl>J.
"Ti_. _ "in pI r, ,. I1 is dlil_nlii Iw fomlirl the joint _ of n
and _. r,ol_ ,i.c.il -, _'_,and iniegfm._ on Ii.
F_ _ ._,l_i otzmoin, we need them _um:xiom: Mr me Ixplmlrmet
=_ill_C_: w_til fiiilum_ X. l'nlPf
F,l_t - fill - fl
P0", _+ ! I>.lw(;_) - _'llf •-_'T wi'k)
11
"rhtvi_
x2 I>.TI f
?in ". f) " _1 It "4"TwIXI_
whatl X_, ::_ X2 il,'mlt_ endl_ints of me rarl_ _r whk:h wl_,} > O.
Tlmn
wl:i,ln t fi .
I_I_ f
¢l e"_TWt>J .
j, I).1"1t e-;tTw{Xld,%
)'l fl
The Ule of Bllyelian Szademi;!!::_,::.._,._
the Zll Failure Prq_ l:; "!.!
-llnm llliliin MitllllCli nllhogl I_, ill + ;_:)r1tie ommbinitlon of
Willr inflxmltion Or hy_olhltW wiUl ¢la'm ' _'' +'i.+',l:,glltl, U'iov Off_l
plaudb_ a_pmlch Ior IMvh_ _ zero tail: " ._,r-_l,'bm of inl_tllt hlml.
Thefllfoni, wt tgm mlimmd lilvBiln m.-I,_, cI:;1:_ otllain I_ilure role
eltimluls _ on I nunllr ot prior dllt_G: :,;,,_;,+++of me Pol:mlttltion
hilum nmi. li. Wit will MIftv mid me _,; _r,,_+,_tim of 5ayelim
ulirnttion _ then lwill lumnll_ ltl, r ,.,.':._-'..m_,mictl _,_r_ I_litairllo.
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TO L;:ie'lt'lil;.nilltiiomtli¢, it ill _"V 10 lel¢icx I Ipltd6c tun=ion
for 'wt_. ?:_,_'e i,'rzm'nlmt in lixlmining tile timplrtiln of tixi Dosm_or
{i,l¢'li_, ,tf,"tIn " O. mrriir,_,,ldlng to _ i_m:donll_Ir w(It).
A r.!!.-:umifilz+:,_li¢,i¢i{i
- 0 fotltl llltir X.
UThis orior !mllilll tie liosOirior
,_xln - 11 - (xT)f_te'_T/ Jl_ C_T)ill
0
eJ'T d_
It was dec:deal to look/so It _ gamri pnor dendw
w(_! - k a + 1 _._'_, k > 0, a > -1,0 q; I <-.
Using the same _i¢_ relal_n_hi;:s as blfore, we o01ain
The |_ in the ¢lcmammmor can be wr_0m m _ of ¢ht mmm-
DlerA_mma ftmction denton by I(u.al and ¢lmfinedby the intqral
(2 p. vl w_XIn - f) -
(T + k}" + f + _)cz * fe-(T + k)_
(¢L+ fl!
0
vPl'Vdv.
5v ipmomm exm=ing d_edmomeimr in the torm ¢ 1t_ imom-
ptm phone t.nctm in¢ |imDlifiing li_t recdting exptmmon, we
obtain
wl)Lin - fl -
(;kT)fe-).T
fldt + 2 ]{'t';a Vft + !, f)
I_ b cu_ome_ xo useChe mean ot _t_emmermr elnrim_ion of ). asin
eninme. L Jn thise:,e, men.
1/a
w_Vctt,upon imgntm beoomm
•, (f + l|vf ÷ 1 lIT/-Vf + 2, f+ I)
TVf + 2 ZCTIaV# + 1.1}
anti the _ailum rato estimate
_,, l÷f*l
T+k "
lnol this 10elxr is ¢oncemrtedwith the zero/allure case, we we_
natur_tv led 1o mns_e¢ Driom with i maximum at or near ). - O. The
iS prior _t rail WPl is nlonmmed by a mght IineioinimJ the
t_a_ IBe_ng 4 I
wi)_t - 2T-2"_X.
UIng lt_e formum livln ltiIM anO luPiioing I Iriiih ix) feikarn in
T part h_urs, tnl rll_ItJ119 IxMl:lhor dimity il
wl).tn - 0t - e"_,T + I IT- ).T2).
llnuDoi_ting ilium rite eli ;,i,_, il
- i I11 - 1_ _-IT ÷ I (_._).T2id.k
We d_ded to u_twovluelofUteom_mt I m thlsmOv, ltwl
narunlllolet I ,_ T_loIthil_).tDthtnngetromL_rOIQ
l_'as di_'m'_J II_vL All mtlm_of _lmm¢ I_,wedid vmnt
Io _111_isr ThB|if1111til_g II • IPI_ L_IrO. We tl11GnGt_1:llift
thl fotlowln t eltin_ilm formlas.
For • - T,
. It i 1) vt + I II11Vf + 2. f + 11
IIl/Vt ÷ l,tl
Fo_I --_ 0
l:or I_1t numix_ at/ailu_ f. the/oliow_ng estimates In)obtltned
_o,_._-__ _ _ I ;,
f l"T t a --"-0
0 ,412/T l 1/T
.S06/T t 2/T
2 _)IO/T ] 3/'r3 344/1" 4/'r
- (3- lt/T
•. 28/T,
AS a llmnd nlxt I_p, m oBnldlnld the useof the #bovl posll_or
es il pri_r. If wl I¢
wOJ " I ")'T + I IT- ),Ti),
end if we l=JpOmmTte_ hour&with no lailun_ wl O_M dl DO_lnOr
w(Xln - OI - e"2_T + 1 IT- XT2t/.2_ (• ÷ e-l),
iX=w. _ _orrm_onding fill: ra1_Ell is
; - 2/T(I 2 + l) i .2384/T.
We can reput this llZlml, umng_he iesi deliria| _,,,i.l_ is •
pli=r,il_inll • nnv Ixllliiormd I new _, |nd cniinvinllto
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iclcllitiorml es_imatlu. LIt,e _ notlrbon w0 ir_.] for _ i:': _:; I :,l._'aiqht
ine crior, w_(k) the _tarior clefiv_l from wo(_, w2(,: ' h:, r.m$_erior
_I'M_ Oy usin(+ w _ (_,| as a prior, ahd I0 o_. The fol|o_ L'H " n_':,'Vlt_ are
_b_mlmL
_rior - Posterior Demtty
0<k< 1/T
wol_) - 2T-2T23,
w 1I_ - e-_'T + 1 (T-XT 2)
4e "2_T _T- kT21
w2(_) -
I +e "2
g e"3XT _T - XT 2)
w3_;O -,
2 +e -3
waiX} -
16 • "_T IT - _T 2)
3+ m"4
%13_ -
k 2 e "k)'T IT - XT 2)
k.1+e -k
FaJluile Rain i_; :lrn;.+*t_
" t£i :,1
l .33_
3T T
T "r
2 .2:_18
T (1 + e2_ 1'
5 ÷ • 3 .:;!03
3"t" I1 + 2e :_ ........ _'--
, 41"II + 3e _ -r
k ÷2 + (k, :!;e _
Tkll + (_.. ,,.,k_._ :
TABLE 5
D!_n
ikltlhood tot enimeling an unl(P, own _nlllrlt bilu_ n ]:_ +;_m ct_=
=onm_+mj o+ the number of t_iksrm, n, ol:eClmm_ in T c+_": +cun_ of
=_enltmn. Of aour_e. ",Jle maximum likMihood 4es_imll_.: r _ ,,. h/T,
,1 _mrety IiCCel_abte for n ;) 1. Ho_Mer, for 1tle zl_, !:! B,,_ne.cue+
lltlmml X : 0 _$ pr1_sumeO to be too low. We ml; ',, .IL,!+:e
_t_m which _ i=een (_e_i_.cl 1_reviomly ano t+ !_, r: +._r)r_--
h._Im moc_ure. Mo_fi=ni_m in _n_ wtm.ning torm_ _, _,i _I I_ ex-
II_ I_ rlmla,=_mlrr= of n .. 0 flilurl in tl_e likelihc, ', : _:'a+mula.
The4m modificationt are masmted in Table 6.
For i .litll _on-ili'ii. _i the alln-_r_, lot _m conmder the
r_l_t_am.nent _f i_ _ _ :_v + co:_mmt which is on uO_er 0ouncl in mn_
._artl_. The s_ion m-' _._c11a c_:l_sTant Ooes introduoe an elmnt of
ar_itra_nms m_: i_ wii_ ,t_ <]©r_i tt_t thn is really true h_" the other
Inm11_'c<_ Ill _IL It i+ : =_m_n+1: illogicaJ to usel_ _ Pound in
pl_lem o+ al ooirrt e_Im'+_,:P+. 3v at1;verl nstum, a point estimalt_ ixln
overi_l_ or mea_rJn_ of .++'rt+lel te_lencv 1110 _ dlerll/or_ usually pr_f_-
a "bslt ili-11m_ll" Path I"_:!_,_1_inn uDl_r Of i_NIr Ioound,
The _ _nfi ;:_nnine lir_ir _a_ u SKI m _e _ltis for three diffem_
msq_ocS, The _r_ o-+: _m,+ t;+:] uD10er con_clelm limit directly _s a
point im'imate, ,! pm..-r :iur_+, _n_montlv encounolr_ in "r.he liteflnu_
"l_e mr_l on_ tm _:_ :'r+iclc+_nt ot the ;,_:_. irltervlt _rl the l_im
_stlrnam. The t_lnd rn '[n,_:l _,_t.a_l an ex1_ootetion using a r_io
tm fro'the +n-_.e-: Imilurmc'mmz. There m_ two basic objm:tionsl_
_e u_ o_ th_ u_r m" _e.._,_, +imit i_mf as • _x_int mmm_t_. Thin
;_=nfid_c_ limit is an ' ,l_e]' lx_n,_na _nll not • "lx_t _ma_" and It ts
limit
The extmOotstion ot the _o= _-J_w_an _u and _.for n ;_ I hick I=_I_
n ,- 0 a_il m to h;_vO It+ ir|t1.1ilivll¥ l_IUrlll I_IIIL _ 1111111111-
;. 1111,
mining _.,_.._i. Tim mcr:r Rnma mne_ in the 8_y_im
ap4Eoa_l fl_" Ulm I_re_ #l'.q_i=tda_. i111Jll _ ImllMtivitv toth_
t._oim of _hl _P+or -- ,_'+mme_t+_;,r |nsw_r t:lm I:M)gram'aLl..1 by
In.llllc_mj =+ de+';ls) lewis and Imrim-I tO be used in de_,_T._,-I_
l+al_m, la._-- _¢ _o _fxilmlm. we e_ m m_" • me- -.
_om_tv oompUmm Ir_ '_i_e_ m_ of __ Is _is_me4
ou_l+ in tt_ _ap_r. W + c'm :x'mrmne the entire mlll_tion of _ m_m,.
results 1_ gain r+:::_+; i+'t',.ii_l_tinto _ Imml3MW Of _J1e _ _D
=s_:mation mel[l_ _:.-;._;:;i:l t(_ _le s_ec_ons of c_nfklence lm lnd
IX_rL The nor_erc +-_ifure r._:_le_e_ shown in Table 6 ml
in Tl+bke 7 witll:xlt r_f::r._'t_ I_;_meUx_d of deri1_Ition, The "xem l_ul
m
.40
.50
.60
.63
SUh l+It'l+Fl'f OF MODIFICATIONS OF
_l;:]::f.) FAI LURE ESTIMATES
(REPLACEM_! ll' /_,,.'.R ZERO AS NUMBER OF FAI[.'.,JR_b'_
Co night Replecml_m_
i 1111, 11 111111fNll_
Un_v
One t.lal f
7-m plus 5 in In eXll_l decimal plato
Rm_ixwrnents Baled On Confidm_ Lira;': ;
............... , m
_
.51 26 _ _0
,69 .35 .34 .31
•92 .46 ,17 .32
8'a_r_sian EstJmmms
m m_Nl_ml_ w I_
Unifon_, 0 1_ 1' ....
Uniform, 0 t0 o,
2T - 2T_). IUs_, _:_nl_.es z l_rior in me tern)
a-_T + I IT-_,+-2]
4e-2_T(-r_XT2)/(I +. e-2)
TABLE §
42_
,u,,
i
.41
1,00
.33
,28
.24
,0,=
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V.24
.26
.30
.31
.32
,12
_2
0rdmd Non-Zero Fwlum R_m_rm
_3
.14
,15
.37
,38
.41
.46
.SO
_0
.Sl
.S8
.S2
1.00
%00
1,00
TABLE 7
There b a rather m l_xjnmkm horn _4 to .51. foIl_ bY
inwrvais from there to the upper w4ue. 1.00. The _ higmm
mlu_ m r_ from the ul_ar aonfidenm limit _ as a _ n_I11_-,,_;_o
unity -, an _1)itraW dloioe, m_ an unnm_i_i¢ kyqmln I_i_.
Racxll that our obficti_ is to di_m_l the maximum likMlh=_l
emcimwmof X for at iem the orm =ml m whid_ no toilurm hmmo¢-
curr_ •nO r_em i_ t_/Jome _,L_iwte which isjuci9oO_ t_ rssson-
able. For an •trireme to be rqmm_Ible it mint hr_ • (ik•ly _lllU•
of course • m_cai derwet_ wou_l m m o,odibilit_,, p_rmu_
prNo¢_ arcjurmm_ _avs mmmlmuy _isheO _ _te _ hillmS_
VmmlSMe dm'ind I_t the t•mt _lio_ _ $incm¢hl_ flMI IRI Ill
mari_WV aOo_e the t_o_t _ vokm. i( is mr_lecl _ wo am |u_-
tified in dL_=mellng_Mmtrom fum_r mmidmmmn am tl_¢_ hx=m
our _tt..,_on _n m• mmemmO 18 whl_ *v,..4 mm_ emmy from•
low of -24 to o high o_ .St. Ss_nman of the_ _imms m 4m_l
w mtdc_ims of ¢onfldmm Irmmmls, or as _..b._dmiom of ,.t;_ in-
roaring oonfi_,-._ ;m_smn¢l point mn;[.-.;_ or by BaW0_ emm-
_lon m_od¢ Pre_m_y l_mmd aqlUmm_ mm_t _ Nd_ of
Coneid_ nowthe m valuta of the 18 mgdaommms/or
Zero failwm. We hml _0mleinm why w• w_h to w a mtDhx_m_
_,_. tr_n xm,o and not k._b, dlln unity. 11_ !11vlluN eli fall in
• pnrUon of this rang•which w_ bo_we w b• en_nHV rm_l_,
we am ¢le_in<j w_h the _ f_iium me, it b nmlisdc to eeb_:t.
value in the Ioww half. It is mn._wtiw to _el_-t • vllue in 11_ uPPer
portion of thit _ _If. This Io_c augrj_ms• zero re_4amm0nt k
_r_ the in_lUmiW:
-24<k <.51,
_s rar_ _etwse_ the e_m of our 16 valus¢ The _ of • sin-
gle vslu• to replacs the oOmrm_ n - 0 failures m r_,m_lv srbttratv.
Our I_xd_nm it to assume d_evalue one third, g_vir_!the zero failure
s_immmr
X - 1/Tr
"This_o moi_ villi, 1/3, " near the median at me 18 valu_
Ils_l in Tsblo 7; it b _'_ m midnotr_ of the Io_cs| tangs m_rs¢l bv
"d_ utum, .and it is certaiNv _V tr, rsmem_r.
Conckll_m
IZ_lour m,__ _.-_,_Shot m _ mnfldmm limit I_ amumat_-
fse_rv mi, stitute for • poim _tirrmte of, _rmant t_l_m rate, m_-
p_iMIv becm_m of its wmmivity to _ ¢onfidm0o le_d. _. •
m_re mmo_oble point ml,.._, un I_ _ as mehemidDoim of
a o0_d_lm_ ma_ m, _ an extrmoi_i_ of rsrJc_ _ up_m.
cG_i¢imm imu_ irm ••ms est,,.ot_ tor cam with flilure Mass.
_itlticsl rn_t_ocis In lDp_m, D_t wnDtivilN tO the
c_oioe of the I_r is • mrlk_n h0ndicap.. We d_dnot find _ re_son-
•tile subr.mae for tt_ m_Zmum dkelihood _mima_ in mm whe_
faikm O_ _. Fm Um z_ro feilum era, we recommend me
mmmmtion of one third of a failure, _Fvmg me (lilum mm m;._._;_
X
_oI/3T
TI_ argumm_ which we hwe pmmmm indicm _et tl_ m_mn_r _
flullBt_ht _ll_tls_e ahd 1]ilat_ il gMter41t_ by I_h_ k_pl/fflmh-
h is mmE-,_that tl_ee is rm sin_e ---rroot mknkm t_ thb
Wol_om. Wenromen_Ntt,_r_m m_s me.imumllkllilloodem_-
,,.'_ vddch ws 10•llwe m be ,"*,-'_/unreelistie bv •
_h is numnrimih_ mo_ acmoW_ nn0 we I_liow Umt _ m_
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Appendix E:
Discussion and Comparison of Monte Carlo and Latin Hypercube
Sampling Algorithms
(rctnodueexl from the
@Risk TM Usex's Guide, Copyright 1990, Palisade Corporation
with th¢ pe, ,_i_Sion of
Corpordtion
31 Dec.k_ Rd.
Newfiold, NY 14867)
III III I I
V
Risk Analysis and Simulation Add-In
for Microsoft Excel
Windows or Apple Macintosh Version
Release 1.1 User's Guide
February 6, 1992
r 4LISADE
Corporation
31 Decker Rd.
Newfield, NY USA 14867
(607) 277.8000
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VWhat isSampling?
Introduction
Saml'_tmg isusedL,tm_,@RT_¢: ,._m=_a_onto genmaxe possiblevalues_ Ixob-
ahRby dJstribu_on ftmetmr,:". :;_::s.=.s_,tsof possihle v_ues am then usedto evalu-
am your Excel workr_eet. Y:e,:tLus_of r_xis,s_apRng _ the hasix for the
hundreds or tho._.d._ of ",: lh:w.ff'" ;cenanos @RISK ca2ctflates for your work
she.t. F;w,la set of mmpiea :r'T,7_,_scn_aa possible combination of input vahms
which _uld occur. Choos::l ,,_-a ._rkplmg method affects i_o_ th_ quality of
yourrcsrfl_s and _e length.:'t.m_,-.r.t_aary to simu[amyour worksh_t.
Sampling is tim _oce,_ by.',:hi::h,_3uea am randomly drawn from input lxob-
ability disrrilmtions. Prob,_:'.qi:_,d_s,_'ibutions are mpresextted in @RISK by Izmb.
ability distribution ftmctio= !' 0_m;_u,_pling is _ed by the @RISK
SatupLgagina simulation i_ '_f3_l,!_t_:etitively -- with one sample drawn every it.
eration from emh inpttt prob'tbi_iitydistribution. With enough iterations, the sam-/ '_
pied 'zalu_ fiyra I_tmisilir, r+:_:¢..dt'ufionwill l_c_ame distrilmted in a ns_t_.
whiedatko:.omximatea;:t_ k:ncl_ iX_ut pm_ility di_trilmtlcm. The stalL_t of
the smnpMd distribution-- "_ea;_,,;tmaOazddeviation and higher mmmtts --
will ,pproxinmm the tree ,,_-._.i_.'i_:_rJ_atwere input for tim distribution. Tat: graph
of tht:m_ple..d _lattim't v.ill. ,:*.v_ look like a graph ofth_ true input di.qtx't'Im-
don..
St.rL=rt_ts madIx'acdon,_,,t_cle,_elopeas=vetalmchniqucxfor drawing ma.
dorasample& "I'ne imlmrm,_: f.*_ctorr_ e.xamme when evaiuar.ing _mpting ttch-
mq),.te,_ts the number of ite_,_:,i:onsn:c.j,,)..,t_.dto acctmamiy reereate an input.
dLmibution ttmmgh samp_::. #,,ccnmm remits for output distribu_on_ depend
on a compiem sampling of"_'_'._utdi,:t_Sbufions.If one sampling method te,q_
mm_ iw_,tttt_mmad kmgtr ri'a,L:uir]tz_t than another to appt_im_- ifiOut
&is_ributi_,itis_ Ir_ "c;_r:_nt" method.
The two nmdmds cf mm_Rn,_ t:_d iat @RIqK -- Monm Carlo sampling mtdL
I ati. Hype_d_e _ampli_g .... d:i_F_' in the numtxa- of imm_tm tcqtfi_ until
mrnplut vaiu_ a_a_ximam. _r_rt di._'ibutiom. Monte Carla sampling oft_t m-
¢,_.ite_a large number of mr:._)let: to avg.mxinmm an input _qribution, _y
if_e |_pat_islribmiontshiF_ly tfl_e_ orIresonm onmornm of low Omb.
_bility. Lar.mHy_ermxtm ,_-; #:ing, _ new mm#ing technique used in @RISK.
forces me samplesdrawn to,'.'3, :+_:sp_ndmorn closely with the input d_ribution
_lnd thusconvergesfasw.zo_ "h.e._cu_:_tistic:s of the input distribudon.
i -
J
: .+ mpling Methods FQ3 - °
_" t _'': •_: _ "_,i "_'_
U
ORIGINAL PAO£ IS
OF POOR _JAI._
Cumulative Distribution
It is of_n helpful, when _-,viewing diffe_nt sampling methods, to fit= nndet-
stand the.concept of a ¢=mnl_ve dis_zibufio=_. Any pr_bitity disffibmioa may
be expressed in cumulative form. A cumulative curve is typically scaled fTom 0
to I on _ho Y-axis. with Y-axis values mpresenm_g the cumulative probcbility up
In _ c_,_ponding X-axis value.
___li'_:=_ Cumulative Probability Distribution ' _: : ;__:_'_;!_: ,
1
l.O
.6
Pmlx_iy
.5
.4
.3
.2
.1
0
M'mkemm X_ _m
Dis_',,_._on Dislr_on
V_,m V,,eum
.............. IIIIIHtH _ ....
In _ curn,,i_dee cm've above, the ._ cumulate value is the point of 50_ m_mu-
ladve probability (_5 = 50_). F'a_typexcent of the values in =e dis_bution _ be-
low INs med_ vaiue and 50% ate above, The 0 comniative value b the
minimum value (0% of d_e values will faLl below this point)and the l.O ctenula-
fivevaln_isth_maximnm valn*(IO0_ ofthevalueswillfallbelow th_ polar).
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°Monte Carlo Sampling
Mine Carlo sampling r_i'_s to the tr_,_iHtwaimchniqtm for u_g random or
psvudo-random nurnbe_ to sampte from a pmlmbility disu'ibudnn. Th_ term
"Mont_ Carlo" was introd_ dur_ug World War II as a codo name for shnula-
tioofprobl=msa_'_t._ with rt-velopmemof_= atomicbomb. Today,
MatureC.arlote_tmiquea are _pptied to a wide variety of complex prvblcms in-
vowing random behavior. A wide variety of algorithms are availab_ for gene_t-
ingttmttomIVionttCarlounto.lesfrvmdiffenmtypes_ input probability
dismbutions.
Monm Carlo sampting techniques am enurely ranciom _ daatis. any givea sam-
#= may fail anvwi't_-,mwithin th= rang= of the input distribution. Sarape. of
¢om'$P_arc more likelytobedrawn m axtasof th¢ distributionwhich ham
Monte Carlo sample will u.m a new random amber between 0 and L With
enough ittm_cr_ Moam ¢'_,-ln tmmpiing will "_m." _ input disa'_uooas
tlmmgh sampling. A proble,m of clu._xing, however, arises when a small num.
l_rofimmtmnsarcix=qctmu_L
erations of Monte Carlo Sampling With Clustering :_
|
i
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.5
.4
.3
,2
.1
0
F-6 Technical Aooendix
1
I
!.+
!-
i
=.ring .r,
,#t
___. Q.
_i,.t
,i
!"
t
I
= .
,_.
l o
; o
_Lu_¢ iLhmzanm=shown hcm_.,_:_ of, the5 samplesdrawn falls in t._ m+,+rn.,,_of
timdisu-ibution. Y'n, vahms ;:..,._teo+]t_ ranl_eso_"_¢ di._n'ibudoctare motu.p,_-
seazmdin the _twF+csa_ r.__: ;_.;dr ._ml"mmt.on yore'w.aolt$L_not included in your
.._mttL_r_nouqmt.
,..'21u_crmg_m_ _: pmraouur.cd when a di_o_budon incluc_._ low
b_01_bilJty outoom_ _ +: :_id_l_.v_ a rr_jor impact on your rc._adm, h is
this, tb-..s,outcomesmu_ Ix: .".'_.._pl_LBut ff their probability is low ¢no,,gl_
ctsmall number of Moaw, C_r'i :__J:c.ra_mnsmay not =arapl¢ suff'zcivnt _,_nrir+__eof
theseoutcomes to ac_y 'u_1_,;'t:sc:._l,IBcir probabiJity. This l_'roblcmhas_ m
th_ developm=at ¢d $t:a_ie, d ._'-_._l.iv._,IP.C.hniqtzesouchas the LaJLi_H_
.'.._mp_m_ tmmiin @RISK.
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Latin Hypercube Sampling
T_.m FIyl_mul_ ¢mmptiag is a reemnz dovololment in sampling _chnoloT/d_-
sign_ to acc_y z_.,e.a_ the inpm distribution through sampling m fewer k-
etations when compared with the Monk (2ado method. TI_c k_y to T_T÷n
Hypr_¢ _mmptiag is stm_¢atk)n of the input probability clisa-ib-fions. Smui-
_..__ n divid¢_ (hc _m_n_v¢ curve into cqual iau:_rals on the cumulative prob-
ability scale (0 to L0). A _xapl= is _ nmdamly _ from e_:h inwxvat or
"s_.._¢._Aon" oft_ input d_l_ilmxion. Sampling isforcedtozepre_cnt values
in mr.h m=rvai, and thus. is forced m rccr_ me inpm pz-obabiIky dis_buuon.
__ __ .'-_. _ __.__'_..._ _ • , .,._
_/_ Five Iterations of Latin Hypercube Sampling _i
e Sampling . ._...__
,_ o_ m m
Pn_aw_r¢
_n_ .4 ........
4-- ..... --,4';! '
" ' i
_ -_'- -"_- _ val_ ,_m_ D_lnl_
V_u_ Valu_
. _'.."."'"'"'.".'_'.'"". *.U). _ ........
In _e illmlr_Jon above, d_ ¢tm_,,i_,_ve curve has be_n divided mw 5
I:_rins ,,-,,piing, a saml_ is drawn f_n each imm,v,aLCompare _is m )he 5
d_ sampt_ drawn mini[ the Moot= Carlo method. With r__. t-Iy_
the sm_npl,.,, nuam _,_-_,_y _:']_ the dis=ibmion of values m the input pmO.
ability (:tisu_u_=.
The _:haiqu_ being used during r _,);,, Hypet_lx) s_npling is "sampling wi_om
__': TI_ _mnl_' o_"_f_ns of the cal_,J=_ive dis_b_ion is
equal to the number of immmm_ _._m-med, In the e_npte above there were 5
itcr_ons and thus $ sc'____,3_'ons were made m _h-..cwn-,d_v= diem-ibm/ore A
samp_ is -,_',, _.u,, each _-,,_fu:mi_. _, mx_ a sample is _ fx_n a
s/._a£iml, this sn_ifi_ i_ not mml)]nd fzom :m_. _ i_ v_lu_ is aln_hr
_p_ in _he sampled
F-8 Technical Am)ea)d_
wHypercube
and Low Probability
Outcome_
How cl_-__sampling wi.rl'thaa ":b:en sc:_cation occur? In effect. @RISK
chooses a :m-ar),ficatio_,for ,_,r-_Dliag )..henrandomly chooses value from within
tho sel_:l stra_.cafiom
Whc'n using tl,_ Lm_ _.Yl_:: Lb¢rJ_.:hn:[o_em sm'aple from multiple variables,
i) is iml_znt to rrraimz.m .ha'_t_._:,:,::_rler.c¢_m,_n variables. The-values
sm'nl_h',dfor one mmabte, n_: It,'."[_',is_pcndent of tho_ sampieA for anmh_"
Omless. of co,,,_, you exp.: ly -:;vs'_:_hem cormlamd). This indeI_ndere_ is
mai_mmcd by randomly sclc:'.:m._;.... for e',achvatiab_ _ which inmrval m
draw a sample f_m. In a ga,,':'nil .-._./.on. Vatiabl_ #1 may be sampled from
.,_,'atiff_don #4., Vm-iabI¢_,::2 .i.--.:,[w ._.za'n_ledfi'om slraufica_on #'22, and_
ThisWe._rvesrand_mnms _r,:l ir.dc_ndcnccandavoids unwan_d cotrpJna_
l_._¢_::n wtriable,s.
A.qs m_ :ffig_:ntsampling'_tn<L I._rlnH_ c_e._greatbe,,_qmin
'tem_ofia_ sampl/xtg-:£[k':;:e.n,:7 and.fast_ran_ne_ These_i,_arcsesp¢-
,._allynoti_..ablo in a PC I_._:_.,mu_:ad.on envimnm_ttsuchas@RISK. __,_,,.
iB'ypc_._sb_,howard, alsohe_.::)c,tl:_;,tnalysisof_-,_,_,,_whe.r_low_iliw
c_tcomes_ _:e,d ini_I_.W-3L_.biliWdJstgibutiot_By forcingtlg_mm-
piing of' _r. simvl_,,_ to inc_,d_,:_/=e_outlying events,! _- Hypetcubo sam-
'_rhcalow Frobabilityou_:, _.s.ar_:"_'yimportantitoft_helpsm nm anm_ly-
._swhichjastsimulacs)_ c::'_rrilz_ti.,'mm _hooust dismbutionfromltzclow
rtubab_ty even=. In ttas m-_,_:t:,::rt, cd._ $imulamsonlytheocc_ oflow
l_c_tb._lity onmomcs -- _=y .:,:r_:.'_ct_:) t_0% probability. Throughthisyou will
i_la_ t_osc outr.om_sand _._:.':c_i,.ts,azd.y_e resultsthey general.
.Tim ctm_-ptof oow,,_,_._n¢¢ Jr l_s=:dtOt_st a.samplin$ method. At II_ _ of
c_n_rgence, th_ output die.l m::(:,ns_e s'mb_ -- tha_is,_,_,_m,_nalit(maitam
"_rillnotmarklxlly change, Ilm ,;'-h._p,_cr smt,_cs of thesampled _Lisl_ll_ml. Th_
_ampic mean vctm_ t/_: tru_ _._'._:_._is _/pically a m_ama'¢ of oonw.rg_n_., lmw.
,_veg,_wness, 1_¢_1¢ Wtg,_bi_ifie,_ andotl_r ._,_i_i_ _ of_'x usedb_
:_a_uan_atgconvergent.
@R_K ptcatid_s a good eavir:._,_tenc for teeing th_ _ at whi_ the two
awii_hte sampling t_hniq_._ :_:_n,_,_ mt an input dis_budon. Run an
number of ilerado_ wRh _.,h o;!"_he s_mpling tcchniqu_ while sel_t_ng anmo
:._utd_=dbwJon@func_on as::_:intarionounFnt.Look at the cime.ness of
_apie sl_Jsficzm ,,,hemzs s_.)_.,rr._.cs-.vhich we_ sp¢ci/'_d in _hedL_mian
,@.funcutm. It should ix'.cvidc.::_tit,atT..ariaH_,_,,.d)o sampling ctmve:g_ _asmr
,:)nlirao-u= _s=ibutions wl'a:z -..o:mpAv._.with Monte Carlo satnpiing,
-- S:)mpling Methods F-9 --
More About Sampling Techniques
The academic and technical literana_ ha_ _d_...._[ both Monte Carlo and r_n
Hypen_ube sampling. Any of the refex_ce_ to _firo,,l_,iqa in the Recomr_nded
ReadingsAppendi_ az the end of this ¢_apter will give the re_er an intmduc_on
to MoncB Carlo sampl_g, l_fet_ces which spccit'_.ally address _a H.vpcr-
cube rumpling are inctuded m 0. sepa.--_ sect_n o1: these references.
F-IO Technic! Appendix
V Appendix F:
Text of MSFC Incident Reports for post-Galileo Major Incidents
:- Appendix F
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1993 5TS Catastrophic Fa.iiure FreQuency Simulation
Forecsst: 93 STS Failure Frequsney Cell: E13
Summary:
Display Range is from 0.00E+0 to 4.00E-2 per Launch
Entire Range is trom 1,54E-3 to 1,62E-1 per Launc_t
Afler 20,000 Trials, the Std. Error of the Mean is 0.00
Statistics: _ ._
Trials 13675 14020
Mean 1,?.8E-02 1.38E-02
Medi_ (intact) 1.09E-02 1.11E-02
Mode (axtmt) 1.54E-03 1.54E-03
Standard Devi_ion 7.29E-03 1.01 E-02
Variance 5.3I E-05 1.01 E-04
Skewnee_ 1.24 (unavwtable)
Kurtosis 4.36 (unmr=labte)
Cooff. o( VariabM_ 0.57 0.73
Range Minimum O.OOE+O0 1,54E-03
Range Ma_dmum 4.00E-02 1.e2E-01
Range Width 4.00E-02 1.6DE-01
Mean Std. Error 6.23E-05 8.50E-05
m _ m _d_q_V
J
M
m
JKE4 _ _ _lK4f
_eW
Pememite= for Entire Range (per Launch):
Peroentile 93 _ Failure Fr.auencv
0% 1_¢,4E-03
5% 4.48E_3
10% 5.38E-03
lS% 6.12E-03
20% 6,83E-03
25% 7._9E-03
30% 8.1gE-03
35% USE.-03
4O% Lq4E-03
46% 1.03E-02
50% 1.11E-02
55% l_0E-02
69% 1_9E-02
65% 1.40E-02
70% 1.53E-02
75% 1.67E-02
80% 1.88E-02
85% 2.12E-02
9O% 2.40E-02
95% 3.20E_2
100% 1.¢?.E-01
(sxact_
End of Forecast
_. _gel
lg93 $7'!!I C%a)astroDhi,; Failure Frequ,:_ l_;y Sira uistion
Foll_ast: 93 STS (Senilit|iity 1) Feilu_ ,_t7_'._quency Cltll: F.21
Summary:
Display Range is #ore 0.00E_;' !: _i OOE-2
Entire Range is from 2.52Eo3 _,: I ,,:.;6F-1
After 14,020 Trials, the Std. Er ::c:! t,_e Mean i;; 0.00
Statistics: D is_rl:::.l!L..;_cgi _Ii_l. R_I_:.,,',e
Trials _:!!,731 14,qF'D
Mean i;!!,l!;E J32 2.26E ; ;2
Median (exact) 'f.!)'_E!.02 1,.046, ;P.
Mode (exact) ;iLi_i;_i-03 2..52E-, 3
Standard Devistion ',i]);q_:,-O2 1._'_Et :;;:
Vm'imnca I:,1:iE,-04 1.77E-4-',_
Skewness t.[37 (uriwnilfal_l _,,)
Kurtosis '.&91 {un_..,ail=4:i,)
Coeff, of Variability ,3,o50 0(_ _
Range Minimum ;;,_,i_,)T.-.tO0 2.52 E..I ::J
Range Maximum ; :)_i!_..02 1.66E.4 1
Rallge Width ]; ');;_-e_ 1.64E4 I
Mean StcL Error ;I ;:;')!!!..05 1.12E, !4
!!!-7!!T
I,.)?II,L!::::).
_ 1S';t 1' _ &.{tier
Percentiles 1or Entire Range:
0% 2._2E-':T3
,9_ 8.48E-_:'3
7','_¢ 'I .02E-£ _=.
'i5% 1,.16E. !:!_i.
;;!!._% 1.37E-{;_.)
_,'PA 1.48E-{:,2
3!_% 1.r_E-£q!
_t,l:_Y, 1.70E-,':;:I!
_!_% 1,82E-_,:;1!
E;0% 1,94E-fT,','!
!_&% _06E-_: _:;!
!_lY_ 2.21 E-;::_I
35% 2._-0_;I
71_ P..E_E-_:;:i)
;;!5% 2.78E-,': _it
!11)% &I_I>E-;: :)
_0% &SgE--;: 7)
:'15% 4.77E'.-':i:r!t
<,_3_:_% 1.66E-' I
End ol Forecast
Page
U
1993 STS CatasVophic Failure Frequency, SimulsUon
Forecast: 93 STS (SendN/Sy 2) Failure Frequency Cell: E28
Summary:
DisplayRange isfrom0.00E+0 to 1.75E-1
EntireRange = from9.83E-4 to 1.37E+0
After 14,020 Tdais,_heStd. Errorof the Mean is0,00
Trmls 13818 14020
Mean 1.80E-02 2.35E-02
Median (exact) 1,10E-02 1.12E-02
Mode (exam) 9.83E-04 9.03E.04
Stan_am Devtodon 2.32E-02 4.96E-02
Varinnce 5.38E-04 2.46E-03
S_ 3,I 3 (umwm_ie)
Ku_=sB 14.a4 (unmvaiieb_)
Coefl. of VattabUity 1.22 2.11
Range Minimum 0.00E+(X) 0.88E-04
Range Maximum 1.7SE-01 1.3"/'E+00
Ranga Width 1.75E-01 1,3?'E,P00
Mean Std. Error 1.97E-04 4.19E-04
.-- --"---..:---'- --.-.l
I- L..............t-fl
!
Pem,entiles forEntireR_mge:
PeroanWD'__'Ser._ _ Fm'kJmFmousnL-_/(exlactt
0% 9.63E.04
S% 3.31 E-03
10% 4.13E-03
lb'% 4.95E.03
20% S.ClE-03
26% 6.41E-03
30% 7.19E-03
35% 8.OI E-03
40% ¢g6E-03
45% g.90E.03
50% 1.12E-02
1.2b'E-02
60% 1.42E-02
1.61E-02
70% 1.38E'02
7S% 2.18E-02
80% 2.67E-02
8S_ ¢9BE-02
90% 4.66E-02
95% 7.72E-02
100% 1.37E+00
End of Forecam
•. IE_,ge3
19g_ !II'T'!I;Catastrophic Failure Fr_,'.:_L_ency Simulation
Fomeu=: 93 8TS (Senstlvtty 3) F_llI,i;_z;Frequency Cell: E3S
Summary:.
Display Range is from O.OC,i.. :J_:._8.00E-2 par Launch
Entire Rsngs is from 9.00E!. :! _: 1.09E+(l per Launch
After 14,020 Trials, the Stc'. !!i mr ¢_ithe Mo=,_ k; 0.00
Tria_ '13871 14 !:_,!:0
Mean ; .O_;E-02 i .2,A.;-.(_2
Median (exact) -_.:_3E-03 7._:'.:,EF('.J3
Mode (exm:) : t.q.l_E-O_. 9.e_ :F."-.(_
Standard Deviation .01 E-_'. P__ :'1_--(]2
Variance ..t:_).E-O_, 6.. ;,F..-(]_
Kurtosis 13.31 O.zna_r_*;_.t,._)
Coeff. of Varial_HJ_ 0.9{; :,._t5
Range Minimum _;:.,:_E+OO _lJ!, iE:,,.{;_:
Range Maximum ;i_OOE-02 1.0!i=_:;-;.(_o
Range Width ;;l¢:_0E-02 1,0!:":!_:-_.-(10
Mean S_. E_ror :i;.59E-05_ 1,9::_F.(_¢.
Percentiles tor Entire Range Loe:rt.,_._:r_):
6% 2J.',,_E-03
10% 3, _,!';E..O$:
15% _,£.;!_, 0:::,
2O% ,¢,_'__=:.-()3
2.5% _f:_'.--.O:_
40% 6,'; ".i'lE-(:,_3
45% 6.£,':"E-O3
50% 7.,- _IE.03
55% tLI__:'E-03
60% _.C¢IIE-03
65% g._: E.C,3
70% 1.1 _:I_-C,2
75% 1.,?_E,-C'2
80% 1._'_:E.-_'2
85% 1.';'_ E.-_:2
90% 2,_._! r_...C2
g5% '_-_:!_E.-O:;_
_.00% 1,0:_ ;_<-0';)
End of Forecast
;=age 4
Ammmption: RSRll Pair
Lognom'_tdistnl_ultonwithpitamililrl:
Mean 7.80E-03
S_ndatd Dev. 8.28E-03
Selected range is fromO.OOE+Oto +infinity
Mean velue insirnutstionires 7.79E-3
_mm-
1993 STS Catastrophic Failure Frequency SirnulsJ_on
,,:.;.:i:... _:_ _" CaB:
0tl, a _ _ tJNI4
U
Asiuml_on: 93 SSME Cl,,.,_._.,
Lognorm_ddis_ubon withpammt_r¢.
Moan ,,l,r_E-03 (=i_
StandardDov. S.74E-08 (=M£)
Selemed .rage is fromO.OOE+Oto _dnlmily
Mean vaJueinsimulationwm 4.70E-3
lUW
Cell: E5
P_;e5
b--
1993 S'I"::;;;'!rtastro_hic: F_lure Freo.ue:'=r:_"$irnul,ation
Cell: E7
Lognorrna_disuibutionwithpararr_t __,_:
Mean I _:?E_..04 (=ET)
StanclardDev. il :_;.;_1:i!..04(=M;_
Setected range is from O.OOE+O to ,E _.,_i.ily
Mean value in simulation was t.9OE. ,:1
As_ptton: 93 Orbiter
Lognorm_d dis'u'_ution with para.n_ ! ": :
Mean .:l..;i:;E'-04 (=EEl)
Sta_clard Oev. :iI::i:';1!._..04 _=Mg)
Selected range isfromO.OOE+Oto ._,-:1i.ity
Mean value insimulationwas 4.11 E.:',
Cell: Eg
U
Ammmptlon: 93 Prelaur_h
LognormaJdist._utionwithpeJ'.am_.;.; ::
Mean ".r_L::l!_.-o4(=Ell)
StandardDev. •I.,h:;_;=l!-'..04(-._/11'!)
Selected range k fromO.OOE+Oto._t ,.,rr=_,
Mean valuein simulationwas 7.02EI.:l
¢eg: Ell
Page (;
1993STSCatasffophi¢FailureFrequencySimulation
Assumption:93Prelaunoh(coflX'd) Cell; E11
ANumption:Serm4tivlty'1
Lognon'n_distribu_nwzthpararrmten;:
Mean 1.66E-.02(=E19)
StaztdaraDay. 1.20E.,02(=M19)
SelectedrangeiSfrom O.OOE+Oto +infinity
Mean va*uein simulationwas 1.66E-2
ms
Cell: E19
U
Assumption: Sen_tiv#y 8
Lognormald_ut_n withpsrameters:
Mean 1.&?.E*02
StandardDev. 6.79E-02
Selected range i= fromO.OOE+Oto +Infinity
Mean value insimu_tion m 1.75E-2
mlr
allW4 _m Ul_D ,',,,
Cd: E2$
_;re ?
1993 ST.¢_ ':,:;EL_;,_tropl_icFailure Frequer_, !_ .=,!;iml._atton
AMummlon: SenstUvtW 3 Call: E33
Lognormal distribution with parameter= :::
Mean (_,=IF.!.03 (=E33}
Stanciard Dev. ;!. i!! E.,:',,? (=M33;)
Seiocted range is from 0.00E+0 to ÷l: t';l,,...
Mean value =nsimulation was 6.21E-:!
I=,,Lt IIF_
¢,1 :._ luct 4_
!
z.1_-I
End of Assumptions
P=Lge O
............................ '-----"i . "......
_ PRA P_mm_ -,Oa,fikmSmo'TUp_Uum
Appendix H:
Comments on the Differences between the Galileo Study Results and
Galileo- era Results in this Study
"-- Appe-_. H
UAppendix H:
Comments on the differences between the Galileo Study Results and Galileo.era
results In this study,
The first step in the current analysis was to ensure that the updated f_!hjtc frequency distributions
w.,sultedonly from additionalexperienceacquh'vd since the Galileo study,and not from the inadvertent
in_'oducfionof diff_"_ntstatisticalmethods, tools,or assumptions. Unformna_ly, thvre"was
in._f-Rcient reformation in the Galileo study report to ¢xacdy duplicate the previously published results
for the SRBs and the SSMJ_s. At the central values (mean and _l_+dinn) of the system level fai1_
frequency distributions, the regenerated values r-,wh very closely the published Galileo study values.
Specifically, the Galileo study results were 1/'78 and 1/55 for the median and mean, respectively. The
corresponding v_lues in the current study were 1/74 and//54. Since the updated (April. 1993) xesuI_ in
this study ate not complet_t v consisr_'nt with the earlier results (even though they were well widfin the
_mt+_tical certainty inmrval of the Galileo study), it was necessary to generate an intmamcdiate set
Galileo.era results using the original assumptions and dam. but using the same statistical methods and
tools that were applied in this update. These inmnnodiazc results axe they=fore entirety consistent with
the updated results.
Since we were ,,.sh,e to perfectly dupl/cate the previously pubLished t_sults, it is impossible to know
precisely the sources of the diHe_ences between the Galileo study calcn)n_ons and the cak_,i_qns used
here. However, the principal somc¢ of the disct_ancy appears toby a bias toward preserving the
exn_me values (fifth and ninety-fifth pexcenfiles) of lowe¢ leveJ distributions when generating l_h +_,-
level distributions (inthe Galileo study.), as opposed m preserving the central tendency (mean) of a
distribution and one extreme (as was done in this study). The problem occurs when aggregating
disu_1_tions or combining the distributions of risk comributors to generate the failure frequency
distribution of the ov_l system. In genaraL the lower ivwl disu'ibutionsmy not bc well behaved or
well modeled functions amenable to sampling for the Monte Carlo or L_ Hypercube sirv-ht+ons.
The lower level distributions must thc_fore be converted to _adily sampled distributions, preserving as
much _on about the originaldistribution as possible, in general this involves selecting the Wpe
of distribution bestsuiw.dto model the orJ_-A! distribution, and two points from the original
distribution to "anchor" the selecmd dis_budon type. In both the Gab'leo study and the current study
the disudbudon type used in the simulations was the lognonnaL The _-_tysrs performiag the Galileo
study apI_ar tohave se,lectedth_ e_tren_s (fifthand -_nP_y-fi._ peJ_emik_s)of theundo'lying
distributions to anchor their lognormaI di.stribudons, allowing the central tendenci_ of ttm ,,-d,-'lying
distribution to '_fIoat" to fit the tognormal distributiom
Whi!_ the process of anchoring the extremes may have been just_ed for the tmique purpose of the
Galileo study, it was felt that for the purpose of this study, it was much mote important that the central
tendencies and the worst case tendencies (the _ and nln_ry-fifth percentiles) be anchoted when
converting distributions. In this study tl_refore, all distributions are generated using the marim,,ra
ut-_lihoodestimator_._) as the mean (_._ = failuxcs / exposure), and all distributionsare eonv_rt_
to lognormal preserving the mean and the _ factor _, The error factor is determined by EF =
95th percentile I median: A converted distribution therefore preserves the mean and 1he relationship
between the median and worst-case end of the andedying diswibution.
, Appendix H - 1
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V Appendix I:
Dete, x_xination of Shuttle Catastrophic Failure Frequency Using No
Prior (non-Shuttle) Knowledge of SRB Failure Frequency
SAIC was *-_k_ltoca.Lc_d.__,the riskof Shuttleca_phic a.sccntfaHm_ without using prior(non-
Shut'?_)knowll_:]gctod_te_m_ tz_eRSRB fa_Rre _ue.._cy _hu_on. This ansiysiswas pe_o_
and isshown herrfor conwactual completeness. "Sensitivity2" shows the estimatedriskifthe 5I-L
failureisincludedas relevant.,and "Sensitivity3" shows the estimated riskifthe 5 I-L failureis
discounted.
l_i_-e 1-1. Shu_e Failure Fr_uency Distribmions
0.1
0,01
O.O01
9a
mR
o8
0 _-,_,S_1
These cases show the failur_ frequency distribution for the RSRB pak (and the w_ulting $TS failuns
frcc/ucncy distribution) if no prior knowledge about the reliability of the I_I_B Is assumed. In rhe_
cases, d_e uncerumty in u_c failure frequency arises only from the s_l confidence assochusd with
data of I failure in 110 RSRB-launches (Sensitivity 2 - including the 51-L failure) or 0 failares in
109 RSRB launches (Sensitivity 3 -discounting the 51-L faflu_). We bcliew that the RSRB reliability
belongs in the set of a_t U.S. solid rocke_ reliability, and that fl_ us_ of the solid rocket prior is
therefore justified. The appmpriaze dis_'ibufions for general use arc there.fore th_ Base case and
Semsihvity 1, depending upon the extentto which the decision maker believes that dr.sign and
operationalchanges sinc_ the 5I-L accidenthave controlledor mitigatedthe 5 I-L fieldjointfailure
mode.
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Risk Analysis Applied To The Space
Shuttle Main Engine:
I]MA NCOMBUSTION CHAMBER (MCC)
ilANALYSIS
Main Combustion Chamber
(MCC) Risk Analysis
The risk analysis of the MCC used standard risk
analysis techniques to assess the contribution of
MCC failure to the overall risk associated with
the space shuttle main engines. These methods
included:
Master Logic Diagram (MLD). The MLD is
used to identity in a consistent, logical, and
exhaustive method all events that could cause
faiIure of the MCC in such a manner credible
_hat a loss of vehicle or loss of mission could
result. For example, unstable crack growth is
included in the MCC analysis but mJssing bolts
on the powerhead and MCC interface _s ex-
cluded because it is not believed to be credible.
Initiating Event ldenaficaa'on and Evaluation.
The initiating events are obtained directly from
the MLD. Those events that start the logical
sequences leading to MCC failure are grouped
into a set of events for further analysis, identified
as the initiating events.
Functional Event Sequence Diagram (FESD).
The FESD begins at the initiating events and
develops the sequence of pivotal events that
must proceed to end at either success or the
MCC failure point. An example of a FESD is
given in Figure I for the Flow Recircutation
Inhibitor (FRI) system in the MCC. All events
are pivotal in the sense that the event must have
a yes-no, or on-off, type of output, These events
are then quantified by probabilistic analysis: e.g.,
the yes output occurs 95% of the time. the no
output 5%.
I-I
Zvent Tree Analysis. The chain of events
:leve_oped during the FESD process is placed in
an event tree format. This format allows the
sequence of events to be quantified as to the
contribution of the MCC to the overall SSME
risk.
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from the hst of initiators, the event tree develov-
ment and quantification, the sensitivitv and
uncertainty analysis, and, finally, some com-
ments about the main combustion chamber r/sk.
Flow Recirculation Inhibitor
Functional E_ent Sequm_nce ],;aqr,smj<........,___L79.F°\ // [
f----
/%,,
/ \,
j %/"::;i;F\\
System
1
-" -3E -#al
' I
/' ix. ,"_\ ........
,- >, ,/' _:_\\ / ,- ,,
/_'::"-'./":_\',(,,.,_., " 1/
' ,7
i
I _
I
p',
/y\
/,:°\
/
i; .... 1,4 eere
i "11 ' :_ "tit# I I
i
I ,:._Tr_ I
Figure 1. Example Functional Event Sequence Diagram
Each element of this risk assessment is discussed
in the following sections. The topics flow
naturally from the Master Logic Diagram devel-
opment to the initiator identification, the devel-
opment of the initiator frequencies, the construc-
tion of the functional event sequence diagrams
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Of POOR OUALI"P/
UI1i{tMaln Combustion
Chamber Probabilistic
Risk Assessment
Master Logic Diagram Anatvsis
Introduction
The Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) of the
Space Shuttle Main Engine <SSME) Main
Combustion Chamber tMCC) has proceeded in a
classical PRA development. The analyses began
"with the development of a Master Logic Dia-
gram (MLD). In this development all potential
causes of the top event, loss of the orbiter, are
identified by use of a logic flow diagram that
captures the logical operation of the SSME and
the interaction of SSME components. While the
program began by examining the full SSME it
was quickly focused on the MCC. as well as the
SSME software. The evaluation of the SSME
software is the topic of a different task and is not
reported here. The MLD, having captured the
logic used illthe design and operation of the
MCC. is evaluated to define ',all credible causes
of a Loss Of Vehicle (LOV) event. It is critical
to note that these initiators are not equivalent to
CRIT-I events. CRIT-1 events are failures that
lead directly to the loss of the engine. Initiators
identified by the MLD may need other events to
ioccur simultaneously or in sequence to have a
LOV event. Thus, what is identified in the
FMEA as a CRIT-3 event may, under the correct
set of circumstances, lead to a CRIT- 1 conse-
quence.
After defining the set of initiators each indi-
vidual initiator is assessed for further develop-
ment in the Function Event Sequence Diagram
(FESD) task. In this assessment the
results of previous tests and analyses
performed at Rocketdyne and
Marshall Space Flight Center
<MS FC) _Ji-Ji-Ji-Ji-Jilli4J_-. _, _-_,_,,,o,,.,,,,, c,,,o,_
are inte- Seiertce Applications ;nternarionat Corparafion
grated to define ).he list of initiators that require
further development. Those initiators are input
to the FESD analyses to identify pivotal events.
These events are then forrnalized in an event tree
analyses. Because of the primarily structural
nature of the MCC and the lack of mitigating
functions for off-nominal events fault tree
analyses ot the MCC is limited in this study.
Master Logic Diagram (MLD)
Results
The development of the MLD for the MCC
began with a thorough review of the MCC
geometry, flow paths, operations, inputs, out-
puts, test histories, and failure histories. The
MCC design consists of an outer structural jacket
forming the shape of the combustion chamber
Iiner and carrying the internal pressure and
external loads from the interfacing components.
The liner conducts hydrogen coolant in the axial
direction and acts as a thermal barrier between
the jacket and the combustion gases, It also
serves as a heat exchanger to heat the hydrogen
used to drive the Low Pressure Fuel TarboPump
(LPFTP), The LPFTP is not included in the
PRA of the MCC but is critical to the SSME
PRA development. The coolant is carried along
slotted channels in the liner that are machined
from a Narloy-Z material. The channels are
closed-out by Electro-Deposited copper (EDCu)
and Electro-Deposited nickel (EDNi). The
copper is in place to protect the nickel from non-
cryogenic hydrogen embrittlement effects. The
liner is supported by the high strength (Inconel
7 I8) structural jacket but is attached only at the
ends of the jacket. Structurally, the liner is
required to strain out to contact the jacket, to
react the differential pressure load between the
coolant and combustion gases, and to accommo-
date the cyclic and thermal racheting strain
ranges arising from the extreme thermal operat-
ing environment. The structural jacket is re-
quired to provide external support for the liner
2-I
ptusreactthe internalcombustionpressureloads
aswell asthethrustandgimbalingloads. While
the iiner isnot attachedall aiongthejacket the
ltncr mottosis restrictedbythejacket.
The operatingenvironmentfor theMCC is
severe.BeforetheSSMEfiring theentireliner
is approximately-400_'F.Duringsteadystate
operationthehotgaswall of the liner is approxi-
mately i,100 °Fwhile the coolant side near the
jacket is - 150 "F. Near the throat section of the
MCC the coolant pressure is 6,300 psi while the
hot wall chamber pressure is 2,100 psi. The
coolant channel height (measured radially) is
iapproximately 0.1 inch which implies tha_ a
1,250 °F temperature gradient exists over thick-
ness equivalent to the thickness of a quarter.
This temperature differential also introduces a
thermal strain mismatch at the Narloy-z/copperl
nickel interfaces.
During detailed discussions with the SAIC and
MSFC engineers and two on-site meetings the
MLD given in Figure 2 was agreed upon. This
MLD is used in the following section to identify.
those initiators for use in the FESD and event
tree development.
List Of Initiators and
Examination for FESD
Development
The results of the MLD evaluation identified a
set of initiators that can credibly lead to the LOV
event from failures in the MCC. The list of
initiators is comprehensive and to the extent
possible exclusive. It is important to note that
there axe overlapping physical conditions that
can cause one "initiator" to appear on the event
sequence cf another initiator. For example,
blockage of several coolant channels is an
initiator that can tead to a LOV event. It can be
the case that it is coupled with cracks
in the hot gas wall that under normal
cooling conditions are not CRIT-I
events but coupled with large thermal.
becoine Science ApptJcBtions international Corporation
unstable. Therefore. even when an event is
listed as an initiator it must be kept m mind that
such inttiators are dependent on rune. the history
of the MCC, and the mission requirements.
Given these qualifiers the list of initiating events
is shown in Table I.
Initiators,: Identified ;from .MLD i>_ __:._,:i_:
. ........ i.......... ra':,:: :: _::. _:Hot:Gas_:_ I1 Crack :. i:.:ii:ii!i_i_!:!:
Coolant Channel Crack
_:_!i::! ;`: .=i_.i;}i!"_iiii:G_!$iB_i_:Failure i:.:. ,_!!_:i[.ii[ii;!i_.iii!'
........... E DNi.s,e.paratiorVcrack ........
ii i !:i; ii:  utap te.! t B ,7.i:i:,:{ 7!iii:
FRI Leaka__e
Failure::
Actuator Sideload Instability
Bent Nozzle Tube at MCC Interface
Loss of Pressure Sensor
Table I. Initiators Identified From MLD
Initiator Evaluation
Hot __as wall crack.
If the hot gas wall crack is large enough then
the MCC failure will be immediate and cata-
strophic. However, there is ,_ufficient evi-
dence from previous MSFC data to indicate
that the MCC can withstand substantial crack-
ing without catastrophic failure. There are
known instances of pinhole and smatl cracks
that have not caused catastrophic failure. A
specific example in which a MCC survived
with 37 inches (cumulative sum of ail cracks,
not a single crack length) has been docu-
mented. However, since the mechanism for
the crack stopping is not well understood the
event "crack stops" or "crack is stable" cannot
be assessed a 100% probability. Therefore,
further investigation of this sequence of events
2-2
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Figure 2, Master Logic Diagram: Main Combustion Chamber For the Space Shuttle MainEngine
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is warranted.
Coolant Channei deformation/crack
_f :he MCC hot gas wall crack is expected to
stop growing due to a reduction in thermal
stress from H: [ea'!cing through the crack then
it is not possible to neglect the effect of the
deformation or cracking of coolant channels.
If reduced or lost fiow in a coolant channel
occurs because of deformation or cracks then
a localized hot spot can develop near a crack
hoc gas wall. In this case the thermal stress
may induce targe crack growth and the initia-
tor must be developed in the FESD and event
tree analysis.
G-]5 bolt faiture
There is evidence from the MSFC test stand data
that a single bolt failure is not a catastrophic
event. In the development of the event tree
this should be accounted for by a separate path
assuming that a report referencing this data is
made available,
EDNi cioseout set_aration/crack
The failure of the EDNi closeout has been
assumed to be negligible because the hot gas
wait is in tprimarily) a compressive stress
state. However, at the interface of the Nartoy-
Z. copper, and nickel there are non-negligible
shear forces because of the dissimilar materi-
als. The mismatch in shear modulus,
Poisson's ratio, and thermal expansion while
small still introduces shear forces. The extent
of these shear forces is of concern. Also,
given a shear force, the frequency of the EDNi
failure is of interest. If it can easily be shown
that the shear forces will not lead to a failure
rate of more than t in i0,000 per engine per
fight then the overall contribution to the risk
will be so small that the pursuit of this failure
path is not important.
There are two important failure paths
con- Science Applications _nternarionat Corporal on
eerned with in the consideration of the cooiant
channet c[oscout failure. The first ts labeled
sub-interface thilures and the second is labeled
interface failures. Either type of failure path
can be initiated by a variety of processes:
Manufacturing defects
Voids in the materials
Fatigue
Thermal racheting
Creep
Of course at.! of these may interact to produce
early failures. For this initial scoping effort it
is assumed that a defect exists. The question
is then: What is the stress state and the poten-
tial for defect propagation given that the
defect exists?
The answer to this question involves complex,
detailed analyses that are time consuming to
perform. However, it is possible to assess the
stress state in a somewhat simplified analysis
to determine if the shear stress is important to
the potential failure of the EDNi/Nartoy-z
ctoseout.
It is important to emphasize that the shear effect
is important because of the dissimilar material
bond. It has been shown that a defect in a
combined shear and compressive stress field
can exhibit Mode I (tensile), as well as Mode
II (shear) crack growth depending on the
materials and crack orientation. For a defect
in the interface the crack acts as a "bubble" in
which the effect of increasing the compressive
force is to increase the crack growth rate -
exactly the opposite effect of what is expected
from single material crack growth analysis.
To assess the effect of the MCC stress state on
interface and sub-interface crack growth rates
two tasks must be considered. First, an
anlysis of the frequency of debond failures in
the MCC liner must be performed. If the
2..4
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frequency of debond is high enou_oh then it is
.necessary to perform some stress analyses of
the dissirrdliar material interface area to
determine if the area is suceptibte to larger
crack growth rates than was previously ex-
pected.
The basic conclusion is thaz the EDNi and
Narloy-z interface must be studied in more
detail. The following sections provide the
debond rate data analysis and simplified stress
analyses.
Multiple coolant channel blockage
Because of the concern over the thermal loading
of the MCC liner wall, the closeout, and the
hot gas wail cooling via thermal stress reduc-
tion from cooling the possibility of coolant
channels becoming blocked, even partially,
could affect the fracture behavior or crack
growth characteristics in these other areas.
While a priori it is expected that these events
will have very little chance of causing a loss
of MCC event they must still be examined.
FRI system failure
The FRI system protects the MCC interface
with the nozzle from exhaust gas re-circula-
tion during mainstage firing. The increased
thermal stres.ses from such a re-circulation
pattern could affect the nozzle tubes, the MCC
liner turn around duct, or the MCC to nozzle
bolts. This initiator must be included in
functional event sequence diagram analyses.
Manifold weld failure
Clealy, the failure of the manifold weld is of
critical concern. It is believed that the mani-
fold weld failure caused a catastrophic failure
of an engine during testing. The evidence was
net 100% conclusive because of the large
scale destruction of the engine.
However, even a belief that the weid
failure could have lead to a loss of
SS_|E Science Applications tnfemational Corporation
requires that it be included in further risk
assessment studies.
Actuator side!oad instability
MSFC engineers have stated that the force that
the actuator develops during an.,,, flight is
insufficient to cause a buckiing of the MCC.
This analysis was carried out by Rocketdyne
and. pending the receipt of this report, it is not
considered further.
Loss of powerhead bolt preioad
There is some recent test stand data that indi-
cates that the MCC could sun'ive the loss of a
single bolt. This will certainly reduce tb.e
frequency with which one reaches a loss of
MCC event from this initiator but since it is
not known if there is a zero probability of the
loss of the MCC this initiator must be evalu-
ated by FESD analysis.
Bent nozzle tubes at MCC/nozzle interface
After meeting with MSFC engineers it was
concluded that this initiator, while near the
MCC and nozzle interface, was outside the
scope of a risk assessment of the MCC.
Therefore, this initiator was not considered
further because it is out of scope.
Combustion/flow instability
During meetings with MSFC and by careful
consideration of the MLD it was concluded
that combustion or flow instabilities are not
true intiators but rather.are the result of some
other initiating event. They will be pivotal
events in the FESD construction, however, the
combustion or flow instabilities result from
causes outside the MCC or from other, already
2-5
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identified, initiating events within the MCC
boundaries.
When the sequence of events after _tae loss of the
pre._sure sensor are examined it becomes clear
that there arc, no events wtthin the MCC as a
result of this sensor failure. If the sensor be-
comes plugged then it is within the bounds of the
MCC but all e,/ents occur at the controller and
turbomachinery. Therefore, the loss of pressure
sensor was not included during the FESD devel-
opment.
Based on these examinations there are seven
initiators which warrant more detailed investiga-
tion m the functional event sequence diagram
analysis. These are listed in Table II. Before
proceeding to the FESD construction the fre-
quency with each initiator occurs is estimated
using the existing data from MSFC tests and
flight data bases.
_ummary and Conclusions
The evaluation of the frequency of
initiating and pivotal event frequencies indicated
that the debond aad/or cracking of the Electro-
1
]Deposited Nickel (EDNi) close-out layer of the
MCC liner is occurring more frequently. There
are difficulties in evaluating these data. First,
there ,are relatively few failures of the MCC and,
therefore, the associated uncertainties are large.
Second, when there are catastrophic failures of
the MCC the design is usually changed to re-
move these sources of faitarc. In this case it is
necessary to discount (i.e. count them as less
than unity probability of occurrence) previous
failures or show through anatysis how these
2-6
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design changes or operational changes have
affected the MCC performance. To perform
such analysis it is necessary to understand the
MCC construction attd the function of the liner.
To show t_ow physical and/or phenomenological
models are used to quantify the failure frequency
of initiating or pivotal events the EDNi layer
debond is investigated.
Coolant Channel Cracks
EDNi Se or Crack
Manifold weld failure
Table II. Initiating Events For Functional
Event Sequence Diagram Analysis
[IStress Analys s andCrack Growth. inthepasthasfocuseclonwallthinningand
T!Application To The MCC _r_ckgrowthi,_menot_a_w._lsideoftheliner.
Liner
The SSME MCC configuration and cross-section
are shown in Fimares 3 and 4. The MCC design
consists of an outer structural jacket forming the
shape of the combustion chamber liner and
carr?-ing the internal pressure loads and the
external loads from interfacing components. The
liner is attached to the jacket at the ends of the
structure. The liner is made of Nartoy-Z with
coolant channels machined into the liner in the
axial direction. The coolant channels are closed
out by a thin copper layer to protect the nickel
material from hydrogen embrittlement. The liner
is supported by a high-strength (I.nconet 718)
jacket that restricts liner motion during engine
operation. Thus, although the liner is not at-
tached to the jacket all "along the MCC, its
motion is restricted. During steady state opera-
tion the liner hot gas surface is nominally at
1,100"F and the back wall on the jacket side is
typically - 150*F. During start and cutoff the
complete liner temperature reaches --400*F. Near
the MCC throat area, the hot wall chamber
pressure is approximately 2,100 psi, while the
internal pressure of the coolant hydrogen is
11[6,300psi.
11[The damage accumulation process in the MCC
liner has been previously analyzed
as composed primarily of creep
and thermal racheting. The effort
v
because there has been test data taken in which
the hot gas wall has developed through-wall
cracks.
The failure of the EDNi closeout has been
assumed to be negligible because the hot gas
wall is (primarily) in a compressive stress state.
Under pressure only loading conditions, this is
valid. In fact, for a single material, under both
pressure and temperature loading, the stress field
may be primarily compressive. However, at the
interface of the Narloy-Z, copper, and nickel,
there are non-negligible shear forces because of
the dissimilar materials.
The mismatch in shear modulus. Poisson's ratio,
and thermal expansion, while small, still intro-
duces shear forces. The extent of these shear
forces is of concern. Also, given a shear force,
the frequency of the EDNi failure is of interest.
If it can easily be shown that the shear forces
will not lead to a failure rate of more than one in
50,000 per engine, then the overall contribution
to the risk will be so small that the pursuit of this
failure path is not important.
There are two important failure paths to consider
regarding the coolant channel closeout failure:
sub-interface failures and interface failures.
Either failure path can be initiated by a variety of
processes:
Manufacturing defects
Voids in the materials
3-1
Fatigue
Thermalracheting
Creep
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Stress Anatv$is of MCC Line.r
Of course all these may interact to produce early
failures. For this initial scoping effort it is
assumed that a defect exists. The question is
then: What are the stress state and potential for
defect propagation, given that the defect exists".,
The answer to this question involves complex,
detailed analyses that are time consuming _o
perform. However, it is possible to assess the
stress state in a simplified analysis to determine
if the shear stress is important to the potential
failure of the EDNi/Nartoy-Z closeout.
It is important to emphasize that the shear effect
is significant because of the dissimilar weld. It
has been shown that a defect in a combined shear
and compressive stress field can exhibit Mode I
(tensile), as well as Mode II (shear) crack growth
depending on the materials and crack orientation.
For a defect in the interface, the crack acts as a
"'bubble" in which the effect of increasing the
compressive force is to increase the crack growth
rate -- exactly the opposite effect of what is
expected from single material crack growth
analysis.
To assess the effect of the MCC stress state on
interface and sub-interface crack growth rates, a
simplified stress analysis has been performed.
This analysis examines a reaiistic MCC geom-
etry and calculates the stress in the
liner cavity. The details of this
analysis are provided in the follow-
ing section.
The stres_ analysis of the MCC liner includes the
geometry shown in Figure 4. This geometry is
analyzed to determine the stress state near the
interface of the EDNi closeout of the Narloy-Z
liner material. To provide a realistic approxima-
tion to the actual stress state, both the thermal
and mechanical stress states must be calculated.
Because of the approximate nature of this analy-
sis, previous thermal an',dysis of the MCC will
be used to define the temperature profile in the
MCC liner. The temperature profiles are ob-
tained from references [1] and [2]. The tempera-
ture profile induces thermal stresses in the
Nadoy-Z material, which is where the primary
heat transfer occurs. The cold wall side of the
liner also has a temperature field profile "although
the gradient is substantially smaller than on the
hot wall side. Figure 5 shows the temperature
profile as calculated in reference [ t ]. The profile
shown in Figure 5 is for the area of the liner
approximately one inch upstream from the
throat. The temperature profile is assumed to be
the same for the liner at all axial points, except
the wall boundary condition. Thus, a simple
ratio is used to determine the liner distribution
throughout the liner channel at locations away
from the throat. When both temperature and
pressure loading are considered simultaneously,
then there is a non-negligible shear stress intro-
duced near the interface layer.
The Nadoy-Z material is strong enough to
withstand this combined stress field, and there
are many thousands of seconds of test data to
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_rovethis claim. Theareaof greatestconcern
•omesfrom theintroductionof adefectat, or
near,the interfaceof theNarloy-Zm_dnickel.
Theintroductionof acrack-likedetectcauses
diiferent behaviorandstressloadingon thecrack
tipsdueto thedissimilarmaterialeffect. An
importanteffecthasbeenobservedfor asub-
interfacecrackwith crackfacecontactzoneina
:ombinedcompressiveandshearfieldt:l. In-
:reusingthelevelof the compressive stress may
resuit in an increase of the stress intensity factor
K_ at one of the crack tips. t'_l The actual value of
the stress intensit3' factor will depend on many
parameters including the elastic modulus,
Poisson' s ratio, the distance from the near crack
tip to the interface, the orientation of the major
crack axis compared to the interface, and the
normal and shear stress levels. Thus, there is a
need to demonstrate that the stress field does
contain shear forces and estimate this effect on
the crack behavior.
To estimate the normal and shear stress fields in
the material, a simplifi_'d, but realistic, finite
element analysis of the MCC liner was under-
taken. The geometry for this analysis is assumed
to be axisyrnmetric as shown in Figure 6. The
boundary conditions for the analysis are a com-
bined pressure and temperature loading. The
two layers modeled were of Narloy-Z and nickel.
The elastic modulus, Poisson's ratio, and thermal
expansion coefficient are all functions of tem-
perature. :4;For this study, the effect of the
thermal variation in material properties was not
included to limit the analyses to a
linear problem. Thus, the material
property data used was for the
temperature condition at the MCC
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throat. By solving the linear problem the prin-
ciple of supe,'-position can be used to combine
the pressure and temperature conditions due to
changing power levels.
Figure 7 shows the root mean square total strain
state for a typical analysis. The label "prob:
shear-03"" in Figure 7 implies that both the MCC
pressure and temperature field have been im-
posed on this problem. The pressure is that of
steady-state operation. Figure 8 shows the
results of the stress analysis when only the
pressure field is applied. Because of the calcula-
tion procedure used in the COSMOS * finite
element package, the "shear" strezs reported is
the stress in the x-y coordinate system. Since we
are interested in the interface layer stress, a post-
processing program was developed to change
coordinate systems and obtain the interface shear
stress. This result is shown in Figure 10. As this
Figure indicates, the shear force at the interface
is not negligible and must be accounted for in the
crack growth analysis.
To estimate the effect on the crack growth, the
results of c',dculations by Yang and Kim Is.)are
used. In this analysis the stress intensity factor,
K_, is calculated. One of the results is the esti-
mate of K: as a function of the ratio of the nor-
mat stress to the shear stress ¢_, (7. For the
nickel and Narioy-Z material properties of
interest, the Dunder's parameters given in
reference [4] are most closely approximated by
of 0.4 and of 0.125. Figure 10 shows a plot of
K_ normalized by the stress intensity factor for a
crack in an infinite plate versus crN,'_ ,. As this
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Figureindicates,evenfor compressivestresses
(negative),thevalueof I_ canbeashighas60%
of thestressintensityfactorfor thecrack in an
infinite plateundertensile loading.
The crack growth rate is given by
where C and n_ are material constants, N is the
number of applied stress cycles, and K is the
range of the stress intensity factor. If a vatue of
1 x t0 .2is used for C and 4 for m, then we can
calculate the stress level necessmy to double, the
crack length over one cycle. If the. initial crack
size is 0.005 inches then it will double in size if
the stress tevet is approximately 35 ksi. If the
crack is half the width of the land then it will
double if the stress is 25 ksi. These must be
viewed only as estimates because the stress
levels are outside the linear region and therefore
equation (1) is not accurate. Also, a doubling of
the half-width crack would require that edge
effect_ be incorporated. Given these caveats,
these stress ranges are within ranges calculated
in a previous Rocketdyne report. 16t
Summary and Conclusions
The MCC liner has been investigated for fatigue
and crack growth at, or near, the Narloy-Z and
EDNi interface. It was found that sufficient
shear-to-compressive stress ratios exist to cause
defects to grow during steady state operation due
to low cycle fatigue. The stress analysis indi-
cates that K_ can be as large as 60% of the K t
value under normal tensile loads in an infinite
plate even when the hot gas wall is
in compression. Local hot spots,
throttle down, and throttle up can
cause a change in the crack length.
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As with all material fracture the larger the initial
crack size the larger the growth rate.
From a risk standpoint, the growth of cracks in
the c[oseout area is of concern if the inspection
for these cracks is inefficient and if the leak rate
is large enough to deform the divergent section
of the nozzle. Efficient inspection procedures
can substantially reduce the risk.
To fully integrate the effect of the EDNi closeout
failure on MCC risk requires that the initial
distribution of defects, due to either debond or
cracking, is quantified. From the SSME data-
base it is possible to define the frequency of the
defect rate. Art assumption about the size of
these defects is needed to fully quantify how
many of these defects cart cause an initiating
event for the failure of the MCC and LOV event.
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Figure 3. Space Shuttle Main Engine Main Combustion Chamber Configuration
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Figure 4. Space Shuttle Main Engine Main CombustLon Chamber Cross-Section
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Coolant Channel Thermal Distribution (110% FPI. hg)
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Figure 5, Main Combustion Chamber Liner Temperature Profile
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Figure 6. Main Combustion Chamber Liner Finite Element Grid
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Figure 8. Main Combustion Chamber Liner Root Mean Squa_'e Stress Pro-
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Calculated Shear Strains For MCC Liner Wall
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Figure 9. Main Combustion Chamber Liner Interface Shear Stress Profile
Mode I Stress Intensity Factor Versus
Normal To Shear Stress Ratio
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Figure 10.
t
K i as a Function of the Ratio of the Normal to Shear, o_<
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[ilMCC PRA:
Initiating Event
Frequency Estimation
INTRODUCTION
Classically, most data analyses are only con-
corned with failure data and failure rates. Be-
cause this is a demonstration project it must
remmn clear that an initiating event does repre-
sent afaiture of a sub-component. However, it
does nor imply the failure of the MCC. There-
fore, in this chapter we will refer to sub-compo-
nent failures, e.g. hot gas wall cracks, as anoma-
rather than failures. Then when one sees an
rate it will not be mistaken for an MCC
failure rate.
This study proceeded in two phases. The data
received by SAIC contained data from.l'anuary
1983 through April of 1993. The fast step in the
data analyses is the examination of the data as it
exists to estimate initiating event frequencies and
event frequencies. An examination of
raw data also helps to provide closure to the
MLD analyses since any events not previously
considered should appear in the data base if they
are truly important. Therefore, the first part of
this chapter provides an overview of the methods
and analyses performed on the SSME data as
received. The second portion of this chapter
then re-organizes the data into a form more
suited for the event tree analyses to be performed
later.
PRACA Data Base Analyses
The anomaly data (both test and flight) t'or MCC
(Main Combustion Chamber) from
111411983 to 41611993 have been
studied. Because of the limited
data base, some assumptions are
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necessary: First. since the successful test data
between the anomalies are not available at the
present time, the accumulated MCC testing time
for each year are assumed to be same, Second,
the environments for different MCC tests such as
QualificatiorVcertification test, Alert, develop-
ment test, in-flight, acceptance test and manufac-
turing are net discriminated in this study. Third,
anomalies caused by different anomaly modes
are assumed to have the same consequence.
Based on these assumptions, the MCC anomalies
are categorized into nine anomaly modes. The
contributions to the MCC anomaly made by each
anomaly mode are estimated. By applying the
basic concept of "AGREE Allocation Method"
rq the anomaly occurrence rates of each MCC
anomaly mode are also calculated.
MCC Anomaly Modes
There are eight anomaly modes in the original
MCC data base. They are:
El':
EV:
MS:
MT:
MU:
MV:
MW:
UC:
Measurement Anomaly
Not-To-Specification
Structure
Pressure/Temperature High or Low
Mechanical Tolerance
External Leak
_temal Leak
Unsatisfactory condition
A large portion of MCC anomalies are related to
contamination, blanching, and surface roughness
which are not identified as initiating events from
the M1,D analysis. Also, many inconsistencies
exist in categorizing anomaly modes in the
original MCC data base. For example, anoma-
lies caused by material crack were placed in
anomaly category UC from 1983 to 1985, but in
anomaly mode missing copper or debond from
1986 to I988. Therefore, the original data base
is re-categorized into the following nine groups:
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Table III. Number of FaUures Per Year For SSME MCC
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BS:
CK:
CT:
LK:
MS:
MT:
MU:
WL:
R[:
Blanching/Surface Roughness
Crack and Pin Hole (Channel, 24%:
Liner, 22%; Weld, 27%; Hot Gas
Wall, 11%)
Contamination
Leak - internal and external (Burst
Diaphragm leakage, 54%)
Structure (Missing Copper, 44%; De-
bond, 39%)
Pressure/Temperature Hi or Low
Mechanical Tolerance
Weld Anomaly (not including crack)
Random Individual Anomaly
MCC Anomaly Mode
!Contribution Estimation
Ba_ed on these new categories the number of
anomalies for each anomaly mode during each
year are listed in Table HI.
The average annual anomaly number (anomalies/
year) caused by different anomaly modes are
estimated by using the following formulas ts_
X_.2= (X,+l_.)/(l + 1_)
_.,.,_= (X,_+13%)1(1+ 13)
)t (?, 1 +
where
13:Weight factor (=1.5 in the present study)
_'t: Anomaly occurrence rate for the first year
3.2: Anomaly occurrence rate for the second year
LI.z: Average anomaly occurrence rate for the 1't
and 2 *_ year
L_...,: Average. anomaly occurrence rate for the I"
through n _ year
The Annual anomaly numbers versus years for
MCC and the top four anomaly contributors
(cracks and pinhole leaks, contamination,
blanching or surface roughness, and random,
individual anomaly) are illustrated in Figures 11,
12, 13, 14, 15 and 16.
The contributions to the MCC anomaly made by
different anomaly modes are listed in Table IV.
The top three contributors to the MCC anomalies
versus years is shown in Figure t7.
Anomaly occurrence rate
Estimation for MCC Anomaly
Modes
The anomaly occurrence rates for each MCC
anomaly mode are estimated by using the basic
concept of the AGREE allocation method m
The anomaly occurrence rate to the MCC
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MCC ANNUAL ANOMALY NUMBER (TOTAL)
I ' I I I I _ [ ;
84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92
YEAR
FIGURE 11. MCC Total Anomaly Number
CRACK (CK) ANNUAL ANOMALY NUMBER
1
84
I
J6
I [ I I ] i
R7 88 89 90 91 92
YEAR
FIGURE 12. MCC Cracking Anomaly Number
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CONTAMINATION (CT) ANNUAL
ANOMALY NUMBER
83
I I 1 I 1 r I [ I
64 &.¢ 86 8? $8 $9 90 9! 92
TEAR
FIGURE 13. Contamination Annual Anomaly Number
BLANCHING/SURFACE ROUGHNESS (BS)
ANNUAL ANOMALY NU_BER
83
I
_4
| [ 1 I '. I "
g$ 86 87 t18 89 90 9 t
YEAR
FIGURE 14. Blanching/Surface Roughness Annual Anomaly
Number
92
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RANDOM INDIVIDUAL FAILURE GROUP (RI)
ANNUAL ANOMALY NUMBER
83 $$ 89
! I I I
84 $5 B6
YEAR
r ' l
9L 92
FIGURE 15. Random Individual Annual Anomaly Number
CONTRIBUTIONS TO MCC ANOMALY MADE BY
MODES BS, CK, CT AND RI
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TOP THREE MCC INITIATOR CONTRIBUTORS
CK
MS
RI
RI
BS
CK
i
Y'F,AIt
FIGURE 17. Top Three Contributors to Annual Anomaly Number
,, mode is given by
_. ffiC(-ln(R(t))/tot
where
t: mtssion time
C: contribution of the anomaly mode
_: importance factor for the anomaly mode
P[MCC anomaly I anomaly caused by the
anomaly mode]
Rto: MCC reliability for mission time t
For a mission time of 520 seconds, the contribu-
tion of different anomaly modes can be obtained
from Table V. The importance factor for each
anomalv mode is I (based on the third assump-
tion described in the introduction).
The estimated anomaly occurrence
rates for MCC anomaly modes in
1992 are listed in the Table VI.
Discussion and Summary
The average annual anomaly number for MCC
dropped almost 80% from 1983 to 1992. Based
on the results obtained from this study, the trend
of the MCC reliability growth is toward stable.
Anomaly Modes Crack_ and Pinhole Leaks
(CK), Contamination (CT), and Blanching or
Surface Roughness ('BS)
The average annual anomaly numbers for the
anomaly modes cracks and pinhole leaks, con-
tammation, and blanching or surface roughness
dropped 88%, 73% and 78% respectively (Fig-
ures 12, 13 and 14), but their contributions to the
total MCC anomaly are still in the important
positions (cracks and pinhole leaks 16%, con-
tamination 15%, blanching or surface roughness
19% for 1992).
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Anomaly Mode Random, Individual Anomaly
',(RI)
The annual anomaly number for the anomaly
mode raadom, individual anomaly increased
213% from 1983 to 1992. Since dealing with
random, individual anomalies is a much more
difficult task than other anomaly modes (which
are more specifically defined), it is expected to
see random individual anomalies take a more
important position for the MCC reliability
Anomaly Modes: Internal or External Leak
(LK) and Missing Copper or Debond (MS)
The MCC anomalies caused by internal or
external leak were dominated by "Burst Dia-
phragm Leak" from 1983 to 1986. The latest
three anomalies (1988, 1989, and I992) are not
related to "Burst Diaphragm Leak". The
anomaly mode internal or external leak contrib-
utes 6% of the total MCC anomalies for 1992.
Ill
83 17.6% 27.S% 11.8% 9.8% 3.9% 3.9% 9.8% 2.0% 13.7%
84 25.5% 31.5% 9.1% 7.9% 2.4% 2.4% 9.7% 3.0% 8.5%
85 22.9% 30.8% 5.5% 8.6% 8.2% 1.0% 5.7% 4.8% 12.5%
86 12.3% 31.2% 7.8% 7.1% 11.7% 3.0% 3.1% 2.6% 21.3%
87 7.4% 47.8% 12.0% 4.2% 7.0% 1.8% 1.8% 5.2% 12.8%
88 4.5% 57.0% 7.3% 8.1% 4.3% 1.1% 1.1% 8.7% 7.8%
89 10.0% 38.7% tl.6% 12.0% 2.3% 8.2% 0.6% 12.4% 4.2%
90 3.5% 13.3% 10.5% 4.2% 46.6% 2.8% 0.2% 17.4% l.S%
91 t3.99 7.9% 28.8% 1.19 12.39 0.7% 0.19 34.9% 0.4%
92 19.0% 15.89 ....... ! 5.49 6,49 ...... !2.49 0,4% 0.0% 30.,3% 0.29_
Table V. Anomaly Mode Contributions to the MCC Anomaly Rate
improvement in the later MCC
perfo,-nance period.
There are 7 MCC anomalies caused by anomaly
mode missing copper or debond in 1990, that
drove the MS annual anomaly number high.
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;];:9_2ii S.75E-O8
;,_,_i_i_. l in 33,438 missions
..! ::: ::.;
4,77E-08 4.65E-08
fin 40.287 missions I in 41.328 missions
1.93E-08 5.75E-08
I in 99.717 missions I in 51.33I missions
_i _99Z_ 1.21E-09 8.99E- [ I 9,15E-08 6.27E- 10
_!;!!!!:_ 1 in t,592.479 missions I in 21,394,699 raissions 1 in 21,024 missions t in 3,065.70a missions
Table VI. 1992 Estimated MCC Anomaly Rate
2.DgE-07
;in 9'_2 "_mission_
More than 83% of the missing copper or debond
anomalies were caused by" Missing Copper and
Debond". The anomaly mode missing copper or
debond contributes 12% of the total MCC
maomalies for 1992.
Anomaly Modes Pressure/Temperature High
or Low (MT), Mechanical Tolerance (MU),
and Weld Anomaly (WL)
The contributions to the MCC anomaly made by
pressure/temperature high or low, mechanical
tolerance and weld anomaly are relatively low in
the recent years (Totally less than 1% of the
MCC anomalies are contributed by these three
anomaly modes in 1992).
Estimating MLD Initiating
Event Frequencies
The previous analysis demonstrated that events
that are related to the initiating events identified
from the MLD are occurring frequently enough
to warrant further, detailed study.
Unfortunately, the detailed records needed to
study the thirteen initiators identified by the
Master Logic Diagram only are available from
1988 to 1992. Previous data did
not contain enough information to
separate the data into MLD
initiating event categories. The annual events
attributed to each initiating event is listed in
Table VII. The average annual initiating event
frequencies are based on two considerations:
The accumulated MCC testing or flight
time for each year, and
The "reliability growth effect".
The following formulas have been used to
estimate the average annual initiating event
frequencies:
F,,_ = (T1.2FI + ]3 F2)t(I + [3)
F,,z_ = (T,._Ft.: + 13F3)I( t + _)
F_...., = (T ._, Ft.....,. , ÷ _Fa)/(1 + _)
where
[3: weight factor, i.5 in present study
F_: Number of events in i_ year
T..: Time factor, T. = T FF.
E4 t.] ,1 t
The accumulated test/flight time use for the T..
I. I
values are shown in Table VIII. The values for F
are calculated based on the data in Tables VI/
and VIII. The results are shown in Table IX.
It is now possible to estimate the individual
initiating event frequencies from Tables VII
through IX. Using the AGREE allocation
method the initiating event frequency for event i
is calculated by the following formula:
k, = (CikMcc)/(O _
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1983 27% Cracks,
pinholes
1984 31% Cracks,
pinholes
1985 30% Cracks.
pinholes
Cracks,
1986 31%
pinholes
1987 43% Cracks,
pinholes
1988 51% Cracks,
pinholes
1989 40% Cracks.
pinholes
Structure:
1990 38% Missing
eopper/debond
Blanct_ing or
t 8% Surface 14% Weld failure
Roughness
Blanching or
24% Surface 10% Contamination
Roughness
Blanching or
22% Surface [ 2% Weld failure
Roughness
Blanching or
19% Weld failure 14% Surface
Roughness
14% Wetd failure 11% Contamination
10% Weid failure 8% Contaminatmn
1 l% Contamination 11% Leaks: Internal
And External
19% Cracks, 15% Random
pinholes
1991 32% Random
1992 29% Random
Structure:
26% Contamination 14% Missing
coppertdebond
Blanching or Cracks,
I8% Surface 16%
Roughness pinholes
where
C.:
(.0_:
Table VII.
Initiating event frequency estimate
Contribution of P initiator
Frequency of all MCC initiating events
Importance factor for the i= initiator
P(MCC failure I failure cause by the i'_
initiator)
The estimate for _'MCCin 1992 is 1.61 x 10 4 per
second. This estimate is obtained by dividing
the total number of recorded anomalies by the
total equivalent test (or hot-fire) time. If it is
assumed that the average mission time is 520
seconds the value of _'_cc implies
an initiator occurs about every. 12
m.issions. Tb2s frequency is prob-
ably too low, that is initiating
Largest Contributors to MCC Anomaly Rate
events occur more frequently, but a more de-
tailed data analysis could improve this accuracy.
However, the purpose of this study is a demon-
stration of the method, it is not to c',dculate the
detailed risk. Therefore, while the initiating
event frequency is believed to be realistic the
current scope of the program does not allow a
more detailed analysis of data received after this
initial analysis was completed. The estimates for
the initiating event frequencies are provided in
Table XI.
Based on these results, it was decided after
examining the event tree diagrams (to be pre-
sented in the following chapter) that more
detailed analyses of the data was warranted for
the initiating event frequencies. These results
are presented in the foiIowing section.
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Table VIII. Events Used to Estimate MLD Initiating Event Frequency
U
I1'
Flight/Test seconds 45,268 44,166 52,407
Time factor 0.9757 1.1866 0.7750
p , ! .,s, _.s i .s
I?.
40,614
1.1 689
_.. 1.5
I I ! I,_ i
47,475
1.0000
1.5 I
Table IX. Test/Flight Time Used to Estimate MLD Initiating Event Frequency
1988 0.0000 1.0000
1989 0.0000 1.5903
1990 1.8000 0.7548
1991 1,1580 0,8340
0.9899
5.1690
0.0000 0.0000 0.0OO0
0.0000 2.4000 0.6000
1.2000 4.1391 1.4848
0,9720 1.8831 1.O603
0,4545 0.4958
2.6265 11.10Z7 3.6408
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.00OO
0.0000
3,0000
1.1708
0.5557
0.1723
0.0805 I
4.9793
U
tl!
i9881 o.oooo I
9891 o.oooo I
199oI _.oooo I
t991 ! 0.6000 1
o.28os Il:rOT__992t....o.88,os'I
Table X.
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000,,
0.0000
1.0000 1.0000
0.3903 0.3903
0,1852 0.185Z
0.0574 0.6574
0.0268 0.3074
1.6598 2.5403
0.0000 Z.O000 E
0,0000 3.1805 9.72Z089_
0.0000 2.1096 12.414522
0.0000 1.2539 8.648312_i
0.6000 = 0.5863 7.64372251
0:6000 1 9, t304 46,-4_86 I
Average Annual Initiating Events For MLD Initiators
4-10
Science Applications International Corporation
1988 I
1989 I
1990 I
1991[
1992t
Large 1 in 96 Large Large Large Large 1 in 32
Large 1 in 73 Large 1 in 48 I in 194 Large 1 in 99
1 in 82 1 in t96 1 in 124 I in 36 1 in lO0 Large 1 in 2_67
1 in 89
1988
I989
1 990
1991
199Z
Large Large 1 in 96 1 in 96 Large 1 in 48 1 in 12
Large Large l in 298 1 in 298 Large I in 37 1 in 12
Large Large l in 801 1 in 801 Large 1 in 70 1 in 1Z
1 in 172. Large t in 1,799 l in 157 Large 1 in 82 1 in 1Z
1 in 325 Lar,qe 1 in 3r401 1 in 297 1 in 157. t in 156 1 in 1Z
Table XI. Estimated Iztitiating Event Frequencies For MLD Initiators
 -Examination of PRACA
Data Base For MCC Initiating
Frequencies
The MCC data bases used in this analysis are
MSFC Report,
SSME FRR Report, and
SSME Historical Data (NASA/MFSC).
MCC Data Analysis
The following assumptions were utilized during
the re-examination of the available SSME data.
Hot Gas Wall Crack
The pinholes and cracks on the hot gas wall are
counted.
The sizes and locations of the pinholes or cracks
are not distinguished.
Surface roughness, blanching, or
blister are not counted.
Abnormal data that are not repre-
sentative of the population as a whole, for
example, MCC 401 i had 141 holes and cracks in
only 8 starts, are eliminated from this analysis.
PBF: Bolt failure
Bolt failure such as bolt stretch, crack or fracture
are counted (obtained from SSME FRR Report).
ESC: EDNi crack - not aft end
The cold wall cracks which are not at the aft end
axe counted.
Leakage in weld joint 15_DNi close out)
causing the MCC liner cavity pressure increase
are counted.
EAE: EDNi crack - aft end
MCC cold wail cracks or debonds at the aft end
are counted.
FR[: Flow recirculation inhibitor svstem leakage
The _ failures such as seal leak and sea2
overhearing are counted (obtained from SSME
4-11
FRRReport).
M33,rF:Manifoldweldfailure
Manifoldweld cracksarecounted.
Lackof fusion,microcracks(acceptableperthe
weld spec.) in weldsa.renotcountedasweld
failures.
CCC: Coolantchanneldeformation/crack,and
CCB" Multir_lecoolantchannelblockage,
Contaminationswb_ichdonotcauseblockageare
not countedasafailure.
Based on the existing data base, the MCC fail-
ures caused by CCC or CCB can not be explic-
itly identified, and are eliminated in this analysis.
The MCC failure data (both test and flight) from
1/5188 to 4/6193 has been used. for this study.
Note: The total number of pinholes cracks on
MCC 2024 were 30. These occurred over 5
years. The number of the HGW events for each
),ear in this case is assumed to be 6.
MCC Initiator Frequency Estimation
The method developed for the MCC initiator
frequency estimation is based on the following
assumptions:
The MCCs considered in this analysis are as-
sumed to have same physical conditions. They
are not discriminated.
The environments for different MCC tests such
as Qualification/certification test, Alert, develop-
ment test, in flight, acceptance test and manufac-
turing are not distinguished in this study.
In order to evaluate the MCC
"'reliability growth effect", a
weight factor has been used in this
study. The basic concept of using
Science Applications International Corporation
this weight factor is to place more weight on the
current MCC initiating event than on the earlier
MCC initiating event in the MCC initiating event
frequencv estimation. For exampIe, the MCC
initiating events which occurred in 1992 are
weighted more than the MCC initiating events
which occurred in i991. In this analysis, 13=!
(no reliability growth effect), b = 1.5. and 13=2
(strong reliability growth effect) has been tested.
Since d_e successful test/flight data between the
MCC anomalies are not avmlable a: the present
time, the frequencies of MCC initiators are
estimated on a yearly basis (the accumulated
MCC test/flight time for each year are available).
The MCC initiating event frequencies are as-
sumed to be proportional to the length of the
accumulated MCC test/flight time.
For this set of assumptions the analysis of the
previous section is repeated. Using a standard %z
distribution uncertainty ranges can be formed.
These results are presented in Tables IV-A, V-A,
and VI-A.
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Table IV-A. Weighted MCC Annual Anomaly Number (Anomalies/Year)
_0000 0.6000 0.0000 3.1805
3.2848 0.0000 2.1096
1.0182 0.0000 1.2539
1.0761 0.6000 0.5863
5.9791 0.6000 9.1304
Table V-A. Individual Anomaly Mode Contributions to the MCC Anomaly Rate
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Functional Event
Sequence Diagrams
(FESD's):
Application To The MCC
Manifold Weld Anomaly Functional Event
Sequence Diagram
The functional event sequence diagram for the
Manifold Weld Anomaly, identified MWF in the
FESD, is shown in Figure 18, The entry condi-
tion for this FESD is a crack of any size existing
in the weld material of Heat Affected Zone
(HAZ) of the parent material. Given that a crack
exists, the first question to ask is if it is large
enough to be detected, MWF-CD-001? If it is
large enough to be detected then it is assumed
Manifold Weld Failure
Functional Event Sequence Diagram
1 I
is .--r8¢i _ltgg
Figure 18. Manifold Weld Anomaly FESD
_An Em_tovoo_ _am_ar, V
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that a repair of the crack is attempted. If the
repair is effective, a positive response to event
Ma,VF-RE-001. then there is a successful opera-
tion. If the repair is not effective then a crack
still exists in the structure and the FESD must
return to the path that examines the size of the
crack. If the crack in the weld or HAZ is small
enough to not grow to a critical size over one
mission, a positive response to MW'F-LC-001,
then there is successful operation. If the crack
grows to a critical size then there would be a loss
of vehicle.
Bolt Anomaly Functional Event Sequence
Diagram
The functional event sequence diagram for the
Bolt Anomaly, identified PBF in the FESD, is
shown in Figure 19. The entry point for this
FESD is that the pre-ioad on the bolt is outside
the MSFC specifications. The evidence from
BoIt Fai lure
Functional Event Sequence Diagram
_..[41,.Im !
1
T:;l; .aII ¢_
I
-|¢ri_.|,Ill
¢l.*I_t
M:l<icr b,mlt
fJ:*._I
Figuxe 19. Bolt Anomaly FESD
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MSFC is that a single bolt failure due to incor-
rect torque being applied, bolt stretch, or bolt
shear, is insufficient to affec_ the operation of the
NICC. Therefore, the first question to be asked
is if more than a single bolt has failed, PBF-BB-
00 I. If more than a single bolt has failed, it is
Bo It Fai lure
Functional Event Sequence Diagram
_t:ncile bo3l _ lilw-llt _o_ _,
; .......,_ \I ...... ( ...... \" "-
---_ e_a_, _---_I _,J, ")
'_,I _\-:::_,",_-_/' \',, ./"\_____ / :,:._.,,_. _ \......f
t
'T_al i,;,|lr _I
i'lll I:,1",l"I l_
I 'tMolt _v ; _,ltl :_,rb¢illwl, llI la/lu, re
m_4¢411
t
Figure 20. Updated Bolt Anomaly FESD
assumed that the leakage mid/or vibration load-
ing will Iead to an LOV event. If only a single
:bolt fails then a total loss of the bolt could also
lead to a leakage path causing LOV. If there is
inot a total loss of the bolt, a negative response to
PBF-PL-001, then it is possible that the added
loading, both mechariieal and thermal, on adja-
cent bolts could cause their failure. The initial
FESD for the bott loss included a branch for the
combustion or flow instability; however, MSFC
personnel stated in an August 24, 1993 meeting
that this is not possible for a partial loss of a
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Coolant Channel Blockage
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Figure 21. Coolant Channel Blockage FESD
singte bolt. The events PBF-CI-001 and PBF-
SW-001 have been deleted from the PBF FESD.
This updated FESD is shown in Figure 20.
Coolant Channel Blockage Functional Event
Sequence Diagram
The functional event sequence diagram for the
Coolant Channel Blockage Anomaly, identified
CCB in the FESD, is shown in Figure 21. The
entry condition for this FESD is loss of flow in
one or more channels.
The first event is whether enough blockage
occurs to starve the LPFTP or change the mix-
ture ratio enough to cause the controller to
change the oxidizer valve position, event CCB-
CD-001. If the LPFTP receives insufficient flow
then the en_ne must be shutdown or there will
5-2 ORIGINAL PAGE IS
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be an LOV event, CCB-SD-001. If the blockage
is insufficient to cause the LPFTP to fail then the
next event to check is whether the blockage
causes a crack in the liner, identified as CCB-
DC-O01. If no crack is caused then the flow path
has been changed but there is no significant
effect on the MCC operation and there is suc-
cessful operation. It" the blockage does cause a
crack, then the question, CCB-HG-001, is if
there is a crack on the hot gas wait. If there is a
crack, a positive response to CCB-HG-001, then
the sequence must either transfer to the coolant
_Af_ _mD_v_-_wJ'-,d_ Con1_n_y
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The functional event sequence diagram for the
Coolant Channel Cracking Anomaly, identified
CCC in the FESD, is shown in Figure 22. The
entry point for this FESD is a crack of any size
within the land area of the Narloy liner. Tids is
an important definition for the remainder of the
FESD discussion. Cracks on the hot gas wall of
the Narloy or in the Narloy-copper-nickel inter-
face and nickel closeout are treated separately in
Channe I Cracks
Fi8ure Z?..Cootant Channel Cracks FESD
•hannel crack, the EDNi closeout crack, or the
hot gas wall crack FESD.
Coolant Channel Cracks Functional Event
:Sequence Diagram
this study. Thus, if the coolant channel crack
occurs and it grows all the way through the Iand
the net effect is to have turned two coolant
channels into one coolant channe! since a flow
path between the channels has now been created.
Because the fuel is undergoing a transition from
a ]iquid to gaseous phase there is the potential
for a mass flow rote reduction due to the corn-
ORICq_AL _At_E 18
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pressible nature of the fluid. Therefore, the heat
transfer characteristics of this type of anomaly
mus_ be quantified through a separate FESD.
The first event that is exat_fined is whether them
are multiple cracks in the coolant channel tand
CCC-MC-001. If there are then the liner
strength is examined to determine if it has fallen
below the load level, CCC-LS-001. If it has then
there is a loss of cooling to the MCC. MCC
failure, and LOV. If the strength is not less than
the load level then the crack growth is examined
[for stability. If the crack growth is dynamic it is
possible to change tb.e liner geometry, due to
bulging and cause a combustion and/or flow
instability, this branch identified as CCC-CI-001.
Such an instability could cause a shock wave
that would damage the nozzle and cause an
LOV. If a shock wave or flow instability is not
caused then the effect of a dynamic crack on the
overall liner strength must be examined. If the
ripping of the multiple channel lands reduces the
strength below the load level then there is a loss
of the MCC and LOV.
Note that several branches of the CCC FESD
converge to the point CCC-LS-001. This is
because the phenomenological sequence after a
no response to CCC-TS--00 I, CCC-CI-001, and
CCC-SW-001 are all identical. If the liner
strength remains above the load level then the
effect of the dynamic crack on the liner-to-jacket
weld must be examined. If the impact of the
dynamic crack on this weld causes weld failure
there will be leakage into the liner/jacket cavity.
Science Applications Internatianal Corpora¢ion
This leakage will transfer to a point in the EDNi
FESD, just prior to ESC-BD-001. If the liner-to-
jacket weld does not fail then there is no adverse
effect of multiple coolant channel cracks on the
MCC .and there is successful operation.
If there are not multiple channel cracks, a no
response to CCC-MC-001, then the next event
examined is if the coolant channel crack trans-
fers load to the hot gas waft causing a hot gas
wall crack, CCC-HG-001. A yes response to
this event causes a transfer into the HGW FESD.
If not then the same question is posed for the
closeout walt, CCC-CW-001. Again a positive
response causes a transfer to the ESC FESD. A
no response implies successful operation.
Flow Recircuiation Inhibitor Functional Event
Sequence Diagram
The functional event sequence diagram for the
Flow Recirculation Inhibitor Anomaly, identified
FRI in the FESD, is shown in Figure 23. It must
be noted that all seal leakage events have been
collapsed into this FESD. The other seal leakage
locations are: pressure port seal; contracting seal
at the MCC and powerhead interface; and the
seal at the MCC and injector plate interface. The
pressure port seal tead._ to events that are outside
the scope of the MCC restrictions placed or) this
study. As discussed with MSFC staff at _he
August 23 and 24, I993 meetings the powerhead
seals are not actual seals. The contracting seal is
not meant to contain gas but rather to provide a
space for the contraction and expansion during
cool-down and engine firing. The inter-propel-
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Recirculation Inhibitor System
Functional [ven¢ Sequence Oi_gram
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Figure 23. Flow Recirculation Inhibitor Anomaly FESD
lout face seal already has a le',_ path provided by
the holes drilled in the plate. Therefore, any
anomaly causing leakage will only act to coot
the hot gas walI and will actually be I_nefici_.
Thus, the only seal of concern is the GI5 bel-
lows seal. Since the FRI must fail b+for¢ any
GI5 anomaly would have any effect on the
MCC operation the FRI system leads to all seal
leakage problems.
Given that the FRI has failed the first event to
consider is whether the hot gas bypasses the O15
seal or whether it recirculates in the gap between
the MCC and nozzle, event FRI-BY-00I. If it
does bypass the GI5 seal then the engine is
operating as designed and this is successful
operation. If the gas does not bypass the Gt5
seal then the sequence may proceed by failing
the GI5 seal and allowing gas to escape, a
positive response to FRI-GE-001, or the seal
may contain the gas within the engine. Whether
the gas is contained or not the next three events
are identical in concept but their probability of
occurrence is different, For example, if the gas
is escaping the engine the force and temperature
change on the manifold may cause its faiIure,
event FRI-M_F-001. If the gas is contained
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Figure 24. Hot Gas Wall Cracks FESD
within the engine then the manifold may still fail
because of the ct_ange in the thermal stress from
the FILl failure but the hot gas will not be in
direct contact causing a lower probability of
OCCBITencP.
Hot Gas Wall Cracks Functional Event Se-
quence Diagram
The functional event sequence diagram for the
Hot Gas Wall Cracks Anomaly, identified HGW
in the FESD, is shown in Figure 24. The entry
point for this FESD is any crack on the hot gas
wall surface of the MCC. The first event, HGW-
TW-001, is when the crack becomes a through-
wall crack. If the crack is not a through-wall
crack then there is successful operation. When
the crack becomes a through-wall crack, it can
undergo stable or unstable crack growth., repre-
sented by event HGW-CG-001. In the situation
in which the crack growth is unstable or dy-
namic. _. similar set of event sequences as in the
coolant channel blockage and crack FESD's is
considered. In this sequence the possibility of a
combustion or flow instability, HGW-CI-001, is
examined which if it does not occur then the
possibility of the liner strength being reduced
below the load level. HGW-LS-001, is consid-
ered. If the HGW-LS-001 event does occur then
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Figure 25. EDNi Closeout Separation/Crack FESD
!
there is a loss of the MCC and LOV. If not, then
I
the effect of an unstable crack being stopped at
the liner to jacket weld is examined by event
HGW-LW-001. If the weld fails, then them is a
transfer into the EDNi closeout separation or
crack: FESD via transfer HGW-ESC-001. If
either the shock wave does not damage the
nozzle or the liner to jacket weld does not fail,
negative outputs from either event HGW-SW-
001 or HGW-LW-001, then there is successful
operation.
If the crack is growing stably, a yes to event
HGW-CG-001, then the next event is fuel leaks
through the crack to relieve the thermal strain
and stop the crack growth. HGW-CS-001. If this
occurs then there is successful operation. If it
does not stop the crack growth then the event
crack growth rate to critical size is less than
mission time is examined, event HGW-GR-001.
If this event occurs, there is successful operation,
otherwise there is a loss of the MCC and subse-
quent LOV.
EDNi Closeout Separate'on Crack Functional
Event Sequence Diagram
The functional event sequence diagram for the
EDNi Closeout Separation/Crack Anomaly,
identified ESC in the FESD, is shown in Figure
25. The entry point for this FESD is any debond
of the Narloy-copper-nickel interface, a crack
within the shear zone of the interface in the
Narloy, or a crack in the nickel material. The
FESD for this event has been modified by the
MSFC engineers to account for the fact that
there can be a different path if the debond occurs
5-7 01_11_1, PAGE .1_
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Ain the aft end of the liner. These changes are
reflected in._ ?.
Thus. the first event is the debond does no.t occur
in the aft end of the liner, event ESC-AE-001. If
this is fails, then the sequence of events is to
check if the fuel jet does not cause a bum
through of the nozzle, ESC-BN-001. [f it does
cause a bum through, a negative response to
ESC-BN-001, then there is a loss of vehicle
event. If no nozzle bum through occurs then the
next event is the after EDNi leak does not fail
the GI5 bellows seal, ESC-FB-001. If it does, a
no branch to this event, then a transfer into the
ESC FESD is made. If it does not fail the bel-
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lows then the FRI system integrity is checked via
event ESC-FF-OOI. This event is FRI system
does not fail, which if true requires that the leak
rate into the aft compartment be checked. I£ the
leak rate does not pose a fire/explosion hazard, a
positive outpu_ from event then there is success-
ful operation.
Because of changes to the EDNi closeout FESD
there are also changes that must reflect the new
transfer points in the FRI FESD. These changes
are shown in Figure 26.
EDNi Closeout
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Figure 26. Updated EDNi Closeotat Separation/Crack FESD
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The FESD's that have been constructed by
applying a structure to the logical sequence of
events can now be cast into a form that is ame-
nable to computer aaalysis. This form is the
event tree tbrmat mentioned previously. Based
on the FESD's just developed, the event trees can
be constructed in a relatively easy manner. Ia
order to quantify the event trees we first need to
perform some data analysis to define the fre-
quency with which different events occur or
states exist. The following section gives the data
quantification for the initiating events.
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l][Applicat onTc) The MCC
!1fEvent Tree Event Frequency Evaluations
The t::'ESD diagrams have been converted to an
event tree format. Quantitatively, there is no
essential difference between the event tree and
the corresponding FESD. Qualitatively. the
format is significantly different, and
computationally, therc axe several computer
programs which allow for easy calculation of the
top event frequency gi,,--en the pivotal event
frequency.
/[[The nex, step in the analysis must be the assign-
ment of event tree probabilities to each pivotal
event. In the cases where data exist to calculate
these frequencies, reasonable estimates can be
made. Unfortunately, there is ve_" little data
available to estimate the frequency of most
pivotal events. This implies that expert opinion
must be employed. In those cases in which
expert opinion is used, the estimates are meant to
be conservative.
The pivotal event frequencies for each event tree
are given in Table XIL The frequencies are
based on previous meetings with SAIC and
MSFC engineers as well as data from the
PRACA data base. Some general comments
about each of the event trees are made in the
following sections.
Table XII, Pivotal Event Frequencies
Coolant Channel Blockage Pivotal Event
Frequencies
The pivotal events listed _n Table XI for the
Coolant Channel Blockage event tree are listed
under the nomenclature CCB. It is assumed that
the blockage of the coolant channel will have a
negligible effect on the mixture ratio 99% of the
time. However, if there is coolant channel
6-1
blockage,theprobabilityof highthermalstresses
inducingcracksis significant. Therefore,the
event "no cracks" is assumed to occur only 5%
of the time. Because we are interested only in
the those cracks that are initiated by CCB, the
hot gas wall (HGW) and coolant channel (CC]
wall cracks are assumed to occur oniy 10% of
the time in which there is blockage. It is impor-
tant to point out this is nor representative of the
hot gas walI cracking frequency but rather is
caused by the event of channel blockage either
from deformation or contamination. A conserva-
tive frequency estimate in which the LPFTP is
affected due to reduced H: t2ow of 10% is used.
In reality it is expected that _he amount of block-
age of the coolant channel will be low enough
that there will be no effect on the LPFTP with a
much higher frequency, say 99.9% of the time.
Finally, in a consistent manner throughout the
entire quantification, the effect of engine shut-
down is not accounted for in this study. This
implies that the frequency of the loss of the
MCC, as opposed to the frequency of the loss of
vehicle, is being examined. The event tree is
shown in Figure 27.
Coolant Channel Cracking Pivotal Event
Frequencies
The coolant channel cracking event frequencies
are similar to the CCB frequencies, with the
exception of consideratmg stable and unstable
crack growth. All events associated with the
stable growth of cracks are assigned a 99%
frequency of occurrence. That is, t in 100
cracks will grow unstably, will have a stable
crack growth time less than the mission time,
and so forth. Each of these pivotal events is
listed as CCC. The event tree is shown in Figure
28.
_,_n Em_'cl_c,,e_ l_o,'rgl,l, afr
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Manifold Weld Anomaly Pivotal Event
Frequencies
An anomaly of the manifold weld is relatively
straightfoward. Either a crack exists or it does
not. If it exists and is large then it can cause an
anomaly. Of course, if it is large then it is also
more emily detectable. Thus, the events MWT-
CD-00t and M'_-LC-001 are not independent.
If it is assumed that the crack in the manifold
weld area has a small chance of being detected,
then there is a corresponding increase in the
likelihood that the crack is small. If a crack is
detected, it is assumed that a repair is always
attempted. However, it is further assumed that
this repair is effective only 90% of the time.
This repair rate is conservative and attempts to
encompass the probability of introducing a flaw
as well as an Lacomplete repair. The event tree is
shown in Figure 29.
Bolt Anomaly Pivotal Event Frequencies
Recent evidence from MSFC tests has indicted
that the single bolt anomaly sequence is unlikely
to a cause significant likelihood of catastrophic
engine failure. Therefore, pivotal events ira this
tree are assumed to be relatively high reliability
occurring only 1 in 1,000 times. The event tree
is shown in Figure 30.
Hot Gas Wall Pivotal Event Frequencies
The hot gas wall pivotal events have led to many
discussions between MSFC and SAIC staff
about what does and does not constitute a cred-
ible event. Therefore, at this time some discus-
sion is warranted regarding test and flight histo-
ries and their relevance to risk analysis.
tn many of the developmental and flight MCC's
there have been many instances of cracking.
These cracks have reached in size from "pin-
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hole"cracksto crackseightincheslong. In
everycaseto date,acrackhasnever been ob-
served to grow beyond the MCC throat area.
Because this has never been observed, the
occurrence of a crack which extends beyond the
throat is viewed as an incredible event by the
MSFC staff. However. if the toad needed to
drive the crack through the throat area only
occurs, on the average, once in ever3' one hun-
dred missions then there is a high probability
i that this event simply has not been observed yet.
To demonstrate this, let us make some conserva-
tive assumptions. First, assume that the entire
MCC test and flight history is equivalent to 500
missions. Second, assume that in one half of
these missions there is a crack is near the throat
area. Third, assume that ail of the missions have
the same statistical load spectrum. Finally,
assume that the load necessary, to drive the crack
through the throat area occurs at a probability of
1%. In this case the probability of the crack not
extending beyond the throat area is 91.8%.
There is still a 8.2% probability that the event
simply has not been observed! If only in one
fourth of the missions is the MCC cracked then
there is a 28.5% probability that the event will
not have been observed. While a substantial
number of MCC's have been cracked, this is still
less than a one-in-four mission probability.
Examined another way, if the frequency of
cracked MCC's is less than one in seven m.is-
sions, then there is at least a 50% probability
that a crack growing beyond the throat area
simpty has not been observed. Of course, the
data can also be used to help determine what the
load level probabiiity to grow a crack beyond the
throat area.
For example, assume that the probability of the
load level needed to drive a crack beyond the
throat area is 10%. With nil other assumptions
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bcing the same. the probability that a crack
growing through the throat area simply not
having been observed is 3.6 x l0 "J: If the
incidence of MCC cracking is one in four mis-
sions, this probability is still 1.9 x It) "_. There-
fore, it is safe to assume that the frequency of
this load is substantially less than t0%.
This is _he logic used to establish the probabili-
ties for the HGW crack event tree. The event
tree is shown in Figure 31.
Flow Recireulation Inhibitor (FRI) System
Pivotal Event Frequencies
The failure of the FRI system wiI1 not necessar-
ily ensure that gas will recirculate in the MCC
and nozzle interface. For this study, it is as-
sumed that tiffs occurs 10% of the time. Since
the FRI has failed, there is a high probability that
the exhaust gas will leave the normal gas stream,
i.e. the gas will not recirculate into the normal
exhaust. However, based on MSFC expertise, it
is assumed that, for 99.99% of the time, the
manifold, bolts, and coolant charmel at the
turnaround weld are not induced to fail by this
gas path. The event tree is shown in Figure 32.
EDNi Closeout Separation/Crack
The EDNi closeout is divided into two event
trees. The first, EAE, is for the case when the
closeout fails in the aft end. This was a concern
raised by MSFC structural engineers. The
second event tree, IESC, follows the events more
closely associated with the previous FMEA. The
event trees are shown in Figure 33 and Figure
34.
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Event Tree Quantification
The data in Table XII was put into the event
trees given in Figures 27 through 34. The
calculations were made using Microsoft Exeet ®.
The results are shown in Table XIII, and they are
graphically depicted in Figure 35. The end result
is that the toss of the MCC is estimated at ap-
proximately a I in 1,500 chance of occurrence
per mission.
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Manifold weld LOMCC Frequency I in 3,959 missions 2,53E-04
i _'3_'_'_ :_::_ _! :i:::_:_:'_iJ:::_:'_::"_:_:_i_!::: S --:_::%_- ,,; _;?_ ,, ::: _r: :: .;:_:i-',_':
Coolant Channel bioeka_ze LOMCC Fre_Juencv 1 in 2_6.654 missions 3.90E-06
I H0t gas wall cracking LOMCC FrequenFv 1 in 18.898 missions 5.29E-05 I
EbNi aft end debond LOMCC Fresluencv I in 5,899 missions 1.70E-f_ /
Table XIII. Loss of MCC Frequencies
f i. 100,000 missio_ ""_:_---_,_,_ "_'_ I
1 In 10,000 mb_ns
11t_ !,000 m/ssk)R¢ ....
-,, ..,. g g
,:r:- = =_ :=_
z E" E_ E
_dt/att_ Event
Figure 35. Loss of MCC Frequencies
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Event Tree
Uncertainty
Analysis
Introduction
The uncertainty analyses of the MCC event trees
and risk models requires that the frequent), of
each pivotal event be represented by a distribu-
tion. The_ distributions were developed, to the
extent possible, based on data obtained from
MSFC. Primarily, these data were based on the
PRACA database. The assumptions and results
of these analyses are contained in the chapter on
initiating event frequencies. This chapter recalls
the results of that data analysis and provides the
output of an uncertainty analysis that was per-
formed for the risk significant event trees.
Input Distributions
The event trees discussed in the previous sec-
]dons were evaluated using a probabilistic meth-
odology for uncertainty analysis. The distribu-
tion fitting for the data was determined to be not
critical. Thus, if a lognormal or Weibull distri-
bution is selected for use in the analyses, the
effect of the selected distribution on the uncer-
tainty results is minimal. The selected distribu-
tions are then one of three types:
Uniform. These are used for the values of
constants. [:or example, the engine shutdown is
assumed to never occur, i.e. no credit is given for
controller logic since it is outside the scope of
the MCC and thus this study. Since it occurs
® An ,E-n'lOJOl,'Z_,,Owr,_oCoe_pe_e.y
Science Applications Internatiorml Corporation
14.61%
99.91%
Table XIV. Uncertainty Analysts Inputs For
MCC Event Trees
with 0% probability it is assigned a uniform
distribution with both the lower and upper limits
set to 0, i.e.a constant.
Normal, This is the standard normal density
or bell shaped curve.
Wdbuil distribution, This is used to approxi-
mate data that exhibits "lortg tails": that is. there
is a significant probability of the pivotal event
occurring with high frequency. It is important to
re-emphasize at this point that there are two
numbers of interest during an uncertainty evalua-
tion: the frequency of an event occurring and the
probability that the frequency selected is the
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"true" frequency.Forexample,fromTable XIII
the mean, or average, value of the initiating event
frequency for the FRI is I in 191 missions.
However, there is a wide spread in the data and,
therefbrc, whilo we believe this to be an average
value,, we ",¢lso believe that the value could be
between I in 109 and I in 772 missions. This
uncertainty in our degree of knowledge of the
true FRI initiating event frequency is represented
by the probability density function, in this case a
Weibull distribution.
Table XIV gives the results of all of the distribu-
tion fits used in the uncertainty analyses.
Event Tree Uncertainty
Analyses Results
The distributions shown in Table XIV were input
to the uncertainty, analysis code for evaluation.
The result of the complete uncertainty analysis is
given in Figure 36. In this Figure we see that the
Science Applications lntmrnationsl Corporation
estimated loss of MCC frequency is between 1 in
3.000 missions and 1 in 800 missions. The 50%
value fwhich is not the mean vaiue_ is near 1 in
1,500 missions. This does compare ve_' favor-
ably to the point estimate, indicating that the
distributions are not causing a significant skew-
ing effect and that many are contributing equally
to the overall uncertainty. This is bes_ seen by
an examination of the individual event tree
uncertainty analyses.
Figure 37 shows the resutts of the individual
event tree uncertain W analyses. In this Figure
the overall uncertainty, analyses, shown in Figure
36, are also superimposed. The individual event
tree uncertainty analyses indicate that the mani-
fold weld anomal.y, aft end debond of the liner,
and the bolt anomaly make up a significant
portion of the uncertainty. The most effective
way to reduce the MCC risk is better inspections
or repairs of the manifold weld.
MCC PRA Uncertainty Analyses
10.000
m--
1,000
Figure 36. MCC Event Tree Uncertainty Analyses
tOO
100%
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APPENDIX A
DATA BASE FOR ANOMALY" AND FAULTS USED TO
DEVELOP INITIATING EVENT AND EVENT
FREQUENCIES
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CoICrlN'OAI'ION OF SPACE Stlu'i'J t.Z PROIIABIL[STIC RISK A3SF.,._MF, NT, TASK I -
TECHNICAL REPORT:
AN INVESTIGATION OF THE RISK IMPLICATIONS OF SPACE SHUTTLE
SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER CHAMBER PRESSURE EXCURSIONS
1.0. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND.
This document isa technicalreporton work by the Advanced Technology Division of Science
Applications International Corporation (SAIC), New York. NY and SAIC's subcontractor Safety
FactorAssociates,Encinitas,CA to supportan investigationof the riskimplicanons of pressure
excursions observed on Space ShuttleSolid Rocket Boosters. The SRB Pressure Excursion
Assessment described hexein is T_k I of the continuation of the Space Shuttle ProbabLlisfic Risk
Assessment (PRA) program sponsored by the HeadquartersOfficeof Space Flight(Code M) of the
US National Aemnauti_ and Space Administration.
1.1. I_Atf, xaan_.
Post-flight analysis of the telemetry data on solid rocket booster internal pressure from Space
Shunle Mission STS-54 in January 1993 revealed an apparent pressure excursion of approrim_tely
13 psi* peak magnitude above nominal pressure and four seconds total duration on the "B"
booster, begin,_n 5 at 67 seconds after SRB ignition. While sfight pressure variations am a normal
feature of the solid-fuel-rocket burn process, pressure excursions in solid-fuel rocket motors
translate m thrust excursions, and therefore can impose a variety of hnT_rds on the Shuttle vehicle
if they exceed a safe magnitude. Since the pressure transients appeared to be increasing
flight-to-flight in size, frequency, and variability, NASA became concem_ about their potential
flightsafetyimplications,and initiateda seriesof inveafigationsoftheircause(s)and effectson the
Shuttle.
Analysis of chamber pressure datafrom previous fn'ingsof the High-Performance Motor (HPM)
SRB and the post=Chailenger-aocident Redesigned Solid Rocket Booster (RSRB) revealed that
similar, although smaller, pressure excursions had occurred fairly frequently in both flight and
grvtmd-test motors. A statistical ansly'eis of this experience led NASA to conclude that the pressure
transient was well within the envelope of the expenence base of earlier flights, and that therefore
the next scheduled mission (STS-55) would be safe to fly. While STS-55 did in fact fly
succe,ssfully, its "A" booster experienced a 13 psi* pressure excursion at approximately 72
seconds. This repetitionadded urgency totheneed to understand and, ifnecessary,tofred a way
to mitigatethe pressure transient phenomenon.
A number of ean_date mechanisms for genemRng pressure transients have been postulated and
evaluated; attempts have been made to establish upper bounds on the magnitude of the associated
thrust excursions through a combination of statistical, analytical, and empirical methods; ground
tests of SRBs with special instrumentation for the pressure transient investigation have been
conducted; and increasinglyrefinedanalyses have been performed to assess the effectsof the
upper-bound thruston structuralstressmargins and vehicledynamics. The study describedin this
reportcontinuesthiswork by bringing a probabili_ficriskassessment perspectiveto the SRB
pressure excursion investigation.
Note: them were the preterite ohm'rations ini_y reported, based on a 2-per-_d sampling ram. 12.5-per-_ data
that became available later showed peLk excursions up to 15 psL
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1.2. D,h,ttraLxr_
The general objectives of the SRB Pressure Excursion _ent were to support the independent
internal review of the SRB pressure excursion phenomenon chartered by the NASA Adm_strator
by providing insights into the risk implications of the pressure excursion situation, to prepare
information on SRB risks that will be needed to support the more-comprehensive Space Shuttle
PRA that is now under way, and to demonstrate the benefits of probabiListic-risk-based thinMng
processe, s to the civil space enterprise.
2.0. DISCUSSION OF PROJECT SUBTASKS.
2.1. Subtask I. Information Review and Risk Framework Develooment.
In Subtask I the SAIC-Safety Factor Associates (SFA) team obtained and reviewed the information
furnished by the Shuttle program to the NASA independent review team that met at Marshall Space
Flight Center during the week of 3 January 1994. In brief summary, this data set contained
briefing materials from pre- and post-flight reviews of the STS-55, STS-57, and STS-58 missions:
information on the TEM-I0 and fEavI-ll ground tests; briefing materials and responses to
questions prepared for both the independent internal review req_ by the Administrator and the
external (Faget committee) review; and a variety of background information. Together with the
program's answers to clmifying questions, this information gave the SAIC-SFA team a reasonably
compl_te and detailed understanding of the process and results of the SRB pressure excursion
investigation.
The information the team reviewed does not m and is not intended to -- deal with the pleasure
excursion phenomenon as one of many pc_ntial contributors to total Shuttle accident risk. NASA
and its contractors quite properly focused on the causes and effects of the pressure transient
phenomenon rather than its top-level risk impLications. However, understanding the relauve
contributions of potential accident initiators to total risk is essential to making sound decisions
concerning the allocation of scarce resom'ces among candidate risk-reduction approaches. This is
one of the key m for performing a PRA on the Shuttle.
The SAIC-SFA team began the process of placing the SRB pw,,ssure excursion data within a PRA
risk scenario structure by developing a preliminary MasterLogic Diagram for catastrophic Shuttle
accidents during the mission phase in question. A Master Logic Diagram (MLD) is a spec/_l/Ted
logic tree that identifies all of the credible accident initiating events that lead to the "top event," but
addresses neither pivotal events that can alter the progress of cause-effect sequences for better or
worse, nor interactions among initiators and event sequences, nor the probabilities of the initiating
events. (These items are dealt with in later stages of the analysis). The MLD is the first step in
constructing accident sequences or scenarios that can then bo analyzed to obtain quantitative
information on the total risk and the relative contributions of risk factors.
Appendix I contains tho top-level MLD for the boost phase of Shuttle ascent, showing the role of
SRB pressure and thrust transients as potential initiators of Loss of Vehicle. As the reader wili
note, these are the only initiators that are called out specLf'tcally on this preliminary MLD; the other
potential initiators are left undeveloped (as denoted by the diamond-shaped symbols), and will be
developed later dttring the main Shuttle PRA. The lower-level branches that are not shown
explicitly in Appendix 1 (denoted by triangular off-page-connector symbols containing numbers,
e.g., z_) aro similar to the analogous branches of NASA's "fault tree" for the pressure excursion
event (which is itself actually an MLD, as we note below). Appen :dLx2 contains 'abe NASA "fault
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2.2. Subtask 2. Correlation of Solid Rocket Booster Pedim'ee Information With
Pressure Excursions.
Subtask 2 is a correlation analysis that searched for significant relationships between the
magnitude, frequency, and variability of observed SRB chamber pressure transients, and the
pedigree and history of the SRBs that had experienced transients. The SAIC-SFA team
investigated potential correlatiom between the following factors and procure excursion phenomena
on the basis of the information furnished by NASA and its SRB contractors:
• Casting sequence
• Firing sequence
- Storage time (interval between
casting and firing)
• Ammonium perch]orate (AP) vendor
• Aluminum powder vendor
• SRB TVC gimballing just before or during
pressure excursions.
Combinations of several factors were considered in some cases.
Figures 1 and 2 show some of the most interesting and potentially significant results of this
subtask. Figure I is a scatter plot of peak pressure transient magnitude versus casting dare for
SRBs containing ammonium percMorate (AP) from the three vendors, Pacific Engineering (PE),
Kerr-McGee (KM), and Western Electrochemical (WE, successor to PE after the PE plant was
destroyed in an accidental explosion.) Figure t cle, arty shows that boosters loaded with WE AP
exkibit considerably higher pressure-tzamient magnitudes than those ¢ontaininoo oth_r venders' AP,
as also noted in a number of NASA an_lyse,s. (A T-test., a standard statistical test of significance,
demonstrates that the differences among vendors are statistically significam at mote than 99%
confidence.)
Figures 2a and 2b on page 5 are plots of a five-booster moving average of recorded pressure
transient peaks versus propellant motor identification number (arranged in order of casting dam) for
SRBs contalnino_ AP from K_M and WE respectively. (Averaging over five motors highlights
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Figure 1. Scatter Plot of Peak Pressure Transient Venus Casting
Date for SRBs Containing Ammonium Perchlorate from Three Vendors.
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trends in the dam by f'tltering out small motor-to-motor variations.) Note the difference in trends
between the two plots. Pressure exemsion magnitudes in KM SRBs have trended gradually
upward, and seem to have become somewhat more variable recently. However, WE SRB pressure
excursions were trending gradually downward until they showed a sudden and sharp increase
beginning at motor number 29B. This suggests that a significant change occurred in some
characteristic that affects chamber pressure stability at that point. It is not yet dear whether the
change involved the AP material itself, its processing into finished SRBs, the treatment of the
SRBs between manufacture and launching, or the characteristics of the flights during which the
excursions occurred (or perhaps some combination of these).
2.:). Subtask 3. Development of Parameter (Ineertalntv D|_trlbutlorL_.
It is clear that thrust is the solid rocket booster performance parameter of greatest flight-safety risk
sigmificance, at least in the present conmxt of risk imposed by SRB pressure excursions. Tla_refore
the SAIC-$FA team concentrated on developing uncertainty distributions for thrust. The basis of
this analysis is the following mission-specific SRM thrust equation that has been presented in
several, of the briefing packages (e.g. "MSFC RSRM Pressure Blip and Dispersions," 11/10/93,
reproduced in Appendix 3 of this report), and that is apparently used to compute the normal and
upper-bound SRB thrust for flight cerli.fication of the external tank (ET).
F = Fsz,oc'_ + AFnuem _rs")" AFprts_ AFosc )tg,ov+ AFtus MgAJV+ (1)
+ ztFbscz)m.
IlW Ii)
Figure 2a. Five.Motor Moving Average of Peak Pressure Transient Versus
Casting Sequence Number for SRBs Containing Kerr-McGee Ammonium
Perchlorate.
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Figure 2b. Five.Motor Moving Average of Peak Pressure Transient Versus
Casting Sequence Number for SRBs Containing Western Electrochemical
Ammonium Perchlorate.
(The nomenclature is defined in Appendix 3.) This equation appears to be an _y empirical
relation combining nominal ("block") thrust;several,quasi-constant terms which adjust for expected
variationsfrom nominal,thrustdue topropellanttemperature,burn ratevariability,etc.;and terms
reflecting uncertainties in most of the other terms. The latter set of terms is combined by using the
"root-of-_he-sum-of-the-squares" (RSS) method into a single uncertainty term that is summed with
the others. (The SAIC-SFA Team questions the appropfiacness of the RSS rac_od in this case, as
discussed in paragraph 3.3 below, but we will reserve that issue for later.)
In order to devetop an unce_ .-:_y distribution for total SRB thrust, the uncertainty terms were
represented as distributions around a mean, and grouped with the terms that represent their
respective means. In this way the equation is r_,mtorl as...
F - (FBLoCK._z_,FNoM) + (ZiFBURNP.A.T£-_.z_FscAI_IrACTOR,} + (Z[FpM_[--+"I_tFpMBTUNC) +
(,dFo6c MF.A_-_ AFosc D,ffP) + (0 _ AF$ItAPF..) + (0 ._ Z_FF/P) + AFIMB MFAN (2)
Consistendy with NASA's practice, and in the absence of conlaaty evidence, the dis_budons on
the uncertainty terms were assumed to be normal or Gaussian. The standard deviations assigned to
the distributions depended on the specific circumstances. This equation was set up in an Excel
4.0 TM spreadsheet, and the distributions of the uncertain terms propagated through the equation _o
form the total thrust distribution by Monte Carlo simulation using Crystai Ball TM, a commercial
Monte Carlo simulation tool that interfaces _dy with Excel. Figures 4a .and 4b.in .para.graph 3.3
show outpuu for severalsimulationcases,and the accompanying textexplainstheirsignificance.
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3,0, KEY RISK IssuEs.
The SRB Pressure Excursion Assessment was performed partly in order to develop risk-based
insights into both the SRB pressure transient phenomenon and the Shuttle flight safety
decision-making proce_. Accordingly the SAIC-SFA team identified a amber of key risk issues
which are presented below.
3.1. Fault Tree (Master Looic Dia_ramL
Early in its investigation, NASA prepared what was characterized as a "fault tree" in order to
systematically identify and track all credible potential mechanisms for the production of SRB
pressure transients. This tree was presented in "STS-54 RSRM-29 Chamber Procure Observation
Overview," 4 February 1993, and is reproduced in Appendix 2. After reviewing the "fault tree."
the SAIC-SFA team concluded that while it is not really a funk tree in the sense in which that term
is normally used in the ri_ _ent community, it is in fact a rea.um_bly comprehensive and
well-founded Master Logic Diagram for the "top event" of SRB pressure transients. (As diseased
previously, an MID identifies all of the credible events that can lead to the top event, but ignores
pivotal events, interactions among initiators and event sequences, and event probabilities.)
Therefore it wilt be possible to transfer much of the basic-events information and logic from the
NASA "fault tree" dimctty into the MI ]3 for the main Shuttle Probabi_fic Risk _ent.
3.2, Deeidin_ on the Aeeeotabilitv of Pressure Exeursion._ Ba._ed on Statt.vtteal
Analysis of Pre._.q_we Exeur._itm ExperifRf.e-
NASA has consistently used a statistical analysis of the experience base of pressure excursions
observed during flight and ground test firings of SRBs to determine what pressure transients (and
indirectly what thrust transients) are considered "normal" and thus acceptable. (See, for example,
the brief'rag materials reproduced in Appendix 4.) In essence, the procedure is to fit an assumed
Gaussian probability distribution to the ptez_ure excursion observations to date, and take the upper
bound of "normal" pressure excu_ons to be the mean of this distribution plns a factor k times the
standard deviation, where k is selected to assure an acceptably low probability that the bound will
be exceeded at an acceptably high sta_tical confidence level In some instances k=3.0 is used, as
in sumd_d aetospaze pra_ice, while in others k appears to have been selected to aci_eveacceptable
confidence. Whether "3o" or "kd'_ used is i_rre]evant to the pointat hand.
The effect of this approach is to widen the envelope of pressure excursions that are considered
normal and acceptable every time a transient occurs that significantly exceeds the range of recent
observations. Figure 3 illustrates this. It depicts the pressure exc_arsions observed on SRBs
loaded with WE ammonium perchioraze, plotted against motor identification number in order of
casting sequence. For each SRB, the mean and the 3erbounds of a normal distribution fitted to the
set of pressure transients observed on motors up to and including the motor in question are also
plotted.
Consider the example of boosters 29B and 30A. which flew on Missions STS-54 and STS-55
respectively. 1ust before STS-54, the 3o limit was approximately 14.5 psi. When the STS-54
observation was added it grew to about 16 psi. This was taken to mean that the 13 psi excursion
on STS-54, while unprecedentedly large, was within the range to be expected considering the
experience base, and therefore was not a matter of serious concern. When the second 13 psi
transient on STS-55 was absorbed into the experience base, the 3o Limit rose to about t7.5 psi,
6-nply-'mg that the STS-55 transient was even farther from the outer bound based on experience and
th_ even less of a concern than the similar tmn_ent on the pre_Ous m_ion.
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Figure 3. Pressure Excursion Experience of SRBs Loaded
with WE AP, with "3o" Bounds of Experience Disttnbufions.
This approach presents three problems. First,itis based on the unstated assumption thatall
pressureexcursionsaxepartofa singlepopulationdi_.e.ringonly inmagnitude..How.ev,er,thelarge
positivepressureexcursions thatare the subjectof thisstudy appear to be qualitauvetydifferent
from the minor fluctuationsaround the nomln:d pressurethatcomprise most of theexperience base.
This implies that incidents of these two kinds are not part of the same population and should not be
treated statistically as if they were. Second and more generally, the approach provides a
mechanism forsafetymargins to be grad,,:_l]yeroded through a seriesof incremcntai decisions
without a thorough engineeringreview of the overallriskimplicationsof each decision.Third,it
tends to mask genuine failureprecursors by making them appear to be partof a continuum of
normal experience. (A "failureprecursor"isany observed abnormal conditionthatcan credibly
lead to catastrophic failure if it occurs again with somewhat greater severity or when the ability of
the system to respond to it is impaired.)
3.3. Solid Rocket Motor Thrust Eouation.
As mentioned earlier, the dispersed thrusz equation NASA uses to estimate SRB thrust loading for
structural and dynamics calculations uses the root-sum-square (RSS) method to combine the
variabilitiesofthe thrustcomponents thataresubjecttovariabilityintoa singleterm, which isthen
summed with severalotherterms. However, the validityof the mot-sum-square (RSS) method of
combining variabilitiesdepends on the variabilities'being random, symmetrically disn'ibuted,and
independent..As faras theSAIC-SFA team can determine,none of the_ conditionsisnecessarily
satisfiedfortheuncertaintyterms of the SRB thrustequationfor the followingreasons. First,the
sources of uncertaintyappear to contain some systematic variations,e.g.,the variationof thrust
excursion magnitude and frequency with AP vendor, and thereforethe variabilitiesare not
nexe.ssadlyrandom. Second, thesourcesof uncertaintyappearto arisefrom physical_ which
may not necessarilybe characterizedby symmetrical distributions.Third,severalof xhe uncermimy
terms appear likelyto be correlatedratherthan independent. Funhennoxe, the violationsof the
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condi6ons for using RSS arc non-conservative in most cases. Itseems clearthatthe RSS method
isnot appropriatefor thiscase,and wing itpotentiallycan increaseriskby understatingthe upper
bound ofexpected thrustand thusdecreasing_ margins of safety.
As discussedin paragraph 2.3 above, inorderto investigatethe riskimplicationsof thissituation
the SAIC-SFA team formed explicit uncertainty distribu_ons for SR.B thrust by constructing
uncertainty distributions for the variability terms of the thrust equation and propagating them
through a reformulated version of the thrust equation using Monte Caalo simulation. The first.
base-case sim))l_r_on replicated NASA's RSS calculations for the numbers given in the example in
Appendix 3, )_k-l,g the "A" terms to be the 3cr values of normal distributions. This case
demonstrates thatthe RSS method givescorrectresults if the n_ conditionsforitsuse arc
fulfilled. The team then investigated the impact of violating the conditions by running several
sensitivitycases in which distributionsthatwore (I)constantover partof theirranges (hence not
random), (2)skewed (hence notsymmetrical),and (3) mu,1_11y correlated(hence not indepenc_n0
were substitutedfor the independent Gaussian disU'/butionsof AFwo _ and AFs_z r_cr_, the two
!argestvariability terms in the original simul_on. Comparing thercsuIlingthrustd_'ibudons with
each other and with the base case that rcpllcated the RSS calculations showed that non-randomness
and non-symmetry of the distributions had very little effect on the outcome, at least with the
moderate violations assumed in this study, but that non-correlation had a substantial impact on rite
crilicalright-hand*'tail"ofth_ thrustdiswibution.Furthermore_ th_effectof usingthe RSS method
tocombine correlatedvariabilityterms isalways non-conservative(Le.,resmltinginlower predic=d
thrustthan theMomc Carlo simulationthataccoums forcorrelation).These topicsarediscussedin
detailinAppendix 5.
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Figure 4a. Dispersed Thrust Uncertainty Distribution for the Base
Simulation Case Replicating the Example That Uses the RSS Method.
Figm'_ 4a and 4b show the frequency distributionsof dispersedSRB thrustforthe base case and
thecorrelated-termscaserespectively,asgenerare._iby theCrystalBallMonte Carlo simulationtool.
The base and correlamd-terms distributionsinthese figures supcxficiallyappear similar,but Figures
5a and 5b highlight the critical difference between them by illustrating how the non-conservative
error of using the RSS method to combine corrc!_red variabilities can affect the margin of safety of
the critical parts of the external tank structure. The three distributions in 5a and 5b are Gaussian
distributions plotted from the parameters given by three Monte Carlo simulation cases. In each
figurethe distributionlabeled"uncorrelated"was derived from thebasecasethatreplicatestheRSS
version of the thrustequation (Figure4a);the "somewhat correlated"distributioncame from the
case shown in Figure 4b, where AF#ox and AFscazsA _ were assumed to he 75% correlated; and
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the "100% correlated" distribution was based on a case in which all uncertninry terms in the thrust
equation were assumed fully correlated with one another. (The latter case puts an upper bound on
the factor-of-safety effect to be expected from replacing the RSS method with a more rigorous
method of propagating uncertainties.) Figure 5a shows the thrust distributions on a large sea]e,
while Figure 56 focuses in on the fight-hand "tails."
LookingfirstatFigure5a,notethat_ asexpected-- increasingthecorrelationamong variability
termsincreasesthe dispersionof thethrustdistributiona d thusraisesthe3o upper bound on
thrust. The fight,most vertical arrow at approximately 6.8x106 Ibs in Figure 5a represents the
ultimate failme-point thrust used in NASA's example, which corresponds to a safety factor of 1.28
applied to the 30" point of the base RSS-derived thrust. Also shown are the 3cr (99.87%) upper
thrust bounds for the uncorrelated, somewhat correlated, and 100% correlated cases. Now refer to
Figure 5b, which shows the right-hand "T,iig"of the thrust distributions in more detail. Note that
when two variability terms of the thrust equation are assumed :o be somewhat correlated, the factor
of safety drops from 1.28 (the minimum requirement in the e-nrnple) to t.276. In the worst case in
which all variability texms are assumed 100% correlated, the factor of safety is only 1.217. The key
point here is that ff the minimum acceptable factor of safety is 1.28 based on the 30"value of the
thrust, and the thrust calculated by the RSS method bawJy satisfies this mquizement, then the thrust
calculated by a method such as Monte Carlo simulation that correctly accounts for correlations
among so_ of variability provides a negative margin of safety.
Inadditionm theinappropriatenessoftheRSS method,theSAIC-SFA team hasserious concerns
aboutthevalidityofthemethod used toestablishthe30-upper bound fortheAFs_At_ terminthe
thrust equation. NASA appears to have performed a statistical analysis of 66 previous RSRM
pressuretracesto derivea 3or upper bound forfuturepressurespikes. As besttheteam can
reconsu'uct,hefollowingprocedurewas followed:
I.The sarnpbpopulationpressuretraceswere dividedintoone-_econdincrements.
2. A normal distribution was assumed for the pressure distribution over 66 motors at each time
increment.
3. A mean and standard deviation (o) were obtained at each pressure increment.
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4.The maximum 3crvalueoccurredattime69 seconds.Thiswas 20 psiabove themean.
5.Itwas assumed that his20 psiexcursioncouldbe generatedatany timeinczcmc_t.
6. The ratio of the 3evaIuc to the sample mean at each time increment was calculated and plotted
as a percentage.
7. At 69 and 71 seconds this ratio was about 3.2%. This was converted to thrust (about 80,000
lb) and was used in the empirical thrust equation a,s the AF_,_ team discussed above.
The SAIC-SFA team performed an independent statistical assessment assuming a normal
distribution at 69 and 71 seconds using the pressure plots found in the review material (reproduced
in Appendix 6). The mean values were found to be 632 and 634 psi respectively, which correspond
to the plotted mean values from the program. The standard deviation at 69 seconds was found to be
0(69) ffi4.6 psi. The standard deviation at 71 seconds was found to be o(71) ffi 4.4 psi. Combining
both populations provided a (r = 4.5. The 20 psi "upper bound" pressure transient used hy the
program corresponds to about 4.4a, not 3¢r. There is no apparent explanation for this discrepancy;
perhaps a normal distribution was not used (although it was staU_dthat a normal was used).
Furthermore, if a 20 psi transient is a 4.4¢r event, then a t3 psi excursion is approximately a 30"
event (assvming a normal distribution was in fact used), which implies that its frequency is
apprvximately t.4xl(Y 3 per firing, or tess than one in 700 fn'ings. This appears incompatible with
the observed experience of two I3 psi excursions in I23 flight and test fLrings of tlm HPM and
RSRM generations of the Shuttle SRB.
F'mally, the NASA analysis divided the population into one-second increments. This impliesthat
each time increment was considered an independent population. This assumption is very difficult to
justify. The data shows that the time to each pressure mmsicnt is nearly random in the time interval
64 to 80 seconds, which suggests that all data within at least that time interval should be combined.
Furthermore, phenomenological investigations indicate good masons for the slag/slosh scenario to
produce transients during this intervaL, but independently of time during the interval The reasons
stem from propellant burn patmrns that begin to allow slag to collect in the bore or nozzle
beginning at about 65 seconds, as weft as considerations of pitch and gimballing that provide a
mechanism for spill;ng the slag. Again the team sees no reason to believe thateach time increment
isan independentpopulation.Itislikelythatastatisticalstudythatcombinesthedataoverthe64 to
80-secondintervalwould be validand would producea larger./or"upperbound."
3.4. Handliw, of External Tank Structural Safety Factors.
NASA's current method of determining the required safety factor (SF) for limits on external tank
CET)strucu_ loads involves scaling the SF between 1.40 and 1.25 according to the proportion of
the total load that is "not well understood" (i.e., highly uncert,_;,,) versus "weft understood" (i.e.,
relatively certain.) (Refer to the briefing materials in Appendix 7 for an explanation of the
procedure.) However. the NASA method appears to proportion the safety factors according to the
magnitude of the expected load, not to the uncertainty of the load, although the SF is intended to
account for the variability above the expected load rather than its magnitude. It seems clear that if
SFs are to be scaled by some general rule related to load uncertainty, they should be proportioned
according to an appropriate uncertainty measure -- perhaps standard deviation or variance D
instead of load magnitude.
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4.0. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.
This section cont_in-_ the conclusions and recommendations of the SRB Pressure Excursion
Assessment. It must be emphasized that they came out of a quick-response analysis driven by
urgent Shuttle flight schedule considerations. Some of them may be modified by a more
comprehensive and systematicriskanalysis such as the main ShuttleProbabilisfic Risk Assessment
of which this study isa preliminary, part.
4.1 l=¢ut, la,sL_.
I.The SRB pressureexcursionphenomenon increasesShuttleflightsafetyriskto some degree by
potentiallyini0,ri-satleasttheaccidentacenarioslistedbelow.
(a)A transientover-thrustinone or both SRBs which exceeds the structuralcapabilitiea of the
externaltank cansesvehiclebreakup.
(b) A severe transient thrust imbalance between the two SRBs that exceeds the swucmral
capabilities of the external tank causes vehicle breakup.
(c) A severe transient thrust imbalance between the two SRBs that is not recoverable by fright
controls results in an unacceptable flight attitude, causing vehicle breakup due to excessive
acrodynsmic fOrCe.
(d) A severe, sustained transient thrust imb,l_nce between the two SRBs that is not recoverable
by flight controls re.suits in loss of directional control exceedance of range safety guidelines, and
fright termination by The range safety officer.
(e) A severe chamber pressure transient induces a hot-gas leak at an SRB joint that impinges on
t_t;ca-_ng an EI" explosion.
(f)A severechamber pressure transient rupturesthe SRB case.
2. It is impossible toquantify the ri._k-_of these sc_n_dos with the limitedinformationavailable to
the SAIC-SFA team in Task 1, _ main Shuttle probabflisticriskassessment is intended to
accomplish this.)However, scenarios(c)through (f)appear to be of negligibleprobability,at
least m the extent that they are inidaw_ by SRB pressure excumiona, chiefly because it is difficult to
conceive of a mechanism for producing thrust or pressure excursions of the necessary magnitude
and duration.
3. Them is a statistically-significant correlation between the use of ammonium perchlorate supplied
by Western Electrochemical(WE) inSRB solidfuel,and the frequency oflarge,positivepressure
transients.The SAIC-SFA team could not draw any conclusions about the reason(s)for this
correlation from the data available to us.
4.Trending of peak pressureexcursionsag,_n_tthe SRB castingsequence suggeststhatan abrupt
change in some characteristic of motors containingWE ammouium perchJor_l_ thataffectsirltemal
pressureoccuxred at motor number 29B. The availabledata do not support any conclusionsas to
wb.at this change might have been.
5. Based on the material provided for review, the SAIC-SFA team has conceptual and technical
concents about NASA's methodology inthesefour specificareas:
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(a) treating all pressure excursions in the SRB experience base as a single population for the
purpose of statistical analysis in order to determine what pressure tr:m¢ients (and indirectly what
thrust transients) am considered "normal" and thus acceptable, although the large positive pressure
excursions that are the subject of this study appear to be qualitatively different from the minor
fluctuations around the nominal pressure that comprise most of the experience base;
(b) using of the "root-of-the-sum-of-the-squares" CRSS) method to combine the variabilities of
the terms of the SRB dispersed thrust equation that account for uncertainties in thrusL although
these is considerable doubt that the necessary conditions for the validity of that method are fulftlled:
(c) dividing the SRB pressure trace experience base into one-second time incwcments which were
analyzed separately, which implies that the pressure traces in these increments comprise separate
populations, although both historical data and phenomenology suggest that the set of pressure
traces within the interval when pressure transients occur is part of a common population; and
(d) establishing the mininaum structural safety factor for the external tank by scaling the SF
between 1.40 and 1.25 according to the proportion of the total load magnitude that is "not well
understood" (i.e., highly uncertain) versus "well understood" (i.e., relatively certain), rather than
according to a quantitative measure of the uncertain ty of thc.se categories of loads.
All of these problems can potentially lead to non-conservative assessments of safety and hence to
incxeases in Shuttle flight risk.
6. More generally, the team had concerns with the flight safety decision process as depicted in tim
review materials. NASA appears to have used a "3e" or "k_r" envelope dorivcd by fitting an
assumed Oaussian distribution to the record of pressure observations in order to define the Iirnits of
"normal" and thus acceptable SRB pressure transients. (The SAIC-SFA team's experience
suggests that this is a common practice that is not restricted to the SRB pressure excursion issue.)
The problem with this approach is that each anomalous occurrence becomes part of the experience
base and thus widens the range of behavior considered normal which can mask genuine failure
precursors by making them appear to be part of a continuum of normal experience, Making flight
safety decisions on this basis provides a mecb_-i_ra for safety margins to be gradually eroded
through a seriesof incrementaldecisionswithouta thorough engineeringreview of theoverallrisk
impLicationsofeach decision.
7. Still more genea'aUy, while NASA and its contractors have done an excellent root cause analysis
of the SRB pressure transient phenomenon, with the wisdom of hindsight the issue seems to have
been handled in a somewhat disorganized, ad hoc fashion that was driven largely by the need to
make timely flight readiness decisions in the absence of complete information. The SAIC-SFA
team believes that much of the disorganization could have been avoided ff the Shuttle program had
been able to t_e advantage of a flight-safety decision process based on a systematic, quantitative
considoralionofrisk.
4.1. Recommendations.
1. NASA should consider the conceptual and technical concerns raised in Section 3.0, "Key Risk
Issues," some of which appear to be generic to the agency and its contractors. Specifically, the
SAIC-SFA team recommends that NASA consider the following changes in its current practices as
described in the data furnished for the SRB Pressure Excursion _ent:
(a) NASA should reformulate the disperseM thrust equation that is used to determine SRB thrust
loadings on the external tank structure in a way that avoids using the RSS method unless that
method is rigorously shown to be valid, and fully accounts for the observed and potential actually
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occurringpressuretransients.
(b) NASA should perform a statistical analysis of historical SRB pressure data that uses
12.5-samples-per-seconddatain lieuof 2-samples-per-secondd,r, and treatsthe datainthe 64 to
80 second time intervalasa singlepopuiation.
(c) At a minimum, NASA should revise its method of determining minimum structural safety
factors for the extemat tank so as to apportion safety factors according to the ratio of uncertainties
in the "well-understood" and "not-well-understood" load categories, rather than according to the
magnitudes of the expected loads.
(d) Better still, in view of the progress in our understanding of probabilistie structural mechanics
and the development of powerful probabillstic structural analysis tools since ti_ inception of the
Shuttle program. NASA should abandon the safety factor concept in favor of rigorous
structure-by-structure probabilistic structural analysis as a basis for Shuttle flight certification. This
recommendation will become especially important ff- as seems Hk_.ly m the external tank is
further lightened by cutting back on structural margins or the Shuttle is called on to fly more
structurally-demanding trajectories.
2.Because ET structuralfailureappearstobe the dominant mechanism of potentialShuttlelossdue
to SRB chamber pressureexcursions,and SRB thrustratherthan chamber pressure isthe direct
driver of structuralfailure,NASA should consider installinghigh-fidelity force (thrust)
insu'umentationon theforward attachmentsbetween the SRBs and the ET for thenext few flights
inorderto bettercharacterizethe thrusttransientphenomenon.
3. In view of the conclusions above, NASA should proceed expeditiously with its planned
comprehensive probabilistic risk assessment of the Shuttle system. This study will determine how
SRB pressure transients rank relative to other risk contributors, and thus whether continuing
expensive and time-consuming efforts to investigate them is a good investment of tlmi_d t'e_ut_e_;
more generally, it will lay a sound foundation for a q._ntitative risk-based flight readiness decision
prece._ for the future.
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Appendix 1.
Preliminary Top-Level Master Logic Diagram for Loss
of Shuttle Vehicle during Shuttle Boost-Phase Ascent,
Highlighting SRB Pressure and Thrust Transients as
Accident Sequence Initiators.
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Appendix 2.
NASA "Fault Tree" (Master Logic Diagram) for Pressure
Excursions (excerpt from "STS-54 RSRM-29 Chamber
Pressure Observation Overview," 4 February 1993
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Appendix 3.
SRM Dispersed Thrust Equation and
Example of Thrust Calculation
(excerpt from "MSFC RSRM Pressure Blip
and Dispersions," 10 November 1993)
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Appendix 4.
Examples of Use of Statistical Analysis of SRB
Pressure Transient History in Flight Safety Decisions
Excerpts from:
• "STS-54 Pressure Perturbation Investigation PRC'B Presentation," 4
February 1993
• "In-Flight Anomaly Summary" for STS-54 Right RSRM Chamber
Pressure Spike
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Appendix 5.
Comparison of Methods for Calculating the Effect of
Pressure Perturbations on SRB Thrust
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Comparison of methods for calculating the effect of pressure
perturbations on SRB thrusL
SUMMARY:
1. The NASA RSS solution to the SRB thrust equation is NOT conservative if
the sources of variation in SRB thrust are correlated.
2. The RSS method of solution, which assumes symmetric distributions, is more
conservative than propagating skewed (e.g.: lognormal) probability distributions for
the existing pressure spike data.
3. The RSS example (based on 2 sample / second data) produces a higher (more
conservative) total thrust than is indicated by analysis of the raw 12.5 sample /
second data.
4. The correlation of maximum pressure peaks between left and right motors is
mote likely due to normal inter- and intra- motor pressure variations than to
pressure spike variations associated with slag "sloshing" and ejection.
NASA uses a Root-Sum-Squaz_ (RSS) method to combine uncertainties in the terms of
the SRB thrust equation NASA to determine the upper bound of thrust for calculating
Factors of Safety. Two of the key assumptions in the RSS approach are independent
sources of variation and symmetrically distributed variations. The extent to which these
assumptions are not met, and the impact of not meeting them were examined by solving
the SRB thrust equadon by propagating uncertainty, distributions (in Monte Carlo
simulation).
The NASA RSS solution is NOT conservative if the sources of variation are
¢_3¢related (not independent). The assumed factor of safety for the SRB thrust equation
example (RSS) provided by NASA was 1.280. Using the same data but assuming a
reasonable correlation between two terms of the SRB thrust equation resulted in a
ca_mlated factorof safety of 1.276. In the limiting case of all mnns p_cfectlyton'elated
the calculatedfactorof safetyis1.217.
The assumption of symmetrically (normally) disud_lP_ pressure spike variations resulted
in a more conservative (higher) upper bound on thrast than the alternative lognorma_
distributions developed by F. Satie (MSFC) or those developed by SAIC for this analysis.
In general, assuming a skewed distribution for the pressure spikes (blips) results in a
slightly asymmetric total thrust distribution with a higher mean but a smaller 99.87% (one-
sided upper) certainty bound than the normal distribution imp/Lied by the RSS solution.
Since the factor of safety calculation is based on the 99.87% cerm/nty bound, the
asynunctric solutions result in a higher factor of safety than the symmetric (RSS)
assumption. For the various distributions examined here, the NASA RSS method is
RbkImplicaticmso{b'pamS/amleSRB _ Pmsmm axctmncaxt:_¢Imadix5.
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therefore more conservative than propagating skewed distributions which betr_r
reflect the actual distribution of the pressure spike data,
SAIC analyzed the 12.5 sample per second SRB p_ssure data by separating rbe inter-
motor variations (mean pressure variations from motor to motor), We nominal in_a-motor
variations (normaLly distributed variations in pressure within ea£h motor of relatively low
amplitude),and the pressurespik_variations(strictlypositiverelativelyhigh amplitude
variationsabove the nominal intra-motorpopulation)forthe 66 to76 second periodof
interest.Straightforwardanalysisofthisdataindicatedthatthe NASA RSS example
(based on 2 sample /second data) produces a higher (more conservative) totalthrust
th*n is indicated by the raw dat_
This analysis a/so found that them is a significant correlation in both inter- (0.42) and
intra- (0.68) motor variation between the left and right motors, but little correlation in the
pressure spike varialions (0.265) between ieft and right motors. It has been noted that 6
of the 8 highest maximum pressure peaks occurred in the left and rigJat motors on 3 flights.
This leadto speculationthatslagaccun_,,lariona d ejecuon (thepostulatedcause for the
high pressurespike,s)may be relatedtoflightdynamics or othermission-specific
characteristics. The relatively low correlation between ieft and right motor pressure spike
populations suggests that the correlation between of m_r pressure penk._ between left
and right minters is there likely due to inter, and Intra- motor pres_re variatimts
than to presmre spike variations associated with slag ejection.
Discussion:
Most analyses of the SRB pressure spike phenomenon have focused on *.he effect of
pressure spikes (blips) on SRB thrust, and the resulting change in the static load factor of
safety. The static load factor of safety (FOS) is defined as the toad at which the structure
isexpected tofaildivided by the_ plausibl¢loadto which the $tracrarcwillbe
subjected. De_enr_ni_g the maximum plausible total SRB thrust is the essential element of
these analyses. This analysis compares the emxmlt (RSS) method of determining
maximum plausible thrust to the fully probabiI_tic method of adding dismbutions in
sirnnlation.
"rim ctm'ent method combines the sources of SRB thrust variation by adding the squaxe-
toot of the sum of the squares (root-sum-square -- RSS) of maximum plausible variations
to the nom/n,l thrust Ix)_ the maximum plausible thrust. It has been pointed out
elsewhere that the underlying assumptions of the RSS process, notably the indevendenee,
svmn_trv, and eoual t)robabilitvofthevariation%may have been violated.This analysis
shows how therrmthod ofpropagatingtmcmaiaty distributionscan readilyaccommodam
the violation of those assumptions, aad Rlustzates the impact of these violations on the
computed factor of safety.
2
Objectives:
SA/_q'Y 94-01-10
This analysis has four objectives: (1) Illustrate the method of propagating uncertainty
distributions and show ks equivalence to the RSS method in the lin_t that RSS
assumptions arc valid. (2) Show how a violation of the RSS independence assumption
affects the calculated factor of safety. (3) Determine whether there is any signffk:ant
ehauge i_ computed factor of safety when the underlying distributions in the thrust
equation are not symmetric. (4) Examine the t2.5 sample / second data provided by
NASA to determine whether there is any sigzfi.ficant chancre in computed factor of safety
compared to the thrust eqv_rion solutions.
Analysis and Results:
Objective 1:
Using the values in the example provided by NASA (Table 1), the RSS form of the thrust
equation (Equation 1) yields 5,309,000 lbf as the 3-cr upper bound of total SRB thrust. A
1.28 factor of safety, implies that the ultimate load (nominal failure point of the su-ucturc)
is eXluivalent to 6,795,520 lbf ttmm. This _t:_rionship is shown graphically in Figure 1.
Equation 1. RSS form of the SRB thrust eq_,e_on:
F_ = F_.._ + AFt...._ + _ + AF,_.m + AF_,m +
(AFt," + AF,_, 2 + _r=, 2 + AF_: + aF_, _ ÷ AF_ 2) _
Note: Adding the3-sigma upper bound valuesof F_ and F_ resultsinan F_,_upper
bound si_ificantlyhigherthanth_ 3-sigma upper bound on Ft_ (forF_ and F_
unconelatcd). Itisequivalenttoassuming thatthe variationsm the high motor are
perfectlycortehl_d with thevariationsinthe low motor. Since theuncertaintyamong
terms foreach SRB atetreatedas uncon_latexlthismay have been inadvertent,but it
results in a very. conservative estimam of total SRB maximum plausible thrust as shown in
Table 1. In the example calculation provided by NASA it is noted: "EXAMPLE IS FOR
ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY. THE AC-qnJAL LOADS CALCULATION
METHODOLOGY IS MUCH MORE INVOLVED". If the "actual loads methodology
calculation" di_rs significantly from the example, in particular, if the aemaI methodology
does not simply add the upper bounds on high and low thrust to determine the upper
bound on total thrust, then statements made m this a,_}ysis regarding the relative
conservatism of the RSS solution are invalid. Except where explicitly noted, all of the
distributions shown m this analysis retain the conservative asswnption of correlation
Risk _ca_s _ Sp_a _h_tls _ _a_ni_r Pre_mm P_alrs_m - ._ _.
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between the high and low motors in order to keep the results comparable with the thrust
equation RSS solution.
Ftgure 1. FlelMIormhipbetweenFISS3-skjrrm Thrust, Factor of Safety, and
Ultimate Loa¢l
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Table I: Vahms Used in the SRB Thrusz Equation (*I000 lbf)
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/rnplicit in the RSS thrust equation is the concept of an underlying (normal) distribution of
thrust with a mean equal to the sum of the non-RSSed terms, and standard deviation equal
to 1/3 of the RSSed variation mrrns. _ds is the distribution is depicted in Figure I ard
4.
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Figuxe 2 as the "Uncor_lated (RSS)" distribution. Despite the nomenclature
"Uncorreiated", this dismbution includes the correlation between the high and low motors
impticite in the example RSS calculation for the SRB thrust equation. (See the note under
Equation I).
The RSS thrust equation can be arranged in a form suitable for propagating uncerta/nty
distributions by grouping terms. Solving thp diswibution form of the thrust equation (using
Monte Carlo simulation) results in a distribution identical to the one implied by the RSS
thrust equation. The ability to produce a distribution with the surf= mean, standard
deviation, and 3-sigma (99.87%) upper bound as the RSS method by propagating
uncertainty distribulions using Monte Carlo simulation demonstrams that method of
propagating uncermir_s and the RSS method are equivalent in the limit that the RSS
assumptions of symmetry and independence are valid.
Objective 2.
If two or more terms in the RSS thrust equation are known (or believed) to be correlated,
then the RSS method does not produce a conservative result. While a rigorously correct
derivationof the RSS thrustequationcould be developed tohandle correlatedfactors,the
Inopagationmethod handles con'elationquiteeasily,by speeifhSnga correlationcoefficient
between two or more factovsfortheMonte Carlo sim_,.:!_n.Figure 2 shows theori_-al
(uncorrclated) total thrust distribution and the torsi tlm_st distribution which would result
if two factors (F_,_ and AFt,,) wen_ correlated (correlation coef_eient = 0.75). The
exu'emc caseofnon-independence,in which all factors in the SRB thrust equationare
fully correlated is also shown. Figure 3 illustrams these mlationships in greater detail by
focusing on the upper tails of the distributions. The axis on the right hand side of the
Figures shows the factor of safety associated with the 99.87% upper certainty bound on
tim distributions.
2. Po:-_,_ml_ Between 3-$i8ma Thrmt. Factm" of S_fety, mad _ Laud
for RS8 _Ind_eat) dk Cm.r_,,_,i Input,
I L-.XII=- -
Pc , - ,,
4800 J000 5200 f,4_0 $61_ 5800 6000 6200 6400 6_ 6800
T_lal _ _{ _tms_d Ibf)
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,1.2110
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The R$S solution to the thrust equation is clearly not conservative if the variation in the
trams of the thrust equation ate correlated.
Risk _iie_ _11 of Space ghtaate SRB 0lamber _ Exmmom: .Appendix 5.
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Figure 3, Comparmon of SRB Thru_ OtstrJbutions lot Correlsted and
Uncorrelmed Sources of Variation.
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Objective 3.
Most (ff not all) of the analysts and reviewers of the SRB pressure "blip" data noted that
there appear to be diff_cnt sub-populations of pressure variauons embedded in the data.
It was almost universally noted that positive pressure blips were larger than negative
"dips", and appcm_i to have a,d;Fft'x=m physical root cause than symmetric random
variations about the nom;-.1 prefaure profile..
The RSS solution to the SRB thrust equation is £ncapable ofhawlli.g asymmetric
(skewed) variations. Implicit in the idea of RSSing variation terms is the demand that
every positivepressureexcursionis(onaverage) matched by some combination of
negative press=c excu_siom, and vice-versa. Furthermore, the RSS method demands that
the probabilityof allsourcesofvariafi0noccurringbc equal.The obsc_ved prcsmm: blips
do not appe_ tooccur with the same frequency,as otherrandom variationsin thepressure
profile,so itislikelythatthesource oftheblipsdoes not have thesame probabilityas
otherrandom (and symmc_c) vm'iadoms.
Figures 4 through 8 depict the restflts of propagating the skewed pressure blip
distributions developed by F, Safie of MSFC. While. Safie's work lxovides some insight
intotheeffectofsegregatingthe populationof pressurevariations,he did not show _he
impact on total SRB thrust or factor of safety. To measure that impact we replaced the
AF_ term in the thrustequation with the distributions proposed by Safic. The results arc
,miforrnly higher factors of safety (smaUcr upper bounds on thrus0.
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,_r.bough the IoB_o_ distribution is stzicdy greater _ 0, _e upp¢_bound on r.b_si:
Coxthese dis_budo_s is srn_lle_than theuFl_r bound _soc_r_.d with the normal
distribution used I:ofit the s¢,_ l_SS_n_ bUp d_t¢ TI_ appa_,J_t_noma]y is due to the
fact thai:the lo_orroal distribution ]_'ovidesa closer _t to _e pressurespike data _ d¢
noxmaIdist_b_on. The xcsoJlton the overall.SPJ_ d_st dJscibution _e the
prol_bLli_ dc_Lty in the _gio_ between the mean and the99.87% upper bound, std.P_g
the mean tdghcr but p,,i_;._ the 99.87-th percendt¢ closer in, resulting in a smaller upper
bound on thrus_ and consequently,andhigher factor of s_ety.
Objective 4.
It is not clear that the thrust equation capturesaU sources of uncertainty in SRB thrust, or
that the values given to the atom of the equa_on (which were derived from 2 sample /
second data) capture the same range as the 12.5 sample / second dam. In principle, the
thrust equation should capture the uncertainty in SRB thrust f_om a variety of sources,
only one of which is observed variability in the $RB pressure profile. An _t
R/skImpli_uolso_SpaceSh==leSI_ _,m_r Presto=Ezcnnmm: Appendix5.
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"sanitycheck" on the thrustequationistoensm'c thatthe maximum plausiblethrust
(99.87-thpercentile)generatczlby the_quation isatleastasconservativeas an upper
bound on thrustgeneratedfrom the pressuredata alone.
SAIC examined the 12.5 sample Isecond dam and developed a segregateddatasetwhich
would allow an al_.xnateapproach totheSRB thrustequationtodetermine tho"maximum
plausiblethrust"based only on variabilityin thedataand uncertaintym converung
pressuretothrust._ thisapproach, onlythe pressurevariationsduring the 65 to76
second mt_-vRlwere examined, sinceallphysicalrmch_ni_ms for ",.heoccun_nce of the
pmssuro "blips"az_ postulatedto occur inthatRrrr_fzame. The data was segregatedto
examine motor-to-motor (inter-motor)pressurevariations,symmetric variationsabout the
nominal value in_tgiven motor (intra-motor),and the skewed pmssur_ variations
associatedwith the pressure"blips".Figures 8 through 12 depictthesedistributions.
Figure 8. '_Raw" Combined SRB Thrust Distribution Based on 12.5 Sample /
Second Pressure Data
12_5/s_ Pre_um Data Derlv_l RSRM Thrust in 66-76 sec Interval
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dataisnota good fitThe underlyingdam shown in thehistogram appearsto have a
normally distributedcomponent with a son.what sr-_,p-rmean thanfm_i curve,and an
additionalco,:_nent forpressurespikes above themean. SAIC fo,mrlthatan excellent
fit m thedam was given by _esolvingthe data intothreecomponents: Notary
distributedMotor-to-Motor variationsin nommal pressure(Inter-Motor);Normally
distributedvariationswithin a motor (J.ntra-Motor);and Lognormally distributedpressure
spikes remaining when the normally distributed Inn'a- and Inter-Motor variations were
removed.
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Figure 9. Inter-Motor (Motor to Motor) Variation in SRB Pressure
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Figure 11. Maximum Pressure Excursions Adjusted for Inter-Motor Variation
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Figure 12. Nominal Intra-Motor Thrust Distribution Adjusted for Inter Motor
Variation.
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Pressure Spike Distribution After Adjusting for Inter- and Nominal
][nit'a- Motor Variation.
I00,
gO.
80.
70
5040
_0
2O
lO
Q
Hisa)gramat_l Dec_ty FuSion of Pr_mL_ _ Related 12.fs/S_ Data
Not= that when rater- and no_naI intra- motor va.,'Jafions axe removed, the maximum
pressure spike above d2c nominal pressure is 13.5 psi.
To ensm_ that the SRB thrust equation upper bo,,-_ captured at least the variability in the
pressm_ dam a scales of Monte Carlo sizzndadons were performed. One set of situations
was based on a nommi dislzibudon using the mean and standard dcv/adon of _he "raw"
pressm¢ data. Since a nonml distribution did not appear to fit the data pa.rficularly welt, a
second set of simulations was performed using the combined inter-motor, nominal iutra-
raotor, and spike distributions described above. T_ mseJzs of these simulations, along
with the oth=_ n,-'n_ricat results of tht_ analysis, are _,mmadzed in Table 2.
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Table2.
'Method of Calculation
Thrust Eqn,
RSS.
Examp_ Dam
PmlmgateM.
Exat_te Data
Fligh & Low Con_ue_
RSS,
BY--pie Data
High & Low NOT Ccrrelat_
Thrust Eqn,
Propagated.
Fata_le Data
[tiglt & Low Nor Corrclat_L
,i
ranm
Fanmnle Data
Block & Sha_ Ctmeiated (0.75)
, i
sqn,
Pmpagate¢
EzampleData
AllTerms FullyCorrelated
"'
P.SSSoluti_
Example Data
All Terms FeLly Con_lated
Ri_ Imptitmiout _ Spa_¢ 51ztmae SRB r-_=_,t-,_ precmm F.xcmmc_.t: Appmdix 5.
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Sunm,,a_ of Nur_rical Remits i ii , .... i,
Thrust Carrespoodine tComments
Upper Factor of -Safe_ t
Bound ,.
f
5309 1.280 Bemclmm_ -Defim_ ul_
5310
5240
5325
5595
12280
I297
t297
1276
1.217
equi_eat tmmst for aLl FOS
calcuLafioas.
Implicit assumption that high & low
motor variations are fully conatamd.
ii i ii, ,, _
IXtpiication of RSS results using
vtt_p,tgadon of uncertainties.
Bulk of conscrvansm in RSS example is
r.'oai tacat asmmption that high & low
are ¢orre_
equation terms except mt_in_
_tive asmmption of higlt & low
ctmelate&
(Ummsoz_bIe) Worst CaseC_
s sa x i7 (Umm._nable) Worst Case Cot_lation
F.rdmr verificatioa tlmt propagati<m
matches RSS for same assumptions.
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Table 2. ,Stream .a_. ofNumerical Results (continued
Method ofCalculation
ThrustF_.qn,Pro'pagamd..
Lognom_ -aIl RSP.M blips
No Correlation (exc. Itigll/low)
....
Lognmmal -allRSRM bfips
w/outtop4
No Contlatioa(=xc.kiglVlow)
Lognormal-allWECCO blips
No Correlation(exc.high/low)
Thrust_ Pmpasamd.
Lognormal.all WECCO blips
w/ore top 4
No Correlation(ext.hidVbw)
=t,
Thrust F-an, Propagated.
Lopm_- WECCO blips + top
4 as scimmt= population
No Omv,lamm (exc.high//ow)
"Raw" dam- _ _
No Corml_ioa (e.xc.mglt/Imv)
12J Sample/ Se,c'Dam..
RSS,
"Raw" dam- normat dimdb_cm
No Cmmlm_ (exc.higWlow)
L_ SampJe/ SecDa_ .....
Pmpaga_ SAIC sepamdm of
"Raw" dam - noxmalinu¢- &
inmt- motor:, Iogao,'m-i spike
No _ (exc. Idgh/bw)
, i
12_ SamI_ t Se¢ 6atL
"Raw" dala. normal inter- &
intra, moten iopor,,,,at
Actual Ri#ttJLeft Commlation
Coefllclenm ,
| ,, I,,
ru_' •
Upper
Bo,md
5:w
5277
5286
5"279
5284
5215
5':Z14
528O
52.51
Correspo,lai_
Factor of Safety
i.288
Comments
_u=_ _Fsuape_ m_=,st
Equation widz Iognormal fit to all
RSRM blips (Sa6¢).
t.238
1.28.5
1.287
t.2a6
z.am
1.287""
1.2.94
Replace DFshapcterminThrust
Equ_on withlognormalfitoall
RSRM blipsexcepttop4 (Safie).
_e DF, han¢ Lf'xm'm The'
F._mmn withlognormaIfit to all
WECCO blips (Safio).
Replace DFshap_ _rm in Thrust
Eqeanon _± lognormal fit to all
WECCO blips cxc_.pttop4.(Safie).
P_l)lac_DF-b'ne.t_tlt_':'£htust
Equationwithlognommlfitm WECCO
blips& add mp 4 asscparam(normal)
distributionw/low probability(Safio).
Normaldistributionfito12.5sample/_
seed=m m. 6(5-76 secondintarval.
Normaldisuibudonfitto t2.5 sampte /
sec a:_m in66 - 76 second _
sep,-,,_12_samp==/ se=,_,_from_,
- 76 secondinmrvalintonm'malliner-
andinwa-momrdistributions+
lognorma/spikedistrilmtion.
SAIC'sbestesdmam_f actual Factor
of Safety based on vadatioa in
obem_ed 12,$ sampldsec data m (,6 -
76 second interval The tl_ust
eqnm")'On¢ouservadv¢ly boundsthis
value.
i
The RSS soludon to theSRB thrustequationappears toprovide a consexvativcupp=
bound on thrustrelativetoIcvcry_asonablc alternativeformulationexamined, withthe
importantcxceptionofcorr,lationamong the mrms of theequation. Itisrccommcnd_
t._tNASA identify_ extanttowhich the terms cm the r.!n_ast_quadon am conclamd, and
14
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incorporat_ a means for dealing with correlation when calculating maximum plausible
thrust and factors of safety.
The thrust equation produces conservative upper bounds on thrust, and therefore
reasonably conservative factors of sa_fcty, primaniy because of the implicit assumption that
tim thrust variation m tim high and tow motors is fully correlated. SLucc the measured
correlation coefficient between right and left motors is 0.63, the tacit assumption of 100%
correlation is not excessively conservative.
15
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Appendix 6.
SRB Pressure Plots Used in Independent Statistical
Analysis (excerpt from "Solid Rocket Booster Chamber
Pressure Perturbation Review Committee Presentation to
NASA," 14 January 1994)
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Appendix 7.
Methodology for Determining Minimum Required
External Tank Structural Safety Factor (excerpt form
"External Tank Evaluation of RSRB Pressure
Perturbation," 6 January 1994.
U
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SUMMARY ......
This report describes the first phase of a study clesigned to improve the
management and the safety of the black tiles of the Space Shuttle orbiter. This study
is based on the coupling of a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA)model and referent
organizational factors. In this firstopnase report, a first-order PRA mode{ is developed
and used to design a risk-based criticality scale combining the probabilities and the
consequences of tile failures. This scale can then be used to set priorities for the
maintenance and gradual replacement of the black tiles.
_ _o
A fist<criticality index is assessed for each tile based on its cantribution to the
probability of loss of the vehicle. This index reflects the loads to which each tile is
subjected (heat. vibrations, debris impacts etc.) and the dependencies among
failures of adjacent tiles. It also includes the potential decrease of tile capacity
caused by imperfect processing (e.g., a weak bond), and the criticality of subsystems
exposed to extreme heat 10ads at re-entry in case of tile failure and burn-through.
Using this model and some preliminary data., it is found that the (mean) probability of
_oss of an orbiter due to failure of the black tiles is in the order of 10-3 per flight, with
about 15% of the tiles accounting for 80% of the risk. One of the report's Key findings
is that not all the most ris_k-criticaJ ttles are in the hottest areas of the orbiter's surface;
some are in zones of highest functional criticality (see Figure 23).
Management factors that can affect tile safety are identified as: (1) time
t_ressures that increase the probability of cuffing comers in processing; (2) liability
concerns and conflicts among contractors, which affect the flow of information; (3) the
low status of the tile work and the turnover among tile technicians, which may
increase the work load and decrease its quality; (4) the need for more random testing
to detect imperfect bonds and to monitor the evoiution of the system over time; and
(5) the handling of the external tank and the solid rocket boosters whose insulations
constitute a major source of the debris that could hit the tiles at take-off.
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Safety of the Thermal '::='_lection System of ++_'t._,,'3pace Shuttle Orbiter:
Quantita'li _,,_..,_AnalysL¢; and Organi;_ntt_._n;_ Factors
Phase 1:
__',_ ! i!!r:! ty .,S_.aj.__and O_.PJJ_J_iiP.!__!._q_ _9 rvatt o ns
S=ctton 1 :
INTI_ODUCTION
The National Aero:' ;iLl,its End Space Admini:_t_'.'.ltt¢_n(NASA) manages many
aspects cf _he Space Shu:!-'-_ Orbiter program ur_der _i',i_I_'_r,gsource constraints: time,
money, human resourc_ _;', personnel and man_,L_,rnen_'s attention, etc. The
maintenance of the orbit,! _; Thermal Protection $1/me!_n_ ITPS) is an example of
operations that must recl:,:,_ with these limitation_, Tl_e processing of the tiles
between flights is labor in",_,,_!:ivs and time consumin!_i and, because it is often on the
critical path to the next tP:.__cf_, the work has to b_' ,ck_ne under sometimes severe
time constraints. Althougt" i_;'=_atattention is dedic,_t_;d t¢ the tile work, its quality is
occasionally affected by tt ' ;i;;!smanding schedule. Thr_ importance of the tiles varies
according to their location ,::n the orbiter's surface. _:w.=r some areas of the orbiter's
surface, several tiles coul_:t :_; !ost without causing rr,,_j,t_r,lamage or risking the lives
of the crew; in other area.,_ :l'_:_.loss of a single tile ¢:_,_utdhe catastrophic. This report
shows that the contdbuIi,:,,'_ of different tiles to '!h:e overall probability of failure
(defined here as "risk-cmi,:F._tity") vary widely _ccn'ding to their locations on the
orbiter's surface. A large p_;_':'-_Ttage of the probabili;,_ r._ loss of vehicle (LOV) due to
failure of the orbiter's TPS _;_'_ be attributed to a srr_,_;ltfrock.ion of the tiles. Because
_here witl always be resr._ ",_e constraints, setting :;,"i,_r,t/es is a first critical step
towards ensuring that the :_::_:_;trisk-critical tites rec,:_ive maximum care and quality
control so as to minimize tJ',!!probability of failure.
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The tevet of risk-,:_':tir._,iity of a tile de_enrls on several factors and not
exclusively on the maxin' :1"_heat load (temperat_'e, an==_duration) to which it is
subjected. These factors i" :::iude: (1) the heat loacl_, (2) the location of the rite with
respect to possible traject,: f'i_s of debris (e.g., piece: _;el ins,utation from the external
tank (ET) and the solid rc_:,,:_','::t:_oosters (SRBs)), (3i :,t-t_._vibrations and aerodynamic
forces, and _-_ the critical!":, ,._Ithe subsystems loc_;_:t d_rectly under the aluminum
skin of ",he orbiter. Failure : ; -"._;single tile located dir_ :;t!v c,,,,er one of the most critica_
systems (such as _:he avi,-:'.';:.;, fuel cells, or hyd_at._!i ;:lines) is likely to cause a LOV
even though these tiles _ _ _xoosed to the m_" ':!mum neat loads. By contrast,
severe tile damage next t_:_;:r,:-_; :r ::_a wing has '*_,_._nsurvived in 13ast missions.
Therelore, the toacls a,_cJ :::_3_$e(_L. ,÷ factors mu_.'t be combined to estimate the
!3roba_iiity of failure anc: '.c ,::_;termine _he risk-cntica!r:y c,f =._,ch tile.
A tile fails because: the loads on it re_:h w;_t_._s th_,t exceed its capacity.
Understanding both factor!: i.:_ads and capacities, i,=:thus crffje, at to the quantification
of the risk associated v_,_l"_the TPS. The capar:i!:i_._s vary considerably among
individual tiles I_cause ol ,:',i.fferences in installation :'r'r_ditions and procedures. For
exam0te, insDections hav_ _own that several tiles l'_ve been installed with bonding
on 10% only of the conta, :: :_t._rface. In addition, the (:a_acities of some tiles have
decreased over time bec_: :;_: of chemical reactim'_ _; _.ff the bond with some of the
water proofing agents us_;,:" ::,'n the o_iter. Similarl:,_, !he toacls on the tiles are not
uniform, in addition to ex!:,_:,.,.::tedloads of heat, vibm _i:cms,and aerodynamic forces, a
tile may also be suloject_;_': '_'._unexpected loads c._._.=_;e_iby debris impacts. The
source of most of the ¢te_,=_:.; _:,_poorly-installed an_ m_intained insulation on the ET
and the SRBs. Therefor,!,. :_:}r,)thloads an0 capaci_'i_; can be greatly affected by a
vadety of possible huma_ ::_:_'r'r.)rs.
V
Some of these ,'-:,._'_-_:_rscan be traced back to weak organizational
communications, misguid.;.=:' incentives, and resour,".;',_ ,,:onstraints, which in turn, can
be linked to the rules, the _;:l_'_tc"tures.and the cuiture_ o_:the organization (Pat_-Comell
- ,..:
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and Bee, 1989; Pate-Cornell, 1990). Efficiency ot the risk management process for
the TPS requires an integrated aDproacn (National Research Council, 1988.)
Considering only organizational sotutiorts or only technical solutions to minimize the
risk of failure would be counterproductive e.nd wasteful. Furthermore, eact_ individual
system cannot be evaluated and managed independently. The performance of the
ET and SRBs affects the reliability of _he tiles which, in turn, affects the performance
of the subsystems that they protect from heat loads. Therefore, when setting
priorities, the management teams for the ET and SRBs must account for the potential
detrimental side effects of their procedures on the orbiter's TPS. By tracing back,
even roughly, the tocation of the insulation on the ET and SRBs that could hit the
most r_sk-crttical spots on the orbiter's surface, it may be possible to identify the spots
that should be given top Dnodty.
1.1 Objectives of the overall oroleot
The obiective of this study is to provide recommendations to improve the tiles
management at Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Florida, based on the development
and extension of a Probabilistic Risk Analysis model (PRA) for the "I'PS of the Space
Shuttle Orbiter with emphasis on the black tiles. The approach is to include in the
analysis not only technical aspects that are captured by classical PRA (for example,
resistance of the tiles to debds impact), but also the process of tile maintenance (for
instance, when and how are the tiles tested) and the organizational procedures and
rules that tietermine this process (see Appendix 1: Pat6-Comell, 1989.) The question
is whether these organizational factors affect the reliability of the tiles, ancl if they do,
to what extent. Linking the PRA inputs to some aspects of the process and the
organization allows addressing the often-raised question that PRA, although it
captures human errors, is of little help when considering more fundamental
managerial anti organizational problems. This model is designed to aitow
management to set priorities in the allocation ol limited resources in a continuous
effort to improve the reliability of the Space Shuttle, The metl_oa thus atlows for a
global apDroach to risk management, involving technical as well as organizat3onal
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improvements, white accc; .H'_tir_gfo=" the uncert_intie.i_ :3.bolJt the system's properties
and human performance. ,_;.,cases where the l:)r_.l_=t_ im sufficiently wetl defined,
one can then assess (eve=' f _.3_-=lycoarsely) the ¢-orr_ _):)nding increase of reliability.
Uncertainties abou: I h,_ perf¢_rmance of a cor_:!.'_t_;x,_;ystem such as the TPS of
the SDace Shuttle can E :;=_:ir_;tdescribed by its i r¢'_l._-,l:)ilityof failure (first-level
uncertainties). When co:= ,..r:tng this probability, o_..=.1_c_,_ uncertainties about the
probabilities of the basic _' '_:_',_::;_inctuC_ing technicat ;; :.ilfJres of individual components
ancl human errors. Thes,_ _.._'tcertainties can be c_:.scrihed by placing probability
distributions on the inputs!; ,_!l_._ncom_:_uting the re,_;,_l_.hguncertainty of the overall
failure DroDability (seconc'..!_;vel unce.,'tainties). Th,_i ='_le an_ importance of these
second-level uncertaintier_ ,.-.t_._end on the intend_:,:_I ;.._s_._of the study. PRA can
generally sul_port two _p6:_ ;:=ictecisions: ('t) wheths_ c_ not a system is safe enough
for operation on the basis ': -'.;_chosen s_fety thresh':_l,:_ or other acceptance criteria,
and (2) (the main objecth ::_,",__.his study) how to atl_:_<:;.¢t_.=scarce resources among
different subsystems on ',;"t_'; basis of risk-based. ;_riodties in order to achieve
maximum overall safety. '_'_',_ depth of the supportit'_;I risk _natysis must be adapted
to the decision to be mad6
in the first type of r:i_,_;:ision, w_ere one is tn;!_g tc_ decide if a system is safe
enough, it is important to ,':!:.-'_._,cribethe resutt of th=_ n,_;F(,,¢ssessment not only by a
point estimate of the fail_,_;":_probability but by a f_.._ll_ist_'ibution of this probability
reflecting all the uncertain1 i_;.,';_:_fthe input vaJues. S_-;¢_._nd..order uncertainties, which
are particularly critical for _:i_.'_aled operations, becr_ 'ne important because they give
the decision makers an inc"_'.:;_ionof the accuracy o,_ 'the analysis. A different launch
alternative may be prefem_.'=:Ii_, _or exzr'npte, the rne_l :_._ohability of mission failure is
less than one in a thous;;_'_c'_ but can take value, c" as; high as one in fifty. Note
however _hat the overal _ihJre probability per >._:e;n_ion is the mean of that
distribution.
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In the seconct type of decision, where the objective is an optimal allocation of
resources, the priority ranking has to be basecl on a single point estimate for the
probability of failure. For optimality reasons, the mean cf the distribution of the failure
pro_)ability is the relevant characteristic. In this case, critical factors are, first, the
relative values of the probat)ilities of mission failure associated with failure ol each
component, and second, the variations of these relative probabilities with additional
units of resources (e.g., :ime). The combination of these two factors then allows
giving priority to _.he components for which more resources will bring the greatest
increase of saiety.
In this study, we construct first a priority scale for the black tiles based on our
current estimates of the means of the partial failure probabilities, i.e, the mean
probability of LOV associated with the potential tailure of each tile (first-orcter PRA).
An analysis of the second-order uncertainties may change the priorities if they
change the means of these partiat faiture probabilities. Across subsystems (e.g., tiles
versus main engines}, the uncertainty of the failure proDaJ:)ilities may vary widety
because the failure modes involve a spectrum of basic events whose probabilities
are known with different degrees of uncertainty. In this case, fult analysis of
uncertainties may wetl change the means themselves and the optimal resource
allocation. Within a given subsystem, such as Ihe tiles, the inputs of the analysis for
the different elements (e.g., the initiating events) are generally of similar nature and
the _venations of uncertainties may be less important. Yet, uncertainties about
extreme values of the heat loads clearly vary according to the location of a tile on the
orbiter's surface. Furthermore, the probabilities of failure (ancl associated
uncertainties) of the subsystems located directly under the skin given a loss of tile(s)
and bum-through vary widely. Further study should therefore investigate the effect of
seconct-order uncertainties to determine their impact on the resource allocation.
Our work on this problem is divided into lwo separate phases. The first
phase, which is presented in this report, involves the development and illustration of
11
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a first-order PRA modef ::t' the btack tiles of thE, TF'S based on a probabiiistic
analysis of different failun_ _,:_,-:=narios.In this analysi ;,, we use mean probabilities to
construct a risk-criticality e_::'r'_-_te ic_r each tile and Ic, _._',.-'_';.'aI)tisha scale of priorities for
management purposes. F :i_'.,,features of this modet _ _r_,that dependencies of failures
among adjacent tiles, an¢_ I::_'_t_,,_.enfait,jres of tiles it, _;pi!._cificTPS zones and failures
of the subsystems iocate_: :_"these zones und,_r the3 orbiter's aluminum skin. The
analysis thus relies on a :::,_,;';'/_ionL_gof the orbite_ ,._:';t.Jr_ace (1) among zones of
temperature, debris, anT: _.-,._.,rodynamic IOaLdS, ar,,c[ (2:1 among critical system
locations. For each tile, _,,_,_,::;omput_ a risk-critic. _/ity f;_ctor that represents its
contribution to the overall L-_!;i,,:_forbiter faiture due to='":!:_Sfailure accounting both for
loads (/oaci-cdtica/ity) and ';_ilu_e c¢,n_equences at t; _-_Ioc_._tionof the tile (functional
criticality.)
the maintenance proces,,_
mistakes (weak tiles), ens_,r
the possibility of weakenin!;
identify, with the hetp of _i
The second phase ::-' 'lhr_ work will involve re_ir_.:ment and implementation of
the model, including (']: an analysis of (sec('_:_rrJ-.order) uncertainies about
probabilities in order to ct_;_;;?_'rnineif these uncert..'.;i_tie.,z can affect management
priorities, and (2)organiz;zl;:_n_l extensions. The o_'i;i_.'ni_:_l:ionatextensions involve
identification and evaluati_.," ,:=,'_the mechanisms by ._#_ir....i-=potential problems occur,
are detected, and can be ::_:_'_:'_}cted. This second pt a.,;e _riil thus involve a study of
ar.,'counting for its abiii::',, to detect and correct past
_ :;atisfa, ct_ry quality cont;'o! of the current work, ancl track
_'!_the TPS over time. Th _}obj_;ctive of Phase 2 will be to
,,:_,etts, the organiza_ion_" r;_ots of technical and human
problems and to make r_::::',:=mmendations for pos_.'!bI=_ _mprovements. The PRA
model will be used to ass=_=;,'!;the relevance of the.¢_" factors to the reliability of the
black tiles and the effectiv._ ;_'-:_s of prcposect solutio_ ;;.
V
In this study, the F:i:_:f_model is not an end n itself, but a tool designed to
assess specific managem=_" ;; _actices. The level of d_:-.;'_ailof the analysis is set with
this goal in mind. One ke', ir_iting factor in _his effc't i_=the; unavailability of precise
12
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values for the probabilities of faJiure of the subsystems located under the orbiter's
skin conditional on burn-through. Such data wouid be the natural results of a
complete top-down PRA for the whole orbiter. Because NASA has chosen to do the
analysis piecemeal and only for selected subsystems, _hese results have not been
generated. Therefore, we use expert opinions instead of analytical resuits to assess
globally these conditional failure probabilities.
1.2 Scope of the work in Phase 1:
As stated in the proposal, the objectives of this first Dhase are: (1) to
understand the basic properties of the tiles, (2) to identify the main experts and
establish working retationsl_ips with them, (3) to identify the main data bases ancl
sources, (4) to design the Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) moaet, and (5) to
identify some of the relevant organizational features that affect the reliability of the
Thermal Protection System (TPS) with emphasis on the black tiles anti on the
maintenance process. This first phase of the project was funded in part under
SIORA (Stanford Space _Systems Integration and Operations Research
Applications), and in part as a separate research project (both under cooDerative
agreement NCC10-0001). Under the SIORA funding, we identified some
fundamental issues involved in the linkage between the reliability of the black tiles
and various features of the organizations that participate directly or indirectly in their
maintenance (including, but not exclusively, NASA at the different space centers,
Lockheed Corporation, and Rockwell International). The problem formulation was
presented in a paper delivered at a major Probabilistic Sa_fety Analysis conference
(PSA'89) held in Pittsburgh, in 1989, in a session chaired by Mr. B. Buchloinder
(NASA Headquarter, SRM&QA) on probabilistic salety assessment for space
systems. This paper won the Best Paper Award of the American Nuclear Society for
PSA'89. It is included in this report as Appendix 1.
This Phase 1 report is organized as follows:
1. Bac't_0round infQr.mation" functioning, maintenance, and failure history of the
13
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tiles.
De#c;riotion and il!{:i;i!,!;{#;Lg_n_J2L_l_hP,._.__A_m.£::_/;inputs, preliminary results
(means); sources c, _:_;,:!3ertiseand data.
Preliminary obse_,; ;:ii!;_!?..s_._.__.(._lLtaj_i_Lt_Y._j_g_r':r,,_!j.L.n._l...gJ_oraanizatfonalactors
and the reliabit.j.ty.__::;;:;;i_J,
1.3 Gath.Qrin_ of tnfor_l ;i::i;i_.t,_..rl¢13_.t_.P,..q_h_!Ce.L_g_!_F!t.;__=¢L1.contact
The data and the ; _,.t_vant information us_;:t ir_ this study were gathered
_hrough meetings ana i'_(:,rmat interviews of ,:it_ s;:,_._cia[ists, tile personnel
(tecnnicians and inspect_l_:l, and management al '::enn_;dy Space Center (NASA
a.nO Lockheed Corporati,:_ i_, ,johnson Space Cer_:e__ (NASA), and in Southern
California (Rockwell Int_ _'_._ional in Downey). w:._ conducted, in particular,
extensive (atthough inJom_:'ili=i_terviews of tile tec_ir'.iAn,.; including both did-timers
ana newcomers. Several =_=':ham came from Rock* ,'_tl _nd had participated in the
initial tile installation wor}: "Fhey described to us :_,.:,cedures and problems and
offered suggestions.
The probabitity es'li ':;_;'_,eswere obtained in "_._,¢c_w ys: frequencies of events
from official or personal ¢ iz_=::_:_rcls(e.g., debris hits; _r_qL,_ncy of tile damage), and
subjective assessments _i,_i._.£.!, probability of failure, _f the subsystems under the
orbiter skin if subjected t_'. ,_:,:c_ssive heat loads du,_ tc_ _ hole in the orbiter's skin).
Note that:
1. The data used i=';;:_ for the illustration o; t"_e first-order PRA model are
realistic but coarse ,_,_!imates that can be refi_*_eclir_ the implementation part of
the second phase.
2. Second-order ,.,_,,.-:;_ainties about the p_.,,_bal:i_ity estimates themselves
have not been en,: .::_.le¢lat this stage, l'he i _rr_bsbility figures that are used
here represent ira!:, _;,..,i'!i_,the means of possi_: 1¢_pr._baJoility distdbuUons of the
prol_abilities ot ev=; _':'.-:..Assessment of the_ =._c.ond-order probabilities or
probability distdbu_.i: _:; for future frequer_cie_ _._fevents (Garrick, 1988) will be
14.
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pan of the implementation phase if it is judged necessary for the relevance of
the results to management decisions.
For this study, the key technical Doims of contact were the following:
At KSC:
° David Weber (Lockheed)
Frank Jones, Susan Black, Carol Demes, and Joy Huff (NASA)
At JSC (NASA):
° James A. Smith
" Robert Maraia
° Car_os Ortiz
° Raymond Gomez
In Southern California (Rockwell, Downey):
° B. J. Scheli
o Frank Danieis
° Jack McClymoncls
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2._1 System description.
The designem of tl"'_l:_'ermatp_-otectionsyst;im {'I"PS!forthe space shuttle
hacito solve a seriesof co_"11,t,;,,:<problems clueto thf_,v.,i'_erange of environments in
which the orbiterhas to o_,!::-__,:':.A single-componer;: r._esigncould not meet allthe
necessary requirements of ,, ii:h_tanding extneme ter... I:_=_'a_._resand vibrations white
remaining light weight and' _,_:ii:,leand lasting for 10C, 'TtiE3Si(3FIS.Instead, a complete,
integrated system was aevr'.".i_ea relying on diffe_'en'_ c_mponents to solve different
problems (Cooper and Holh=,',,lF._y', 1981.)
the orbiter where heating
(FRSI} is used. This mate]
which is heat-treated to attc
in areas where surface tern
flexible reusable insulation
one-inch stitch spacing, tt
In the highest-tempE,,mu;e areas, reinforced ,_,:ar_on carbon (RCC) is used.
This material is extremely I",_.:_ resistant and able t_ _rithstand temperatures up to
2800°F on a reusable basi i;;_.nd up to 3300°F for e. single, flight. The use of this
material is fimited to the ie;E_:'.ir_o edges of the wing _.'._=¢;the nose cone. In areas of
;;t._s are lower, a flexi_l'_ reusable surface insulation
i_t i_ matte of a silicr_n e_a,._.o.'nenc coated Nomex felt,
,,, using it for 100 mi_sior_:" _t: t_-_mper_tures up to 700°F.
".=_-_:r,_._turesare above 700%: b=_t :_)eiow 1500°F, advanced
,; FRSI) is used. AFRSI i i; _ "blanket" composition with
::_:_..'_sistsof an outer layer' of 27 rail silica "quartz" glass
fabric and of an inner layer ',," !;'lass fabric ('E" glass) ,=-,hic_ encompass a silica-glass
fett material (microcluartz, c::; '_'monly called Q-felt). These materials have replaced
most of the 5,000 thin wh _'_:ti}_.s on the upper sur!ar:.e eft the orbiters, originally
designated low temperatur_i _..:usable surface insula_i)r_ (L.RSi_. Their replacement
has reduced the complexit,/ '_;tP.e TPS at the cost o__,_;,slignt weight increase (see
Figures 1 and 2.)
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The tiles that are of primary interest in this report are designated high
temperature reusable surface insulation (HRSI) (see Fig_re 3.) These tiles are
coated with black reaction cured glass (RCG) and are certified for 100 missions up to
a maximum surface temperature of 2300°F. ApDroximately 20,000 of these tiles are
used to cover the bottom of the o_iter. Among them, approximately 17,000 have a
density ol 9 pounds per cubic foot (pcf). The remaining 3,000 tiles are of higher
0ensity (12 and 22 pcf). They ELmused in areas where higher strength is needed,
primarily around doors and hatches, and where it is required by structural
deflections. The 22 pcf tiles are capable of withstanding surface temperatures as
high as 2700°F without shrinkage.
These tiles, being highly brittle, have a strain-to-failure performance that is
considerably tess than the aluminum skin of the orbiter. In addition, the tiles have a
much lower coefficient of thermat expansion. Therefore, if they were bonded directly
to the aluminum, thermal and mechanical expansion and contraction would cause
the ceramic matedai tO crack and fail. To protect the ceramic material, the sizes of
the individual tiles were kept small (nominally 6 inches square). These numerous
designed gaps allow for relative motion of the tiles as the aluminum skin expands
and contracts and the substructure deforms uncLer loading. However, this allowance
is not sufficient to protect the integrity of the tiles. In order to further isolate the tites
from local forces, a strain isolation pad (SIP) is secured between the tiles and the
skin: The SIP is a felt pad constructed of Nomex fibers and comes in three different
thicknesses (0.09, 0.115, and 0.16 inch).
The tiles are bonded to the SIP and the SIP to the aluminum skin using a
room temperature vulcanizing silicon rubber adhesive (RTV-560). in certain areas
where the aluminum skin is particularly rough and disjointed, ascreed or putty
(RTV-577) is used to smooth the surface. In o_er for the SiP and tiles to vent during
ascent and to protect the aluminum structure from gap heating, filler Oar strips
(RTV-560 coated heat-trealed Nomex felt material) secured oniy to the aluminum
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Vskin are ptaced around each piece ot SIP. The porous tit_s_re allowed to vent since
the RCG coating does not extena to the filler bar. Between tiles in the hotter areas
_..,_
(approximately 4,500 locations), gap fillers are used in dddition Io the filler barn to
prevent gap heating aamage during reentry. The gap fillers are secured in place
with RTV. Figure 4 shows a typical black tile with aiI the retateO components.
2.2 Life cycle and maintenance ooeratlon_
2.2.1 Tile manufacturina and installation
Because of the extreme environment in which the orbiter operates, the TPS
must be made of only the purest materials. Contamination of the tiles during
fabrication could lead to failure of the TPS well before meeting its 100 mission
Flaw material (amorphous silica fiber) has to be 99,7% pure (AW & ST,requirement.
1976).
COA11N@RCG
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SHUTTLE SKIN
Note: Thickness exaggerated tor ctartty; Screed (RTV-_//) only where needect
Figure 4: The tile system
The fabrication process starts with a slurry of water an0 1.5 micron diameter
sitica. The water is drained and binder added. This mixture is compressed into
blocks stightly smaller than 1 cubic foot. After the binder sets up in 3 hours, the
blocks are dried in a microwave oven. The sintering process which locks the fibers
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together requires tight hea_ ".:.'._lerances. The blocks _ve t)aked at 2,375°F for two
hours. Next, they are cut ir:=: _',::tugh1lies (four to e/g!";: !:)_..=rDlock). Tile density and
density gradient are vedfiec .,_ringX-rays. Since ez_:t_ ':il_ is different, the tiles are
trimmed to specification usi:' :: _._._tomated milling mac_'_ir_s. A second quality check
assures that the tiles are fit ,:r ,::dating. The coating i_; ,',._t._r_yedon and then glazed.
A third quality check verif :!_,i;'the inte!;Fity of the c,,_.,ting. 'These tiles are then
internally waterproofed with _ :_;itane material. Dunncj c,riginat construction, the tiles
were next pieced in array._; 1 _:'rl: matched their l._lac_:m_nt on the orbiter's surface.
Each array consisted ot aPl:, ,:_,::.:imately 35 tiles. The t',:_t_x:_mso_ the arrays were then
shaved to match the sha[:_, ::_f the c_rbiter. A fm_ If q_ality check verified the
dimensions of randomly sel_,:t_zd tiles from each arra!, All current replacement tiles
are machined individually.
The original installali :::_.of the tiles at time of c-.::r_;_ruction was done an array
at a time. The SiP was firs1 ':,;':='_deOt(_ _he tiles using !'_TV, _i_ile a lattice of filler bars
were bonded to the orbiter. ,_ter these bonds had sPl:, 1he entire array was bonded
to tl_e orbiter. Difficulty aro:! _i_ir_ _ligning the tiles/SIP _;m,ay_th the grid of filler bars.
If the tile/SIP array is parl: _i=!_:,,resting on the filler h.ars instead of directly to the
orbiter's skin, the strength t_._-_h_TPS bond is greatly "edu¢-.ed. The arrays are held
in place with 2-3 psi press=, r,:_while the RTV dries. !'_-'::rtds are verified using a pull
test on each tile. The stren!; i:[_of each test varies bas_,_ _=_the location of the tile and
the_expected in-flight loading':: i:;! to 13 psi). Once a tik_ l_s _,assed this initial pull test,
it is uniikely that it will be c':,i'cl._ed again dudng its iif_ r_;_cl_._of 100 fli;:h_'s unless an
anomaly is detected.
Z,2.2 Fliaht profile 1;:...i!;!jn_
During a typical mis_ i,:)_, the tiles are subje_ :_to a wide range of loads and
temperatures. These mus,' I:_ considered in order tc :.:letermine the limitations and
life cycle of the TPS. The ;'_z_:_criptionbelow summ;!_ri_:_ a report by Cooper and
Holloway (1981).
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Ignition of the orbiter's main engines creates an oscillatory pressure wave
that loads the tiles in the aft region of the orbiter. Though strong, this wave should
dampen rapidly. In addRion, acoustic pressure created by the engines can directly
Iced the tiles and the aluminum skin. Any motion of the aluminum will, in turn, cause
inertial pressure on the TPS. The amount of inertial pressure depends on the local
response of the aluminum substructure, but noise levels up to 165 dB are atlained
0uring lift off. During ascent, the tiles experience a wide range of aerodynamic loads
including: pressure gradients and shocks, buffet and gust loads, acoustic pressure
[cads caused by boundary layer noise, inertial pressure caused by substructure
motion and deflection, and unsteady loads coming from vortex shedding from the
connecting structure to the external tank. Almost every tile will experience loads of
160 dB during this phase of a mission.
Since the tiles are highly porous (90% void), it is during the ascent that any
internal pressures must be vented in order to equaJize with the external environment.
Because of this, both the SIP and the tiles may experience varying degrees of
internal pressure. Vent lag can cause tensile forces to build up. In addition, small
residual *,lie stresses are caused by differences in the thermal expansion rates of the
tiles and the coating. Also, any water that was absorbed will cause internal pressure
as it expands anal contracts with the temperature changes.
During re-entry, a second series of stresses are placed on the TPS.inctuding:
• _ , .! ._o_.!!.._._., ,..
substructure deformation, boundary layer acoustic noise, steady aerodynamic loads,
unsteady aerodynamic loads caused by boundary layer separation and vortices, and
loads from aerodynamic maneuvedng. The boundary layer transition from laminar
to turbu|ent flow always occurs, but the time of this transition (for the same entry
trajectory) depends primarily on vetticle roughness. This rougtlness is divided into
two types: discrete (one single large protuberance) or distributed (many small
protuberances.) Early time of transition resutts in higher turbulent flow peak
temperatures and higher total heat loads that depend on temperature and time of
U
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exposure (Smith, 1989). N,i=!!! _-t'?one third of the tite,,; erl the lower surface of the
orbiter reach temperatures i'_ e:=:cess of 1900°F and ; r=;; s:.tbjected _o problems of
uneven thermal expansion.
The TPS has been ti_',;!:_ri_usty "_ested and has wi'!h_:ood thousands of test
cycles of limit load without fail ; "_-:. The sys'_em has ther b_er_ certified for at least 100
flights. However, repeated .t_:,,: :',:,_ure io 'the stresses ,-'_t s:;rr_Lins that accompany a
space mission can affect the; :,,l:_._gdty of the individuF; c(:=m_onents. The tiles can
wsat<en, for example, above l_' _ densi_ication boundaE, I_¥er, _he SIP can stretch as
fibers pull out of the matdx, ;i _:¢! the RTV can creep qj_7::t_:: very high loads. It is only
through rigorous maintenan,:_ ::',roce¢_ures anct ctualit: c:rjntr_l verifications that the
true life cycle of the TPS cart :',:._ _eter_ined and that _:cc:t_otable system safety can
be achieved.
2.2.3 "rile maintenan! !i ..!:_:3:)_P..CJJJE.e.
The maintenance ;: ',:,_:;_dure is guided by 'he Rockwell specifications
(Rockwell International, 19!!!!:, !989}. 1_ involves (11 a s s_quence of tile-damage
inspections and assessment:; ;;_t_er landing to decid_ w,hich ones can be mended
and which ones must be re::l;:_,:';_l; (2) tile ret_tacem__'t; _3) Done verification using
pull tests; (4) step and gap n'=,:i:!_,_ljrement, (5) decision _::) in._-:;_.dlor not a gap filler.
The steps involved in' i1-.;__eplacement of a tile _;_'_ 'Ihe following:
° First prefit
° Densific_tion
° Second prefit
o Bonding of the SIP ;: :::it',.=,tile
° Cleaning of the P__,' ',, .iinspe(,-'tion point)
o Priming of the cavity,
° Mixing (and testing, :f the R'FV
° Application of the R' :' ::<_the rite/SIP sys_=m
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Bonding of the tile/SiP to the cavity
° Verification ol 1he bond.
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The venfication of tl_e bond at the end of this process involves a pull test of
variable strength. One problem that has been reported is that this pull Jest may not
allow detection of tiles tl_at are only partially bondea because bonding to the
adjacent gap fillers may provide sufficient strength to pass the test. Though these
partial bonds pass the initial pull test, they tend to be more susceptible to
deterioration over time and slumping.
Step and gap measurement is meant to ensure the smoothness of the
orbiter's surface and avoid the excessive neat loads due to vehicle roughness. It is
currem.ly a time-consuming procedure involving 24 measurements per tite, done
ma_nualiy by insertion of plastic gauges to a certain depth in the space between tiles.
The result o| this inspection often leads to a decision to install standard gap fillers.
Several problems have been reported in this part of the work, including inaccurate
measurements due to misplacement of the plastic gauges. A laser system is currently
being developed to automate step and gap measurement, making it both quicker
and more reliable (Lock=heed Researct_ and Development Division, 1989; SIORA,
1990). Clearly, the corresponding reliability gain for the whole TPS depends on the
initial contribution of wrong steps and gaps and orbiter's roughness to the probability
of failure of the TPS.
Note that this maintenance pmceclure is mostly maintenance on demand.
The only ranUom testing that occurs is in select areas where a small number of tiles
are pulled to determine if there has been any weakening of the original screed
caused by initial anti subsequent exposures to waterproofing materials. In the
absence of a non-intrusive test of the bond, the fear is that the tests themseives may
weaken the tile/SIPIRTV system.
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2.3 Failure history: inci!;::!i.!;!_t,re¢..¢.r..qljD.g__'_a._..._L_'_:_Lt;_._=._
2.3.1 Failure history if,:;:;[ .i.n_n_.t=r_p_._EUin__
A history of the till! :_;'oblems c_.n i3est b_: ct_,.,s_:ribed by grouping the
difficulties into three broact ....i_,'iggories: (1) design f;"=_.qems, (2) processing and
maintenance induced pro_!_ r,,s, and (3) damage c_!r !,_.=.,,dl>j,, external debris. This
information is summarized I",_':" data. compiled by C_ dos Ortiz at Johnson Space
Center (JSC) in Houston, "l'r_fJ::;_,;.It shoutct be reme_b_:re_::! that to date, only two
black tiles have been lost ,=,r
_, ,,_.__,oor during re.ert_r_ _:,:_.,'.-:;du_ to RTV failure caused
by chemical reaction with a. ,,_'_:,'-:;rproofing agent (Ch_._i,;_nger, Flight 41-G) and one
clue to debris impact (A_I_-.: i_, Flight STS-27F_). }-!,_=!_nthen, there was some
remaining m_terial in the ttt_ ".,,:i_tlty _rior to gntr3'.. In _:_c)tl"l_;_ses, there was neither
catastroDhic secondary tile, .........'-,,,:,,_.oge, n_r burn-througr. :_t _h.= _biter skin. This aood
fortune was due in part to th_: I,::oation of the missing t!! ;.=,._;n.;_lthe structure under the
skin. Similar losses in c!_.t_¢_rentlocations could ;;ave been far more costly.
Nonetheless, the TPS has ::!,;r_. very weft and prov; n _o ..he far more robust than
anticipated.
With any complex Ct'_t_rn, the design proces.r does not stop with the initial
product. Improvements o_:',.-:._s the sy_em is used :_r=dv/eaknesses are detected.
The orbiter's TPS is no diff_ _,mL Revisions to the ori!_inat design started before the
first launch, and have conti_'
h_v_e greatly increased the!
;'_,::lever since, These pr,'_t_eri',/ redesigned comDonents
;_;',iiabili,_y _nd maintain" hi lily of the overall system.
Deficiencies that have, as ¢_",-'_ gone undetected wil bg ._;oived in a similar fashion
13roviding that they are unc¢;,,,:_=edprior t_ a major syst_r_ failure.
kj
Desian
During the initiaI de;;i ::r_of the TPS, each com_'_¢._"errl(tile. SIP, and R'1"V) was
certified individually; but it _, _z;;no'; until they were cr_'nbim_d during the construction
of the first orbiter, Columbi !: !:hat a "weak link" in th{_ bond between the tile and SiP
was indentified. Tests of "_:_ _i_e/RTV/StP/Koropor _.,t a system revealed that the
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combined tensite strength was weakest at the tile-to-SIP interface. This was caused
by the RTV not impregnating enough the basic rite material to insure aclequate
attachment. The President of Rockwell Space Systems Group stateO:" I think that it
is a fair criticism that we didn't define the problems more clearly as far as the
tile/strain isolation pa(_ capabilities are concerned. We worked too nard on the
quality of the material alone and waited too long for the thermal analysis." CAW&ST,
25 February 1980.) Because of this oversight, many of the already installed tiles had
to be retested, pulled, densified, and replaced. To eliminate the "weak link', the tiles
are densified by applying a mixture of Dupont's Ludox AS and silica slip to the
underside --or inner mold line- of the tile to an approximate thickness of 0.010
inches. The result of this procedure is to move the "weak link" up into the tile material
itself. Since the minimum strength of the basic 9 pcf material is 13 psi, the majority of
the tires now satisiy the maximum induced-loaci requirements. Many of the installed
tiles were known to have greater than the minimum 13psi strength and could t_e
shown to have positive margins for flight Ioa£1s. The tiles that could not be shown to
meet flight loads with a positive margin were replaced with 22 pcf tiles whose
minimum strength far exceeds the maximum flight loads. This additional work meant
that the 30,000 tiles on Columbia required more than 50,000 tile installations before
the first flight. Even so, not all the tiles were densified prior to the first launch, but
were deemed acceptable based on proof load testing to 1.25 times the limit stress.
For all the orbiters after Columbia, the tiles were densified during installation.
Even though the overall temperatures reached during re-entry were less than
the maximum allowable, tiles in three areas were found by flight experience to be
subjected to local thermal degradation and/or unacceptable thermal gradients
resulting in a negative margin for the mid-fuselage structure. Three redesign
solutions were used to resolve these area-related problems. Tiles inboard and
forward of the main lanc_ing-gear doors (denoted as "location A" tiles) were
knowingly made thinner than the initial tllermal design thickness to minimize weight
anc_ to retain the aerodynamic mold line. The thin tiles were able to maintain the
U
J
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structural temperature limit_; !:::.tc;<3.usethe initial flight.=_,_,_r_., flown from the Eastern
Test Range at Kennedy S;: iln,';,!!Cen_.er, white the th,_., :_al design trajectory was
based on launches from thP.. ',,'f,_tern Test Range, whi':;i', out a greater heat koad on
the structure. However, _ :l;_r_.=;ivean_.lyses, botl_ hern;_l and stress, showed
unacceptable negative strut; =r,;_ margin due to them':_:_LIq_adients. These negative
margins were initially resoi,,_',_,_ l:_/inter_at structural _:c._,_ific_tions and by installing
internal heat sink material, l,,:-:_r, the "location A" tii_:_ _t'e reDiaced with siightly
thicker tiles (approximately ';I "iJ;; inches thicker) which; s.;'till provided an acceptable
aerodynamic outer mold lirt;i I._secl on _ght data e',_It:a_ion. Tiles between the
nose cone and nose landir_[,: ;_._r_¢rware receiving ex_,_._,..'_,!;iv_z_heating, which caused
tile slumping and suDsurtac_; i_,:'_w.These tiles wee e,_,_.=_'_tu_llyreptaced with a much
more durable RCC chin pm _.,t. A simiiar proDtem r:_:_;:,,ur_ectwith the etevon cove
tiles. In this case, the size ::_ ths tiles was increaser! thu:$ reducing the number of
troublesome gaps. All thre_, ; "_;:=dificationshave prove- .=ur_sssfuL
.
Processtn_ and maintenm_¢;iil
The most critical TP:'II i'_',_blems related to pro':'=._sirLq and maintenance have
occurred with various water:: _'=_,_,fingagents that have mff_.;c.t_,_lthe strength of the R'I"V
by reacting chemically with "_'..'_bond. However, in e._,'Jffion, a significant set of other
problems have arisen ,.,=,,.,,_".... _,',.:_,_''',of maintenance err,::_'s. Initial waterproofing was
clone with an external _pp_i':;:]tion of Scotchgard to t.__ tit_ surfaces. This was not
totally effective because !:1_:._waterproofing degrac_.¢,_ with exposure to rain anO
sunlight. On the second f!, _,,';tiles that had absorb_:l _md trapped water, fractured
when ice formed in orbit. TI'_. ,_:'_efinecl_ need for an i_'_t_rnz_!waterproofing agent, in
addition, the Scotchguard _,,.,=_,:-:_,=und to chemically at_:_,¢:,:the RTV-560. Fortunately,
this was discovered imme_:_,i;_tety after an accidentmi ,:_verspray. The first internal
waterproofing agent, HMD:! _,_as found to react with ti-_. ;zcreed (RTV-577), slowly
reverting it from solid to li¢: _i_:t. This interaction betv_'_'.,n waterproofing and screed
was not immediate, and e,,'_'=t_lly led to 1he loss c,_ a bl-'_.¢;t_tire. Fortunately, the
other nearby tiles affectec !:_' the sottene_l screed :li=_r'(:_t fail dudng reentry. A
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second generation of waterproofing, DMES, has been developed and proven
successful. However, the long-term, residual effects of the outdated HMDS are still
causing concem.
Several chemical spills during tile installation have necessitated the removal
and rebonding of nearly 1,000 tiles. These spills, involving an oxidizer on Columbia
and hydraulic fluid on Challenger, demonstrate the sensitivity of the tiles and their
bonds to their maintenance environment. Another incident fnvolved the mislabeling
of a container of the bonding agent. RTV-566 was labeled as RTV-560 which has a
shorter drying time. The bonds were not allowed to cure for the appropriate time and
thus were weaker than atlowed. This discrepancy was caught during final pull
testing. Finally, during a return flight from California to Ftorida on the back of a 747,
the orbiter Columbia was flown through a rainstorm, damaging over 1,000 tiles of
which 250 needed repiacemerd.
Debris
Since the first flight, the orbiter has always been exposed to external debris
damage. Table 1 summarizes the damage by listing total number of hits and major
hits (greater than 1 inch). Simple statistical analysis demonstrates the great
variation that has occurred (Total Hits: mean = 179, standard deviation = 157; Hits
>1": mean = 51, standard deviation = 60). This variability is further highlighted in
Figure 5, which shows histograms of the debris damage (for the upper graph,
number of flights as a function of the total number of debris hits; for the lower gr=_ph,
number of flights as a function of the number of hits greater than one inch). For the
first flights (until STS-27R), the actual major source of debris was found to be from
portions of SOFt insulation from the External Tank (ET). During STS-27R, the
orbiter's TPS experienced significantly more debris damage than on any previous
flight, including the loss of a targe portion of one black tile (Orbiter TPS Damage
Review Team, STS-27R, 1989). Basecl on the pattern of damage and the recovery of
actual debris material lodged in the tiles, AFRSI, and gaps, it was possible to
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Figure 5: Histogram of tile damage due to debris.
Indicates the number of flights thin experienced a sl_lctlied amount of debris damage (i.e. tour
flights had 40-60 total hits, two differem flights had 60-80 total hits, etc.) based on available data
for the first 33 flights(missing: first five missbns and STS-51L)
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determine 1hat much of the ,__j'zf_,_r-eda.mage was caus_ 1 l._y i_'=sulation from the cone
area of the right SRB. Oti",_;' ,'.tamage, minor but m::_"_, e;:I:ensive than usual, was
caused by the insulation of t,_,i: ET. This was similar t!: t_,e t_pe of da,mage that had
_een experienced in previo_. :, t:iqhts. In addition., ar_ ir_-de,t:_1h analysis done at the
time concluded that there ,,,,r_,.;;no c_Dvious correlati_:t_ =_Tween tile damage and
launch conditions that migt" ".,.._l:_:,.cti e formation, wP_ic_ was considered earlier a
possible source of tiie irr=!:,;_.::l:darnage (Orbiir..:r 3"::=_ Damage Review Team,
STS-27R, 1989).
Figure 6 displays ¢,_' ::,he orbiIer surfaLce z:: t umr._[ative recording of all
significant tile damage fro:'/ _lt flights and all orbit: i_r_; (through STS-32R.) The
ciamage is obviously not uni' ::,rN'_lydist_buted, anc_ ce_"_ir= tires are much more likely
to be damaged than other._; ';:_mputer models dew.!c_F._ed by Ray Gomez at JSC
have been able to show ho,_, _':,,.;L_tationfrom both the ."3i:_I_.,;and the El" could cause
such damage (see Figures '1!: _-.'_._d19 in Section 3.) ....l_e complexity of the problem
does not currently allow fo= _:_direct: and focused b;._,ck',:rac.king from a tile on the
orbiter to a particular spot ':_'"_r_sulatiort because the_ t_:_iectory depends on many
factors (e.g., the velocity of '1_: orbiter and the angle .:_,f}'Ltt=nck.) It may be possible,
however, to determine rout;!_._ythe initial location an_ the, size of 10ose insulation
necessary to inflict specific r.I,;_-_-_age(location and seve:'i_) to, the tiles.
Del:_ondina of tiles due to f_t;:_.'.;_.;::iL.olhe_#._th.La,.C__,i_. ._--'.i£,,t
To date, as mentiont_.::! ;_bove, only one black _:i_ has been lost due to factors
other than debris impact (i_ ':"_,":_:case, chemical reverr,_i._,n(_f the scmecl). There are
several reasons for unsatis'!': ':_:_:rybonc_s: 1) improp_;:" ;._iignment during installation,
2) tailum to compty with R3n, ,:h_ting limitations, 3) cher--_i_;elreversion of the screed or
RTV, and 4) possible weak.,!_' ir_g of vadous com._one;_;ts in the TPS under repeated
load cycles. An initial investi.; =.rttonof a small discrete, .'_-_1cf tiles s_nowed that a higin
proportion of the bonds I ._=:._thad pssed the pull t_-'.st were later found to be
unsatisfactory (see Figure 71 ..:.._.'.inceth n, however, thi;_: number has been tound to
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_j
Riaht Wino
Figure 6: Accumutated major debris hits (lower surface)
for flights STS-6 through STS-32R
Source of data: J, McClymonds, Rockwell InternationalU
33
,,=,
,=,,
o=
D=
34
Pat_-Comell anO Fischbeck
be much smaUer. A recent and on-going evaluation of all 9,045 tiles using the 0.090
and 0.115 inch SIP has shown that of the 6,517 tites evaluated to date, only 8
showed anomaious conditions (most of which, but not atl, were subnominal bonasl.
So far, during normal maintenance and the replacement of debris-damaged tiles, 12
tiles have been founct to have no bond between the SIP and the orbiter's skin. These
tiles were only held in piece by the gap fitler's bond to adjacent tiles.
As mentioned earlier, the SIP is bonded to each tife using R'I'V while the filler
bars are boncled to the skin. After all these bonds have firmed, a layer of R'tV is
placed on the skin in the hole defined by the filler Oars. The tile/SIP combination is
then held in p_ce compteting the installation. If the tile/SIP combination is not
aligned correctly with the filler bars, the SIP may rest on the filler bars and never
touctl RTV or skin. Obviously, these tiles will have very poor bonds. In several cases
the tiles were placed correctly between the filler bars, but directly over exposecl
sensor wires. These wires prevented complete contact between the SIP and the
RTV and thus made for a weak bond. It should be noted that even with no primary
bond between the SIP ancl the skin, tiles have still passed the pull tests (because of
the gap filler bonds) and that, as of yet, no tile has been lost due to poor installation.
If the RTV is aUowea to dry before the tile/SIP combination is placed on it, the
bona will not clevelop to its full potential. This can happen when several tiles are
bee.n placed at one time, and a single bat_ of RTV is mixeal for the several pret_ared
sites. If the instatlersare nat careful, the RTV may exceed its "pot life', i.e., the age
beyond its safety margin, before the last tile is placed.
i
The chemical transform_ion of the RTV is very sensitive to temperature
anal humidity and must t_e monitored carefully (Juring installation. In several cases,
the curing time of the RTV has been reduced by the installers using water (or saliva).
Such a procedure, whicl_ is ext3ticitly forbidden, is not believed to affect the
immediate strength of the bond, but may reduce its life. A similar class of probiems
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has occurred when the ah.;;_Li_'_;,.=msurtace has not b_,_:_ properly preDare0. In 1his
case, the RTV bond may f_.::: _._the interface with the r_=hit,.=r'!!;skin.
The only black tile 11'_;_'ih;as been lost due _o n'.,,l:=r_nding not caused by debris
occurred when the first int_; ....=';:;1wateroroofing agent, '.II,_D:5, reacted chemically with
the screed causing it to so,_';'_"_llld rever_ _ac_: to its _-_¢:,_'_viscous form. The formula
of the waterproofing ager' "_:_ sincs t_een changP"J _o that it will not affect the
soreea. This new waterl:_:_':_::fing agent has com;:t_:_,d 50 mission cycles on
combined-environment te_'i",;;1, and no weakening _1: '_e TPS system was found.
Yet, careful monitoring is _!ci_._ired to ensure that =_:_re.=;iduat amounts of the old
HMDS agent are causing ;_=,'_;p/stow reversal reac_i:: n =_n:l. eventually, loss of tiles.
The current HMDS '_esting :;,=_:,_:eclures invoJve rerno_,i _!_1t_o or three tiles after each
flight to check the chemi::_:t _'omposition of the sr_r_._ed. To date no additional
problem has been found.
In the long term, ,",_,i::_e.atedexposure to I(_:-:}clc,y'cles and environmental
conditions of heat antt h_.=_i:_fi'ty on the ground n_;_:t_j'we._aken some of the TPS
components and, eventuatt:' ,:.',:._usetile failure. The t_:',_ vulnerable tiles are those
with no bond or very lit'tie _ ;':':_:',!(e.g., less than 10% ,:;f"iI"_e,_urface) between the SiP
and the orbiter's skin, aria '1'_',.are held primarily by he g;._pfiller's RTV bond to the
adjacent tiles. RTV bonds _=: far, have not shown vi_ihle signs of deterioration over
time and load cycles. It is I =:ewn, based on extensiv,,:: re,sting, that the hundred-flight
certification is justified for v.,_'i-h,ondec_ tiles. What wi!l I:._Lpp.P.nin the future, however,
is uncertain.
After some flights, :i¢;:v_rat cases of sluml3i_t (,_agging) tiles have been
observed. These are easiq, :':i_ntified visuaily since tI'_:_' br_ak the smooth surface of
the orbiters. Accorcling 1,:_ I'.lavid Weber at KSC, _he.=_most common cause of
slumping is a weakenin,;; ::_Ithe 51P's fibers d_._e Io repeated load cycles.
Pre-densification testing _v.,,_d that the part. of ':i=e tile located right above its
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interface with the SiP was the weakest part and was most iikety to be affected by
repeaIed load cycles. With densification, this weakest zone has moved, on one
hanct, further up into the tile, and oli the other hand, down into the SIP itself. A
proDlem in either location is difficult to detect if there is not overt visual clue. Yet,
once again, to date no tile has Deen lost due to repeated load cycles.
2.3.2 Data bases;
Three data bases have been identified and described by Ellen Baker and
Bonny Dunbar as part of their TPS Trend Analysis Survey (March, 1988). They are:
= PRACA (ProDtem Reporting and Corrective Action) which is managed by
NASA. _le problems constitute only a subseI of these data. The
information regarding the tiles can be accessed at KSC.
o TIPS (Tile Information Processing System) wi-tich is managed by
Rockwell (Downey, CalHornia), The specialist is Ms. B. J. Schett,
supervisor of the TPS Data Systems at Rockwell International, Downey,
California. The information can be accessed at Downey, JSC, and KSC.
° PCASS (Program Compliance Assurance and Status System) which is
part of a NASA (agency-wide) System Integnty Assurance Program Plan.
PRACA and TIPS are described in Appendix 2. The survey conducted in
1988 by Baker and Dunbar showed that a trend analysis was judged highly
desirable:
1. To monitor the performance of the TPS in order to ensure conformance
with design requirements
2. To ascertain long term effects of TPS-retated procedures (repairs, etc.).
3. To enable engineering design changes to system failure.
The participants to the survey indicated that there was a need for a single
user-friendly data base including all useful data and, in particular, resutts of trend
analysis. They would want Io have rouline access to this data via a local PC or
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terminal. As we show in se:::r'c:,_ 4, the risk.criticality :_d_x tP,at we have developed
can be an important part o_ ":"_,,_.record for trend ana!",s:,:.'_ because it represents the
relative contribution of eacl'_ 1,:-_ to 1he probability of !._'.T_ clue to TPS failure. These
proDabiJities can be upda.te_: :;'.l the basis of new inf_ m_.tio._ and the results can be
encoded for all tiles that sh_.:t"_, _;imilar ct_aractedsti_.
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Section 3:
DESCRIPTION OF THE PRA MODEL FOR THE TILES
3.1 SusceBtibllltv and vulnerability
Our probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) model for the black tiles of the
thermat protection system (TPS) of the space shuttle is based on two major _ac_ors:
susceptib#ity of the tiles to damage and vulnerability of the shuttle once tile damage
has occurred. The terms susceptibility and vuJnerability have been standardized in
the study of aircraft combat survivability; their use in the space shuttle context may
facilitate the understar_ng ol the problem.
Susceptibility of the tile system to damage is determined by the comioination
of loads on the tile and its c.apadty (strength) to withstand them. Failure occurs when
the loads exceed the capadty. The problems can generally be divided into two
categories: (1) tile loss caused by excessive external Ioa0s and (2) tile loss under
regular loads causedby weaknesses in the tile system (debonding due to factors
other than debris impact). A third possibility (a combination of the two) is the case
where external loads not severe enough to cause the toss of & well-bonded tile,
causes the loss of a weakened tile. In this study, this case is treated as a subset of
the first category. Historically, the vast majority of excessive external Ioadings has
been from debris, mostly from the external tank and the solid rocket boosters
(defective insulation and ice). Also included in 1his category is space debris.
Depending on the size and energy of the debds hitting the orbiter, several tiles can
be damaged simultaneously. It is also conceivable that the reentry temperature may
exceed the designed capabilities of the tiles, leEu3ing to tile failure or burn-through
(for example, due to severe malfunction of the guidance system).
Capacity reduction caused by weaknesses of the tile system account for tile
losses caused by long-term deterioration of the R'rv, defective bonds not caught
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during installation, anO tile bonds weakened due to improper maintenance
procedures, waterproofing, and spills. These weaknesses could affect a single tile
(tile resting on its filler bar) or a group of tiles (use of a weak batch of R'Pv'). Tile
susceptibility can therefore be reduced by controlling tlle external debris, improving
tile installation and maintenance procedures, and developing new tests
(non-destructive pull tests ancl other types of tests) to ensure bond verification.
Another approach to reducing the susceptibility of the tile system that will not be
considered in this study would be to harden the tiles so that the impact of external
debris would not cause any damage, Extensive use of RCC would be one suct_
solution, but at the cost of a significant increase of weight and design complexity, as
well as an enormous additional expense.
. r
The vulnerability analysis starts with the premise that a tile has been lost for
whatever reason, then proceeds to analyze the effects of this loss on the st_uttle's
pedormance and safe return. Of primary concern in this phase is the layout of the
shuttle systems immediately below the shuttle's skin. A heating or bum-through of
the skin could cause the loss of vadous hydraulic lines, computers, fuel tanks, or
even a weakening of the structural integrity of the soacecraft. Also included in the
vulnerability analysis is the effect of an initial loss on the surrounding tiles. When the
TPS was developed, it was feared that one hole ¢ou1¢1lead to adjacent tiles peeling
off because of reentry heating (the so-called zipper effect). This phenomenon has
not occurred in the two instances where tiles have actually been lost. Yet, the loss of
a tile clearly causes a local turbulence and exposes directly the side of the next
tile/SIPIR'FV system to high loads (forces and heat). The probability of loss of a
secondary tile, atthough obviously not equal to one, is still higher than the probability
of loss of the first tile in a patch. If not checked, the loss of subsequent tiles could
_ead to exposure of a much larger patch of the shuttle's skin. The vulnerability of 1he
orbiter could be reduced by moving, hardening, or increasing the reclunaancy of
various critical control systems. If the tile damage can De discovered prior to reentry,
then, in some cases, the vulnerability of the shuttle could be reduced (either by
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protectingthe exposed pro:: _' ¢:_="by rerouting, Crainin_;l, cr ,securing exposed lines
and tanks.) In addition, by (: "L;_rl_.iing the reentry flight _',rc_ile of the shuttle, it may be
possible to reduce the temp'_ _;_:ure of some weak,, vuEr _,-a_-le areas. The sequence
of evems that is studied in tP:i:_I;_r_alysis is shown in Fig L:r_ 8.
CDeb.;
LOSSofT_e _ l:_;,_.,nlryHeating _ Ivl_l; "r_'r =_ |=_ Loss
by r'i
F=ctors Other than Debris L_ 'T_es ..,,)V ...............
of Shuttle
Figure 8: Ever," ;:li_.;ram: failure of the TP3 ;_ar.Jina to LOV
The structure of the I: :'_t:_.,f3itistic model used in ._h,.=.analysis (Figure 9) follows
closely that of the elements; i::_¢:.=s_nted in Figure 8. It includes: (1) initiating events
(probability distributions for ".he number of tiles initk _ly lost due to debris and to
debonding caused by other 'I; :h:_rs), (2) final patch siz_ (probability distribution of the
number of adjacent tiles Io,¢: ,:_::,nditional on the loss o_ the first tile), (3) burn-through
(probability of burn-through :,=_:'rdil:ion_l on a _ailure pat_".:t"_of a given size), (4) system
/oss (probability of failure ct _::!,,,_ems under _he skin _:onditional on a bum-through),
and (5) loss of orbiter (prob_::_ lit_"of LOV, conditional c_:'_failure of suDsy"stems due to
bur=-_hrough.) The analy_i_; is thus done using tt'_.e u,_;uat mix of probabilities
estimated through frequenc!,_-;, _nd of sut0jective Drob;_t_!:lities when needed (e.g., for
the probabilities of failure (:I ,,_;ubsystems under t_e ,.-:kin for which no formal PRA
stuciies have been done). _=:._'_sian formulas were us(d to corn.pule the probabilities
of different scenarios as de_;'::=_t_ed further in this sectirJ _.
Note that, in this st_._:::' ,^,e did not accounl for excessive heat loads (aOove
the design c_eria) c_usin!; _!'_e burning of a tile dt_,..', fo;" example, to tile design
problems or to a malfunctio:: :',:_he g,zidance system _;_d/or :he control surfaces.
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2_
INITIATING EV_;N T _ BURN.THROUG H _ LC_SSC_OFIBIT1E'_
© .
(_ _ _ -
m _
o a. g.
x
n _
o.
@
®
®
®
®
Discrete ranOom vanable: numt_r of initial tiles lost due to debris
Discr=e ranoom va_==i=: numeer o! initJ_!tiles k:_'t clue to ael=on_in9
Discrete rar_om v=mable: nurn_r of eddllionaJ tiles lost given Initial tile cl=mage
Continuous tsndom vari=hl=: ssvarity of bum-through given a l:_l,tc'hsize o! missing tiles
Binary random vm_ble: sul_ystem failure occurs given level of burn-through
Binary rano_omvat,hie: LOV occurs given loss of su=_-ystems
..
Figure 9: Event tree of LOV due to TPS failure
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Although this failure mode rrs_:.=;::ontribute to the overatl :H:._k_f faiiure of the orbiter's
TPS, it was considered her,! t,_=_t t.hese initiating ev_: _I_; now have a much lower
probability than the loss of a ':'L=!l_ue to debris damags _r_d/.:r aebonding caused by
other factors.
We did not account _::,r ,_J_pendencies among _',_e pr_._t)abilities of failures of
subsystems under the skin ct=_=:I.'._TPS f_ilure; for exar, pie0 _No redundant elements
of the hydraulic system coul(:: I:_, c.-,,-ippled during the sa_;e t:lk;lht by loss of tiles in two
different locations. The pro_c,;.!:,i!ily of such simultaneo=F_; failures was considered to
be too small. Finally, we :Ii_':1:_ot account for depe_d_r=cies among tile failures
caused by the repetition of tl' : :_:_._memi,_ake (e.g., fro_"_ '['he :._ame technician) which
becomes a common cause (=_;_';_i_ure (for example, adcf!:ir,)n ,_f water to the RTV mix
and treatment of several tile;_ ) "T'his concern will be p_ 1 ¢_f the second phase of the
study.
3.2 Definition of mln-zow;!_;:i}.
Because of the fact{: _:; described above, the ::}lact,: tile system cannot be
treated as a uniform structu_,_ l..')sbris is more likely t¢; hit some parts of the orbiter
than others, different boncli::_;: m_teri,_ls are used in ,-._ff_Jrent areas, temperatures
vary considerably over the s[.r_ce, and critical Subsyst..r m_: _[re located only in a few
areas. Therefore, for this an;.."1'/sis, the entire tile protec';ir_r[ system is subd:vided into
smaller areas, caJled here rr :':.:;ones, such that a/t ti/e_; o_' a specific rain-zone have
the same level of su$cept::i,':itV and vulnerability. Deperding on the number of
discriminating charactensl .,:',: the number of tile_ i=_ each rain-zone could
conceivably vary from a singl_ _:ile to thousands. (An arter n_L_ive approach would be
to categorize each tile indivi;:'=,.._)lly with regard to ._._sce_:ibii[ty and vulnerability, but
since most adjoining tiles I'_;:_,='r:identical che.ractedsti_".s, this level of detail is not
needed.)
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The definition of rain-zones is critical to the analysis. The number of factors
used to delineate the rain-zones determines the complexity of the problem. As an
initial cut, we define a rain-zone by four factors: (1) susceptibility to debris impact, (2)
potential for loss of additional tiles following the loss of the first one (depending on
heat and aerodynamic loads), (3) potential for burn-through given one or more
missing tiles (heat loads), and (4) criticality of underlying systems. For this study, it is
assumed that the probability of debonding caused by factors other than debris
impact is uniform over the orbiter's sudace and does not require a separate partition
of this surface. As mentioned above, it is also assumed that flight profiles will not
expose the entire "I"PS to severe temperatures that would exceed their specifications.
:3.2.1 Debris classification
tn order to account for the fact that debris damage during ascent is not
uniformly distributed across the underside of the orbiter, the black tiles are
partitioned into three debris areas such that all tiles in a particular area have roughly
the same probability of being initially damaged by external debris. The definition of
these debris areas also accounts for the fact that some areas are more susceptible to
being hit by large pieces of debris that wilt damage several adjacent tiles
simultaneously.
To define the debris zones, we plotted all known alebds damage from the first
33 flights on a single shuttle layout (see Figure 6.) These clara came from J. W.
McCIymonds (1989) at Rockwell in Downey. Areas with similar damage intensity
were grouped together into high, medium, and low debds damage areas(see Figure
10.) An estimatecl probability of tile ¢larnage due to debris per flight was determined
by dividing the number of hits by the number of tiles in each area and by the number
of flights; A similar plot and calculation was done for all damage to black tiles over
one inch in size, (Hist0rically about one fourth of the damage has been greater than
one inch in size.) It should be noted that the only missing tile to date causecl by
debhs is in one of the "high debris damage areas'.U
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Riaht Wing
• . • l_.,., t;_,"9_ .'CVDe_ofFigure 10: Pare! :__ _._fthe orbiter's surface: .... .. .
;J,-)l'.:,fiszones (index: ,_)
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Based on this analysis, the probabilities of a specific tile receiving any debris
_amage were assessea as shown in Table 2. The probability of multiple tile
damage was calculated using a typical six-inch by six-inch square tile and estimating
the percentage area, within a 1/2 inch boraer, that would allow for other tiles to be hit
simultaneously with sufficient energy to cause significant damage.
Debris Ar_g
P(Single tile hit)
P(One of two tiles hft) °
P(One of three tiles hit)
Hiah Medium how
10 -2 3xl 0 -3 5xl 0 .4
8xl 0 "4 2xl 0 -4 4xl 0 -5
7x10 "5 2x10 "s 3xl 0 -6
"P(one of x tiles hil) ,, probabilitythat a particular tile is in a group ot x adjacent hit tiles
Table 2: Probabilities of debds hits in the different areas shown in Figure 10
V Translating this information into the probability that a specific tile will be
knocked off or so significantly damaged as to burn off during reentry is a more
difficult task. It is logical to assume that the probability of this level of damage is the
ratio of the number of destructive hits to the total number cf hits in the past. Since
one tile has been lost out of roughly two thousand significant debris hits, it is
proDosed, in this study, to use an initial estimate of 1 in 2,000 (5x10 -4) for the
probability that large hits would destroy a tile's insulating capability in the high debris
areas. Slightly smaller I:)rababilities were used in the medium and tow debris areas.
The probabilities of tile loss due to debris hits for each tile in each area of Figure 10
have been further allocated as shown in Table 3. For example, the probability of a
single tile loss in "high" deDds area is the product of (1) the probability that the tile is
hit by a debris, (2) the probability that the size of the hit is greater than 1" conditional
on a hit and (3) the probability that the tile is knocked-off given a Urge debris hit.
I
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Debns Ar_
P(Single tile lost)
P(One ot two tiles lost)"
P(One of three tiles lost)
.........J:::lig.l:L_...... .M._ il,!,i::!__ Low
•;,;i; x 10 .6 1 C,? 10 -9
: 37 1C"3 0
•,,,:].,e 10- _) 0
"P(oneofx tileslost)= pr_, ;'
Table 3: Probabilities of tii._
.-'=,:a 10artk_Jlartileis in a c/tot.C;_.,t:<aclj_camlost files
,;;',_;Sdue to debris in the ::'ifferent areas shown in Fig. 10
3.2.2 Bum-?hmugh. ',;;!iK.'._.F!_f!_c_t_O.
In a simitar fashio," !:ha tiles are partitioner] imp.) _:hree burn-through areas
(see Figure 11.) The prob':;E':,iJjty Of _ burn-through i::: deF,endent on two factor: the
temperature that the surf_': _ rgaches during reent%; (arci for how long), and the
aDility of the unprote_ecl _ :.=minum skin to dissip._te ::h_=Inoa.tbuild up. The denser
and stronger the structu",_ _.f:,_clerthe skin, the 9._ater the capacity to resist
burn-through. In bott_ ca:_'.=._where tiles have b_::._,ntest, burn-through has not
occurred in part for this rea=_:.:,r...The larger the patch ._f mis_ing tiles, the greater the
likelihood of burn-through. Yho probabilities shown in "[abis 4 were estimated from
information provided by R:.t='{z_';:Maria of NASA John_:;:or],<;pace Center in Houston.
Once again, these are only :::_':]rse estimates.
i
Burn--throuoh Am_,
P(Single tile lost)
P(One of two tiles lost)"
P(One of three tiles test)
........!:!j_h ..... _.M:,_:_ii_;_.... Low
• _'_10.,. 0.1 0.001
r).7 0.2_: 0.01
I).95 0.7 0.1
"P(one of x tileslost) = probai3ilityt',.._ :zparticulartileis in a groupo<._-_dj;z<._entlos files
Table 4: Probabilities of I:,_'n-through due to tile Io_.::;in ar_as shown in Fig. 11
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High pmb_billt,/at bum-_rough
Medium probabiiily of bum-through
Low probability of bum.through
t !
Figure 11 : Partition of the orbiter's surface into three types
of bum-through zones (index: k)
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Note that the two a_ _,_;_z;just in board of the __ain h_nding gear have been
notated as being in the hi._i _ burn-through area. Thi:_ _s not, strictly speaking, a
burn-through problem. Th_._ L_tnJcture in those _:.re_'.s is extremely sensitive to
temperature differences an,l v_ould fail even witl_ou _ _urn-through. However.
because of their sensitivity t:: :L:_Tnl:_eratur,.=,these two _.';e_:s were groupea in the high
taurn-through category.
3.2. _1Seconder v til_. ;;;l_._Lr;_._._'f_;._tLO_n
In order to accounl 'I,)F the potential of a si==£rl_._tile causing the Joss o'_
adjacent tiles, the orbiter is ,i:vic:ied into two seconcla:.;i" _:ife loss areas (see Figure
12.) The probability of aacti! _:,'::,_! tile to_s depends or t'_e _._eroclynamic forces and
on the magnitude and dur_;:i_r_ of the increased r_e'=t_.')_ _emperatures that occur
around a missing tile due to, tt',.._,disruption of the la_-_inar flow. This increase ol
temperature also depends _;;'_ the ability 0_ the skin _,' ,'.t_s:._ipate the heat build-up.
The RTV bond will fail abow _;_::,0<'F. Because of this, thin _;econct_ry tile loss areas
are related to the temperatu¢_:; ,z_.zas used in the burn-tt' :rt.',_]ghanalysis above. In this
study, the two secondary til_.. :,'_; areas will be defined P.,y the probability of adjacent
tile loss shown in Table 5. "lt',ese values were estim_.',_cl from information provided
by Robert Maria from NASA ;_::,.f_SC.
Zone 1 (high loads):
Zone 2 (low loads):
l:: {Additional tile lost t On(: tii_ iostl = 10 "2
P(#,dditionzl tile Iost l One tile;= lost} = 10 -3
Table 5: :_:obabilities of losing odin',cent tiles
due to in_: ;t_ _il_ loss in areas shown :n I.'-icjure 12
.J
A failure patch is =i_:_!i_ed z,s a group of Io_:;t _ils_; that startea from one
initiating event (initial tile tc:_:i i, and has reached its r',;_m:imum size. The size of a
failure patch depends on ',h_ numt_er of tiles ini':i_lly damaged and on the
subsequent vulnerability of tt,_;. _;djacent tiles.
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r--
high probability of secondary tile loss
tow probability ol seconaary lile loss
Figure 12: Partffion of the orbiter's surface into two types of
secondary tile loss zones (index: f)
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3.2,4 Functional cnti!;:il lJ!_.',l_._.i.f.L_i_o.
The varying cr_ticalili:, ,::=1"the subsystems of 1'h_ orbiter located under the
aluminum skin is handled :,,' partitioning the tiles i_ _c three functional criticality
areas. Once a burn-throu_l _'_h_.*_ occurreO, various .-'.:,_'_r_emswould be exposed to
extreme heat and would.fail !f those systems were :;s_ntial for flight, their failure
could lead to tP,e loss of th,! _ :::,:ir.;iter. E_y examining t,._, toe:orion of critical systems
(electrical, hydraulic, fuel, =;t:r.. as shown in Figures "3 arid 14), three areas were
identified (Figure 15). The "_:_ !:::_'_vingprobabilities wen _,r.-.=..ttrnated by assuming that a
bum-through would cause _ _: z_a'_aof four square h.=et ;:.rmJr:d the hole to be exposed
to hot gases.
Area of high fun_ior= :-:' ,;,.nf:Jcatity:
Area of medium func'i,'_:_al crilicality:
Area of low function_! ! _.*:_;,'licality:
P(Loss of od:_it_,r I Bum-through) = 0.8
P(Loss of _,_er I Bum-through) = 0.2
P(Loss o_ ¢_l:_iter I Burn-through) = 0.05
Table 6: Probabilities of I. =:'_.t ¢_nditionaJ on burn-thr _t_t_ in functional criticality
;_;_',.=.asshown in FTgure 1 _
3.2.5 Oebondino c-_t ;..=!_-_.12,y_J_.o.t_rJb._...q .,_._t_,,.j_..p._/.t
In this model, it is _:_;umed that the probat:ilily :,f debonding caused by
factors other than debds irr_::,-_,:_; is the same for all til,-_. In reality, the location of
screed, thin SIP, and gap fili_i,r _$ welt as the age of !._'i:"v', and the temperature and
pressure zones would aff_i .::',i: the probability of deb'._,nding. Short of conducting
considerable additional rest! _r_;t_: this simplification shouk:l be adequate. Again, the
probaDilities used for illus:::;:'..:ion are only coarse at;timbres th=_t are intended to
provide an idea of the rel_ _,.;.,._magnffude of the def:::o_din,_ problem to the debris
proDlem. Another retations_' i!:_r,ot considered directly ir this analysis is the effect of
weak bonding on the suscel:lib[!ity of a tile to debris irni_'_c_. A weakened tile is much
more likely to be dislodged i: ',, ;_:medium-sized debris !' it. F_nr the purposes of this
• :..._,_, ::i_ ._:....: : : :
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High criticality
Medium criticality
'"]Low criticality
V
Figure 15: Partition of the orbiter's surface into three types of zones o! functional
¢ritica.tity (index: j)
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model, with its uniform cti_=;:'ii:>_._tionof debonaing, thi_ factor is included in the debris
analysis.
Of the approxima_J;.,, 1:30,000 btack tiles tt_,_ h:_.ve been installed at various
times on all the orbiters. • ;-' !'_.,ve been found durir_!;il _'laintenance to have no bond
other than through the gEq:,;i_fer. A complete an_.tysi ; of tile capacity, as revealed by
the maintenance observ,;Jl: :_'t;_, witl be part of the -';E_(::o_OpMase of this work. We
assumed, for the momenl. ',h_rtabout half ¢_ the unt_ :mde:i _iles that are held in place
by the gap fillers have b_i,_=_ {::letectec! by now, eith{:;<" b,ecause of visible slumping or
because they have been ,i l::;laced for other reasor,:: _:;;JCf',as debris damage (about
25% so far have been rel,':_z_:e_.) Those with no t:,_:ncl t;'_,a.thave not been detected
so far are those that ha_=;; not yet shown visibte _,gns of weakness and have not
needed replacement.
David Weber fror' ,_;I'-3Cestimated that a tie witt_ this weak a bond would
have a probability of fail :',"z_o_ one in a hundr_ :t (10-") per flight, making the
probability of debonding :_' 'this kind, for any tile, tc t_e approximately 9.0 xl0 -7 per
flight. Estimating the pm!'_;_:_i!itiesfor the other types =:_fc_ebonding (excluding those
caused by debris impact;_ :_ more subjective. We u_._,_rla previous Lockheed study of
bond verification (see I=i_.i;.::tl;16) anti confirmed th_ _.sults during discussions with
David Weber. This st[;,;i,,' !;lives relative values :)'I the probabilities of different
debonding modes. Follc,,,_i%t these results, we as_;u=;=ed that chemical reversion of
the screed and weakenin!: :[_e to re_e=_ted ex_osu_'_ to load cycles are tess likely to
cause debonding, and _, _._sed a probability of fai!ure of 2 x 10 -7 per tile and per
flight. As a further simpl_l:,_:.-',_ticn,these two probab!!!ti_._s Iweakening due to repeated
exposure to load cycles _ _r:! insufficient bonding) ,-_r,e_sumed to be indeDendent
and can thus be added, t_'_actuality, poorly bon'led ti!es or tiles resting on soft
screed are likely to be m'.;,':'; _'nore susceptible ta thi::_:I.:ind of weakening. Using these
values, the probability of ,::,=_inqat least one ef the _il_;_,_due to debonding caused by
other factors than debns : _pact, on _ny flight, woul:! h._,_ little more than 0.02. which
5_
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then implies that over 35 ': ii!;r_t.-%the; proloabi[ity of Iosir,,;j st least one tile on one of the
flights is a little less than '::5(]. This appears reasr'."l_J:.>le based on historical events
and the one missing tile.
V
3.3 PRA model; defirfi:::.!_!3...0f vg.U_a_l_e_
Throughout the re_'. :_-!the ana.tysis, the are-'."; _e_ined in the previous section
are indexeO as follow:
i: Index
h: Index
j: Incfex
k: Index
I: Index
Of i'"i ri-.:zone$
of ¢!;:b;-js areas
of _:,_'_,::l:iona.Icnticatity areas
of !'_;;_'_.._.hroug,harea.s
of =;,;=:_:_r=aary.tile loss areas
Note that a clou#l_; ::;Hbscript (e.g., ji) re0res,-:nrs par,_meter j (criticality in this
case) of rain-zone i and _1'_._1:the term "dsbonding" r_;.'.f_:_r=.;to "debonding Oue to factors
other than debris impact"
n:
nl:
N:
NI:
q:
M:
m:
Ft:
FalFt:
D:
S:
L:
p(x):
P(XtY):
P(X,Y):
EV(Z):
Total nun'_"._,e_,rof black tiles on the e._:bit,=r
Number ::" tiles in rain-zone i,
Total num!_r of min,-zones
Number r'._ '!;{iture patches in min-z_.'.ne i.
Index fo," '_lm failure patches in any :_in-zone
Final nun":,_!::r of tiles in any failure l'..;al.P.,l_
Index re," t,-_z.,,number of tiles in a fai',ure p._tch
Initiating ";iil_Jre of a tile
Failure c." :7.nyadjacent tile given ip!l:iatin.q failure
NumDer _','"?,:ljacent tiles in initial <_ebris a.rea
NumOer r:i adjacent tiles in initial c!f_.=bon_:ingarea
Loss of _'_:'_icle (LOV)
Pmbaloitil':, _::_fevent X
Probabiti!_:,' ,:,_event X conditional cr_ event Y
Joint pml:, _,.hilib/ot event X and eve :"=tY
Expected: ,.',!_.!ueof ranctom variablE- Z
This analysis folk: :,,:.-'.:closely the structure of vP.n,a.l::.lesdescribed in Figure 9.
Two types of initiating ev=_:_'t_;_.re considered: those caused by debonding, and those
caused by clebris impact., i_= '_hirctcategory, failure n_ the tile itself clue to heat loads,
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may be added later.) It is assumed that the two types of initiating events are
probabilistically independent. Since each rain-zone has its own set of ctmractenstics.
they are treated as separate entities. T_]es in each specifi_ rain-zone have the same
probaDitity of being initially damaged and of causing a larger failure patch,
burnothrough, damage to a cdtical system, and the loss of the vehicle. Because of
these assumptions, the analysis determines first the probability of losing the vehicle
for each type of initiating event and eac_ rain-zone. The overall failure probability is
the sum ot the failure probabilities tor all zones and initiating events. Debris impacts
are cansidered first.
3.4 Inlttetina event: Initial debris tmoact on one tile only ('D=I_
To determine the probability that a sDecific tile in rain-zone i starts a patch
due to debris impact, it is also necessary to consider the size of the initial damage.
We consider first the case where a single tile is initially damaged. Throughout
section 3.4, it should be remembered that the probability of initial tile failure in
rain-zone i, Pi(Ft}, should be read as Pi(FtlD=I). Next sections consider Pi(FttD=2)
and P,(FtlD--3). These additional levels of initial damage (two and three tiles
simultaneously) are comDined later.
Once the first tile in min-zone i is lost clue to debris, there is the potential for
adjacent tiles to also fail. The probability ttmt the final patch size reaches M depends
c_n the secondary loss index of the rain-zone (li) and is given by the Jollowing
geometric distribution (which means that M-1 additional tiles fail ancl no adjacent tite
afterwards:)
Pi(M I Ft) = Pti(FatFt) M-1 x [1-PIi(FalFt)] (I)
Note that M must be at least equal to 1. This equation assumes that the
probability that adjacent tiles debond does not change as the patch grows.
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In each rain-zone, :__ere is thE_possibility of s.=.;w;rai patches starting. The
probat_ility that the numbs' :=:!patches reaches N i in _'°=in.-z,_nei is:
Pi(Ni) =
Ni! (ni-Ni °,
This formulation a._;
there will be no overlappit'
(Ft] is stoat1 compared tc
EV(Ni) x EV(M)which e::
considered negligible con"
patches) are considere,
assumptions, the expected:
n_! ..........Pi(Ft)Ni ): [1-Pi(F't)]ni-Ni (2)
_;=_'n¢,Sthat the initial tile f_,ih._rg,_;are independent, and that
=;;Ir_f patche,; because the. l:rob_=bility of an initiating event
":_:_ numbs:" of tiles in s;.:_:::t';rain-zone (hi). The product
_._.h; the total number o._ tih_s lost in each rain-zone is
;_;r_d to n i, Also, N i (nur_r._er of patches) and M (size of
! independent ran_om v_d_tbles. Based on these
'_=:rnber of patches is ap!:::"c,:<i:m_.tely:
EV(Ni) = n i x Pi(F:I (3)
and the size of each patch i:.._given by the mean of th_., _lislribution of M:
EV(M) = 1 /[1-Pi(F_':i :t)] (4)
Given this result, il ;:_ rtow possible to calcul_:_e the probability that the orbiter
will fail clue to debris that !"_'F=a.ctone rite only. Rem,_ml:._edng that j is the index of the
criticality areas and k i=_ _:_e index o1 the burn,'t=:oLtgh areas, we define the
prot)abilities of orbiter fa_ ;_,_.edue to a patch of si_ M, in rain-zone i, initiated by
debris impact (D=1) as fo!':r,,_._s:
Pi(LI M=I) = Pjki,_
Pi(LI M=2) = Pjki,2
Pi(Li M=m) = Pjki,m (5)
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It must be remembered that any given min-zone could have several patches
in it, and eact_ patch could be of a different size. To calculate the probability of
orbiter loss due to specific number of patches (Ni) in min-zone i, the following
definition is necessary.
causes a failure.
ag
P'i = _, Pjki,rn x P (patch size = m)
rr_l
P'i = _ P_i, m • PIi (FalFt) m'l x [1-Pli(FatFtll
Let P'i be the probability that an arbitrary patch in rain-zone i
(6)
(7)
Therefore, q being the number of patches in a given min-zone, the failure
probability for a specific number of patches in a min-zone is:
Pi(LI Ni=q) = P'i x q (8)
Once again, this assumes that the probabilities are small and that the patches
will not interfere with each other (they are assumed to be separate and
independent). These assumptions are valid providing that each min-zone has a
sufficiently large num0er of tiles and that the size of the patches is relatively small.
_ Based on Equation !8), the probability of orbiter failure given all patches that
occur in rain-zone i becomes:
¢11=1
P(Llmin-zone i)= _ Pi(LINi=q) x Pi(Ni=q)
q=o
= _ P'i x Q x Pi(Ni=q)
q=0
= P'i x EV(Ni)
= P'i x ni x Pi(Ft) (9)
6O
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This result represer'!', :=nly lhe cases of det_"i.,; impact causing the initial
failure of a single tile. A mot _;,complete rewriting of Ec _;_::d:ion9 highlights this fact:
P(Llmin-zone i, D=I) -: _:_'i(D=!) >:nT x PI(FIID:,I} (10)
3.5 Inltlattna event: In!l!i'_L.t;!_e_b_r_isJ.___,_.'._',!_E=_L_
• In order to expand tlii; rr',odel to include the I:_,_,_.sibilitythat the initial debris
impact damages more tha.r' ' r:t:::tile, it is necessary ',3 modify some of the above
equations. It is assumed :'" _': if a large enough pi_::=_:,, o! debris hits the orbiter,
several adjacent tiles may I: _H!mocked loose at ¢nce E"acn o! these missing tites
ma.y in turn cause their adj_ ::_;_fl';:ites"tofail and a s_P:,.ific nrJmber of additional tites
can fail in multiple ways. ]"t_i r_fore, additional summ:_tion,,_ are required in order 'to
account for the increased '=;tuber of exposed rites "i"hi.¢.,compounded problem
requires that Equation (1 } ::,_; rewritten to account it:=."::hi.=;potentially larger pinch
growth rate. if the initial dart :;_!;!_.?,involves two tiles, the.:,prol:,_._ility that the final patch
reaches size M is:
Pi (MIFt, D=2) = (M-:::. _) x Pli (FalFt)M'2 ,,[1 ,, Pii(FalFt)] 2 (11)
If three tiles are __.,,"t-m=:,;....,,,.,,-| initially:
_i_:-1
Pi (MIFt, D=3) = [ _;:_/,,,'"l }': Pti (FalFt) M'3 x [I .-F'li(F'a!Ft)] 3
If four tiles are dama, j _;:l initially:
Pi (MIFt, D.=4) = [,T_.,
kI|
R
X.,, J X Pii (FalFt) M'4 x
i==I
(12)
[! -F,;i(FalR)] 4 (I3)
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This set oi equations can be extended to include greater initial damage;
histoncal evidence, however, supports limiting the analysis to this levei. It must be
remembered that the value M of the final patch size must always be at least equal to
the size of the initial damage area, D. Equation (2) in its most general form is written:
Pi(NiFD---d) = Nil
ni! (Ni-ni)!
and Equation (3) becomes:
Pi(Ft]D---d) Ni x [1-Pi(FtlD=d)]ni'Ni (14)
EV(Ni) = nix Pi(FttD=d) (15)
EQuations (5) and (6) do not change except for tl_e indexing of the summation
since their results depend only on the final patch size and the functional criticality
index. Equation (7) would change as Equations (11) to (13) are integrated to
account for the various debris damage areas. The final probability 1or each initial
damage area and rain-zone is computed using a variant of Equation 10:
P[Llmin-zone i, Dad) = p'i(D=d) x ni x Pi(FtlD=d) (16)
Because all the initial damage probabilities are very small, it is possible to
approximate the probability of debris causing loss of an orbiter for all damage areas
in'a particular rain-zone by:
Maxd
P(Llmin-zone i, debris) = _ P(Llmin-zone i, Dad)
d,=l
(17)
Once this probaJoility is determined, the proioability of orbiter failure for all
rain-zones due to debris impact is simply the sum of the probabilities of failure for all
rain-zones since all min-zones and initiating events are assumed to be inaependerrt:
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Np(LIdebds) = Z P i,[lnin-zone i.debris) (18l
3.6 Initiptinq @vent: .!;;:!.E.I;.;LP..B._n__q._c._J,L=_.Q.__!.i._.f__;Lt..g..E_other than debris
impact
The same proc_',::urs and basic formul;s art; used to determine the
probability of orbiter fail,. ""._ due to cJebonding ¢al_,:_;ecl t_V factors other than debris
impact. Again, the probr.._:,:_lily of o_iter failure due ;'L__aik_re of the TPS is computed
from 1he probability of t!l;;__ spontaneously debondin,;_ in groups of various sizes in
each rain-zone. The pro:' ,;=.m is slightly easier sinc_: il is _ssumed that the likelihood
of such debonding is uni;:':r'm acrc._s all tiles. The : rnba::_ility of secondary tile failure
Pi(FalFt) is the same a;; ';or the ,'Jebris prot_lem. "_ha pmbaDility of orbiter failure
based on all patches in r',i:;.zone i that started fror" _; d_.rnage area of initiat size s is
given by:
P(LImin-zone i, S,,:i} = p'i(S=s) x ni x Pi(Ft _,S,,=s) (19)
The other equatio ;-:; f,._llow accordingly. Th4:.. ir.ltal probability of shuttle failure
,,hn t_y factor:; other than debris impact is:for damage initiated by c_;.. nding caused
N
P{Lld_bondi _) ;' P(Llmin-zone i, debon"l.ing)
:lit '|
(20)
Finally, assumin!; i_':,:tepenclence of initi_tiI:g events (debris and debonding
due to other causes), t"_=:_overall probabilih,' of ._huttle failure per flight due to tile
damage is:
P(Lltile problem) ,,: :P,'Lldebonding) + P(L]d_bds) (21 }
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3.7 Additional tnformetion and dllltf_
A PRA model like the one described a_ove needs to be constantly u_odated to
reflect information that may have existed before but had not been uncovered at the
time of this initial study, and information from new experience including recent
insr)ections, tests, evaluations, studies, and in-flight performance data. In this
im_tementation phase, more refined data may thus • be used and adclitionat
information available at NASA can be introctuced in the analysis. One important part
of the problem at that stage will be to capture the evolution of the failure probability of
the orbiter. Clearly, the system is not in a steady state. On one hand, the quality of
the maintenance work appears to improve (Figure 17). Initial defects of the
installation work that resutteO in a decrease of the tile capacity are progressively
being discoverecl an0 corrected during successive maintenance operations. Existing
prot_lems, such as the impact of chunks ol insulation from the El" and the SRBs or the
e[evon-cove design pro_olem, are resolved as they are discovered. On the other
hanoi, the possibility of long-term deterioration of the TPS clearly increases the
probability of tile failure (even if slowly) and the rate of deterioration is a major
unknown. Of specific concern are: the possibility of degradation of the bond over
time, of slow chemical reaction due to water proofing agent, and of weakening of the
SIP/tile system under exposure to repeated load cycles. Additional (iota regarding
the initial test results used in the certif_calion procedure from JSC and from the
manufacturers of the tiles, the SIPs, and the bond are needed to update the model.
Therefore, this upaiating should be based not only on statistical data on tile
performance during eact_ flight, but atso on basic inlormation a_out the componems
of the TPS.
A complete analysis of the distribution of tile capacities will require additional
data from maintenance ol_erations including:
The numbers (_f tiles replaced so far on each orbiter;
= A statistical distribution of the percentage of the surface of the tile/SIP
system that was found to be actually bonded to 1he orbiter's skin;
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° Estimates of the 1orobabitity of faJture of a tile of given capacity (e.g., 10%
bonded) under different kincls of load (e.g., debris hit >1").
A more refined
such as:
partition of the orbiter's surface can be o0tained using data
Effect of excessive step and gap on the hem load in different Jocations;
° Possibility of partial failure of the guidance system or control surfaces at
re-entry' and corresponding increase in the heat load;
° Trajectories of debris from the ET and the SRBs. Computer simulations
clone at JSC (see Figures 18 and 19) could give better information about
the vulnerability of the orbiter's TPS, in particular in the most risk-critical
areas;
° Measuremems of temperatures and aerodynamic forces on the surface of
the orbiter (see Figures 20 and 21 );
= Effect of tile loss on the orbiter's surface temperature in the cavity (Figure
22).
The analysis itself can be refined in several ways. A major unknown is the
performance of the subsystems under the orbiter's skin once they are exDosecl to
excessive heat loads due to TPS failure. The only aJtemative, sllort of a systematic
PRA of these individual systems, is to use subjective estimates. Finally, it seems that
the availability of a kit for in-omit repair of the tiles might provide a significant
reliability gain. An assessment of its effectiveness will be included in Phase 2 of this
study.
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Section 4:
ILLUSTRATION OF THE MODEL
The illustration of the model presented here is based on coarse numbers
whose relative values are more significant than their absolute values. By overlaying
the functional criticality, burn-through, debris damage, and secondary tile loss areas,
33 rain-zones were established. Of these, 21 are unique zones (i.e., that have
different sets of indices). Several zones with the same combinations ot indices
aDpear on different locations on the orbiter. Figure 23 shows the final layout of the
rain-zones and the numerical results of the model. Each zone is assigned an
identification number. The lower numbers are generally assigned to more cdtical
areas. Each zone is also identifieO by an index number whose digits relate to the
four area types shown in Table 7:
1st digit:
2 nd digit:
3 rd digit:
4th digit:
Bum-through areas (1 high, 2 medium, 3 tow, probabilities)
Functional criticality areas (1 hig h, 2 medium, 3 low, criticality)
Debris damage areas (1 high, 2 medium, 3 low, probabilities)
SeconOary tile loss areas (1 high, 2 low, probability)
Table 7: Structure of the indices of the min-zones shown in Figure 22 and Table 8.
Table 8 lists the rain-zones, and shows the number of tiles in each zone and
the probability of failure of the orbiter attributable to this zone. This value was
determined by calculating this probability for both initiating events and then summing
to obtain the results. The boundaries of the rain-zones have been simplified: the
number of tiles in each area is only an approximation and is not based on an actual
count. The location description is only intended to provide a rough placement of the
_i " ..
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Right Wing
12:2311
3:112I
ltj: 2321
1:1111
5:1221
9:2112
25:3122
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21 : 2331
6:1311
14:2312
13:2311
3222
Risk Criticality]
I O0
50
33
30
2_
1(;
1S
6
3
2
1
o
4: 1131
U 19:2321
2:1111
30:3312
23:3112
11 : 2131
27 : 3132
22 :'2332
:.-.:.:.'.:
21 : 2331
"':':':':iiii
26 : 3132
24:3122
11:2131
! 6 : 2321
32:3332
7:1311
0:2121
29 : 3312
33: 3332 I ? : 2321 I O : 232 I!:i"
Figure 23: Partition of the orbiter's surface into 33 min-zones (index: i)
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ID # Index
P_'LOV_' 1o_
Locntien ,:t..T_-_.._ Debris Debond Tatal
1 1111
2 1111
3 1121
4 1131
5 1211
6 1311
7 1311
8 1331
9 2112
t0 2121
ll 2131
12 2311
13 2311
14 2312
15 2321
1 6 2321
1 7 2321
1 8 2321
1 9 2321
20 2331
21 2331
22 2332
23 3112
24 3122
25 3122
26 3132
27 3132
28 3222
29 3312
30 331 2
31 3322
32 3332
33 3332
J
Right si(:t{_ ',m0er crew t56 0.87 0.36 1.23
Right sicl,_ i {8,'..}J"main Idg gear (aft) 156 0.87 0.36 1.23
Right sid,:! ! l_i;,'.._.rm_..in Idg gear (Iwd) 676 0.13 I .62 1.75
Left side _l_,:{r' main Idg gea.r 780 0.00 1.87 1.87
Centerlir:_ .J"_der crew 364 0,51 0.22 0.73
Left side, i,_er crew :]12 0.11 0.04 0.15
Center el ::_!h_ elevon tC4 0.04 0.01 0.05
Center oi I_,_'__.lewn t04 0.00 0.00 0.00
Right siaf_ _nrd mlct edge 624 1.73 0.75 2.48
Center o[ _:,::Jy flap 208 0.02 0.24 0.26
Left wing. i _,{nter 488 0.00 0.56 0.56
Right sid_ mir_ edge 1 _64 0.30 0.13 0.43
Left side, "
. r, edge 1196 0.21 0.08 0.29
Left siae. "=_d mid edge 572 0.10 0.04 0.14
Right sidr; rl;:.se ,._ z 0.01 0.02 0.03
Left wing. ,:enter 832 0.01 0.06 0.07
Right sidf_ _ "* 'J,.,_y flap 10,4 0.00 0.01 0,01
Left side, i".".:h:_} t tla, p 104 0.00 0.01 0.01
Right wir'_ ii 2132 0.18 0.16 0.34
Left side, _:;::i',_, 31 2 0.00 0.02 0.02
Left wing, '; ,_d 1768 0.00 0.13 0.13
Right ele, =::r, outboard 31 2 0.00 0.02 0.02
Right win!!, r:enter 364 0.01 0.01 0.02
Left wincj, ::=;_:rlter 46B 0.00 0.01 0.01
Center, [_ !{_,,'t,::,adbay fwd 1664 0.00 0.02 0.02
Center, I:; ;!;l"ic';ad bay aft 1976 0.00 0.02 0.02
Right wir':.:; _:;enter 4.68 0.00 0.01 0.01
.,,,_.0 0.00 0.00 0.00Center, I_:'.:11_[:]_._1bay, mid =r_
Right ele, ,: r_, in boe.rd _t 2 0.00 0.00 0.00
Right wit:; '.:_nter _ 16 0.00 0.00 0,00
Left elew:;= in I center body flap 728 0.00 0.00 0.00
Left elev:: ,", a_.rtboara 57": 0.00 0.00 "0.00
Center, a":t 1040 0.00 0.00 0.00
_:&t_ 5.09 6.79 1 t .88
Table 8. Identification ol 'h._; rain-zones ana their cr",.r_tdt:L_tion to the probability of LOV
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min-zone. No attempt has been made to use orbiter notations. The final numerical
resutts of the model are presented in the right-hand column as multiples of 10 -4. The
probaDitity values are mostly in the order of 10 -4. Again, it is important to remember
tl'_at the importance of the numbers is not their magnitude, but their relative vatuss
when comparecl to each other. According to our coarse numerical analysis, the total
probability of losing tl_e orbiter on any given mission, clue to TPS failure, is in t_e
order of 10"3. It is interesting tO note that approximately 40% of this proloability is
attributable to debris-related problems and that 60% comes from problems of
debonding caused by other factors. By scanning the columns, it appears that a few
rain-zones contain most of the risk.
Using a risk-per-tile measure, the rain-zones can be ordered according to
their criticality with respect to the two types of initiating events, and to the total
probability of failure. The results are shown in Tables 9 and 10. Table 9 displays the
contribution of each rain-zone and of each tile to the probability of LOV separated
into debris and debonding due tO other factors. Table 10 shows the contribution of
each tile and each rain-zone to the overall probability of LOV. In this table, we show
for each tile, a risk-criticality factorthat is proportional to the relative contribution of
this tile to the overall failure probability, accounting not only for the loads applied to
this tile but also for the consequences should it fail. This risk-criticality factor is the
point of reference that will be used in the second phase of the study to set priorities
among different management measures designed to improve tile reliability.
A slightly different graphic representation of this table is displayed in Figures
24, 25, and 26. It is possible from our results to identify the most sensitive rain-zones
by ranking them Dy order of individual tile cnticaiity. One can then plot the marginal
"i '
increase of the failure probability for each added rain-zone, the slope of each
segment representing the ((_ecreasing) comribution of each tileto the failure
probability. Each black clot represents the a0diUon of the next most critical rain-zone.
The greater the horizontal spacing between the dots, the larger the number of tiles in
r
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[,' t::_L.)I:S ............
ID# P(L.:I_ ...., ];,,.one F'(LOV)/tiie
0.'::: :.4 0.00E-8
1 0. !i',:70
2 0. ",:::)
9 1 :: !]0
5 0. :!i_0
6 0 !0
7 0 :, I,C,
3 0 :ll3
12 0.:!,ll:l
13 0 ;:!: i 0
t 4 0, _ii:}
1 0 0. _:;:t,:]
1 9 0. ',:_5
23 0.E _ (3
1 7 O. {_:')2
:t218 OL''"i ' i. (.,
1 5 O. t, :}3
1 6 O. [",_8
4 0. : ;i:)
8 O. : :_0
11 0. : i i_0
20 0. : ::bO
.:: _21 0 : 0
22 O. [ :}[),
24 O. : ::!0
25 0. :' '",0
26 0. :: :}f)
27 O.' :;_{)
28 0." :_0
29 0.' ::;0
30 0. :: :_0
31 0. :' :_(')
32 O. :: :;0
33 0." ::_0
55.77O
55.770
27.720
14.010
3.365
3.365
1 923
1 785
1 781
1 748
0 961
0 867
0 274
0.!92
0.192
0.108
0.096
0.000
0.000
O.O00
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
O.O00
YIl11!!4,,T_rrigll 8nCl Pk_K;lll_K
........... ing
ID# F'{LC)V),'zone P(LOV)/tile
c).C),:)E-4 0.00E-8
4. "i..870 24,000
3 "_.620 24.000
1 0.360 23.100
2 (1.380 23.100
9 (1.'750 1 2.000
11 (:.1"_,J O 12.000
i 0 C).2,40 11.500
5 C).;!I8 5.990
6 0.04.-5 1.440
7 0.015 1.440
15 0.023 0'829
1 2. 0.130 0.781
[ 1 8 9.065 0.781
21 ,3.1 33 0.752
1 4 0.0 ,$3 0.752
20 0.(17_3 0.737
22 C .C]23 0.737
1 9 3.1 56 0.673
1 7 0.CI07 0.673
1 8 0,(107 0.669
1 3 0.D80 0.137
23 0.005 0.128
24 0.C106 0.128
27 0.006 0.121
2B 0.024 0.114
2 5 0.D'I 9 0.038
28 0.002 0.000
8 O,DO0 0.000
2 9 Ll.OO0 0.000
3 0 O.DO0 0.000
31 O.DO0 0.000
32 C.DO0 0.000
3 3 O.CmO0 0.000
Table 9: ProbE:_ili'ties of Loss of Vehicle d_,_e1:olile failure initiated
(1) by debris damag,i, _r.,d (2) debonding causerl by fBot0rS other than debris,
for ear. '_rain-zone, and each tile =' :_;:achrain-zone
/
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_D #
1
2
9
3
4
5
10
11
6
7
12
14
13
19
15
18
17
18
21
20
22
23
24
27
26
25
28
8
29
30
31
32
33
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• ..•.. -
P(LoV)/zone
Q.OOE-4
1.2300
1.2300
2.4800
1.7500
1.8700
0.7280
0.2600
0.5600
0.1500
0,0500
0.4270
0.1430
0.2930
0.3410
0.0260
0.0730
0.0090
0.0090
0.1330
0.0230
0.0230
0.0150
0.O06O
0.0060
0.0240
0.0190
0.0020
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
i ,
P(LOV)/tile
0.00E-8
78.800
78.800
39.700
25.900
24.000
20.000
12.500
12.000
4.810
4.810
2.570
2.500
2.450
1.6OO
0.938
0.877
0.865
0.865
0.752
0,737
0.737
0.412
0.128
0.128
0.121
0.114
0.038
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
Risk
Criticality
0-1oo so_ate ....
100
100
50
33
3O
25
16
15
6
6
3
3
3
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
<1
<1
<1
<1
<1
<1
<1
<1
<1
<1
<1
Number of Location
Tiles
156 rt unOar crew
1 56 rt main gear aft
B2 4 rl lwd mio edge
676 rt main gear
7 B 0 It main gear
364 center crew
20 B buoy fla;: cen
468 It/rt wng cen out
312 It crew
104
1664
572
1196
2132
277
832
104
104
1768
312
312
364
468
468
1976
1664
rt etevon ten
rt sloe mid eOge
_ mid edge
It middle
rt wing
d nose
It wing outboard
body flail rt
body lla._ It
It wing forward
It nose
rt elevon out
rt wing center in
tt wing ¢enler in
rt wing ten out
center bay" aft
center ul:)loerIoay
520
104
312
416
728
572
1040
center mid bay"
It elevon center
rt elevon in
rt wing cen
I! elevlbody flap
It elevon out
center aft
Table 10: Risk-criticality factor for each tile in eacll min-zone
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the zone. Severat sma _!in-zones contain a lar;;_,pan: of the risk(those with the
steepesI slope), wherea.,; :_-.',;veralvery large min-zn '_.,; carry only a small part of the
risk (those with zero .¢.;1_::::,-_). Figure 23 show,_ i:he contribution of increasing
percentages cf the tiles t,:, ;:t-m_risk for debns-initiat_!,l damage. Note that, for failures
initiated by dei:)ris, 80% ::;;' the risk is due to only 6'% ,;_ the tiles. For clebonding
problems that are not cau_i;'.'.dby clebris, the contrib, ,_ion ,:f increasing percentages of
tiles are shown in Figur_ :;!'-_: 80% of the risk is du_ _c_13% of the tiles. Finally, the
overall result is shown in ::'Eure 25: for the total ri_:, inchJding both initiating events,
80% of the risk can be atl ,,b-,4ted to 14% of the tile(.; It is important to remember that
the same tiles do not nec _!_L-';adly appear in the sat '_e or(_er in each graph. Clearly,
some zones pose a much : igher nsk _'or one type of ]nitiating event than for the other.
For example, rain-zone Iocatecl near the left n-,ain gear has not historically
experienced significant :li=,!)ds clamage anci is n,)t on "Ihe oDvious trajectory of
trac_able debris; so, the f: ,:t::;'.'_bitity of LOV due to TT:,E; de Otis clamage in that zone is
basically zero. There or} hc,wever, some critical ,':omp._nents that are temperature
sensitive uncier the skin _, ':hat area; so, the risk _:,fLCV due to debonding is non
negligible (1.07 x 10"4).
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Figure 25: Relative risk of LOV due to debonding-type TPS damage
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Section 5:
EFFECTS OF ORGANIZATIONAL FACTORS ON TPS RELIABILITY:
MAIN PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS
5.1 Errors end risk
Well-bonded tiles are very unlikely to debond even under moderate debris
loads. Given the temperature gradients measured inside the tiles during flights, it
has been determined that the tiles absorb most of the hem within a fraction of their
thickness and that they are very unlikely to burn, even considering a wide range of
re-entry scenarios. If the tiles are to fail, it is likely to be because they have been
weakened and/or hit by debris. The problem is that one does not know which ones
are weaK. Human errors (past and present) are at the source of m least three of the
fundamental causes of tile failure: (1) decrease of tile capacity because of
undetected partial or weakened bonding, (2} increase in '[he heat loads due to
roughness of the orbiter's surface (caused, for example, by protruding gap fillers),
and (:3) poorly-installed and maintained insulation on the SRB's and ET that flakes
off dudng ascent, damaging the TPS. These hum_.n errors are often the consequen-
ces of the way the organizations (NASA anti its contractors) operate.
In the second phase of this work, we will exptore to what extent
organizational procedures (for instance, those that induce time pressure and
turnover of the personnel) are at the root of these incidents. Rules that apply
uniformly across tiles of widely variable risk-criticality, and rules that do not account
for the possibility of system weakening over time may become major contributors to
the overall risk. Furthermore, the scope of the research cannot be strictly limited to
the TPS. Procedures and management decisions regarding the maintenance of the
insulation of the L=T ancl the SRBs also affect the reliability of the tiles since they are a
8O
Pat_.Cornelland Fischbeck
source of debris. Finally,
reoeated load cycles, ex::
chemical reversion, may D(_
it, tl_e long term, weaKenin;i of the tile system due to
f:._=.,..:_re to environmental :'r_ndil:ions on tt_e ground, or
:::='_n'l_a dominant factor c,1the failure risk. The problem
at deterioration over time r' ;i_._,not be (=and is not lik6_'y _4.3t_e) of immediate concern
for well-I_onded tiles, but m;! ,._'t_come a cnticai factcr :.nr thc,se tiles whose capacilies
have been reduced by d6.1,:_':_;iiveinstallation and rr,_in_enance. Therefore, in the
second phase, we will exarr,[ "_,_.:_closely the procedure.; of _he organization, using our
PRA model to see flow th_ .";_:.[_;;'tivecon'tdbutions of e;;-ch ,_f these factors affect flight
safety.
In addition, the st/'Li,::"'...r:-eof the organization _i:nd its=;peripherals (NASA, plus
Lockheed, Rockwell etc.) _:.'.._:ithe rules that determ:ne tl_e relations among these
organizations (for example, in setting contracts, pay _;c:at_s. and incentives, as well
as schedule and budget cc _'=_;;r_.tints,)may also affe(: _lighl safety to the extent that
they determine the occun'e_ :'._..and severity of huma.n e:_'¢_'.'.-;and their probabilities of
detection. Some organizati, ;,_fl improvements (which r_ay have been recommended
before and ignored for v=..'ir_;-_sreasons) may ha;::.,...=_nly a minor effect on the
reliability of the orbiter;, oth;_";; may be essential so_, _. Our analytical model will be
used to determine which o'[ :'.';_;se factors actually affe._I -t_._eprobability of failure of the
tiles (and consequently, o',! !!-_._orbiter) and by how r..,ur.-.t_. Finally, the cu#um of the
organization may also pin, ...'.;role. As we describe !'-e_a,_', the low status of the tile
work may induce low m_: _._.i_,._among some tile tnc,;nicians. Furthermore, the
behaviors of other workers ',,:v,rards the tile techniciar_,'.., m..a,! be a significant source of
additional work load and tit1,:;;pressure.
Errors (most of whi :=1'=:;an be traced back to these organizational factors) can
be classified using a taxc, _'.-.,mywhich _as been d{;.si.q.n._rJ to guide the choice of
management improvemehl:._ (F'at6-Cornell. 1990.) F'!rror:_ are categorized into two
groups: gross errors (unc.x._;'t:'3versial mistakes, for _;xample, an unloonded tile) and
errors of judgment unde' .'mcerrainty (for insta.r_..'.".e,the decision to live with a
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problem that seems minor --bUt may not be so-- until the next flight in orcler to
decrease the work load.} Gross errors generally call for improvements of the hiring
anO training procedures, insloection and quality control, an.d information flow; errors
of judgment generally require modification of incentives and rewards, improvement
in the treatment and communication of uncertainties, and adaptation of theresource
co net rai nts.
5.2 Preliminary observation1_
In this preliminary phase, we identified the following factors as possibly
affecting the efficiency of tile risk management: (1) time pressures, (2) liability
concerns and conflicts among contractors, (3) turnover among tile technicians and
low status of tile work, (4) need for more random testing, and (5) contribution of the
management of the ET and the SRBs to TPS reliability problems. The study of these
factors wilt be the object of the Phase 2 of this work. The foundation of this analysis
will be the risk-criticality of each tile so that limited resources --for example, the
limited number of tile insoectors-- can be directed first where the probability and the
consequences of tile failure could be most severe.
U
5.2.1 13me Dressure$
Tile maintenance is often on the critical path to the next flight, specially attar
missions where tile damage has been extensive. People who find themselves under
tirDe pressures some'times cut comers. For example, it was found in January 1989,
that a tile technician had added water to the R'IV mix in order to make it cure faster.
Adding water at that stage (or sp_tting in the RTV) may decrease the long-term
reliability of the bond: the catalytic reaction, which occurs dudng the curing, may
reverse earlier anti thus increases the probability of debonding under different types
of loacts. _me pressure is also probably the cause of more frequent errors, such as
the misalignment of the tile/SIP system with the filler bar, so that only a fraction of the
surface of the SIP is in contact with the orbiter's surface. Time pressures may be
unavoidable, Out some organizational improvements may attenuate their effects,
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first, I_y reducing them wi_,;_.,n_ver possibie and se::,-...rT_J,by increasing tile quality
control in the most risk-oh': ,:_;i ._ones.
The time pressure :, ;der which the tile persrl _=nr..Bi:operates can be reduced in
several ways, First, autcr_ ;_!i_:_nof step and gap rr_:.P..=.;ur'e_ment(using laser devices
and automatic data recor':'_irl;;tsystems currently un .c'ez"de',.,elopment) may result not
only in a significant rsduc._' _"t of the processing tim _;, _ut also in a Oecrease of _.he
roughness of the orbiter'_ :'_.,'face. Second, sirnptif ,,i_g the paper work for the tile
technicians would allow tl',_;_'r',_o spend more time __,:)r_ing on the tiles and less time
shuffling papers (an a.;:};:_,,'!_-Isource of frustratio_ IL Third, it seems desirable to
avoid over monitoring. F::_' E,:_._,mpte, imposing clail,/ t;._rgets (as opposed to weekly
ones) for the number of lii=_.,_,to be processed may :l'--..'.-re-asethe variability and the
flexibility needed for opli_'l;_! performance and .,;','morn reliability. Fourth, time
pressure may be allevi;;l_,;:i by reducing the ar:':_;,_;s time to data bases and
information that is neces,¢;;, '_, for prompt maintenanr, _ _.-lecisions. The maintenance at
KSC is clone by Lockhee:?. ,,_,hilesome of the mle_.';_r_'Ld;=.:t=_bases are controlled by
Rockwell. NASA may w,;rt ".,o improve the transfe: td information from one to the
other and/or within these I L,:, organizations.
5.2.2 Liability cor'.!:i.i:,;;;:i:_..=3__l..__.n_.m...Q.n._._!..n_tt._-;LGI.Q_
Relatively harmor :'_,_.srelations have been i _titL:ted among the _eople who
work on the tiles. They st. ;;r_ a common concern f_ fl_:e s;afety of the system despite
obvious sources of confli:=l ;. Roclw_elt and Lockhe_r.1 ar_ in a competitive situation
which does not always p_,:,,,,'icteincentives to make ;1"_',c,ther's work easier. Among
other factors, the liabiliti_,_ _:_fthe main contraclom _ s_ch that they occasionally
have incentives to withhr.,'_:'"i:._::hnical information (f_:"r leg_i and contractual masons)
tttat may De useful (if not _;;_;.entia_)for tt_e perlorma_-,ce or the other. These decisions
may be justified given tl" ;::_,',_aysthe contracts ha,;_:_t:,e_=n set. There are ways of
writing and handling r,':,_'_tracts that improve ircentives for cooperation and
encourage the shadng cl '.'-.q,_vantechnical inforn'_;_ti_n. This implies that contracts
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tMat affect the same subsystems (e.g., the tiles) and are signed with ctifferent firms
cannot be managed independently. The positive side of this competition among
comractors is that there are no incentives for complacency and strong motivations to
detect and correct errors made by the other. There are, hoWever, strong incentives Io
hide those macle by one's own company.
5.2.3 Turnover amono tile lechnicians and low s_alus of tile wofl:
The turnover among the tile maintenance personnel is high. Because tile
technicians are ctassiflecl in the low-pay category of material {fiberglass) technicians
(a practice that NASA apparently inherttecl from the DoD), many of them leave their
tile maintenance jobs shortly after completing the training program and obtaining
certification. Organization experts generally 0elieve that high turnover is
incompatible with learning (individual and organizational) and optimal performance.
Therefore, this turnover might affect TPS safety due to inferior quality wor_ by tess
experienced people. Protruding gap fillers, for example, are caused by poor c_uality
installation and are a probable cause of early boundary layer transition (Smith,
1989.) This condition may not, in _tself, threaten flight safety unless it is coupled with
other factors. It does decrease the overall TPS reliability and may be an adverse
result of high turnover and the corresponding lack of experience of the work force.
On the other hand, according to some of the technicians, the old-timers may not be
as respectful of "the book" as the newcomers. Assessment of the net result of
inexperience and compiacency requires a study of the coupling between _ime on the
job-and occur-rences cf errors.
The low-paying job factor may have other indirect, negative effects on the
reliability of the tiles. Because of the low consideration that other categories of
technicians seem to have for tile work when doing other types of technical work on
the orbiter (e.g., mechanical, or electrical) other workers do not pay sufficient
attention to the integrity of the tiles. They damage tiles frequently (if not seriously)
thus adding considerably to the tile maintenance work. Therefore, the low status of
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the tile workers, grounclea in ' "_r_,p_,_yscale, may have s_.v_,_raicfetnmental effects: (1)
a waste of money in training t:=_,_technicians that leave tl'e job as quickly as possiDle,
(2) low morale for some of thr.._:', which is seidom conc_u.ive t:_ high-quality work, and
(3) the "no respect" syndror." _ on th,e _a_ of ether ts'c:tl_icians who carelessly
damage tiles. The result is ar_ _,::rease of time pressur.'- f.,._r_ system that is already
"the long pole" a large part f:f ti_e time. In the end, tl' _s,z f;_ctors may encourage
detrimentat corner-cutting in ti!,_ !',_rocessing.
5.2.4 Need for more r_!i':,:_;,,',..n%._;_L_
The original tile worl,: ;_t:_dsubsequent maintee_.r_ce work has not always
been perfect. Some of the 'i'_;_ have been onty pa_-'i_=lty _'._onaea and, in a few
instances, not gluea at all. F:.= r_::,;ample, in November ! 9_!._, it was _ound in that one
tile on orbiter Columbia hacl I::ee,n holding for several ._li:4;Ihtshy the friction of (or
perhaps some RTV adherent =:'.)._he gap fillers. The fa¢'_'th_ tl_is tile held and did not
cause an accident was calI_._: "a miracle" by the pe-T,_:_r'el who discovered the
problem. How "miraculous" c_!_"be determined using the! risk ..-..¢ssessment model. (in
fact, according to our estimat.!: t_-';.,sprobability of debon:'!ir,.c.4i,_ "10.2 per flight for such
a tile, making the probability _:_,.*k:t:<)ndingin five flights "'__he _rder of 5%.) Because
of these hidden weakne_:_s, it may be clesira31e to do more random,
non-destructive pull tests o_ ":!:_:;_;black tiles between f;ic!hts, focusing on the most
risk-critical areas of the orbit=!=r_; surface in order to clet :_'.1and replace the tiles that
are 1dr below the expected _=_; _:ity.
In addition to the pose t:i_ity the1 previous work m-_,; ":.':+th__ve been perfect, the
possibility of long-term aeteri=: __:iion of the room-tempe:']t_'re vulcanized (RTV) bond
shoutd be acknowledged ant:_ ""]-,'.en into _ccount in m_int_nance proceclures. This
catts (1) for additional rando;'"= _.:..,stingto monitor the p,.,.c._sibiechemical degradation
of the RT'V after repeated i' _:,-;.'t.-toadcycles, and (;;.'_ h_r the development and
implementation c_. non-destnr.":iv. =- and, if possible, non.-,_ult testing of the tiles' bond,
to be applied in pdority to the ....t:>.'..;tnsk-critic_ tiles.
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5.2.5 Contribution of the msnaaement of the ET anti the SRBs 10 TP_
A significant fraction of the risk of TPS failure is clue to clebris, in particular.
pieces of insulation from the external tank and the nose cone of the solid rocket
boosters. In acldition, tiles are much more tikely to debon0 under the shock of
chunks of debris when they are already loose or less than completely bonded. By
backtracking the computer-simulated trajectories of pieces of debds from the most
risk-critical parts of the orbiter surface back to the corresponding parts of the surface
of the ET and the SRBs. it may be possible to identify which parts of the surface of the
ET and the SRBs should be given special attention in the treatment of the insulation.
Additional testing should, therefore, be performed for tiles located in zones that are
most likely to be nit by SRB and ET insulation debris.
For eactt of these organizational factors, the analytical procedure is to identify
the decisions that they affect, the errors that they can cause, the frequency with which
they occur, the nature and the severity of the resulting errors as a function of the
seventy of the conditions, and their effect on the probability of failure of the system
using our PRA model. The efficiency of possible management improvements can
then be roughly assessed so that efforts are concentrated where they can provide
the greatest benefits. This assessment will be the objective of the second phase of
this study.
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Section 6:
CONCLUSIONS
V
The results of our ,",(':_l..'lel'sillustration sugge_;! that tl_e probability of loss of
orbiter clue to failure of t<',._K:,lsc_.tiles is in the ord_,r of "10-3 with about 15% of the
tiles accounting for aboul _!!':!%of the risk. If one a,:_:_)pt._;the rough NASA estimates
that the probability of Iosi='_;;an o_itet" is in the drop.' _)J10 -2 per flight (BroacL 1989)
and that a significant par_ ':_ i'mis attributable to the __in engines, then the proportion
of the risk attributable to :_";_TPS (at_out 10%) is no; _lar::_ning, but certainly cannot to
be aismissecl. (Our pro :: ;_hitities are coarse nur._'_rs _hat can be refinea in the
seconc_ phase of the wor., I:)._Jtthey are probaDty it: I(-_F._I:_ti park.) A c_ical issue is:
how will these probabiliti,_'ll _::votve in the years to _;;.-.tT)e? On one hand, the quality
o_ the tile work ana the :_-:,':(_.)(,-'tionmechanisms fo_ '.'..lef(._ctivetiles are expected to
improve. On the other )=;_"_d,exposure to repeat_ :1t(:)actcycles and environmental
conditions or chemical r,!,ri:ction may deteriorate ti',:_ .=_y,,;tem'speformance capacity
unless closely managed.
One of our key '=i.'_::tingsis t_at the most _isl_.-c,_ticat tiles are not all in the
hottest areas of the o_ii:i_"s surface. We introd: cad, in this study, the notion of
risk-criticality and the ca,,_: '_::i:,ation of a risk-c_'caii_j" i:n,_J:to account for the toads to
which the tiles are sub, ;_,-):r..)dand the consequer)cr_s of their failures given their
location with respect tc .,:lher critical subsystem_ wlnt¢'h tl_ey protect (functional
criticality). This inclex ":;_)")serve as a guide tn set management priorities, for
example, for the gradual! r_.placement of the tile_;, "!dousing first where tile failure
could be most c_amaginc;
Well-designed, ,'-_';;!,_'i_.;faCtL[red,bonded, a_ rn_.intained tiles are extremely
unlikely to fail. A large _,'_'_r','tionof the risk seems _¢,b_, _ttributable to tiles that are
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only partially bonded, or '_o those that are not bonded at atl ancl are heid in place by
the gap fillers. Management assumes unnecessary risk by denying that errors have
occurred and wilt occur again and that, consequently, the capacity of the TPS is
reduceal. To assume that atl work is perfect leads to a potentially gross
underestimation of the risk, rendering the maintenance procedures based on 'this
assumption of perfection suboptimal. What the actual magnitude of this part of the
risk is and which organizational improvements can bring the greatest risk-reduction
benefits wilt be studied further in the second phase of this study. This part will
involve a systematic analysis of the maintenance process to identify the different
types of errors (past ancl present), their rates of occurrences, their probabilities of
detection and correction, and 1heir severity levels (i.e., by how much they decrease
the system's c¢oacity in each case). Relating these errors to the organizational
factors described in the previous section will allow us to identify management
costs, anti their expected positive effects on the TPSimprovements, their
performance.
: • H
Attar the completion of 1he first of two phases of research, our preliminary
conclusions are that it is desirable: (1) to expand the current concept of c_icality for
the tiles (to include functional criticality, as well as the heat loads in a nst<-criticatity
measure), (2) to adapt the inspection and maintenance procedures to focus in
priority on the most risk-critical tiles, and (3) to modify the existing data Dases to
include the risk-criticality factor for each tile.
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reil_l_ linOeti'41'l_il'ie _,;-i;+,,ii"IIIL 'Ti'il _r l,',+ri+:'lil,'lIUii.illil
aim _ iri lielime ol tit lyilm'i uriOM _r t_':; :_i:-_P.[:ol coill.
imll, IriO IXXlOmlnco.
T_ m_iilt¢iliOlll, llllmlr, reWltl;+, '+ ._r+_#t+ne cllil
if risk marlalimlrll llllltit$. Whln I lyllIwiI tl +!,t_till IKudisd
i il_lbllnOtt, t iS oitlfl pomlll@ lllliWhIi RlIul', :_I !i' tl;ii
,aJlulll llI IclJil_ IOOl1_ ifl i Ipmi.,,'Sl Oi, IuIx:rr: q! t_lllllll Ol thl0
oR_lmitatioh. This sllIi lhll till. lOi tzlml_, ol tli 7_i +r.l _l 111o
'_l)l:l it.I, Rle Ci I w_l I riJmDertit l Pl! lil_+i'litl II
i NASA.'i I i I lil_+ir _/silI
ez_, Ci,_el,lllclIIimllln<mui innllnlll I: '_i:¢ ;ilmmu_i-
ellioni), tml _,.-,il-inl Ir_ Inllllnl ol Ixi_(: ._I'=..rii_inl.IdodF
_ lllrlmvlmlnl Ill Irlo aIVlnlllm i'.l _'. i::i,W li_lllil
im:limo, tor exm. _ <i0ntmalilom +_+_'_'_,_I,_llllllc_(,
"l'ho lii III Ot1111llli ilO I I llll t_:I ++,,itIllltilli
IPliyltl OI thl Iltlidl Ot orglnmllilxll kill +;It<,!:cm_¢m
!Imil_. Thl _ ;lilo mmm_m pmlimfl _ ,_le,'+l:lt'rlm:i
.+1hi I:11¢ li, llrll m _MM _ lllln I II (!_,,,_,,+'+31;iPlill_l in
ClilS¢.++ll 1+11.4I # lini_ir.! tllii :i,_iillly ill Ill irii :l'_tSs
_tsolt. * TPll m_r.+lf:r:4il_+,lves exDtiCil tl$1111mlfli ot ill41llfftct of
lll_fllil f'_), _t¢_11"tll_:,nil'li lilly <ifte_'IfliCll _ililiirlli Ilii.
lPii_liOrl], i_':, : r;¢lilrlliDPl 0f _ ill i ii'llOri"ri_iOl'i (it l_.l'i'i'e_
t_ll PRA. B_ :let:,]_ll+lll I!i_iClllyth41 rltliSO_ _nl Of Ol
slltin 9 l_orilil ,_'_;';',,+.,=ll:i'.:_i'_ rrimm ma _ _ ilci'mii
IliXldiPJI1ilin!l _+mli+
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tlOiml,,_m ._,'=+n__ (It _'4_ _ormcltlni NASAillletmmrll
tOO01_lll ",1 _l+,ilil i,_t I Ol Id0i 0t 11111llllm
i + UP:_., i ltt,i _ dllietli_el M lm-
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retldllld by it'. It711n¢ilt1_iltll 4110111I i II1011 MI
tXld/inrll i=i,h_+?" n ++i.i_rilell lliO I ll"il _llillirll ol
tl"mi tisl( lllil:i-_.:+mm:;;,+',ilPli_ililill ol lilni_ giveh il'i41_ ol
vu_erili_liiy =t e__u:_,m+m_ Ol_ili,-ll. Thell lllllm_ _WtlV_.
vim# anwnl I_._ <l!m],rt, l+ _m _ tO meir
/ r;:_,t&ltn._i_ _ 1 fie tllllllil,'litl oi I manitt
"flail Tl_:m=t l_t_t_li_ti Stlilml ITPSl ol llml I llluml
i_m+,lil _ an em_+':ll+ii¢+ 'li_n_ _ t;,_,',,-,_lll llnll 0_llin-
ililonnl i:ui_t-_::l+ it. kl I c_n_lx lyllml II d/l
fl, OPoCl._':',ll_l.ir!l mltlillttii I=y llwlmil ottl'i_- t_ni li is
i ol blil:k _.:_ ,:P;Plml¢ii (ill.Ill _._ 1 _ I Oi*
lryl, rl+ "ll_i+,iwI1-311rltminlhl//, uIirml Dim
ll.rlll I _,' ', _:ltll U_ (R'T'_ I_ 1 lleXlIM I II m
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a_so_ i_e Den0nr_ of 1_e orbiters sad&ca, _ I_lOS 8r8 0ondeo To
fl'_ alurr,_J m sx_r_(nsH ¢on.ld wt. a _mer_ I:y t_e same R'r'v
The TPS can tail in three wa!r_: Oel:)of-,or,Q, Durn-lrlrOUgn. anO
_amage i_ _m_c_s. _ IS suo_scleo to s set ot e_msl _sas, some
of flqem most_ ¢)rea_aote (like viOnnonS ano heat under nonmal
Ol_erabng cono_i0nsh serum o_ mere morn nmOom like Oel:,ris,
In'•:earn features of f_e PRA me•el icrme ti*es are me potentkl_
failure ¢:aper_encte$ f_m file to ti_e. an(2 _ couDunQ betwoen
_a_lure of the TPS s_o ta*_um of t_ sudsy•zeros _.ateo d_r_-tty
under Tee a_uminum s_n o_me on_.r.
The managemenl of tl_e TPS DTeser_s _ char•crees•ice
thai are ty_¢_J el tee linkaQI Detwmln organc_lJOnS ileal rlgJa_y.
K invotv_e several o rgalllz_io_s ill'_ ¢on_ mdiffefM_ I_l_e8
(inc_JOing ROCKWelL L_. and NASA. W KenmlOy S_1C4
Career sr_ _n J_,r_son _ Ce_er) _ 1:s'oc_r_ m_ v_re
r't_C[ly Clev_l)e4 for t/14 mk'_ SIlulUOco_n anO nof for a
_on9 larrn me,men•now De•ram The TPS ins_ec_n and ffaJme-
_ance ;)roceoums are e_nremeLy t_ar mlermve ono lime consum-
i_. ant are onen o_ t_ CrllJr.all_kllthl0 tee ne_ UlunCh. The framing,
OeOical_on.8r_ moflvat_onof lhe mimonniN _mnmclin this _rocwsa
rsera,CarlO _e te_al_ity of Ihe system. The _Jn_m pmeJmure rehes
mos_/on mmn_m'mnca on ¢lema_=, NU_ou_n c_mJC;_'_ 9u#tm_s
are Derforme4 for a seat! sample of tiles, m mo_ p_J)/L the
IDrOolems POSe_ Dy t.e aging Of Irle _=n¢_n_ _ not i=_mlecl
¢lireat_y. The recom_nQ of operalions ,worn • ma_ 04 psper
Oocumems. Fuflheffnom. Ins Droce_u_ invofv_ some pno_lza-
.'q am0r_ the TPS elem_'m; OlSt4Oh aFJ4dJ4dkte_,_lgmentl. bl_
._tstomat_= pnor_ieS D:_Sedon a gUanPt_ mule&stem of t_e
at tai_u[_ 4ue to rites' location w_th reSl_CI I0 o_hef critical
/stems.
new nmhoo _o w._nuntze the Insmm_n of Uw tiles is
c_rrm_, pemg _np*ememee.' An s=ponam ame_ o_mis memocl
is tn_ ¢ greny S_9_t_Sthe curmm tss_s o( _ commun_
cain•, stonng, and removing mlonnstlon om'men_Q me =m_em
s_ate at me ti_• and me_r :zm performers, t smwO, memkn.
_hcrease me retii_|ily of tee msm_:mn area n'm_ananm opera-
tJons. By •_eierM_Q the Dm_s&. |aroma'ton may Id_O. in mamy
instances. •aXe the _e$ oft me crdaa) DaShtO U'm next launc_ The
gamin S_utUem(la_lily Oetw_en maflu•h_ end 8utomatio n
is s _unc_zon (1} of the irtt_kllCor/,ril_1_n ot th4 TPS to the m_l14
fa_Jre ask and (2) 04me Wuns maoe inTPS nmUdlty. 0;*4 _peolk:
ssve mat o_n ne aooressea by the extMmon of PRA 0ee_l_d
here s tl_ebenelt_ of acmur_l_ lot the _ ml_lity _ II'm Uies
in a_erent Jocmmns on the om_er8 luffeoe in me _mem of
the TP5. Thts may maul in inC_lllRl_ _ l_m'tll m Key
areas_¢n u me_xl_,e covenr_menyamu_c_nman__m.
Ix_t_v_. _en'm_, mec_ mmvtm'_l_ me insmlmionm_m'mto_
for mesa most ontical anms. Anofl_f m _ can 0e a_Immr, ecl
by ex'mnS_n of PRA aS OellCnl_O horn _ 1_ ree_lv_ _lnc4 01
the mare•seem Ofthe TPS _ •nO of the management of other
sylnem$ InM ere sources amdetx'_ (e.g.. tee exlen'_ tank inSukl-
ton) In If_e over• mt,m,tity of the tt_emla,I i:_q_oc_lonhJrlCl_n.
INTEGRATICN MODEL
I_a_s_¢ ,s_ ana_/ss iPRA) tar engmnng systems
al_,s mmffic_n o! meir wea)_eM pans nvougn quanld_non of
me I_'O_d_e$ of the cliflemm fldum modes ISle. tar example.
_' ,W •rd K_mutm0to_" _ 04 me P_ _ Demurs more
--,r, pmceo.res._ cu,um,.) mm_,¢z I,o _ m Dl_ra-
"Crone.S_K=a_ in si_ua_ens o_ cltstri_j_lm deccan rramng." The
melhOd g_nanOe me s.¢_De ol PRA _hr_u¢_h a _yesien ana_s_s o_
t_e sequence of tesk.s IO De OeJ1Orrne_ :n Inn Drocess of desQn,
m_r_t_-_J'r.,_lQ, il'_D(F_lO_,r_"lmfltenance, 8_ oaer•llons, and t,e
=o_al,on Of tr_a :m=aoilit,es of [ecnnica| as we_ as organize.
t)oP.aJfailures mat Can _ec_ me system's re,in,italy. The reasoning
_v_ves •naiys_ in,, extens,on ot e_or_ to t_,_:s no_ c_nty_he
c_ass_=ai ¢oera_ors errors but also effete thN are QJO to 1he
;_roce¢_jrea end stmc_re ¢4 me orgamz.lt_on. An esse_]a_ clist|nc.
ten is maae here between gross er_orl an_ errors of ju_gmen!
because remeatal athens IO aoOmss mesa _ w_es of problems
may 0e 01 _dfel'o_ na_rl. ,_
A,.4
The ten pnmm is an anaty,_ at t_ proamw, (e.g.. eng_-
ngeflr_, fflalftleh_'lC41, arl_ edema) in crOer 10 _em_ wl_at
0011_I_$ "110rllUllDeffoffrla,'Ice" EJ'loDotef11_BtDr¢;t_em$ W_thTheir
I:xolNlO_tles Or base rome P4r time unit or per oDerln,=n. When
Oepencl, among ofrmr tSUO_, on tr_e a_a_.ation'm cuqure and
inc_mlv• stroc_m. G_venmal a mmc e_or occur. _r_enext =nase
iS Ifi analysis of the On_a_mr_ proceoums •nO ;nCentrve
system1ooetewnmethe Pm_a_W mm il_ ooserv_o._ecoQr_ze(_.
commuruc_44, and c_m_e_ in t_ne (i.•., be•ore it causes a
system tmum). The n)l,u_s at lhe_e two phases s a ,_m_Jta_o not
Ihe pr_l_llOiMie8 Of the _l_mnf system's states cowesDor_ng to
ImU_e lyp_ of smamml ¢_t_t_ •nO, _em_om. to _ferem _eve_
o1 sysm_'s c_pec_. _ _Pam_ _sa pmOa_t_stc mx z_s
of the _ system ma_ suows oomputa_n of me overd fa_re
prooa_ty (_) un:w nom_ cvommanc_, and (2) given po;an_•l
wo_ 04 th_ CWIWWll eteff_Jlt9 _ Jr¢_ue of meir fuimm
pmq0eb_llm. These _fue nsgdghS |_Q_I;, orgen_za_n, ann PPA
Ior ditiem_ Im_ls 04 Wstem's _) Ire Iltegr_e¢l usmQ an
m ls-ee (Of an Jrdluenc_ d_gJllrn_ to oom;)me the OVlrlll failure
• nO the m comn_,n_n ol Oi_emns _¢_n_nos (e.9.,
__',__.,11t10_4he con'm=_on of • grv_n proem'n). FiQure I p_oyioes a
Scherna_ U__,on _ the _..cmm 04 m_s neonmon mooeL
PFUt,FOR THE THERMAL PROTECTION SYSTEM OF THE
SPACE SHUTTLE: MODEL STRUCTURE
A PRA mo44Hctnlwmty unOer sluoy for•tie TPS of the Sl:qlce
ahume rNem on • perilune; m4 _Jdl_e aUor_ several Om_ns,,,ns:
(1) the exlel_ 10801 |/taStily _ _ dee)rig) to which the ameer
G4Utbe eLd:4OCtOd 8f_ mm _ _ to the Io¢8IJO_ On the
orl)_Ml _ 8.'¢1 (2) the _it_jJity o( InS Olflemnt lul_ystems
tocaled mvmmlamy um_ _e munv_ skin. tn oa_ to
re_omn_nc_lon_ _'q; the num_emenl el the m*evam suD-
symoms, me maclel/s cl_Ood _o two rams:, me tim pert _ • n_y
04 di_ng Irld bt_l-tlll_JQh QJ4 tO welUtheue8 Of 1he I_,
heal loads. _ etc.: the sm pan _s• se_mUe st_. of
the _ Of d4_. meir lab.,el. _ theN' e(le¢-_, on tee TPS
reUliD_, m ffVeiNIDM, me eoDDe o(me PRA model ill I_10 the
t_lS Ior._ed on 11"4uf_lme_l_ luft,ll_ m me om_er.
Rrl_ I_1_: aeboft0;ng and t)um-thn_Jgh (exC_Lll_ me efle_
F_m 2 prm_ol$ • sof-dmlal¢ dlusUation of the I_lflitior_ of
trio odo4ere lxldemelm left•ca t_r the _ Dlfl Of the anatyaza
L'2_itm i| m ll_mp_ il_ thJ, ate_o 10 _Oe,ale me_m_caW _ Oflterent
zone8 _Oomabng to lempeq_m _ ctliCaMyl. A minmuU zoneeot
r,m. zone) I_ am eWl_ of me tmau pemlon of 1he sun•ca. Each
mi_. zone Ot P_Ju i • U_U8 chara_onzna by 4theal tr,_x (kI_l) a,_
.acr_a_ in_eJ,(j(,')).
The Dm_ nnunmns •m me P_owmg:
ORDINAL PAGE |$
ipmm,m i I Nmur,in I of
Sul_Wltmml ! Pmblm
" !_l,ii_t|
_; i'r+I'.,+i':'._3T_tolrl t
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A,:.tmn
EXlOl,nlll
Lt'_ l+
$I PllSl Y Y Y
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_$4
System
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e
ProceSS PmblbllbltI¢
Analysis C,' ii1_ i' bPJ,tlonli| ,l_.rt_lyll|i mt'Ik Arultysts
_ +all ......... ,-,................... " !_::,+'_I .... IlL '
;k_IUt9 1 : _llIJCtlJl'O O1 the l_)fle_+l _r t',+:_',;11_d_It__Sl_l _ ¢',rl;_ll_t,]::+_'ll:c++';;]lI( _,l_,!t'6S1111::IIrror (]it+
F(tl" Failure O! tPlll mbiter: lOSS01 vr, '_: .]:.-+.,a nd ¢rlP_
[LOV/C_ _ launcll t pnl'tlllllly ¢_L :_! :_ L',!_likB'o Oe
tile TPS
r_: Total ruJm0er of bill on me Of+.:t'_--
j: InOl, x ol cnt=_ am& (11,,:re'rip.;I +!'_:"ol the m_.
zones
covenng me nyclrau_ Wstimn'+
k: |_dlZ (If llllllpef'l_re Mill
i: Imm ot _n. ,orme (I, k) ,_. _(i_ _p+)
N,: Nurn_r of fIIUl OliCtml In rr_1. z+:L_,Ji.
nr: NUIllOIf Of 'bitl in mJn. ;[011_L
F? : FllilUrI Of me "_ llile" |krlilMl_r_ ++,,._+r._,+_1:,|m II
_a+mrlmllCn
IP]F+: +ailumo_anyadianentti_ _vm..;.-.++:,_,glalbm
Ir+il+_imnnt :_faikifn_fr_
10411¢11(Of SiZe one 0," !I',0111 dlylllOOI Dy ll_ IOs41_'f +;'ih"+._tINp(F1;
in_iatirlg ?adUI1 tar 11111ai;C_). IONOWl¢l or r_ ::, ,'.,+'.+t_lure ot
adjicinl tiles (F'IF1). Thl pm'_l_lity ot Ioimg me +i'_i::;P.,.m_na I_l_'_
13eDOI_S Or,-lhI llik,lf4D mode lOM3Ol11Okl10m I_l,ll"l'-:_! :+Lq_):
P,tFl) ,. p(Fl.(_10OndMl0) . _m(F1,1Xir:+,..fl+;:_+,lgtl)
The IXOO_++W of ¢letumdi_ i_ m_,qUKIt,-+ +._irml_0enlX_
of i (IPI8 IOC_:I :_,'t.+)rl tt;e orbitllll_ whllrllB the SlK:41_Idterm
(lIxffn-tl_rOu(jn) ¢_m.nOs on 1he len'C4MItum o=mponem of the
minJL'_P,ectis¢.:' _{:," _<,[i_.
Thll pr¢'_;_ll+ly _ on the templlrl_Pli ol me rain.
?'nil It't,::'_+O_ ii_xlm!! rill 1Ire ¢ll,,ll_=mlnl Of d_lnlltt
pl*a:4"m#Ire _.l+'Srln_Jtr_m events and 1hal 1nero +s no O_nOD Of
_. to.. t_nl +_mpm_v_ EVp_L) z _,'(M) is rm_i_m.
EV(N_ +_,_ ;_,piF1) (.ei1341caKlvaluiOlml_nUmOer
ol pmcP_s rn nun. zone 1}
'
Mln.
i=l
1=2
1=3
i=,d
+:'.+1i",0 $:
I'+(_P;r.ri t_c_l
cotrJ::non c_tlcol
n+._t;non criticol
/"
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EV(M) ,, 1., [1-p_,,(F" 1 _'I_] [- e=De,',xl value of _.hesize
0! a _'b-.Jl oo1"_d_r_| o_ R$
start)
FRikJrm¢'_th@artier _um t¢a _mch ef ._iz@M"
As =a_ of toe ¢:uta. one ne easme I:_ooaod_ of failure of the
eraser our lo tf_e oevetoDment ol a Is,Jura muc_ of a given size m
a zone of given c_'ical_'y. These Oata may oe ocxatneo throug_ an
anaeys_ of t_e reliability of Ihll lysten_l la¢_lld un_ir IM otoaer
surface IIr',Ot_eir co_=ution 10t_e overall reli&Diih,y of tl_e Oro_er.
These Drooa_l_es can I>e use0W oelme cr_¢._ _tse_l.I_(P")thus
c_eDenos on I(;), 1hecr_cality ir_ex of rain. zone |.
p.IF I M,,1} - _,
p:CFi M=P.)= g;,
PI(F 1M-ml • Pi"
_:_i.r_ nf 'ti-k_ _n_ffi.rt-ltew _ r)_Ir_mmm r_ r:m_m _i?et'
A lailure o! the O_iler aue to TPS lailute in me. zone _occurs rtany
ionm or more) o! _ DamP,R of ram. zormncauBllUlum. Given trim
tadure _r=:_Ogn=es ptF1 ) aria I_F') are assumeO 100e sma_.one
can wr,'te"
PIFI N,,,q) - <:IX;)',
• _ p', is the prol_z_ tt_t an amt_,ary n:,_ m zone i cue=
_,e.. _ p,:.. x p(s.e m)
m• t_D,-
I=', .. _._ I:_.,, x p,=_(F'IFI)" z [1-1_=(P'1FI)]
miltn_
1Nicdty ts usKI Ks a ¢¢nven_m _l_:m_xm_on of ulX_r
_¢_s when tne pmoa_l_/of lar_ values _ the ranaom _nal_e
is _uflic_m_y sr_¢
_h'_e_m_'h_'v' of orbi'rm'f:_ltt,r_t,"JILmto '1"_Sfailure m xtsne i:
_{F tCr al_ aaC.J'.m in rain. zone 0
- _,. p(F t N, - q) x I_N_ - ¢1)
q=l tO_
Q*llOm
• p, x _(N)
- p', x n, x p,_(F1)
Failure o_t_ _t_ foe an IP_eram. L,onee.,
;_ " Z. P', x _ x p,e(F1)
i,, 1_04
9fftsCff _f gl,'lamll I_Vl_nl_
The I_O_a_Nty o1 _allum *nthe sum over _11vaUe= _ the
emema_ ioacl X _e.g., max,_um terreerimm) ¢ it turns out to be
c=¢a_l el me c,=oa_ly 0er_ lure=on for X muRilD_¢l I_/the
DroI_IU=IUCyof failure of tile ember condc_n/an X.
In the ¢OmOlete ai'_Nsm of toe e=emat avamz, dis ne,cls.
saw to take into a¢_un_ tt_e a_ffefent aliases of tP,e liRht m oraer to
o_ta_n • o,stnl_tmn over time o_ _osa of lira titl anti a measure m
the OeDenaer_ on _me at the ross ol stJl=S_uent Ides attar _os$o_
the litst one.
Second phaso: nsK el failure clue IO aeons
The anzhrsm Oaths w_ln the sIu0y at lr_esources at _eDris
(e.g.. L'-aulmlono4me extarrm tanK. other=ar_ mtthe STS. mzlemal
ob;_,) in omer to o_m the WoOerS' el a_erem scenanos
c_t_lm In' tt_e nnJm _xl me skze at debm, the :_-_ac_s
lock,on on the omiter'e sudace, an_ tale time oi I_rN___.,_unnQ _e
tlkllfd. This lil_ le_Kl• tO • 0e$¢1'_i011 0_I!14 iilflUII tile 0arrtsQe
(in¢_u¢l_n_prooi_i_y ota nit tar _es m ¢liffemm _nos. _tJ_J_n
of nurn_r ot 1,as m_tm_ly nit con_lonat on ae_s impel, several
of the Oam•go _f'_t'_llg on _. m 10_ n¢ono Dirt. the
of • lailure tNnc.n m ctutcun_aJm:octby the _omual:>d_ of n'nultq_e tnn_t
fa_n.nra_wth ai_e_em _eve*s el sevemy. T_e sluoy at runner oovm-
<:DIMre of tailuae _n____s _P_ni_nll on mitiat_lg ta:_um(s) In0
cofuoquont egloct on me oroaer ,s $_ni_rto me aria ._1 _eflormeO
rome lirst _ The mare ¢liffemnce m tt'm tt_ ana_ys= ot the et_e¢=
ol Oebfil invoNe= O_amm leve_ el _mage _n, emy.
MANAGEMENT OF "tHE T].ES AND PO'I_N'r1AL ERRORS
T_$ _.IrlIKItlTMIII lltl relUIDi_y
l'_e ¢luamy of me Dg_oel_ ot _nlgn, mar_a=unng, insrm.
la_n. inm_mon, uu_ _ of the tales altq_'l_ mo DmO_-
ily ot _ arat tulD_om f•itl,_e, tlv_gn _um-mmugn or m-
|_F _) ate :(F'|F_ ) In me Wev_ua metier). The ap.ml4yat
_he mana_mem o_ ome'sy'w, ema _ as the e_et'naStanktnal
potenti•l iources at cleom attec_ me p__ **,i_bf md me smmnW o_
0amage 0_e m aim _ m ¢ttterl_ _c_ionl at lm_ omeer.
G;ven IS ettucr._. _ moOet de_'tb_ move can _ _ to
tile _utul of _ll_n=_em_nw an1110mal_omem of tl_e
ano m me IXCX:e_-,_ ,_ 11_ omem mm_n t_ leam_nem ot me
m IXFI), I_F'), aria mi_r vanaoles lot one case ot _e_s
immlm.
For oxm. q_mml _ ¢ mo blon aotDorm _
the azlNq_od hem _ iw/th oml_lal_ on zorl_ _ |s th8
teS_s'_ e020_ O_m doom mo i_maaum m6nO_ea_om of me
mtl_m_ _ tl_ a_/_lOml Iomn_l emily ur_ler mo ulUn_m ran.
fsriom_mon in Itm TPS Dmcmu.ng u _ as the ;_x:nlung ot
i_r¢llr.ot _W_al IItlyl_l 0etll0flo¢i M 0eatolse futt_lWlne
_oq_ _ irvlial_l tile latimer rathe en_ antk_ z_nes, l"_e
reeultl, ca_ tho4t ne moaau nm I_/mmDutallon of m• o_eralt nsx ny
tile Cmvmu_ moae, usmQ new vajuee el J_ ta_Jl'ml. AnOthM
OItlNIllDNI.Ot if19¢lro_gflWflt 1_91d_ _ Isae_leO IP,fOt_fl the _ol
ksthe ¢levaJo_ IU'Kt_ us4 oi f10fl ¢tostnJ¢IPtetemk"_ of the
RW. The _m llibJm IXF_I ant I_F'I tnthe finlt Dart at th4
ir¢_mm over Ume wan tP.e numDet ot f_Ql'_tSel the omaer.
Non ctmamcUve tes_n_ ta_ i'_ir.i_ ¢_HInermmn ot me t_onctcR
anO Uow _tmm_ nmtimmmL
m wxlmn m m_ _m _n u ignon_ me
age0 I_enomlre_ or uni(_m mpe_lm ot me ti_m. er_rs can
_,,p.__je m ev_y _ at _ n_ cOmo ¢Iillemm elements
_ttrm TI_ (lor oxamme, a Oa_lMt_ ¢ RTV). otlhe ira_oc_cm anct
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In _.•sa| w_ere tr_en) s no conrn_v_rsy al]Qut value NO_-
men_s ,wolveo mt_ level Oecmons !cm1$_e_,_.Tor irxlm1_a, insl
the o_nc, rtsof COn_ss rout t:RlVld)thl question is_ ensu[e tr_at
•elevsnl ln_mrl_1On iS av'_ll_ll to tll_ tO_ fftan•gomerlt wt',e'fi
unoamema; Oat=sans are maoe. an= that me o_lncat_nal and
noivi0ual's risk an_tu0es m,ernuatly _tte_ ulat m INs top level The
oO]ect_ve is no cles_gn an ircentNe sttijc_ro anc_r a teecm_
."nscr_,sm mat ensures this acl4_--y. This amides me use at
_¢X:mpnate infom",at_on anal m mw._fy Ivat_i01e. tl_ m_.;L,=_tion of
tO0il_onat information when it hal a nM Ix=lulh_ va_u(i grven t_o
or0anL_alion's Ixe_emncl sym•m, ancl I cecaraon mlldng process
mat _eaos w _nsmercy in ask att,tuOeu. The 4t.tauay o_ the
_ea_erst_l= clo•ny Dfayl an emsl 0411'1in the c_utty ano tl_l)
:,on_lStl)11_'ot s1sr1¢ImrOI_l_osa 61,1oO_rL
SOME ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEMS I".IAT AI::k"_CT SYSTEM
_EUAB|u'r'_
_m a_.iS =nalysm of en_rs one can iclenll/y two broaa
ca_oqor_s ot or_anf.a_ntl l_:blem tl_st relate _ the failure
_rooao_ily of • system _ tl_y at(l¢l tl'_e _ of
_ocess ono_: n_off_981_onproOtor_ and _lcanm,_ 9roblem$ wdl_
,he OOss_;;W of ccmo_a_on Of I=_.
I_Orm•liOrl l_OOterl_l
mformamon pr0_orr_ rosy oc=ur wimm In ar_miz_lon or
at.ross organ(za_ns msna_ng me same •_at_n. They may
•._mf_ I_scoU may _e _SlOnm:l _I I libel' _ will'a=ut
f_cX X_X_ m _ ma_ m• Oemoncm_m_Is _oI11e_.
,r t.'_ r•_rces at ,tll_._e¢l m_oeny l_r _ mllal_W. For
:x_'=_le. tham may not e.xiStany mm:l.amism to t_oK ll_'m_
pnce o_me _ons_ramts _ by manaOeme_. I.•.. w._wm_l Oeme
gains (•41., in mliaDIlity) a=_¢mtl_ Io clam _ of m_
,t_r_ cons•rants ¢e,g., _;t scne¢l_).
* Accosx ?_ m_,vam _,m_ev 1, Th4 o_Qar_m_q'•
;era is 1o _lelldy anO COnlrrUVc4_ signals tha_ an r4Hevanl
eg*al_e. Oq;amzmior=t Ill•MS rnlw Ioe_ the Iome _efll_.'tl_
isnats nndu_ nv,ss_'w wl'_e inmevant ones _a_t mntulm
,n• system, Fi;_t. the m=WiOutl mu.. =e _ _/OMmlyw1_! to I_1¢
for art= to oaten thnS imoml_n In _. Co_'/IuP','-=_m__ my ta_
•_r • vanew of reasons. Al_ro0nlle =omm_,-_-_ Ch_mnetl nlW
,n_ r_nexm. or oz,sl_r_ _ann_ rnay hot womcUew _.
.r _rac_cat _. or _ mmnmn of Imn'nob_.
A;SO.me signal may o4 __o4p_tm _ml (me
_-wOq ell•el).
0is•on•el, Fw mcarrtl_, me OP;_l,.n,=,i_,,trely not Oee¢lga)eO (in
_ _roceOunla. _ cuuum, otc,) to o_mm,'m_s _.o,_ly,mpe_ec_
_omu_on anO ur_,m_lam. Tl_emmm, c_iem ('Go Ix=t.,.'} rr_y
• Orol_K_ _h the pmceu.
tr_m_ve pmo_
Ince_ive DroDtems rosy _ec_ th_ syIRim're I:41to_
t_'- _rout _ pror.e_ ar_ tact•m) tl_ tonowm_..
_nd where the risks c_ v,siblot-,,,re8 ate sulficienuy m, incemhm, s
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at each revel m3y leacl to the su_;_msmcn of oa_ news an•.
t_erolore, a bias towards optimism, l"_is _strue, in =an_cular. when
_81_KiS o;'I, I_e (:_lttCati_lm to prOOuCl_Onor ==erat©n may lind
themselves unOer oressgm to cm comer. "rnis Omssum increases
w_m the O_erence ol total t_me _oOleCt,v_ tunc_)on) _:=e':weenInem
and _e nex'l crit=cat task.
be ¢luflcult for •n organ=rm_n su_;ec_l to l=u=lic_n_ to assess
its own c_rlormar_co II1(I lotto tram JtSrr_staXea. In s_'ult_ons OI
suoc_u_ them my be 8 lerOency to over_o_ shW_nlSas Dotm_tiai
pm_m wnerelm sn Muatmns of Oit/tculle_. Ire on;ian_mlon may
be OVe_hem'_ by s_mUs ol DmOhlr_ d it doeli not r_av_ c_oar
pn_csOumo to iJIIOU their m_P_ seventies ind _ sm I_ont_es
among mmeo_iaci:ns. Furmermore. o_janizatJor_ leam, r_ an•
in _ change of _UleS may be (:lift.S when q can I_
inlerpmtea U a4m_that _s prtX:eOuroswem ,nao_Kiuale.
RETURN TO THE PRA MODEL
,_=em=ymo_.
The i_- __,y Of _milum p(F1) and Of .",__'___luont talk=ms
p(F'_F1) _ be llnlu_l to the _,_',.-_'ence of ermm oi cl_emnt ty_es
(e.g., a trac_n Of the 8urla_ omy was covom4 w_h RI"V) anO.
IunJse_. to con'_nmlons o( enom (e.g., JnmaT,cte_ Quant4y ol
FOr el_t type af en_r. tNi c_Jos_=n _ to know what aSfls level of
sevlm_, _e nun'_r of die• _ It can a_lecL ana melr _..m_n wnt_
re_=¢= t= me c_ca_Jty pan#im_ of 1he oro_ su_lace, tn •=ditk=n,
_lmay Oe ml_onam to consiOerwhlnnef t ma gross erroror an error
of hxlomem _ may be _sa euay iOentilie4 am cormoeO. An
en_r hsr_r_ n:_._,ml_. the _nme_n _ can be arul_rz_l as
a _ of flfl4rl: It 011¢11Ile_ 11111effor flaw Oe Clarified O_
rnmm_ FtnUy, given trat an •mar nat o_cun_ an(s been mnn-
IIKI. # ,q_ly Or m_r_rmot_o _rrqK:t•4.
This ena_ i d_ _y me tam•n== _ st•own
in Figure 4. The msu_ _ • _.,e_on _'th= _ of =n_=_',_
taitum D(F1) given pore cornmr_'m of errataan_ their myers
ol _ mn[I m• _Ullutm_ of tl_ nuenOerof li/ee Idlocto_. "rnls
_t_lmullml of WlluU of _ F 11 I_ Ihefl Olltllflld il_ lh_ I_'tl_nol_ rllOO_l
tOaouUn• sbeclnJm of milum womm_ ILOV_C) clue to labium ol
tim TPS. The fit•Oat can then bl ullm to _ trio ef/e_s Of
Oet_al_Oftal _R"teer_ _ to iflONNIN the rel_ll_lly of
trte TPS.
f.xl_lom _ =_=m_,lm_ _rn=mvewm_Ul Of 11PSmaml_l-
rnm ma lrmr m mm_n t_ m
• ln'aDmvementi_lear;'_r_ poss_rmmlumsJncluclotmncl
amuym anm_¢,=u:x mecnan,m=. Ttu_ _e_t. mtnd mo_eL ==to
decrlm the t0qmID_iiCy_t _ of snore In the tff_ DlaCe.
AMO. ,,,_,,,.,.eml_ fletOsmlg (lu_rlUt_teltlng of RTVfor
agmo et_ex:_) whose mtec_ I_ to clemme _e m_4_ll_ity of taJk_re
the rue mcauon can be a_oa Oy the _ mmusn me
O_.,,ne_NALPAGE iS
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: _so of Iff.e prOl_ll:ilily =f il'lt_fa_ifl(_ tailuro on I_11most cr_icat
-_ _r_ev:i_(,_ ,_I_:rr_m_,_r_mcte;I,$e the 9t01:l=d_t3'Ot ot:Slfvatl0..,1
.= Jr o0rcictional cn C¢=urronce :=nOincteaso II_O Wol:aJ_'y o!
-_.-ti_:n cona_nal on o_serva_on.
"_LU$10N
The exlenmon'= Of ¢_as._ca! PRA 0resent_l in tits l=aPer
-ease cor_eraDIy _he value oi _ntormal_n ot such sluaies
-- so ,I altows senin(j pno_ms among i taf_lN' numl_r of
i,q imomvements, An analysis of th_ engin_ennq IXt:X_$
. . Iocus,'¢J anormon aria resources (lime ,n _tCuu, rl on me
st=nlcal tin|. O_ar.zwiona; _ _1enl;meenn_ reliaOil/_y
•., _ntm to rese=mners in o_;lanLtlmr_' Oemwmr,'= The
[ IillNe melllo_ outlinea _em _ inc_asion of till bo4y of
.- .)till irl II1_)t31)¢liSilOhmi_lrt_ pfl0Clld_lily&l_ellMIl_lt'H! felt_lh/11
_rtanclt ot tnesm or_an_z=ll_On_ effect1 mtougn met ¢ontn=u.
: tO the overa;l Sy$1om reti,ll_lRy.
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5.1 NASA PROGRAM OFFICE I! :E,.;PONSIBLE FOR:
C. PROVIDING NECESSAff'_ R!.:.SOURCES TO SUPPORT T1. 'E PRt_CA SYSTEM,
INCLUDING THE PRAr. _, IIX_,TA SYSTEM, COMMUNTC _,TION SERVICES, AND
COMPATIBLE HAROVL' _, _[! ,_.ND SOFTWARE.
E. ASSURING THAT THE :I:_L=,',,'I_I.OPMENT OF A PRACA I*._A.TA SYSTEM WILL PROVIDE
INFORMATION IN A ;;_;I;:::;LUlAT WHICH WILL BE SUP!:'")E.'_"IVE :OF A TRENDING
SYSTEM TO BE USE[:,, ii '-_,:q.L ELEMENTS AS SPECIFIED IN TED.
5.2 JSC & MSFC ELEMENT PRCI lILT OFFICES ARE RESPON$1B_ _ FOR:
B, ASSURING THAT ALL :: :!PORTABLE PROBLEMS, INCL;.IC:.INC; IN-FLIGHT ANOMALIES.
ARE IMMEDIATELY F_i ::{)RTED INTO THE NSTS PR,_, ./_, OATA SYSTEM.
D. ASSURING THAT THE :HF.0t'(MA'rt0N WITHIN TilE P:;,_,EA SYSTEM IS IN A
FORMAT WHICH IS C ill _o;I:_'_TIBLE WITH AND SUPPCI .tC._ "T!_NOING ANALYSIS.
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ABSTRACT
During the post-Challenger investigation the National Research Counci3
Shuttle Criticality Review and Hazard Analysis Audit Committee expressed
concern that the approximately 1.300 safety-critical failure points were not
prioritized based on probability o? occurrence. They suggested that an
integrated systems assessment be devised which would provide for failure
probability quantification. The National Space Transportation System Program
OFfice subsequently initiated a pilot project employing the probabilistic
risk assessment (PRA) methodology to evaluate its usefulness and also to
identify any areas of concern not previously established.
This report describes the PRA performed on the Shuttle Main Propulsion
Pressurization System, which is an assembly of many components contained
within three of the four vehicle elements (the Orbiter, the External Tank,
and the main engine) and which crosses the element interfaces. The PRA was
performed by Lockheed Engineering and Management Services Company in
conjunction with the Lockheed Missiles and Space Company Research and
Development Division. The report includes a discussion of t_e scope of the
analysis, a description of the team organization, a description of the PRA
methodology and its application in this study, and a summary of lessons
learned. A matrix is also provided to map the information in this report to
the information in the analysis report (LMSC-F2230402, January 1988), which
is provided as an attachment.
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t. BACKGROUND
During the post-Challenger investigation the National Research Council
Shuttle Criticality Review and Hazard Analysis Audit Committee expressed
concern that the approximately 1,300 safety-critical failure points were not
prioritized based an probability of occurrence. They suggested tha: an
integrated systems assessment be devised which would provide for failure
probability quantification. The committee Further recommended that the
assessment be closely coupled with the existing failure modes and effects
analysis/critical items list (FMEA/CIL) activity to assure coverage of the
truly safety-critical items in the Space Transportation System (STS).
The National Space Transportation System (NSTS) Program Office initiated a
pilot project employing the probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) methodology
to evaluate its usefulness and also identify any areas of concern not
previously established. This methodology has been used successfully by the
nuclear industry in analyzing, quantifying, and prioritizing the risks
presented by nuclear power plants.
This report describes the PRA performed on the Shuttle Main Propulsion
Pressurization System (MPPS). The MPPS is an assembly of many components
which is contained within three of the four vehicle elements (the Orbiter,
the External Tank (ET), and the main engine) and which crosses the element
interfaces. The PRA was performed by Lockheed Engineering and Management
Services Company (LEMSCO) in conjunction with the Lockheed Missiles and Space
Company (LMSC) Research and Development Division (R&DD).
A summary of the conclusions found herein is as follows:
a. The PRA methodology and the NSTS FMEA/CIL techniques complement each
other, and together provide an enhanced approach to risk management.
b. The PRA methodology is adaptable to NASA space systems and is usable
throughout the NASA organizational environment.
i-I
CQ The PRAmethodology can be learned and aoplied,:using the currently
available tools, by any integrated aerospace organization, and does not
require extensive training.
This report consists of a discussion of the scope of the analysis, section 2.
This discussion is followed in section 3 by a description of the PRA team
organization, including the skill mix and experience of the team personnel.
Section 4 describes the PRA methodology and its application in the study of
the MPPS. The lessons which were learned from the study are contained in
section 5. Section 6 provides a matrix to map the informatimn outlined in
this report to the detailed information contained in the LMSC R&DD analysis
report (LMSC-F2230402, January 1988), which is provided as an attachment.
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2. SCOPEOFANALYSIS
The MPPSwhich NASArequested be analyzed using PRAmethodology is comprised
of those elements which furnish the pressurant gas at the necessary condi-
tions for proper and safe operation of the entire Main Propulsion System,
from the beginning of ground operations to successful return of the Orbiter
to earth. A complete analysis would have required consideration of the
entire Main Propulsion System which includes the ET, the Orbiter, the Space
Shuttle Main Engine (SSME), and the ground support equipment (GSE). Such a
task was a far greater effort than was required to meet NASA's objectives of
demonstrating the usefulness of the PRAmethodology for mannedspace
applications in a reasonable time and at a reasonable cost.
V
The MPPS system, which was defined with NASA's concurrence, can best be
described as a collection of functions which cross many system boundaries
rather than as a well-defined system in itself. The following functions are
considered:
a. Supply of pressurant gas to the ET to prevent its collapse from external
pressure, and to provide sufficient positive pressure to _revent
cavitation of the SSME pumps.
b. Supply of purge gases and gases to inert the system, minimizing the
explosion hazard.
c. Supply of pressurant gas to actuate engine valves as a backup to a
malfunctioning hydraulic system.
d. Supply of gas as a primary source of actuation pressure for various
system valves.
The analysis considered those elements and components of the Orbiter, the ET,
the SSME, and the GSE which either affect the pressurization functions or ar_
affected by the pressurization functions. The scope of the analysis led to
partial inclusion of the Electrical Power Distribution and Control System,
the Electronic Instrumentation and Control System, and the Hydraulic Power
System, as well as operational considerations. The scope of work chosen for
2-i
the analysis, while abbreviated from what would be considered in a complete
system approach, provided extremely useful results and demonstrated She
effectiveness of the PRAmethodology.
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U 3. TEAM ORGANIZATION
The team organization is shown in figure 3-I. The task was administered by
the NSTS Program Of?ice with technical management assigned to the Propulsion
and Power Division of the Engineering Directorate. LEMSCO provided program
management, performed engineering and organizational support, and provided
the liaison with other related NASA organizations. LMS_ R_uu performed the
PRA analysis and delivered an analysis report (LMSC-F2230402, January 1988)
which is included as attachment I. The engineering and analysis teams
consisted of personnel having a broad mix of PRA and spacecraft systems
engineerlng expertise, including new college graduates, journeyman-level
engineers with PRA and system engineering experience, senior project
engineers, and managers. These teams possessed little or no experience with
propulsion systems. They were assisted by consultants who contributed an
understanding of the system's operation _nd an understanding of NASA's needs
across the communities of engineering; safety, reliability, and quality
assurance (SR&QA); program managementl and PRA peer disciplines. Support for
the site-licensed PRA CAFTA software was provided by the vendor, Science
Applications International Company (SAIC).
A subsequent independent peer review of the PRA was accomplished by Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratories (LLNL) under the sponsorship of the NSTS
Program OFfice. This review was supported by the LMSC analysis team, and the
LLNL review results and team responses are included in attachment I.
The team mix brought these various specialty areas to the project; however,
the systems engineering specialists originally had no knowledge of PRA
methodology, nor did the PRA specialists have any knowledge of manned space-
craft systems. LEMSCD personnel and the consultants provided the under-
standing of engineering, operations, and NASA's SR&QA techniques and policy.
LMSC provided the necessary expertise in PRA analysis techniques. Meetings
and working sessions between the groups provided the necessary cross-
fertilization across disciplines. This interdisciplinary exchange required
by the process made it evident that PRA would be especially useful on a new
project as an integrated activity during the design, development, and test
3-1
_ phases rather than as a separate appraisal after vehicle development is
mature.
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V 4. PRA METHODOLOGY
Figure 4-I is a graphical summary af the process flow used to perform the
MPPS PRA. The Figure depicts the following process elements: a system
definition, failure rate data base development, and PRA software :ools.
Figures 4-2 and 4-3 are provided for discussion Of fault trees contained in
section 4.2.
4.I SYSTEM OEFINITION
The most important step in a PRA project is system definition. Th_s is
accomplished by an engineering review of all system and component documemts,
drawings, and schematics to provide a clear understanding of the system
requirements and operaticn. This allows the creation of a system definition
and the establishment of boundaries defining what will be _ncluded in the
scope of the study. This was difficult because the MPPS crossed many Shuttle
element boundaries and mission-operational regimes.
4.2 FAULT TREE
The end product of this analysis is a fault tree whose top level is shown in
figure 4-2. The fault tree in itself does not reflect the system reliability
or likelihood of failure. PRA assumes that components fail; hence, it is
necessary to characterize all malfunctions as failures at the component or
Functional level. The fau|t tree is constructed in a logical manner to
depict the relationships between failures. This requires generation of
failure modes as had previously been done by the NSTS program using the FMEA
technique. These previously generated FMEA's and hazard analyses (HA's) were
used to complement and validate the current Fault tree analysis. It is then
necessary to determine whether failures of one or more components or
functions at any level will propagate into the top level event, which is loss
of life or vehicle. This is illustrated in figure 4-3. The fault tree
progresses from the top event through the definition of mission phases,
categories of failures, and definition of contributing functions. The bottom
love} represents failures or groups of failures which contribute to system-
level failures. The fault tree simply provides a mapping of all failure
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VEXAMPLES
Top Level Even te.I.
I
' Major
• Mission
Phase
• rl: OR
Category
of Failure
Ultimate
Result of
Failure
_'1 OR
Lossof Life or Vehicie
Lossof Engine
Loss of Mission
Very Expensive Failure
Prelaur_ch Countdown
OPF Checkout
Ascent, Orbit. Landing
OMS Burn
External Tank Related Failure
Engine Shutdown Related Failure
Fire or Explosion
Prope{tant Flow Related Fault
Engine Thrust Failure
Pogo Suppression Faiture
Helium System Oepressurization
LH2 Leak
LH2 Tank Overpressu rization
Valve Failure
Line/Weld/Flange
HEX Coil Rupture
GH2 Flow Contamination
Pump Cavitation
2 of 3 Flow Control Valves
_-,,'° 4-3 Fau le tree _rchit_cture.
4-4
events which can progress to a top event. The analysis is iterative, as the
PRA analyst modifies the engineering Fault tree model to improve
com_utationa_ efficiency while preserving engineering clarity.
The fault tree does not reflect the degree of system usefulness. In the
original application of PRA, response to failure results in a safe shutdown.
In mann_u _p_ce operations, safe shutdown of critical components or functions
is _ot acceptable, and it is necessary to continue the mission using redun-
dant systems which have noC failed or default to operational workarounds, or
to continue operations during a safe abort.
U
At the top of the fault tree in Figure 4-2 is the top-level event - loss of
life and/or vehicle, which would result from a failure in some component of
the MPPS which propagated to the top level event, The system was analyzed in
three phases of mission operation: (I) prelaunch, (2) powered flight, and
(3) ET separation. Each phase has an operating environment so distinctive
that the three phases were identified as the second level of the tree. Each
phase then forms its own unique tree, and the software treats each
separately. The next level of the tree provides categories of failures which
can cause the top-level event to occur. Examples of these are ET-related
Failures and catastrophic failure due to fire and overpressure. Finally, the
malfunctions which may, by themselves or in combination with others, cause
the loss of function were identified and placed in the fault tree as basic or
bottom level events.
The fault tree indicates those events which were not analyzed, as well as
those that were. The diamond symbol under the event 'catastrophic failure
due to internal missile generation" indicates that this event was not
analyzed. The triangle symbol indicates continuation of the tree event in
more detail. The complete fault tree is quite detailed and fills
approximately 150 pages similar to figure 4-2.
U
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4.3 FAILURE RATE OATA BASE DEVELOPMENT
In reference to figure 4-I, it was necessary to obtain failure rate data on
the various components in order to get some type of relative ranking of the
failures. NASA sources such as Problem Reporting and Corrective Action
(PRACA) and other NASA data sources were inadequate, either because of the
small number of samples or because service life and operation cycles were not
available. The PRA team extracted, From Department of 8efense (DOD) sources
such as military handbooks and Rome Air Oevelopment Center notebooks, generic
Failure rate data on similar components in an operating environment very
close to that experienced on Shuttle flights. These data proved to be more
acceptable than was originally anticipated.
4.4 PRA SOFTWARE
In reference to Figure 4-i, the software, CAFTA, was provided under license
from SAIC. This software greatly sim1_liFies the PRA analysis process. It is
used in developing and updating the fault trees, can be used to manage the
failure rate data base, can quantify and prioritize the various failures, and
can be used in sensitivity analyses where the effect of component reliability
on the probability of a top-level event occurring can be evaluated.
The software, waich was run on an IBM PC-AT, was easy to use and understand.
Training times were short for PRA team members who had no previous exposure
to PR$L The load imposed by the MPPS analysis taxed the limits of L_e
addressable memory of the machine and indicates that more complex systems
will require something larger than a persona] computer (PC).
4.S SUGARY OF PRA METHODOLOGY
The PRA methodology accomplishes wh_t is intended. It provides an accurate
representation of failure scenarios, pinpoints weak areas in system design,
flags those areas requiring more attention, and prioritizes the various
categories of Failures.
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Its weaknesses arei_s _f_li!ows:
ao
bo
C.
It cannot test for model completeness.
Its quantitative results are limited by the quality of input data.
The analysis may be simplistic in its representation of the system-level
behavior.
Fortunately, these weaknesses can be minimized or eliminated by use of the
FMEA and HA techniques; thus PRA and FMEA, when used together, complement
each other.
U
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5. LESSONS LEARNED
As a result of the MPP$ pilot project experience, eight major lessons were
learned. These lessons are discussed in sections 5-1 through 5-8.
5.1 MPPS PROBLEM AREAS
No new problem areas were identified by the PRA study. This is not
surprising, since the Shuttle is a mature engineering system that has
undergone years of development and study. This observation lends additional
confidence to the FMEA/CIL process.
The study identified the single forges: category of catastrophic failures to
be those associated with leakage of pressurized mechanical.system components
which results in explosion or compartment overpressurization. This single
failure category contributes over 84 percent of the MPPS risk. The addition
of functional redundancy will not, in general, reduce overall risk.
Additional piping and components containing propellants or pressurants
increase, rather than decrease, the catastrophic risk sources, with the
resulting failure probability growing at a polynomial rate. It would appear
more beneficial to emphasize controlling the direct sources of risk through
ground maintenance and early leak detection.
5.2 USEFULNESS OF PRA FOR NASA
The PRA has the ability to quantify risk. The FMEA methodology does not.
Not only does the FMEA process ignore quantification in general, but it (by
definition) cannot consider 'multiple failure modes." In principle, such
analyses could be performed, but the question would always remain whether all
reasonable combinations had been considered. The heart of a PRA study is its
"top down" methodology, in which the system is dissected and quantified free
From designer-level prejudice.
5.3 RISK HIERARCHY
The PRA analysis yie}ded an effective ranking of the risks relative to loss
_, life and/or vehicle due to MPPS failure. Sensitivity computations served
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ito verify the internal Consistency of the fault tree. The PRA methodology
points toward an objective resolution of the conflicts of traditional
engineering analysis. If the results of the PRA study are disputed, it is
necessary to identify and resolve the Flaws, either in the Fault tree Gr in
the assigned failure rate data. The bottom line is that the study provided
an explicit quantification of the risks inherent to the MPPS.
5.4 KNOWLEDGECAPTURE
Two major products of the PRA analysis were the fault tree and the associated
MPPS system description. In retrospect, it is evident that both of these
products serve a purpose beyond their immediate intent, in Chat they provide
a vehicle for knowledge transfer. To be precise, the system description was
generated because there was no comparable document in the NASA literature.
It organized information available in many sources into a comprehensive
system description. The fault tree, originally developed to support the
quantification critical to the PRA procedure, also served to reinforce the
system description. These products capture corporate knowledge far beyond
their obvious intent,
5.5 COMPLEXITY OF THE PRA METHODOLOGY
Contrary to expectations, the PRA methodology proved to be easily understood
by the technical staff. There are subtleties that require specialized
knowledge, but the project staff had no trouble in absorbing the genera]
technique. This is especially noteworthy when one considers the diverse
composition of the engineering amd analysis teams. In actual fact, it was
found that the PRA analysis process provided a common forum which encouraged
inputs from the various engineering and SR&QA disciplines. The PRA process
demands of its practitioners a commitment to excellence, and all members of
the team responded to the challenge.
5.6 THE FAILURE RATE 8ATA_BASE
The study illustrated the inadequacy of the extant NASA data base for failure
rate data. In general, the problem is easily described; the current data
reflects Failures, but without quantification as to time, cycle, cause, or
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detail. On the other hand, the MIL-SPEC generic data bases proved quite
adequate to the quantification of the MPPS fault tree. This indicates that
effective analyses can be performed in the absence cF Shuttle-specific data,
though the latter is clearly preferred.
5.7 SOFTWARE CONSIDERAT!ONS
The computer software was crucial to the success of the MPPS analysis. In
particular, the CAFTA fault tree analysis program allowed easy development
and manipulation of the Fault tree. The Latin Hypercube Simulation/Top Event
Matrix Analysis Code (LHS/TEMAC) sensitivity codes allowed the PRA team to
perform computations that were far beyond the capability of hands-on
calculation. On the minus side, the magnitude of the MPPS project taxed the
CAFTA program to its limits. It is clear that software support is necessary,
and that studies larger than :he MPPS will require expansions of computer
capability (more memory and better program integration).
5.8 PRA AS A MANAGEMENT TOOL
The immediate results of the MPPS PRA study provide a convenient too) For
management, in that the resulting risk hierarchy aids in the allocation of
sometimes scarce engineering resources. Furthermore, the fault tree and its
associated quantification are extremely flexible in practical application.
For example, once the basic Fault tree and risk data base are in place, it is
easy enough to reflect changes in the MPPS system, simply by editing the tree
or data base. The products of the analysis serve as a flexible and visible
madel of the MPPS system.
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6. REFERENCEMATRIX
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the l_ke!_oo_ of a catastrophic accident by ut_[zz_ng ProbaO,l_st_c Rz_k
_e_smen_ (PR_) techniques. The r_u[t_ o_ th_ a_udy Id_n_fy thal the m_jor
comtrtbutors to catas%roph_c failure of _he MPPS are a_aoc_aled _th hard.are
leaPage and ructur_ _hich r_ult zn _xploston or aft coMOartMent
ov_rpr_urtZati_n. @reach of pressure boundary _s the C_r_ct re=u_t of rando_
_eal/_e|d/_o_nt Leakage anc _o_ of com_onen( structural :nteqrzty.
.. _'/ •
POOR gU .
Section I
INTRODUCTION
LmSC FZZ_O40Z
in January I_7, Ine Natlonal Research Council Risk Oversioht Panel
recommemded that N_S_ oerform a Proba_lli_tlc Risk 6ssessmen: (FR_) of _ever_l
_Qace Shuttle _ystems. in response to the recommendatlon, the NAS_ National
State Tran==ortati_n System Grogram Office requesled that Lockheed Engineerln_
and Management Services Co. (LEMSCO) perform a PRO on the Shuitle Main
Frooulsion Pressurlzaticn Systsm (MPPS). The intent of this effort _as tc
de_ermlne if any areas cf concern not previously iden_ifieO by th= F_E_!HA _ere
uncovered and to evaiuate the usefulness of PRA methodology. This e?fomt
parallels e _Imilar t_sk currently belnQ reformed by McDonel! Douglas on the
Ruxili_ry Power Unit (_PU) _hlch suoports hydraulic _ow_r generation for _he
Shuttle Main Engine and the Flight Control System.
Under the direction of LEMSCO, Lockheed Missiles & Space Company's {LM_C)
RID Oivisio_ _as commissioned to perform a comprehensive evaluation of risk
posed by the MPPS during flight and preflight _hases. Periodic meetings were
held bezween N_S_ and LEMSCO/LMSC to further define the scope of analysis and to
discuss _ecific risk issues of interest _Ithln _he MPPS.
The _rincipal ourpose of this study is to quantify in _robabilistic terms
the risk uhich the 5pace Shuttle's MPPS Ooses to human life and prooenty, PR_
is the analysis technioue used for thls purpo=e, A description of the
historical use of PR_ as an analytical fool and a Oefinition of MPPS boundaries
consioered wilhln the scope of analysis are orovided in th_ following
paragrapha.
I._ USE OF PR_
PR_ is a method of qu_ntlfying the probabilities of potential _¢cidemt_ ant
_heir conseouemoes. PRA employs fault tr:e an=lysi_ <?T_) _o develop and
eva!ua_e a _ystem model as well as t_ analyze consequences and _hezr associated
r_sks. PR_ has _een used as a technique to formally addres_ these ri_ks at
nuclear _o_er plants since the Reactor Safety Study, WASH-ICe@, was oerformed in
f975. P_ior to _SH-liBO, the _oein9 Corporation applied PR_ to an evaluation
ef _he Minuteman misaile, The aeorosgace industry initially viewed PR_ _s too
expensive _nO subseouen%ly reolac=d it with non-probabilislic (i.e.
deterministic) methods such as Failure Modes and Effects _nalyse_ (FME_=) and
hazards analyses (H_s). These _ere the tools NMSA had used is da_e in their
analyses of _he risk posed by $oace 5hurtle _ystems,
S|mce _SH-14@@, FRA has beem applied to many other industries such as
chemical, _e_rochem_cal and defense, bu_ not to _be same e×_ent a_ in _he
nucl_r industry. Consequently, the methods of analysis and _he comouter codes
used to solve the numerical comou_atlons for thi_ study were adopted from the
nuclear Industry where the PRA _echnlque is most mature.
FRM is recognized in the nuclear _ndustry as _he best available tool for
quantifying the frequency a_d severity of serious accidents, PRA grovtdes
tnfor_ation to suoport a concerted effort to identify corrective Cur preventive)
actions u_th _he Orea_est potential _o reduce overall risk. Nonethe!e:s, FR_ is
not a stand-alone ana!ysi_ for the evaluation cf risk; a well-executeO PR_ i_
based on FMEAs, hazard analyses, and other standard _eslgn activitte=.
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Slnce data are often incomplete. _R_ doe_ have certain limitations uhich may _
_ummari:ed as follcw_:
PR_ may not identify all events that could _tart or d_r_c_
the course of an ac:ident. In addition, there 1_ no test of
model completeness (i.e. _Moor_ant acciden_ _cenarlos coul¢ _
uninten!icn_lly omitted by ihe analyslst).
SuffLcient and tellable data may not be avazl_ble to Model
and quantify _he benavior_ of system and accident Droce_ses.
The faui% trec analysis tooi ui_iized _n PRA _ay be _im_!Istzc in it_
representation of _ystem i_vel b_havZor.
The_e i:mitatlcn_ do no:, he,ever, dim:ni=h the n_d for a _robabil_ty-
ba_ed a_essment of ri_k, PR_ z_ a _ystematic _oproacn tc evaluatln9 r_sk Qiven
=he _nformation end un_er_tandLn_ available at the t_mm that the analy_z_ is
oerformed. In effect, PR_ i_ an attempt to oetermine: Whet _am go wrong? Ho_
likely is _t to happen? If _t hoogen=, what are thecon_eouences_
!.2 COMP_RISON OF PRR _ITH OTHER METHDDOLOBIES
0ual_lative t_chnioue: _uch a_ FMEQ have been ui_ely used in the aeromoace
i_dus_ry a_ e means to identify end control sources of risk. The FME_ i_
e_sent_ally a bottoms-up approach; e_ch component or subcomoonent _ analyzed
?or its failure mode_, cau_e_ of it= failure and the effects of i!_ _a_lure on
the _ystem to which it belonos. For examole, in the case of the O-rin_ in _he
Challenger accident. She effects of e leak _ere correctly identified e_
re_ultino in "high-lemoera!ure gas flow burn-throughend case Out,t;
catastrophic failure of SRM {_olI¢ rocket mo_or)_ mission lo=s; veh_c|e lo_s and
_arsonnel loss". Nevertheless, zn the case of _hallenger, a recision uas made to
launch d_soil¢ _he existence of _his and hundred_ of other identified s|no!e
ooint fazlure_.
FME_= _nd other hazard_ analy_e_ are al_o limited in thai they consider
occurrence of only one failure at e time, The logical connection betweem events
_nd systems is not apparent from the FMEA documentation. In many _ztuations.
subtle interactions between varlou_ systems or between man an_ machine are
mi_ed in the consideration of individual oomoonent failures in the FME_
acoroacn. (See Table l-t for a comparison of _he advantage_ and disadvantages
of FMERs and FT_s,) Combinations of events that can lead to failure may have
a grealer _robability of occurrenc= than _ingle feilure=_ yet the FMEA is not
designed to address combznatlons of failure.
By contrast, the FTR _ • to_-down eoproach; a top level event '_ first
ident:f_ed, _uch es "failure of the MPPS which results in los= of life and/or
vehicle'. Then the po=_ibl¢ failure combinations causing thi_ event are
developed. For each event, contributory events or chains of event_ are
_ucce_slvely deveioped, until arriving at the basic event,_. L_hlch are u-_uelly
_'_ng!e co.mDoncnt failures or human errors, By this method e downward branchinQ
fault tree i_ formed. Figure 2-Z consist= of &he to(: branches Of the fault tree
_enerated for the= r=pcrt. U_ng B_olean "end" "or" log_c, _he total proban_-
l;i_e_ of var;ou_ fa_[ur_:s ar_ calculated and their r_:|at_ve =ontri0utzons tc
tme t._tal rl_R ere as_e-,=ed. Refer to Figure _-__" for definitions o; _ymbols.
1.30RGANIZhTION OF THE REPORT
Thss re:ort _ divided into e maln report (Volume i) anc _o_endzce_ R
ihrougn _C which are contained in Volumes iianO !II. Th_s re_ort z_ Oivided
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into a maln report (Uolume I) and Appendlcms h throuoh K which are contained in
Volumes II and ill. Volume I contains the Methods by which the anaiysl5 ua_
perforMe_, the dmta 5ources used for prob_bilislic qua_ification , and
description= of the _ystem_ and ev_ni_ included in the reliability mod_l.
The executive summary. Section 2.0, d_scusse_ the Major conclu_zon_ and
recommendati0n_ re_ui_ing from _n_s PR_. Methodology _o COmDutational
(echnioues _re pre_enleo :n Section _._. Quantitative evalua¢ion of r_ii_ility
l_ performed in Section 4. h brz_f _:r_ot_on of _n-_c_ _y_tem_ and hardware
is pre_ented in Sectlon S. Risk and c_ns_ouenc_ analysis is _ummarlz_d in
Section 6.
Ap_endice_ contain all the _upporting documentation and comoutatlon For _he
technical evaluation. A _rief descr_ptlcn of the _ppondice_ i0 provld_d below:
_pp_ndi,< R:
_poandlx B:
doscrzotion of abOreviaticn_, acronymns, LniliaLzsms and
termm u_ed throughout %h_ report,
d_crLoCion of fault tree basic events an_ the shortened
descrxptors (mn_Monlcs), along with a cross referenc_ of
p_ges wnere each basic event appears Xn the tree.
AppenOix C: Tabulated failure ratem, exposure ti_em and other suoportlno
data used to calculate basic _vop( probabilities.
Appendix O: De%ailed fault tree showing al! branches expanded. A
description of _ach of the branches along with rationale for
the fault tree s_ruclure i_ provided.
Agpendix E: OeiaIL_ end outline drawings for maQor syslem components.
The_e drawings sup_immeni _ys_em de_cr_pt_on_.
Appendix F: A diacumsion of fire and ex_los'ion caused by l_mkage and
conlamination. General discussion to i!lu_irale mechanlsm_ by
which ieakage and contamination can cause caiaslrcpnic
?a_lure_,
Appendix _: _round operations and tasks which _re reouired during ground
fi|l and flloh$ preparation.
Appendix H: Fault tree consistency evaluatlon to cross index FME_
_quence_ with appropriate port_on_ of the PR_ model, This
index i_ a comorehen_ive review df all FME_'s which are
related to &he main Dro_ul_ion system.
_ppendix I: CAFT_ code files u_ed to analyze and quantify risk. are
attached to a brief _yno_o_ of the prooram'_ c_pabilitie_.
&ppendi× J: Codem used to test _tatiaticml sensitivity using Latin
Hypercube techn1_ue_ and TEMPO _oftware.
A_pendix K : Comment@ resultin_ from Lawrence Livermore National Laborato-
ry'_ :ndeoendenl review of this reoort _re addressed,and the
zmOact of Lhe co_en_s on tho re_ort are d_scws_cd.
Ea'ch of the tmbles and figures in th_ Appendices ore _wppl_mented by
aoCo_panylng taxi _nd de#criptions of their use w:thin the ma_n report.
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TABLE I- I
A COMPARISON BETWEEN FAULT
.AND
CURRENT SAFETY ANALYSIS
TREE ANALYSI S
TECHNIQUES
I I I
ADVANTAGES
DISADVANTAGES
im i
FAULT TREE ANALYSI S
II i II
• DEDUCTIVE
• ACCOHODATES FAILURE
COMBIN ATIONS/INTI_A CTION$
• PRIORITIZESM PROMkBILISTIC
IMPORTANCE FAILURES
• SY$1_ OHIENTED
III Ill II
- UNIQUE PE_SONNE.L TALENTS
• TIME INTENSIVE
CURRENT METHOD
(_/HAZARDS ANALYSIS)
I I II
• EASILY UNDF,]L_OOD (INDUCTIVE)
• SYSTEMATIC
• ROUTINE APPLICATION MISSES
SUBTLETIES
• MAY OMIT
- HUMAN £LqORS
- SECONDARY FAILURE F.;J-'I:.'I_CTS
- COMMON CAUSE FAILURES
• TRADITIONALLY LIMITED TO
SINGLE FAILURES
* OB$CURI-':SDEPF.,NDF.,NCIES
! I
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In po_t-Chailenger discussions w:th Ccngre_=ionel Committees _n_ the
N_tlc_al Research Council Ri_k Management Oversight _ane]. criticism _aS levied
aoaJnst NRS_ because o? the inability te ortor_tize the 1368+ _ingle pclnt
failures, in the ab_nc_ of a rank_nW it wa_ difficult to determine where
special effort was needed in failure evaluatlon, _n design improvement, in
_anagement review of problems, an_ In _It_hi readiness reviews. The belte_ was
that the manag¢ment _ystem was overwhel_ed by the quantity of critical harc_are
items that were on the Critical Items Li_t and that insufficient attention was
p_ic to _he items tnal required it.
Congressional =tall members ?ram Congressmen Markey's committee who have
oversight responslb_i_ties in the nuclear industry, and specifically over the
ruclear fewer suoplie_ for NS$_'s Gal_leo and Ulyssa_ misslon_, felt very
strongly that th_ addition of PR8 to the exzsting Failure Mode Effaces
_nalysts/Hazaro _nalysi_ {FME_/Hh) methods wa_ e×cee_zngly important. They
indicated thai the PR6 approach had matured to the extent that it could hanole
very _mail failure rata data bases, _uch as thai Maintained by N_S_. NAS_
respon_me with arg_meni_ that th_ FMES/H_ had t!luminated all aigniftcant
failure mode= sat±sfactorily and thai no failure r_te data base was available.
compromise position to evaluate PR_ application to two _ilot systems,
MP_S and _u×iliary Power Unit (_PU). was suggested, The plan was to dc a PRA on
these two sub-system= to:
l. Idenllfy areas cf concern not previously identified by the
FME_/H8 process.
3. Evaluate the usefulness of the PRA methodo1oy.
The plan was put into effect an# has resulted =n the Lockheed PRA effort am
the MPPS. With regard to item _l a_ove, no new failures or combinations of
failures were Zdentifte_ by the PR_ process. Thi= result i_ not unexpected if
o_e considers that ihe MPPS ks a mature system, has flown repeatedly after a
thorough design, development, test, and eveluatzen and has passed through a
thorough qualification and certification program - eli of which effectively
detect design, manufacturing, an_ inspection weaknesses. [n addition, ihe FME_
on the MPPS elements is equally mature, as it ha= been _crutinizeO by numerous
contractors and issued twice,
The select_on o? the MPPS was perhaps not the best for illustrative
purposes, s_nce _t contains numerous single failure points {SFP_). The dominant
rt_k contributors, therefore, are associated with the individual 5FP's, rather
than with the combinations of failures which the PR_ highli_ht_ _o el/actively.
Wxth re_ect to item #2 above: _he usefulness of using PRR on a shuttle
_ub-slste_ i_ effec_ive!y demonstrated. The fault tree i;_elf p_ovides managers
w_th a !oOZCal, to_-down perspective of the entire system dur_no all m_sston
phases. The quantlficalion of the various events cn _he tree. base_ on the best
Generic failure rate data available (In _ha absence of shuttle-spec_fic fat_ur5
r_te Oata), combined with a Monte Carte treat_e_,t _f _,,_ _,,iy, yteio a
OQIQINAE m
oF POOR OUAUTY
LMSC FZZ3040Z
_robability range for the loss of life and/or vehicle due to failures
or_glna_ing in the MPPS. The PR_ orocess s_rves as an excellent cross-check
against the FME_'s, building upon the knowledge of component failure modes,
causes and system effecis. The determination of a ranked lisling of failure
conlributors provides guidance to NASA management as to where attention mu_t b_
focused to r_duce risk. Th_s ranking is _een a_ a useful tool in a v_riaiy cf
areas involving _he following program decisions:
a) Oeslgn
b) Failure analysis
c) Selections of improvement :hangee
d) Oes_gn revie_ decislons by _an_oe_n+
e) Readiness reviews
f) Waivers
_) Spares _rovi_ioninq _lan_
h_ Mat_rial review board
i) Procuremenl controls
j) Inspection planning
k) Estaolishment of critical _roc_ss controls
1) Oesloning test _rograms
m) E_,ecuilon of cost benefit ana!ysts
Some specific benefits of PRA which result from the Lockh_eO _licaiion of
PR_ to the MPPS include:
General failure cateQ_ries in the top branch of _he fault
tree are highlighled, lhereby providing better system
insights io N_SA manaoemenl.
Zq Imter-sysiem dependencies and interactions such as thi_ ere
ty_ically omit_eO fro_ N_S_ FME_s. _n example i_ the
hydraullc system which is out of scope. Th_ PR_ _uanttfies
the extenl to which the _neu_atic system is challenge_,,by e
_ailure in the hy6reulZ¢ system.
The faul_ tree graphically displays the limits of the
analys_; for example, contamination and ice plugging are
not trea_ed quantitatlve_y Cb_cau_ of _ Lack of data), but
_o appear on the f_ult Ir_ to hlghli_ht _rca_ of future
inve_tigallon_.
4, The fault tree treats combination5 of failures such as a
two-out-of-four criterion for the hydrogen and oxygen
depletion sensors and a two-oul-of-thre_ criterion _or the
flow control valve_. CoMmon caume or mode failures _uch
as _hese are treated incompletely or no_ aL all in N_5_
FME_so
_° The fault _ree incorporates mlss_on phasing by considering
the mu|t_pl_ consequence_ of f_ilur_ for various m_Ssion
ohases; for example. _ncor_oralion of d_fferent enq_ne
requirements for intact abort scenarios allo_s ?or an
oss_ss_ent of sysLem reliaDzLlty over the entire Mission.
In contrast, the NAS_ FME_ Lyrically provide only Lh_ _or_t
c3_e s?_ct of a component Failure on tne _ystem rather _nan
_ore realist_: assessment o_ consequence s_nslt|ve to
_ystem modes end conf_gurations,
 UAUTV
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The fault tree offers a terse _resentatlcn of the path_
_h_ch lead to the top event catastrophy "loss of life and/or
vehicle due to failures in the MFPS". The only sequences
which ao0_ar ir_ those which lead tG ?allure, and the_e are
contained in slightly _ore than 159 pages. In contrast, the
NSSS FME_5 conta:n many _ore oages, as they include iteMo
which do noi either by themselves, or =n co_lnat:on, lead
to loss c? life a_dlor vehicie.
In conclusion, PRFl, coupled wi_h aensitivity analyses, prov_de_ a
rankimo _ymt_m with _hicn to a_sess NASA sy_teM_ thrcughout their
life. It is iM_ortan= _o _o_ly PR_ early in _y_te_ life, when chan£=-
can be afro:ted _t minimal cosl. It _5 alao imoortamt to develop a
failure rata data ba_ on pmogram hardware to enhance thm realism _n_
_redibility of the FR_.
It i_ there?ore recommended that PROs be utilized at the beginning of n_w
N_S_ _ro_ram_, and thal _elec±ed high energy _yS_em_ on sp_c_ _h_ttle, where
ca_trophi_ failures can be generated, be considered for _ retmo-active
a_pizcallon of PRA,
2.1 SIGNIFICANT FINOtNGS
Table 2-I _how_ a compositional breakdown o_ events [_ading to loss of life
and/at ve_icle. The event_ have boen grouped into the following g_neral
ca_cgor_.=s :
1.
7
3.
¢o
5.
S.
Explo_ion/comoar_nt over-pre@@urization,
Valve-relaled failures,
Tdrbopump fazlure_,
Los_ of Pogo suppression Sy@teM,
Lose of pro_ellant _ystam screens, and
M_sc_!la_eou_.
Th_e classifications were based on _he too level fault _ree m_oel for the
MPP5 _re_ented in Figure 2-2. Oeta_i_ regarding the development of lower
branches in the tr_e are orovided in Section 3.
-- .1. 1 RL_k Contributorm
1. Catastrooh_c E;_plos_ons and Overpressuriza{ion Events
The _ingIe largest category of catastrophic ?ailur_ _s that associated
with the r_ndom _reach of mechanical system mre_ure boundary. Th=_ _nctude_
release of _aler_al through eilher the propellant _pZng/component_ or the
helium (He) oneumatic system. _t the zndlvldual commonent !evel the ?aLlures in
the H_gh Pressure Oxld_zer Tarbo#ump <HFOT) heat exchangers and turbepumo_ are
major contrt_utors. Co[lect_veiy, however, the numercu} other we[_ jo_nls,
_eals, fzttlng_ and mechanical connection_ (through wh:cn oro_ leakage could
occur) are the mo_t a_gn_f_canl _actor.
ORI6 R L PA E ;5
QuAu 
LMSC FZZ 3040Z
The mechanis_ for these catastrophic failures varies depending on the type
cf material released. For helium_.._ystem depresurizatlon, the primary _ffect i_
compartment overpressuri_'_Ltion. Hellum is an inert gas incaoabla of zgn_zion.
l'FFe impact of gross leakage or comDonent rupture on the _pace Transportation
5yste_ (STS) i5, _here?ore, Maln!k one of _tructural damage io the orbiter (if
vent panels in the aft compartment cannot compensate For th_
overpre_sur_za_ion>.
The acciden_ consequence cf _r_achlng the _opeiiant _¥sieM giplng end
components :s immediate explosion._Mos--t'of t_ese leaks occur w_thin the oroiter
_?t coMpart_ent-_e_ui t_,,_-zn elt_er an _Mediate.e._p_,?sion___oj_erpr_._uriz____at ion
of _he compartments- Im_d_a+_ expiosion-would be the result of cryogenic fiu_
Gon__a._{ip_ _,-l-_'.'_tsd |_mn_rature SGurce_. Ov_rpreB_ur:zatio_ is the primary
accident consequence when i_ediate ignition sources ar_ not _resent in the
vicinity Qf l=akage (e.g. gaseous oxygen pressurization line), That i_, gradual
or ra_zd depre_urization lead_ It _tructural damage o_ the aft comparlment if
ore_ure relief is not achieved.
U_Ive Relaled Functlona! Fail.ure_
The _ost important valve-related failure_ are those which comstltute
_Ing!e oo_nt failures. Functionally redundant valveo _hmch ooeraie indeoen_ently
o_ each other-_throuQh _eoarate control signals, _o_er su_oiies, pneumalic
supply etc.) contribute minimally to overall risk.
T,t!e.b_'a-i-w_-_ood v_Ivm_ ¢onlribute significantly to the too
event occurrence within thz_ category of failure_. _n the helium _ystem_ flow
regulators comprise the most important functional failures. Other system valves
such as external tank _re_sur|zation flow control valve_ and External Tank
(ET)/orbiier disconnect valve failure are minor contribulor_ to riok,
_. Tur_ooumo
Tur_opuMp failures a_sociated with the MPP5 are pri_arily cau}ed by laakag_
through mechanical _eal_.
_. Lo_s o? POQO Suppression Syste_
The valves, _iping, and accumulators _hich comprise the POlO _ogre=_Zon
system accoun_ for le_s _han one percent of the total failure probability.
Failure to regulate low frequency oscillations is assumed to cause slruct.ural
damage to the 5TS and/or los: of life,
S. Loss of Propellant System Screeno
Bmeak-a_art or %earing o_ _ro_ellan_ screens (located downstream of engine
pre-v_!ves> _s assu_ed to cause Oump binding. Fragmenta of the screen will
destroy the turbogumg on i_pact. The l_kelihoo_ of these _ingle point failures
collectively a_oun_ to le_ than one half of one percent of the total failure
probability.
_, Miscellaneous
_emaln&_ event5 contribute neQlig[b!y to overall r_l_. Th_ category
cons_ts _rimdr_[y of }pur_ou_ _clua_on o _ control c_rcu_t_ an_ o:her in-sc_e
portions of the electrical t_tru_entat_on and controls.
_|_AL PAQE
O_ F_)R QUALF,eY
LMSC FZZ304_2
_ RECOMMENDATIONS
The key tc nininizing the likelihood of =atastmoph/c accidents =_
controlling Ignitable leaks end sources of compartment overpressurizat_on.
Breach of pressure boundary, whether !he result cf ran_o_ ?=ilur_ or human
error, are expecteO to account for mor_ than four fifth_ of the iota! risk. In
comparlson, Failures _t_ctly related tc the functional performance ef the
enolme <i.e., safe engine _hut_own c_pabi_Ity) constitut_ a _mall fraction of a
percent of ail events _ding zo cataszrophic accidents.
Thase percentages re0re_ent preliminary findings be_ed cn i_ue_ aCcresmed
as part of the _cope cf thls analy:l_. Cther risk _cur_ = a_soclatmd with the
MPPS were not included _n the analysis and r_qu_r_ further i_vestigation.
partlal list of risk sources not addressed or proba0iliszical!y Quantified _
this _tudy im contained in Section 2.6.
6(_dition of f_nctional redundancy will not, in general, signiF:cantly
reduce cvera_l r_sk because add_Lional piping and components containing
propellant, hydraulic ell or high pressure helium will contribute _ore source.s
of fire end explosion. It i_ therefore recommenoed thai effort_ be (_irected
towards controlling direcl sources of explosion or tho_e leakage ano rup_.ure
_vents _hich lead re, an expio_ion. Table _-2 conlalns recomm-=ndati_ns base_ on
the PR_. _dditional -_reas requiring further investigation are itemized in Table
2.Z.l Prevention of E×plc_ion and 0verpres_urizat_on Scenarios
Explosion and overpreasurization event5 were quantified based on generic
dale for co_poncnt rupture_, seal failures and other leakage ter_. The data is
ba_ed on reporled failures for environments and a_plications _imilar to that c_
the _TS. However, leakage _n the 5TS May have a lower frequency of occurrence
than _hat reporled in the dale book duc to the increased level of _nspmct_on of
hardware. Similarly, _rly detection of the leak may Oreclude catastrophic
explosion_ under certain :¢enarlo=, A brief di_cu_slcn i_ provider below.
Inspections Be!wean Fliqht_
A comorehansive investigation of the accuracy and consistency o_
nondestructive tesllno (NOT) is racom_enOe_. The %nvestlgation should include
I ) a review of human reliabi_lly in performin_ the tes_ and d_tec_in_ potential
flaw: and 2) a _iatlstlcal a_essment of the accuracy of the te_t performed in
actually _etecllng potential flaws.
The te_i _ypes presently being utilized between flight_ involve:
POOR QUAUT 
o
o
c_
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
Ultrasonic e×ten@iometer
Ultrasonic leak
Optical leak
Laser inter_erometry
Differentlal radiometry
Holographic leak
Re_Ist_vlty monitoring
Halogen leak
Flow leak
_5_ _p_c_r_sco_y
Thermal leak
LMSC FZZ30_OZ
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o
O
.0
o
c
o
o
o
c}
o
c
o
Torquing
Leak fluid
Pre=sure d=cay
l_otope thermomctry
Isotope trac_r_
8oreecoping
Exo_lectron _mi_ion
Positron ann,h_lai_on
Electric current injection
Eddie current
Continuity ch_ck_ng
X-ray radiography
Polarometry
Hygrometer
Optlcal Pyrometry
Other specialized flow detection methods may ai_o be Znoluded.
V
Le_ Cet_c_[cn
Sophisticated detectlo_ cf po:=nt:al th=rmal shock cond:tion_ or early lea_
_enoing prior to SRB ignition i_ crillcal to accld_nt preventlon. Follo_in9 $R8
ignition, _ffor_s _hou[d be Focused on in-_light leakage and high pressure
turboDumo _avit_ion prevention. In the PR_, high pressure tur_oDum_ cavilatlon
i_ assumed to result in pumo explosion.
Pump cavitelion detection mu:t b_ re_on_ive to the r_lat_vely _horl time
beiween transient :nltiation and Oumo exolo_ion. Currani|y exlst_ng 0arametr_c
sensing such a= pumQ _uclion pressure droo, exce_s vibration cf the _ump bocy,
pre_ur_ fluctuations throughout the prooellant _y_ten and ullag_ pressure may
represent only e smail number of detect:on schemes.
•. _._ Fa_iure Rate Data Base Oeve_oomenl
The computed top event orobabii:ty depend_ on basic event failure rale=.
Fai!ur_ rata information for %he _T_ hard.are _a= found to be fr_gvem:ary amd
incomplele. Thls resulted that oeneri= daia be u_d to _upplemen_ _TS _ecifi_
?_i!ur= rata.
rt i_ strongly recommended thai a failure data coilec!:on system _e
e_tabli_hed to fac_litate futur_ PR_ and re-_e_ign activ_ti=_, The main
comoonent_ of thz_ compel*dated data ba_e _hculd include (a_ a mlntmum) the
followino information:
o Hard.are name/de_cri_tlon (e-g- unloue identlfi=r)
Harduare type (i.e., pneumatically actuateQ hydraulic valve,
turbopun_, etc.)
_ailure h_tory <t.e., time .of failure, number of _es_ hourz/c,ic!e_,
time between failures, r=_a_r time)
E_ch t_t mu_t De describer _n _uff_c_en_ d_ta_l _o _hat _:_
_,gnz_:cance _or the e_t_m_tzon of th_ or_a_illty _f f3_!ur_ un_er
•_peratlonai con_tlon_ can be determined
ORi(_INAi. PAOI I$
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o Reaoon for any testinO that is no± _ar% of the prsplanned teal program
o Failure m_d_ Ce=¢rigtion.Zr_o: c_e evaluatlon
o Hard,are duty cyc1_ and o_ere!ing nodes
_ny 5T5 Fa_!ure rate data _nich cen'_e compiler c_n be u_ed 1o u_date
ear!ier est_n_te_ of performance b_se_ on generic data. rt _ important _o
note, hc_ever, that the cb_rvea failures may constitute a 5tati_¢ally _maii
s_mple for anaiytzcal purDcBe_. Caution should be taken to es:ab£_h the
confidence £ntervai when few failure5 are r_corced or when few o_eratimg hour=
withou: f&llure have been observed. Rl_o, te_ data must be treated differ_ntiy
from _ctua'l c_=rating d_ta.
The mamoo_er r_quired to imDlement thi_ failure rate data ba_e will be
deoemment on initial setu_ effort_. Most of the co_t _il! be incurred during
data b_e development and installation. Once _n place, re_ort_ng and record
updating _hould average 2-¢ hours oar failure incident Olue periodic updaleB %0
r_¢or_ the o_erat_ng log time for those componenl_ _nich have not experienced a
f_ilure. _u_h uodate_ prlmar_ly involve da_a _ranscripi_cn and r_quzre
_iOniF_cantl y les_ than one hour of effort _er component. Oata transfer option
from contractor nalntenence or mainlaznability data bases 0hould be
investigated.
2.2.3 Improvement of Oocumentat_om System
It wad the consensus among persons _onlr_butlng to thi_ _tudy that
N_$_'s documentation system (for techmtcal enaly_e_, drawing_ an_ reoort_
re_ard_ng the MPP5 an_ other system_) require= _ub=tantial improvement, Thi_
is particularly important in the follo_n_ areas:'
o Centr_ilzatlon of Technical Oata: Ccll_tion of the a_proor_a_e
documenis/drawLng= to perform thi_ _tudy _a_ time intensive. The
mec_sary _ocumenta_on had _o be obtained from a varlety o? N_
organizations and subcontractors. No central coordlnat_on cf _uch
cocuments wa_ found.
o Cocument Control: A mumbar of ?ac_ual inconsi_tenc_e_ were identi-
fie_ _n and between the various _ocument5 util_=_ _n thi_ _tudy.
The pro_er control of 9overning documents i_ essential to the
=ccuracy of the PR_ results.
o Quality of Documents: In a number of in=tances, particularly tho_e
relating to ground operation, th= reproduction quality wa_ e×_remely
_oor. B_tter ccp_es were often unavailable or non-existent within
N_SA'_ documentation _y_tem.
Future PR_ and other _afety _ludles _an be more effe_tive!y and
efficiently performed _t_h the _m_rcved availability, and _uali_y of tec_n_l
document_.
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2.3 STUCY LIMITATIONS
The f_It tree _odel r_resents failur_ _h_ch, _n themselves, cr :n
C_Mb_nstio_ w_th other events, reeul± zn occurrence of the ted event.
Znlti=l!y, the fault [nee Lo_ event Ls calculated based on pclnt (_ingle v_lue)
e_tlmases for Oasi; event orobabzlil:=s. The _robabilitles ape Desed on the
coin% estimate of _ atatist_c_ily _:gn_ficant _ampLe of r_c_rded r_li_res. E_ch
population of ?_ii_d components has an assoclst== dlstriOutlon. This
informa_ion is !o_t, however, _hen only %ha point e_timate :_ used.
Several method_ are ave_|able :o incorporate unceriantie_ about ba_zc event
_robabil_tiss Into a calculation of the top event probab:li:y. Tht_ can b_
acccmolishe_ by Syntheti: mampling, a v_rlan% of _hz:h is u:ed zn thi_
analysis, 6 _ess sophi_tlcated but simplier _Iternate m_thod u_ed t_ d_tern_ne
too even: variance is by evaluating _ensltivi_y. Sensitivity i_ t_ted by
v_rylng _oe_if£c basi_ event prooabililies _hila maintaining others constant.
In this manner, a range of too event probabilitie_ c'_n be generated, thus
bracketing "_crst" and "be_t" case ccnditzons, information regarding Synt_eilc'"
samoling and otmer sensitivity technique_ _s provided in _ection _.
The Generic fallure data _s based on _Leid _xoerlence with a pcouiation of
well-maintained comoonents and systems a_sumed to be _n the useful _id!Lfe
o_rform_nce range. The degraded reliability cf Darts due to wear-cut, limitsd
life, or fatigue zs not a part _f the analysis because aerospace parts are
a_umed t= be properly _n_ected. tested, and maintained or%or to launch.
Furthermore, t_e fazlure data from which the orobab_lit_es were derived ere
based on ex_erzenc= with aerospace _iss_le and satellite comoonents.
Informa_iom regardin_ e_uipment duly =ycle, nodes of o_eratioh and environmental
_re:se_ provide5 at most a "bes_ e_imate" cf expecte_ hard_are performance on
the STS. Much of the uncenlainty ar_se_ due to the trens]a{ion of "Dec-hour"
_a_iure r_te data (much of which is expressed Ln fallures per _iilion_ hours of
operation) into e "per demand" or =ycLic re,lute'rate. Th_s _s a _articularly
dlf?Icult Oroblem in the der_vatlon of _ailure promabzii_l vaiua_ for equioment
r=qu_r=O Lo o_er_e in different modes _ur_ng the varzou_ !auncn _ha_es.
Latent fallures _re con_dered owl of _cooe. &lthough ta&ent f_lure r_tes
are genera[IV _ns_gnific_mt comDareO wilh Oosl launch failure rates, %me
cumulative Latamt _eriod for the total of eli cOmponenis under evaluation _i_l
add to overall risk. In addition, ice _lugging and contamination are excluded
_rom the PRA a_ out of scope because data were umaveiiable.
2.4 COMPARISON OF HPPS PRA TO E_RLIER STUDIE_ AND TESTS
The value of a PRA depend= heavily on the understanding of accident
_=ouences, sn_ thelr subsequent _uant_fication. A revlew Of grevious enaiytica!
_valuasion_ was _ruczaL to both model develoomen_ and _uant_f:catLon. 6 brief
descr%_tlon o? _ome of the documents examined during the Course of this study i_
included below.
mumber ,)F prev_ou_ safety and ?unctiona_ studt:_ have been Derfcrmed by
n_S_ con%tactics Lo asse:: the potential "_SI._ _S_O_iated _It_ the _P_. A _e_
of _nese _tudle_ used in tm_s PR_ are _rovlde_ _n Table _-_. These _:ud_e_
:ro=aQillt:es have been assigned _o the p_t_iatgd _ccident sequences.
O ;GINALPAGE IS
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The MPPB FME_s (Refs. B, B, 18 and 30), were !he most zmOortani guides to
under_tandzng co_oonent failure _o_es, causes and sy_:am effects. Thz_
information was aloe valuabl_ in i_en_Ify_ng cert_1_ f_ilure_ which _ay be
induced by human _rrorm _n th_ _n-m_ch_ne inter_ace_. The FME_'_ are
part:cuiar!y u_eful to PRA in that they can _e used to ver£fy %he mco_5_nl
_equenc_ generated :n the rz_k _ode!.
Comprehensive review o? FME_ _i_gle point ?ailure_ wa_ performe_ to
en}ure that the safety-related FMEA items uerm properly inc!udec zn the r_k
_odel: lhe resullin_ _or_istency check :s docu_enteo zn Appendix H,
d_crzption and cre_ ind,× b_t_een the FME_ s_ngle point failures en_ fault
_r_e bam_c aven:_ are provided to f_czl_iate thz_ crc_s check. Mor_ di_cu_n
on detaz!_ regarding the ri_k Morel are provid_ i_ 5_ctlcn _.
U
2.S SUMMARY OF _N_LYTI_L _PPRO_CH
The analysis z_ based on a oeducttve !og_c _rocedure caller ?ault_tree
analysia. _ foul! troe i_ a graphical re_re_ent_io_ of all conceivable
accident _e_uencea _nich can l_a_ to a sy_Lem l_v_l c_ia_trophy. The fauIL _r=_
_o_el ccnez_ts of hard.ere failure, human error and environmental c_ntrzbulor_
to the _ystem i_vel cataslrophy.
In ri_k analysis, the too event i_ typically a _ysLem-!eve! acczcent _uch
a_ "1o_ of lifo an_lor vehicle", The undesirable top event is _ucce_s_v_ly
roduced to a combtnalion of lesser feilure_ represented in the Io_er branche_.
The lowe_i events depicted in a fault tree are re_re_enied by rectangles,
circles, and diaMond_. The diamond is used to _ndicete an event which could be
Further reduced bu_ _hich i_ noi, to s_mp|ify the depzciad fault tr=e
structure. The individual failure_ which are no_ fur:her reduced (basic events)
ar_ represented by circle_. The rectangle is used to indicate an intermediate
event tc be further reduced to basic _venLs. The triangle 15 u_¢_ to _ndicate a
continuatlcn of the fault tr_e. Figure 3-2 oontalno a depiction of fault tree
_ymboi_ and terminology,
Boolean algebra _m used to depict the ralat_onshipm a_ongst the _a_lurem.
The "and" 9ate indicates %he ev_nt_ necessary to proCuc_ the next higher event
i_ the tree. The 'or" gate indioates all _vent_ _uch that _ny one of _hi_h is
_ufflci_nt to pre_ce the nexl higher event.
In adOzlicn to the calculation of top-event probabilities, cu_et_ are
generated. A cut,mr i_ e collection of basic event} _ufficleni to cause the
occurence of the top event. _ m_nzm_l cut_et has the _roper%y that no proper
_ubset of it i_ el_o a cut_et. The collection of m_n:mal cutaets provide_
cuel:tazive _nFormation about the vulnerability of the _ystem. In _h_ absence
of failur_ date it can be _mid that the vuinerab:lily of a system incr_ase_ as
the cutset s_ze decrea_e_ and the cutset numuer increases.
The dominant c_tset_ identzfle_ :n the FTA ar_ then u_eO to quantify event
tree _r_nc_e_. An event t.-ee t_ a _ucce_/fa_lure mod_ _e_n_ng tha possible
outcome or c=ns_quence sta%es base_ on sequential _r t£me depenoent c_nn_t_ons.
Th:s d_fLne_ the _Lme-pnaeed r:_L a_ well a5 recovery factors (such .aS abOrl
_ceKar_!_ _h_ch cannot _e easl£y depicted cn 3 szngie fault Lra_ _cdel.
Oetai[_ re_ara_ng FT_ and event tree _evelop_ent _re provider _n 5ac:ion_ _ and
6.
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2.6 $CGPE OF _N_LYSIS
The _co_e o? tn_s PR_ includes the MPPS anO _ajor pot!ions o? associated
supporl _y_iems. The MPPS con_Is!s o? _he ET, aspects of the Space Shuttle Main
Engine CSSME). mnc those compenents of the Orb:tar which connect the ET to the
SSME and provlne _he necessary matrices for proper KPP5 Func%ioning.
_round ooer_ion_ co_menclng at eight hour5 prior to launch wem_ e×amined
for Impacl on the launch but not cuanlzfied in the anaiysis. Tmble Z-3
_onta_ns scme o_ _he majer risks not included in _hi_ PRR.
_.6.I Baa_a ?or inclusion o? E,,,ents
The MPPS _ an integral part of the Meln Propul_zon Syslem (Mrs). It is
nol, hou_ve., a separate a_d distlnct syste_ with _irictly d_fZned boundarie_
an_ _nter?aces. Reference to a "sy_le_ _ i_ merely a convention which reco_nize_
a reQuiremenl within the Mr5 For gaseous pre_uranls. Thus, the MPPS is defineo
here_n for the _pec_fzc purpo_ o_ p_rform_ng a PRA. The "system" is co_ri_ed
cf varlou_ Mrs pres_ure-relaled functions wi_h Jnterface_ incluced for
_na[ytic_l completeness. The s_uCy par%icipant_ reco_nlce that there _ay _e
_iffer_n 9 definllions of the MPPS, ba_ed on historical bounaariea _n_/or
contractor responsibilities.
The _co_e of the MPPS for the puroo_e of thi_ PR_ was based on various
analytical, at w_ll as engineering considerations. Am a Qenerml rule, an
element 15 in s_ope if its failure directl_ fails an e!e_enl of the MPPS or if
iL i_ directly failed by an MPP5 e_emen_. Out of scope ele_eni5 include
_O_onen_ failures out_'i_e _he MPP5 which lead directly to loss of !i_e and/or
vehicle and for which _ub_eQueni failure of %he MPPS is imreJevan_. The
inlercunnectlon of plpzng and contro_ systems necessitate_ %hat _ub_y_te_ which
interface directly with Oaseous pressurani_ be incluOed within _ope for this
PR_. inleract_cns between system: and spatial dependency of major comoonents
can cause ?aiiure_ in the MPP5 which ultlm_ely lead %o los_ of llfe end/or ST_
vehicle. A general itemization of hardware mnd human activitie_ con:idered
in-_ope and owl-of-scope i_ proviOed in Tables 2-5 and 2-B. respectively.
_..S.Z 5(_ecific Scooe Boundaries
number of scenarios involvin9 In&effaces with the MPPS mu:t be examined
f_r anelylical compleienems. Eval_a_ion of failures occurring _rlctly within
the MPPS anO affecting only _he MPPS hardware addres_ only a small fraction of
total risk coniribwtion_ _o the 5T5.
The general categoriem of items conslder:d w:lhln analyti:al stoma may be
summarized a_ follow_:
Event_ affect[n_ MPP$ pressurizatio_ functions, This
calegory includes all failures which lead to !_s_ of
pre-Ocessurizatlcn and re-pressur_:at_on functlon_.
_ddltlonal_, this category _ncludes any _nd all event_
which create In=ufficient ullage pressure conditions zn the
e_,ternal propellan_ tan_s.
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All porlsona of ±ha closed process loop conCain:ng th_
MPPS, Interconnections with Main engines, orbiter pieing
and external prodellant tanks cr=s_e a single pressure
boundary and flow ioo_. Loss _f _ressure bouncary cr Flow
through th_ close0 loop necessarily aff_=ts MPPS function.
H_rouare and human actions which directly _u_ort _PPS
narcware or i_-_coDe hard,are def_ne_ by 2), This category
includes _ocal electrical control s_nal_, _n_matic
(hellum) _ystem lines and ccmponents, and hydraullc lines
direc_|y suooortino maln emglne valve nydraui_c actuation.
Excluded fro_ thls category are all controller/gcner_l
_ur_ose ccm_uter failures and all hydraulic _u_ply _nC serve
ccntrci failures (including hydraulic control of yaw
and piich functions).
Elements contained clearly' ui%hin the MPP$ boundaries.
Th_se _nclude flo_ control valves, HPOT he_t exchangers,
heat exchanger bypass Flow orifices an_ gaseous o.<y_en {_0_)
and gaseou_ hydrogen (GH2) pressurization line_ ant
components.
Events thai challenge the MPPS, reou_ring a re_oonse. For
example, MECO requires closures of the prevalves which are
in scope, The _uty cycle, _roce_s con_itlons and environ-
_ental stresses greatly affeci the ability of the MPPS to
perform _ts oressurlzat_on functions. By evaluating the
_mOact the_e factors have on the MPP$, one can establish the
number of valve actuations, preasure transients or flow
re_trlc%ions that _he MPPS hardware will e×per_ence. Those
influences are, for the mo_t _art, external to _he MPPS.
Ev_nfs which define MPPS success criteria. Theae are
primarily functional fa_lures in the main engine _hi_h
e_tablish whether the MPP5 can function _n_er _¢clficd
conditions. For _xa_ple, loss _f more than two engines,
as:de from failing to provide proper thrust, may al_o result
in insufficient ullage _reasure.
Crew or ground control actions which =au_e or mitigate MPP5
failures or failure of hardware defined by 2), 3), and 4).
Theme are exclusively errors of omls_ion or failures tc
respond when required. Errors of COmMII_iOn _hiCh induce a
failure are nat within the sccpe of analysis.
Miscellaneous hardware included for analytical completene_
and Io accounl for _ymmelry between _ubaystems. !s_ues of
_ymmetry ariae frequently when coMpar_n_ _he [i_u_d oxyOen
(LO_) and liquid hydrogen (LHZ) propellant sys_em_. The
HPOT prsburner has en internal heat exchanger uhIc_ provices
a pres_urIzation function _th_n the MPPS. The _FOT
or_burner, therefore, i_ _n-scope. The H_gn Pressure Fuel
Turbopum_ {HPFT) has no analogous nea_ e;,=nanger on it_
oreburner, but the HPFT oreburner _ zncluced _ithzn scooe
for analytical completeness.
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Recommendattons
Table 2-2
Based on the Probablllstic Risk Assessment
/
f
Risk ,Source Recommended Action
Leakage through Seals
inComponents and
Piping
Releaseof Ignltable
Materials intoAft
Compartment
Oepressurizatlonof
Helium Pneumatic
System in Aft
Compartment
B leadvalvelantiflood
valve failures
Pneumatic System
Pressure regulator
failure
Allother failures
8eelleakage-relatedfailureratesare two orders of m_nltuOe
higherthan welded connectionfailuretales.An evaluationof
whether welds can be used In lieuofflangedconnections
(involvlngO-rlng or other seals)shouldbe performed. The
trade-offofthlsmoOificationinthatone sacrificesservic_abillty
when connectionsbetween components and plpln0 are welded
tooether.
Evaluatethe additionof an in-flightleakdetectionsystem Inthe
aftcompartment. The leakdetectionsystem can be used as a
shutIIownparameter input tothe enginecontroller.
Evaluate the ____j_wj__,y of the aft compartment vents in rei laving
overpresa-urizotlon conditions. Of specific concern are scenarios
In which high pressure helium supply system pressure Dounda_
ts breached.
Evaluate options to ensure that these valves _ssume their proper"
position duvlrR flight. Increased functional testing prior- to
launch prel:_or'ation _ cryogen detectionIn bleedlinemay
prevent overpreesurlzatlon exi_Ioslonevent during engine start.
although It Is r. __ r_izeO that expire functional testing may
a_ually degrade tel labiltry.
Evaluateoptionsto automaticallyisolatethe requlatorfrom the
downstream system upon a high pressure detectionvia an
overboard vent.
No action recommended as the failure rates are sufficiently low to
contribute negligibly to overall risk.
TABLE 2-3
SOURCES OF RISK EXCLUDED FROM PRA I NVESTIGATION
LMSC-F2.?.30402
• External events (specifically natural phenomenasuch as lightening and strong
winds).
• Prope]]ant hydr{;dynamic transients.
• Structural failure of ET under dynamic Ioadfngs,
• $patta] interactions between structural components.
• Latent flaws and commoncause fal]ures introduced during repair {ln(I
refurbt_ment.
= Common cause failures of sensorswhich occur"during flight due to power supplies,
control systems endother hardware tntertcttons
• Plplng oncltubing failure mechanisms,
• End-of-Life, wear-out and fatigue char=,-'t_'Istlcs of major mactmntc_i components.
• Yalve sequencing failures.
SPECIFIC
• Turbine blacleson ht_ pressure pumps shouldbe e_amtneclfor" potential reOastgns to
prevent missile generation.
• Yaw andpitch control sul3system'seblllty to compensatefor ]ass of a single engine.
• Detailed evaluation of controller _ engine interface unit lnternel architectu_.
Thermal shock In piping downstream of S,SMEpr-evelves.
LMSC-_'_3040_
TABLE 2-4
Summary of Previous
SSMP Risk-Related Studies
Type of Stuck'
Element I nterface
Functional knaiysls
(EIFA)
FMEA
Hazard Analysls
Mal ntenance Study
• . m
Reference
(Section 7)
8 External Tank
9 5,SME & Crltlca]
Items List
i 8, 30 Orbiter
10 Extern#l Tank
11 SSHE design-
o_r-aUonai l'IIghf_
12 L02 Control
System
13 LH2 Control
System
14 Reusable Rocket,
Engine
15 55ME
Combustion
Chamber
I nfor mat ion
o OuatilJttve analysis of Bystems and their iaterfaces.
o Examines effects of failure in one system on other" relate<
Systems.
O Also I¢tentifles non-Pedunden¢fstlure Points and assigns
cr'Itlcallty levels (I-3) LOitems.
o QualILstlve analysis of failure modes and effects.
O Summary of a0plicable hazards, precautions end remedie
in a system. Identifies hazards, controlled and
eliminated. Evaluates system_ and response_ on a
daterminlstlc (¢uslltstlve) l_vel.
o Utilizes limited nuaiitatlve fault tree modelling,
o Summary of $SHE and other` liquid rocket molar failure_
o Recommends controls for reducing failures
LMSC-F223040:
TABLE 2-5
SUMMARY OF PRA SCOPE
Time Interval: T-8 hours to MEOOtET separationor intact abort initiation
Risk .Sources: • Hardware Failures
• Human Errors
Consequence Cotegorles: • Loss of Human Life
• Loss of Vehicle
Hardware Inctuded: • Piping, tubing, valves, pumps and other components
forming the Mrs pressure boundary inside _he orbiter
and 68ME compartments, External Tank and Orbiter"
Umbllicals.
Support systems
- pneum_lc subsystem
- hydraulic subsystem (select functions)
- local control circuitry and ssme controllers (selecl:
• ET separation wrotechnlcs
• HPP$ dedicated instrumentation and sensors
Ground support equipment associated with LH2 and L02 fill and He
pre-Pr-_rizatlon operations
operations.
U
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SUMMARY
TABLE 2-6
OF RI5K 50URCE5 EXCLUDED
FROM HP.S P_A
• 6olid Rocket Booster (SRB) System and any SRB inter.feces to the External Tank
• Structural failures (except for failures of MPS propellant, pneumatic and lines).
= Events external to the STS ( natural or"other)
• Latent design lnadequ_Y, workmanship, Installation or servicing defects introduced prior
to T-8 hours
• Sabotage and security violations
• Primary failures outside the MP$ which induce _,:,ndary failures In MP5
• Oeneral Purpose Computer, Maln Engine Controller,Ermine InterfaceUnit and Cockpit Dlspl_/
Control Failures
• 8oftware and firmware Inducedfailures
• Electrical power supply and distribution
• Cabling, wiring or connector-related failures.
• Wear-oot (e.g.,e_-of-IIfe failures)
• Delayed accidents ( I. e., after orbtter/ET separatton)'resuittng from a failure _curlno
during the time intervalT-8 hours to ET =eporation.
• Thrust vector adjustment-related failures (e.g. glmballng, throttle-up, thruster collision,
yew/pitch actuators)
• Cryogenic leak@ spray'ing on zi_Jaoent _-_-,gonents =using temperature decrease below safe
operating1tm its.
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Section 3
METHODOLOGY
P_ re_ om O_t_ FT_ ant event tree ina!ySlS (ETa) t@ _uanttfy risk. FT6
:_ _:ed :o e_mb£i_n the loglcal reiattonshlp oet_een a _ymtem !evei :milure ano
all ¢¢nc_iva_l_ combinations o{ ¢omg_nent level f_ilures which cause it. E=6
r_[_te_ _ac_ adverse out=ome posslbi!ity ulth _he time _eQuence of _vslems or
The fau!t-tree mc,_el , _ structum_d from a k_owledge .of _y_tem oceratlc, n
am_ _re.:iOu_ FMEA'slha_ar_ _tudles (Ta_le 2-4_. Oata i_ derived from varz_u_
fail_re rate or probability data base_ (Table 3-I). Theme are the tmpu_ ,_alue_
f.r the fault-tree mo_el.
The fault-tree Mcd_i can then be used ic generate a "top event" (e.g., !o_s
cf l_?e an_/cr venlci_) pro_abi!ity. Because the input data i_ g_neric (i.e.,
net _peclf_cally baseo on 5TS hard.are _ailure h_tcry), an evaluation of FT_
_e_ and failure rate d_te se_itlvlty Im needeO. Sens_tlvlty _n_iy_is
invoivem perturblm_ the input data to determine it_ e_fect on the to_ event.
Senslttvlty analysis c_n _e performed by altering the fault-tree mo_el to test
oifferent assumptions. Sensitivity analyses may involve mod_ficatlons, such as
_he deletlon/add_tlon cf fault-tree branches, changing _a_e log_c, and changing
the _uccess criteria, The recomputed top events provide soma inmlght of the
sensitivity of the mod_l to the _arametric or _tructurai ch_nge_. In additl_,
one can vary the value of a _pecific failur_ r=_e input, in _h_ man_er, _ne
can beg_n to bracket the too event probability range. Subtlet_em associated
_ith sensitlvtty calculations are discussed in more detail in Section _.
The results of FT_ are then used in the final ETA computations, _here
conseouences are faciored in based on the time of accident, the _robabilzty _f
ioss o? li?e [respectlve!y, loss "o_ vehicle). If. for example, the accident
oc=ur_ when the 5TS _ _till on the launch pad, hero.are lo_es _i!l be greater
then once the _TS ha_ cleared the launch facially. The tlme-gha_ed a_pect of
con_equenc_ and ET_ tn _en_ra[ are provided in Section B.
The_e actlVitie_ and results are presented in Figure 3-I.
3.1 ROOEL OEVELOPMENT
fault tre_ Model i_ based on Boolean _athematlcs. That is, logical
_erator_ con_ting primarily of and, or, not, _nd combinallon _ates are u_ed
to represenl the oarts fro_ louer order event_ and the top event. _ descr%otion
cf Boolean logic _ymbology and terminology is prov_6ed in Figure 3-2. Thls
_tandard convention is u_ed for all FTA in tht_ report.
brief description of f_u[t tree organization amd a_ example cf the _ethod
in _hlch Major MPP_ component_ _ere accounted for in the FT_ are providec below,
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3. I ' _'-_',Lt ',r, .- '_*'_e_l .• , . , " _" "it ' _".",
...... _:: un=er=tand_n 9 ._ th_ _azn _roc_s_ fl_w of the LH2 aR_ L02
zr.. _ : ,. vaices and other active
oe,v_:=__- _ncch ...:--_r_,_ir.d to cel_ver the propellant to the main _no_ne bur_er_,
:n_ their a,ct_a:_./,r.r_t-ol!ar_ _re depicted i_ F=gure 3-4. Com_.D_e_
prc'./za[ng _ _com_ary function anO _y_tem5 _u_oar:zng the Npp_ are not d_p[cte_
:r c:_ure 3-&, but _mclude the hy_raul_c, _neu_at_c e.nd eiectrzce_ _cn_rots,
Fhe cc.mo_t_ ?_ult ',r.__, along wit_ descriptions ef :t,: basic events, _
In general, the foul± tree model wag :tructure¢ zn three _artm: _reund,
l_unc_ and REC0/ET _e_ara_iom failurm_. Theme three tCme Be:uence_ re_re_ent
the actual t_me :f occurrence of the to_ even%. _aLlures cccurrinO durLn_ the
_re-f!:gn: _a_ _nciuced human error_; for example, fzre/ex_!osZon at the
launch _=:e _cuL_ _e the resul_ of human error _urinQ maintenance, r{o_Lr _r
flight preoaratzOn actzv_t!es, Human error on the groum_ prior _o launch can
also _am_fe_t itself a_ a latent failure 0ur_m_ th_ ac_a£ fl_ght! _.e.,
Lmpro:er e.,ecutzon of preiaunch tasks can cause or allow an undetected _rob_em
to contrzbute tc the manifestation of a catastrophic failure our&nQ the Pzrmt
fem mtnutem o? t_+ _unch. _n o+ntras_ w_th the @round o_erat:on failures,
flight Failure5 conszsl primarily of hardware problems, because there i_ much
ii_zted corot%unity for In_l$ghl human error.
To ensure tha_ all prevlou_ty _dent_f_eo SLn@Le point _a&lure} have been
_ncluOed In the fau|t tree, a cro_ reference _heck u_th FME_'s and H_'_ _s
performed. That _s, every cr_ticai_ty I even_ zn the FME_/H_ is cross indexed
:o a _ecifzc basic even_ or gate. In some cases an FME_ _tem may a0Dear _n
multiple branches of a tree. For detaila re_ardi_ this consistency evaluat_on_
refer t_ _poendi× H,
NOTE: Figure 3-3 is an edited version of the fault tree, provided for
convenience. Eranc.es which co n01 add _ignSfZc&nily to understandln_ _he mode£
are not prov:0ed. For examole, ell redundant branches a_soclated with !he
cemter and right engines are not included, as Left engine is typical. The cage
number: are _dentZcal wikh those in Figure 0-2, the expanded fault tree. Figure
_-2 _houl0 be consulted for transfer gates on pages not provided.
3..-.I2 Example of Model Oevelopment
S_ru_turzng a faul_ tree from engineering diagrams _ not, however, a
straight forward grocers, Hardware failure mode_, f_lure rate _ata, and
_zme-pha_ed ooeration gr_at|y affect the _anner _n which the coBponent i_
treated wlthip the fault tree. To illu_trate thss point, a simplified LH2/L02
pum_ valve schematic _as developed (Figure 3-4). The comoonen% and major o_o_n9
_ine5 represent the m_zn 0rocess flow and oressurlzation functions associate_
• wlth the LH2 aria L02 Oro_ellant subsystems.
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Cz:_nent F,_i[urti may _o@_r _n di:?_n_ _r_ncn_i ,i? (h_ f!uit tr_
depen_in_ =,p zhelr l_,=t cn 5T5, Thls ii evldemt by _,amlnl_ 0 _e Cr?_i
refer@rice n_t@_ snobn In Figure _-4, E_ch nc_e ! _.e. , idem-t_Ica_ion numOer
appearing ne_t +o the co.potent _ corresOond_ to a basic event or _i: @vent_ in
the Fault tree model. The f_il_r_ mode an_ _ime of failure ere clearly very
:m_ortant f_ct_rs in determining In _h_ch _rancnes of the tree eech component
_elomgs, More di_c;i_om re_ardln_ fault tree organization ts cQn_ain_ in
Aopemdl,. O.
3.2 O_T_BR_E O_UELOPMENT
3o2.1 Component Failure R_te_
Componenl ?a&lure rakes are based on widely u_ed gametic sources. Rono _Ir
Development Center (RAOC) documents provide most o? _h¢ d_a w_ed in this
analysts. A summary of RAO_ and other failure rate documents is provided in
Table 3-I. _henever available, however, snut_le _oecifio _ata is utilized to
e_tablish failure rates.
Electronic component failure rates are primarily based om MIL-HDBK-217E
with the failure mode alloca:ion determlneO by [EEE S_an_ara S@@, Tha_ i_ fhp
base Failure rate is calculated ?or the oarameters and quality f_ctors as
outli_ed in MIL-HOBR-ZITE. In a case when only sel_cted component failure modes
lead _o catastrophic system failures, the overall failure rate is adluste_
according to the failure mode allocation _etermime_ by iEEE Standard S_@.
3.2.2 Basis _or Exposure Timem
The _robabillty values usea for each of the basio evemt_ depends on both
the failure r_te and on the exposure time. _ssuming that the component
reliability deceases exponentially in time, the probability of failure is
calculated via the expression below:
P= I - exp (-i_)
EQuatlon _-I
Where l'_ is the produc_ of failure rate ( _ ) and the exposure
t _me ('_ ).
Many components are required to function on a "per-demand" basts. Example_
of co_oonents requireo on de_end consist primarily of valve o_emlnqs/clo_inos.
pyrotechnic FkrinQs or human actions associated with operation. "Failure on
demand" means that at a discrete time, certaln components must:perform a
one-time action. "Per-demamm" may al_ermativeiy be expressed as "_er cycle",
ORI_NAL PAO_ I_
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_, >_£t;_; t_e _.-G_.Jre time f3r thal _$ic event _Qu_l _c _h_ _lre tl_e prL_
t_ the ;:::.rs_,:e cf {_e cm-_e_e_d requirements. F_r e..emple, the pre_Lve_ eno
tme enQlme m,_r_i_.: ,_._e_ _olete emg=_e= L_ r_ll_e comdlt;,3r om Cemend. The
_-.d f: _hut _own e _art:cular enotne may occur at any time prior t_ ME_O.
Therefore, the c_m_lat_ve e._sure t_me [s the t_me between _lart of t_::_m
_e¢;_ence t.; PESO -:r a_Drc,_m_t:Ir _.I m_nute_. _ote _hat _hz5 e_t:mmte may _:i
t_ be c_nser-_mt_ve :f +h_ "on-demand" r_quir:m_nt_ or the oat_ ba_e com_:ment_
3?9 _c_ th_ th;s_ of the MFPS components.
The t_me-phase_ natdre of the fault _ree recuire5 thet for 5om5 comDonent
failuees (e.g. those _h[ch c_uld occur ai any t_me to contrlbu_e to the too
event) separate e_pcsur= time_ must be establ_shed for each time segment.
8reaw-u_ .)f other tim_ phase_ m_t _hown in the fault tree Ls re_u_red for the
3urpese cf conse6ue_ce analysis. Oeta_15 regaroLng the partition,he of time
intervals _re proviced tn Section T. _ tabulation of the time-phased
orobabil_tzes _ cont_ned In _Opendlx C.
5." PROBABZLISTIC CCMPUT_TIONS
3.3.1 C_FTA Code
_tI fault tree computations are performed using the CAFT_ cede, C_FT_ is a
microcomputer-ba_ed orogram which performs fault tree analysis on a system or
_roua of systems. The program includes a fault tree editor For bu_Idlmg and
upcatimg fault tree mo_els, and a reliaOility data ba_e for storing all basic
events used _n _he models. _ brief Cescription of the co_e cagab_li_ie_ and
Limitations is prcv_de_ in _ppemdi:, [.
C_FTA reties ¢m FTAP algortthm5 to generate the minimal cutsets. The
comp!e_it/ of the fault-tree model prohibits the generation of eli possible
m_nimal cut sets. Therefore, a truncation limit (10-8) is define_ to eliminate
consideration o_ very low probab:llty _equences.
C_FT_ trumcates Io_ orobabiitty sequences in a bcttom-to_ memmer at each
level of fault tree intermediate events. Intermediate events above the cut-off
threshold remain for _nclus_cn in cutset reduction. The sum of _inimal cut_et
probabilit_es conservatively approximates the top event probabIli!y.
It was judged that cursors w_th probabilities below Ig-8 are negligible
contrxbutor5 to top event occurrence ano cam be eliminated from consideration,
as the probability of the _op evemt is on the order of 2.5 x 1e-3.
_._.2 !mgortance Mea_ure_
Importance, £n the probab_listLc sense, refers to {he slgnzftcance _hich a
bas;c event (or m_n_mal cut_t) has towards the outcome Of e top event.
Consider the _mp_rtance of a l_est level event {i.e., basic event) to the top
event. Basic event "i" (£Ei) _lil appear in at Least one sequence or cut set
O_ _5_JR QUALR_'
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The zc[lec_{cn of cut set_ Kj where EZz xa contaln_d =_ FC] _s _sed to
ao_pu_e t_e :mpon_nce of BE_. The ra_io o_ _he _robe_Iity of eli 5equencea _m
_hich a Given basic event occur_ to the total top event _roba_[_ty determlne_
the L_ort_nce of the b_sc _vent.
r
The Fu_el1-Ue_ely measure _f basic event _mpo_tamce i_ effectively a
ueigmt_mg functlon wcth numerical value between @ and I, The Fu_s_11-'Jm_ely
me_sure, I (BEz_, _ defined by the _ollo_zn_ ratio:
F4'
Probabil_ty of The Boolean union of minimal cut sets BE_
Top Event P?obabtlity.
Equation _-.,m
IF a Oaszc event Is contalned in each minimal cu_ sets (also called n_n cu_
set) then its i_OOct_nce v_ue _s unity. Stated in cth_r terms, the
Fusee!l-Venery i_ the conditional proOabillty tha_ a min cut s_ _cn_ainin 0 the
basic _vent occurs given the occurrence of the Top Event. The Fussell-Uesely
_mportamce _s therefore computed as:.
Sum of min cut set probabil_tie_ conta:n_ng BEt
Sum of all min cut set probabil£_les.
Equalion 3-2b
E_uai_on J-Za r_pre_ent_ a u_Iveesally applicable Fu_sell-Uesely
relationship between a m_ecific basic event an_ _he _op event. This
relationship is useful in e×pressing how much a_lention should be given to each
basic event w_thin the fault tree. Noie that the importance of BEt a_ defined
by Equation 3-2a _ill vary w;th the choic_ of different top even%_. _ weakness
of the F_s_e!l-Ue_e!y measure of _m_ortance is that :t depemds on failure date
uhich May be uncertain (as in this study).
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_tr_ctura[ [mport_n,ze i_ dmFi_e_ as thm frmctlc.,na! numoer _f _./_tem stm_es
that ar_ crttlca! f_r a _omDcnent, A crzt_.:al _.y_tem _ta_e For a com_c, nent i_
=eFined ._ a _tem st._te such that the _y_tem me_es a tr_nsitlcn f._ th_
_nfg'tmd. _ to f_Ited state ahen a component fat]-_, _-r m6re _enerallz the ',3:. _tmm "__im_
o_curs _h:n a basic event occurs. This can be cOmOutat_onaily ap_ro.,_m_ted b'r
the _>Dresslon _eleu:
• .'5 •
I
$
Sum _f :he orobabilitte_ of at! cut _ets
oiven PCBE1} - 1._ ano P(BE_) = ¢.5
- 5u_ _f _he probabilitle_ of all _ut aet_
given P(BEI_ = _,@ and P(BEi) = 0.S
EQuation _
_here P(BEi) = _.5 =ignzfie= that all basic events excepl for BEz are
assi_med a probability of _.S.
Structural imOorlan_e measure5 are m:_ u_efu! in fault trc: ztr_ct_rc_ i,;
which minima[ Cutse_s are comprised of doubleton_ _i,e. _uo basic events) or
migher order outsets. Minzma_ outsets in which only singlelon_ e_ist
necessarily have a com_uted value of zero by structural measure. Furthermore,
minimal cutset_ consisting primarily of singletons comOined with olher events
_hich aopear in only or a Few outsets, have computeO values at or near zero. it
Z_, therefore, very important to under_tand the cut_et conditions and
composition which exist orior to com_utln_ the structural imOortance value.
It is important to realize, however, &hat structural importance is mot
computed entirely indeoendent of _robabiliLie_ assigned basic events. CAFTA
u_es a truncation value ta eliminate curse,s wi_h _robability below a _pecified
limit. The _ructural importance measure is calculated only for _hose bami=
evenls which appear in cut_ets above the truncation va_ue. Structure!
importance can provide a useful tool _or ranking. The rea6er is cautioned,
h_waver to exerci=e careful iudgemenl _hen ana|yzing _mporlance of ba_i_ event_
which a_oear in cu%:eis at or near truncation value.
Each relatiom_hi_ :rovides valuable information regardln_ the significance
of hardware and human _ctions in pre=luding a major accident. Priorltizaticn
ba_ed on the ranking scheme is a useful Ioo1 for possible u_gradeB,
modifications and _rocedura| changes.
_ummary of the highest ranking basic events end their respective
importance values i_ provided in Section 6 _mH ,_ App_,_, T
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More discusslon on the application of this measure is provided in Seclion
3.3,3 Synthetic S_mpLino Statistics
The unaveila_li%7 _f STS-specific failure rat_ date =on b_ eddressed
MatheMatically _hrough a synthetic sampling method discussed b_!ow.
The variabLe of interest in th_s study is the lop even; (e.g. less of llfe
and or venlcle). The too event <TE) is a function cf basic svents EEl,
_E2.,.EEk. The functzon zs complicated and represents the sum total of all cut
sets above the soecifled cut _et truncation limit. The Questlon to be
invest_Oa_e_ is: How does TE vary when the BE's vary accord:no to their
indivioual probdbil1[y dlstributlons? Relalem QuoslZons are: _hat is the
expected value of TE? _hat is the _th _ercenti[e cf TE? etc.
By saM_llmo repeatedly from the individual Qrob_bi!i_y distributions of
the BE's and evaluating IE for each samole, e probability distribution for TE is
produced. This PRA w_!l ukilize the Top Event _atrix Rn_lysis Cede (TEM_C) for
the sta_is_%cel computations needed to generate th_ TE distrzbuiion.
..,
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Summary of
TABLE 3-1
Fat lure Rate Data Sources
LMSC-F2230 Z
DOCUMENT ( Ref _')
None_ectronic (Mechanical)
Parts Fmlure R_tes,
LMSCID520737, Revision C.
Nov. 26, Ig86, prepared by
J, T. Yea (I)
Nonelectromc Parts
ReliabilityData, NPP.D-3,
P.ADC. Fall 1985, prepared by
Michael J, Ross, (2)
RADC Nonelectronic
Reliability Notebook,
I:_ADC-TR-85- Ig4, Interim
Report, Ocf.. 1985, Hughes
Aircraft Company. (3]
i ................
NonelectJ'onic Reliability
NoteDook, RADC-T._-75-22,
AD/AOO5-657, RADC, Jan.
I985. (4]
DATA CONTAI NED
o Compiled From various sources: RADC, Hughes Aircraft Co., TRW.
L_SC Internal document_.
o Strictlymechanical components.
0 Provides failure rate (per hour)_mnL estimates: includes
environmenL/applicstion, but no breakdcwn of reiluce modes.
..l_ .... u 1 II
o Data from Rome Air DeveioomenL Center For non-electronic parts,
o Provides failure rate (per hour) pmnl. estimates, also 60R upper
stogie sided, 20R lower and 80_ uoper intervals From chi squared
distribution.
o Includes breakciown by environment.; [dilute mode distribution given
se=)ar_t_W.
o Provides failure rate (per hourJ estimates wi_ 80_ upper and
lower bounds f_om exponential and Weibull distributions,
<_ includes DreaXdown by environmenl,, not by failure mode.
0 Same as above, except uses go% confidence limit..
tEEE 6uide to the Collect.ion and
Presentation of Electrical.
Electronic, anti Sensing
Component. Reliability Data for
Nuclear-Power 6eneratinq
Stations, IEEE STD 500-1977,
June 30.1977, (5)
• 1 ,1 i ii • i
Reliai_itit.y Prediction of
Electronic E_luipment,
MIL-HDBK-217E, 15 Jan
1986, {19)
Handboot_ of Piece Part. Failure
Rates, It=u-tin Ma-ietta Corp,,
Denver Division, 61PEP
03 I- 1273, (27)
o Provides faiiure rates per hour and/or per cycle; gives
Hanc_book of Human Reliability
Analysis with Emphasis on
Nuclear Plant Applications,
NUREG/CR- 1278, SANO
80JJ200. August !983,
high, low, maximum, and recommended vatues t'or go_
confidence int.e_/=t t'rom chi squared dis&rtbuLion; gives
breal_down by failuremode.
¢ Provides equations and parameters for
calculation of failure rates baaed on
environment, quality, packaging, etc.
o Data from PADC.
¢ Point estimate failure rates for mechanical piece part_,
o Human reliability data,
o Human error probability shaping facLors,
LMSC-F2230402
TABLE 3-2
SUMMARY OF MINIMUM SUCCESS
PARAMETERS AND CRITERIA
Component or _ystem
SSME System
SSME
ET Separation
Tank PressurIzatlon
Pressure Boundary Integrity
Success ParameterlCr Iterla
Two of three enginesare availableand fullyfunctionalfor
the first 5.8 rn_nutesofthe fllent.Thereafter at leastone
engine Isavallabetopress toMEC0 and abort.No creditis
given for the existenceof a shutdown inhibitpreventing
shutdown of a secondengine under many red]ineconditions.
This oonservatlvemodal Ingassumpi:1onIsused because we
cannotassess theperformance ofa redlineengine.
All major --"-'""-"-'" (o.cj. ' n_'_",._,,,LPOT HPFT HPOT,
OPOV. FPOY. MFV, MOV) are fullyfunctionalin or(letfor
an engine tobe consideredavailable.
Complete separationof the ET from the orbiter on demand
considereda success.Partial.premature, cr delayecl
separation are allconsiderecltobe failures.
Tank Integrityismaintained during flightc_nditionsby
maintaining proper uIlaqepressure. Failureto maintain
prescribed pressure resultsin structuraldamage totanks
and/or main enginepump cavitation.
Pressure boundary failureofa high pressure system is
consideredan immediate catastrophicfailure.An ignition
source must be pr'esenttocause such a fatlure ina low
pressure system. Any break of propellantsystem,
hydraulic system or pneumatic m/stem piping In
conjuric[ionwl tn an ]gnltlonconstltutesa lossoi'venlcle.
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Fault Tree Symbology and Terminology
iI Ill , , •
SYMBOL NAME
I i i i iiii ii i iii
ouLout
¢
inouts
ouWut
inputs
out.put
F-'-i
inpuL
output
inpuLs
/%
_ YY
pageZZ
"AND"gate
"OR" gate
"NOT" gate
"Combination" gate
"Tra_fer" In _te
ii ii
DESCRI PTION
i i
All Inputs must occur in order for the output
to occur.
Any Input must occur in order for" me output
to occur..
Neoated Input causes the output to occur. In
probabilistlc terms, the output is the
complement of the Input or I-P(tnput).
At least "n" of total inputs must occur in order
for the output to occur.
a transferred branch of the tree aoPeerlng in
"x" different locations as identified by page
number(s) shown; If no page number ls
shown, that denotes a supprassed portlon of the
tree, whtoh ls presented in Appendix D.
! , n|l ill i m I l"l L '"''' I
_ppe_r_ ben_th mhemonic descriptor.
Figure 3-2
Fault Tree Symbology and Terminology
LMSC-F2_0402 P_
I
SYMBOL
©
I i2345678 I
GATE
DE_RI PTION
6ArE
DESCRIPTION
_a_e YY
gage ZZ
NAME
Basic event
I I III II I I I I III I h
DESCRI PTION
Lowest element _n the faulttree. The basicevent
represents the limitof resolutionof the faulttre_,
Undeveloped event"_
House Event
Mnemonic
Descriptor"
Event or gate
descriptor
"Transfer" out gate
8elf explanatory,; used to represent events
oonsidered outsi_ the scope of analysis. Further
definition or quantification may De required at a
future date.
Used as a toggle device (e.g., value of event is set to
"0" or "I")to isolatebranches ofthe faulttreeas
necessary. This is primarily used for time phase
aspects of fault tree development.
En¢o(_ information re_rcling event type, name,
and failuremodc, See Appendix B fordet6ii$
regardingBasic Event Mnemonics.
A briefdescriptionof logicaloutcome of any event
or gate.
A transfer of a gate to other branches of the tree.
"X" denotes the number of locations to which the
gate was transferred.
I I I
N.
Appa_r$ berA_th mnemon/c descriptor.
£MSC -F"v.2.30402.
F i gure 3-2
Fault Tree Symbology and Terminology
paoe3
i i ii iIi
TERM
I I
Basic Event:
Intermediate
Event or O_ate:
Top Event:
Cut 8at:
Minimal Cut _t:
Event,%quence:
Consequence:
II I
DESCRIPTION
II
• I ilil _ I II
The lowest order event developed in the fault tree logic model. In most
cases this corresponds to a c=omponent failure, human error, or an
environmental condition.Basic_ents are the Inputstothe l_lc model.
A logicaloutcome resultingfrom a singleor combination of basicevent
or lower order event occurring atany levelinthe faulttree.
The Ioglc_loutcome ofa faulttreemodel. The top event in thisanalysis
Isthe catastrophiclossof human lifeand/or $T6 vehicleand facilities.
A oomblnetlon of basic events which le=_dsto the top event.
A cut set with no proper subset which is itself a cut set.
The success and failurepaths definedby criticaltime tntervaIs,ET separation
and mission abort landings.
The outcome of an event tree sequence measured in terms of success, or loss
probabilities. Consequerces will be measured both in terms o( loss of tife
end/or vehicle.
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NOTE:
FIGURE 3-3 IS AN EDITED VERSION
OF THE FAULT TREE CONTAINING ALL
ESSENT1AL BRANCHES.
IF FURTHER DETAIL tS REQUIRED,
FIGURE D-2 (.EXPANDED FAULT TREE)
SHOULD BE CONSULTED.
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Tumble
Valve
PYRTTXPD Pyrotechnics on tumble valve fail to open the tumble valve at
the time of ET set_aration. This basic event includes only
pyrotechnic assembly failures and not the actuation circuitry
failures.
Vent
Relief
PRVOOXOP
PRVHFXOP
PRVHFXDO
PRVOOXDO
Vent valve on external tanl<opens and sticks open. This
mechanicalmalfunctiondepressurizesthetanks.
Vent valves on external tanks fail to open when ullage
pressure is too high, resulUng in overpressurization of the
tankandhyIlroeXt,namic instaDilitiesinthepropellantlines.
06
DISC (PD1)
iS
Dlsc (pal)
PNVTOFDC LO2 flapper valve failure to close on demand( i.e. mechanical
failure of valve actuators) causes a possible collision
between external tank andorbiter.Pneumaticsupplyor
controlsystemfailureswhich preventvalvefrom closingare
notpartoftillsbasicevent.
L
OB
DISC (PD2)
IB
DI$C (PD2)
PNVTFFDC LH2 disconnect valve failure to dos= on demand it,e, me(t=,
failure of valve actuators) caused;possible cotlisi;n
between external tank and orbiter. Pneumatic supply or
control system failures which prevent valve from closing are
not part of this basic event.
OB DISC
IB DISC
PNV3FDCS
PNV3ODC5
LH2 orL02 disconnectvalvefailsinclosedposltlenclueto
mechanicalcauses,resultinginblockageofthecorresponding
pro_llantflowpath,
U
FLOW
CTRL
LV54,
LY52
PNVCOIC.S
PNVLOICS
PNVROICS
PNVCFIC5
PNVLFICS
PNVRFICS
PNVCOICD
PNVLOICD
PNVROICD
Tank ullage pressure (flow) control valves fail in the closed
or 1_rtlally cleseOposition, restricting the pressurization
flow from the engines to the external propellant tanks. This
mechanicalfailureIsassociatedwiththeflow controlvalves
or theiractuators.Thesebasiceventsdonotincludespurious
oontrolsignalswhich causethevalvestoclose.
T_W ullage pressure (flow) control valv_ fail to closewhen
required (e,g, due to overpressure conditions). This
pressure regulation failure occurs _tueto mechanicalcauses
_lated with the flow control valves or their a:tuat.ors.
Thesebasiceventsdo notinch_e.._ptlriouscontrolsiqnaP.
which cause the valves to close,
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RIV PNVVB 103
PNVVB2CS
Pogoaccumulatorrecirculationvalvesfailint_ clm_d
positionsoastopreventL02 from recirculatino.Th_seblsic
eventsrepresentmechanicalmalfunctionsassociatedwiththe
valveanOvalveactuator.Spuriouscontrolsignalswhich
forcethevalvetoclosearetreatedseparately,Note:failure
toestablishrecirculationflowis_ssum_Itoc_us_poop
accumlatorfloodingand subsequentlossofp_josuppression
subsystem.
P¥2 PN2COZOP
PNVCOZOP
PN2LOZOP
PNVLOZOP
PN2ROZOP
PNVROZOP
PNVCOZCS
PNVLOZC8
PNVROZC,S
Oxidizerprevalvefailsin open position,preventing
shutdown.PN2 denoteseventsoo;urringinflight;PNV
denoteseventsoccurringpriorto8RB ionition.The causeof
suchfailuresismechanical,internaltoeitherthevalveor
valveactuator.
Oxidizer prevaive fails in closed position due to mechanical
failures, resulting In cavitation of the high pressure fuel
turbopump, turbine blade failure, anti internal mi_ile
oeneration; this event al_ contributes to failure at the LH2
system in that angina Pneumatic supply or control system
failures which c_;_espuriousvalveclosurearenotpartof
thesebaslcevents.
PY5 PNV_ZOP
PNVLFZOP
PNVRFZOP
PNVCFZC,S
PNVLFZC_
PNVRFZCS
FuelprevalvefailsInopenposltion,preventingshutdown.
The causeofsuch failuresismechanica),internaltoeitherthe
valve or valve actuator,
FuelprevalvefailsInclosedpositiondue tomechanic_I
failures,resultingincavitationofthehtOhpressurefuel
turbopump,turbinebladefailure,and inter'nalmissile
_eration; thiseventalsocontributestofailureoflheLH2
system In that engine. PneumaUc supply' or control -,,ystem
failureswhichcausespurious
valveclosureare notpartofthesebasicevents.
LPOT
LPFI
TDPCFLSZ
TDPCOLSZ
TDPLFLSZ
TDPLOLSZ
TDPRFLSZ
TDPROL$Z
Low pressureturbopumps fallinan over'speedor unOerspeed
conditionduetorandom mechanicalfailuresinlernaltothe
pump. Thesefailuresare non-catastrophicand,ifproperly
Oetectedandcorrected by shutOown, neednot necessarily lead
to loss of life or vehicle.
2
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HPOT
HPFT
TDPCFHSZ
TDPCOHSZ
TDPLFHSZ
TDPLOH,SZ
TDPRFHSZ
TDPROHS2
Hionpressureturbopumps failinan overspeedor
underspeedconditionduetorandom mechamcal failures,
internaltothepump Thesefailuresare non-caiastrophio
and,ifproperlydetectedandcorrectedbY shutdown,neednot
necess_riI7leadtoIc-_of:;CoGrvehicle.
HE PNEUMCONTL
PNEUMCONTC
PNEUMCONTR
Pneumaticsystem is notavailabletoeach oftheengines.All
tanks,plpt_,regulalors,controlvalvesand associated
hardw_e are containedwithin this _te.
HPOT
HPFT
OPOY
FPOY
PRBCFSLK
PRBCOSLK
PRBLFSLK
PRBLOSLK
PRBRFSI.K
PRBROSLK
HY2CFWCD
HYYCFWCI)
HY2LFWCD
HYVLFWCD
HY2RFWQ)
HYYRFWCD
HY2COWCD
HYVCOWCD
HY2LOWCD
HYYLOWCD
HY2ROWCD
HYVROWCD
Preburnerson hlghpressureturbopumps leakor release
highpressurecombustionprodusctsIntothemaln e_ine
compartment.This failureiscausedby leakagethrough
mechanical_Is an jointsbetweenthepreburnerand pump
assemblies.
Preburner valv_ (FPOV, OPOV) i'{_iltuc)_ _Idemand due
to structural failure,thereby preventing snutOown. HYV
denotesevent occurs prior to SRB ignition. HY2 denotes
event occurs in flight. Hydraulic supply, pneumatic supply,
and control system failures are not considered part of this
basic event.
MFY HY2(}'JCD
HYVCFJCD
HY2LFJCD
HYVLFJCD
HY2RFJCD
HYVRFJCD
Main Fuel Valve (MFY) fails to closeon dema_ due to
mechanical failures, th_eby prwenting shutdown. HYY
denotes event occursprior to 6RB Ignition. HY2 denotes
eventoccursinflight.Hydraulicsupply,pneumaticsupply,
and oontrolsystemfailuresare notconsidered pactofthis
basicevent.
MaY HY2COJCD
HYYOOJCD
MainOxidizerV_l,," _Mnv_ ?oi_o,,,,-,_-,= ,,,, ,_,_,,,_ ,_,,:,,,,
structural failures, thereby preventing shutdown. HYV
3
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DescriptionofBasic
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denoteseventoccurspriortoSRB ignition.HY2 denotes
event occursinHYVLOJCD flight.Hydraulicsupply,
pneumaticsupply,anOc_ntrolsystemfa!lu.r_.are.not.
consideredpartofthisbasic_ve-nL
LMSC-F'223 0402
HOY
MFY
OPOY
FPOY
HYVCFJCS
HYYCFWCS
HYVCOJCS
HYVCOWCS
HYVLFJC8
HYVLFWCS
HYVLOJC5
HYYLOWCS
HYVRFJC8
HYYRFWC6
HYVROJCS
I-IYVROWCS
Enginepropellantv_Ives(MOV, MFV, FPOV,OPOV) fad ina
closedor flowrestrictingpositionaflerSRB ignition.These
{llechanicalfailuresincludefailuresofthevalvesandvalve
actuators.Hydraulicsupply,pneumaticsupply,orcontrol
systemfallureswhich c_u_ spuriousvalveclosurears not
partofthesebasicevents.
HPOT HEXCOPRP
HEXLOPRP
HEXROPRP
Oxidizerhighpressureturbol)ump(HPOT) heatexchanger
ruptures.The ruptureisassumedtocreatea breachofHPOT
preburnerpressureintegrity,.
HCC CHBURN Main combustionchamber burnsthroughdue tocorrosion,
random factors,or excessivechamber temperature.These
eventsareoutsidethescopeofanalysisand are un_,velop_
POGO ACCCOMRP
ACCLOMRP
ACC_.,ROMRP
PO00 accumulatorleaksor ruptures.The leslcaOewill
probablyresultfrom breachofpressurebounclarVator near
theflangedssal.Othermaterialmigrationpathsincludethe"
inberf_ with theheliumpr.echargsvalvesandRIV._
Rupturesare ar_sumecltoberandom innature,resultingfrom
a major breachinany partoftheaccumulatort(Ink.
RIV BLOOORRG
BLOLORRG
BLORORRG
Recirculationlisolationvalvefails( mechanic_lor
structural)inPO00 suppressionsystem,resultingin
regulationfailureinthatengine.
Note:InabilitytomaintainL02 bleed/G02recirculationfI_
b,sckintothe main oxidizerfesdlingwouldcausetheSSME
POGO _ccumulatorstodump excessC-02pressurantintot,%
inlet to the HPOT, causing possible pump cavitation and
4
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overspeedwithpotentialforuncontaineOenginedamage,
(Ref.7,p.10-3)
GOX
CHTL
VLV
BLOCEXSRG
BLOLOG_
BLOROGRG
Gascontrolvalvefails(mechanicalorstructural)inthe
_OGC suppressionsystem,rasultinginregulatlonfailurein
thatengine.Amajor ruptureinthevalvewillc_LISepump
cavitationarldsubsequentexplosion,
RELIEF
RY5
RY6
PRVVFKOP
PRVVOKOP
LiquidpropellantoverboardreliefvalvesfallIntheopen
position,releasingpropellantatan uncontrolledrate
overboard and diverting flow en routeto the main enEjines.
Thesefailuresare mechanicalmalfunctionsofthere_ief
valves,
I50L,
VLV
PV7
P¥8
Isolation valves upstre_nl of 1_ liquid prop_ilant overboar_l
relief valves fail to close on demand. That is, given that the
overboergreliefvalvefailsopen,thes_pneumatically
actuatedvalvesfailtoisolatetheflow.Thesefailuresare
mechanicalfailuresassociatedwithvalveor valveactuator
malfurc_ion,Spurioussignalswhich preventthevalvefrom
closingare notincludedinthisbasicevent.
5
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PO00 ACCCOMRP
ACCLOMRP
ACCROMRP
PO(O)accumulatorleaksor ruptures.The leekacjewill
probablyresultfrom bre_chofpressureboundaryatornear
theflanOedseal,Othermaterialmigrationpathsincludethe"
interfac_withtheheliumprec,nargevalvesandRIVs.
Rupturesare assumedtobe random innature,resultingfrom
a maior breachin_ partof the _umul_or _onk.
RIY BLOCORRG
BLOLORRG
BLORORRG
Recirculation/isolationvalvefails(mechanicalor
structural)inPO00 suppressionsystem,resultingin
regulationfailureinthatengine.
Note:InabilitytomaintainL02 bleed/O02recirculationflow
backintothemain oxidizerfesdlingwouldc_usetheSSME
PO00 accumulatorstodump exosssG02 pressurantintothe
inletotheHPOl, causingpossiblepump cavitationand
ova'sl)emlwith_tenlialforunc_mtainedenginedamage.
(Raf.7,p. 10-3)
6OX
CNTL
YtV
BLOCOGR6
BLOLOQRO
BLOROGR8
Oescontrol valve fails (mechanical or structural ) in the
POOOsuppression systam, resulting in radiation failure in
thatmxjineb,major rupture in the Valve willcausepump
cavitation and subsa_umt explosion.
RELIEF
RV5
RY6
PRWFKOP
PRWOKOP
Liquidpropellantoverboardreliefvalvesfailintheopen
POSition,reiaesingpropellantat_n uncontrolledrate
overbold ando'IvertlngHow e_ routetothemain engines.
These failures are meohanic_l malfunctions of the relief
valves,
h_OL.
VtV
PY7
PY8
PNVYONCD
PNWFNCD
Isolation valves upstream of the liquid propellmt ov_lx_'-d
relief valves fail to close on Oemand. That is. _iven tt_t the
overheard reliefvalve failsOPen,thesepneumatically
actuatm valves fail to isolate theflow, Thesefailures are
mect_mic_i failures ._.-_;::_ with valve or valve actuat_
malfunction._urious signalswhic_ prevent the valvefrom
closingare not included in this basic event
6
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Secl ion 4
QUANTITATIVE EVALUATION
-_._ _:,ETE?'_ G;F" C£'MP']HE'¢T FAILURE RkTE5
C-:_onent ?_l,_re rate_ end e_soclated e_oosure ti_e5 ere u_ed t_ c_Icule_e
?allure or_aDilltle_ for contlnou_Iy _oer_ttng co_ponent_. Each _aszc event
Fa&tur_-rate deoend_ on _ts ccmoonent type, failure mode, Coeratlng mode, and
environmental a_DlIca_ion, The're_uit_ of thi_ data comO_latlon effort are
_mmerLze_ in _opendix C. The rationale for the established failure r_tes _
similarly included in the data summary,
The generic failure rates In _ppendix C, Table C-I ere u_ed in the
development of individual basic event failure rates. That is, a _Oec_flc
failure rate or _eL of failure rates are derlved ?or each basic event in the
_autl tree. The data base _er_ved From ±he generlc failure raie and used in
fault tree ComputaliOnS is also grovzOed in _ppendix C, Because _uch of the
Failure rate data i_ tlme-dependent or conditional, several _et_ of
probabtllt_es are calculated. The rationale behind the u_e of time-de_en_enl
data _ contained in Section B.
Structural failures, such _ failure of the ET within its design envelope.
are not included within _cooe. Soch fellure_ are shown for modeting
completeness on the ma_ter fault trees but are not quantified in the final
computations.
U
4.2 HUMAN ERROR
Man-machine interactions ape examined in two distinct ways: I} as a source
imtmo_uclng potential risk due to human error, and 2) as a means of recovering
from syste_ failures or reducing an exlsting hazardous condition through
c_rrectlve action.
From T-I_ seconds to T+B minutes, human actions (either introducing or
recover&rig errors) become secondary to automatic control_. In contrast, ground
operation errors may result in delayed sources of catastrophic accidents if
flight scrub safeguards fail to detect the error, Oelayed effects include tho_e
failures which do not _an_fest themselves until flight; PoP example a latent
ground error will not cause an accident until after SaME ignition.
Table C-2 summarizes the various human failure rates oer task or specific
operation. Ouring ground fill o_erations, the human is assumed to provide only
backu_ and status monitoring functions. Fill ooerations are aSsuMed to be
software controlled and fully automatic, For all tasks in which the operator
_akes responses to a software or hardware failure it i_ assumed that the
operators follows written _r0cedures and that there is at least one other
independent check. Other _ajor assumptions regarding human errors and response
characterlstlcs are provided in _endlx C, Table C-3.
OF _n_= ^ .......
LMSC-F_0402
--; "..L.,,'
4._ F,_iL_E _RC, E_BILITY ChLCUL,_TIC:N5
T_e ,',:_event _rc.bao-_._t'l ,_,_ _eter_,ed ._ng the _]RFTA ,zone '_e.e_-._ce_ b.
Cr,:,oa_ _ _ :',.:=_=. F.T.r tr,e -ode. The OrCbeO_Izt'/ _a_ _or,._ _ate,_ b"I ,he. crcduct c.F
'e.cc,_cate f;r pr_.ba_llt_e} _eto_ ,_01. Th_s _=_ the ca_e for all _._c =_ent=_ :n
t_,e "_IF K__ult tree _oc.el.
T:m:n_ C._ • c_t_}tccghi: Wa:lure _ _ery _moortant In determzn_n_ the total
_O_.:C en the _TS, _T$ crew, and _urr_undzng Facil_tie_ a_d _ersonnel.
Therefore, different _me _nterv_l_ _ere defined to account for vari_u_ sy_te_
co_ft_uratl_ and consequences. In addlt_on, the e_o_ure tzme varies
de_endtng on the functional r_qu/reMent_ _f the ,component [z.e, , certain
coMDonent_ can C,nll _nduce catastrophic f_ilure_ dur_n_ specific tz_e i_tervaL_,
-..,-....._ ..
•_perat_o_ ,_r _-_tem con_/gurat_c.ns). £n t_Ls manner, the e:<_osure tsme _ _t
a_E'he |cngm_t perto_'o_ t[_e zn _nich the p,ostulated basic evenl faiLurm can
occur. C_moonents _ht_h are _nactive (until required to operate) assume the
en_sre t_e duration from the _%art of launch a_ _he exposure ti_e: _hi_
a_sump_ion errors in the direction of conservation. _ de_ail_d de_criptlon of
the time intervals and the basis fop those interval_ i_ described in Section S.
The sum oP top even% probabilities for eac_ of the mutual!y exclusive time
:ntecva]_ y_eld_ the total probability of-a catastrophic failure during the
per[o_ T-8 hours to ET seoaration.
Most of the failure _robab_lity occurs durimg the time _nterval T-I_
_econd_ to zero thrusl. _ny failures which result from component leakages, zce
pl_gg_ng, or related failures _ill meal likely be realized dur_n_ the early
seconds of _light. Subsequent _ortions of the flight ere important
contributors, but add only a fractional contribution to the _rcbability of
catastrophic failure.
It _ important to note, however, that the initial calculation cf the top
event is ba_e_ on _oint e_tlmate value_ for each cf the basic events. In other
word_, the _nput probabil_tie_ do not carry _ith them information regarding
their statislicel dislribution. The top event, therefore, does not contain any
znformation regarding its dlstrlbu_ion.
4.1 SENSITIVITY _NALYSIS
8ecau#e of the unavailability o_ shuttle - specific failure data, generic
failure data wa_ _ubstituted. The subsequent uncertain_y in_roduced by u_ing
generic data may be addre:_ed through sensz_iviiy analysis. In sensitivity
analy_Is, the probabllltles assu_ed for certain basic events are varied and the
el?act on the top event probability noted.
Two commonly used sensitivity techniques a,e _=t_,,,=L, iu v=r'iaLion and i'ionte
Carlo simulation. A brief dlscu_lon of how each technique _s used and the
results produced by each apgroach is provided betoa,
ORIGINAL PAGE IS
oF Boon OUAI,,ITY
LMSC F2230402
The -:_t !:razgnt forward me_ns of Ocrfc_mcng a _ens_t_v_ty anaiF_l_ _s b_
c_m_ :no _ms:c e_ent pro_abtlltles for those events of.h_ghest _m_ortence
ran_ :n_. _n _C_t:_n_ _n_It_v_ty ana|y_s are _arf_r_e_ for co_Donen_ of
spec._ _..r__: ,o Oe_zgn/analys_ team_.
The _ems_ivlty ana!y_i_ i_ ba_e_ _n v_ry_n_ the follOU_nO _ar_meter_:
Reduce all _eal failure rates to the 2gX lower confidence interval
•value as _i=tated by the failure rate data base.
Chang_ undeveloped event VENTPANEL (i.e. orbiter aft compartment vent
p_nel.,'d_or). A_ume _ucces_ful rel_e: _f pressure (fello_ing gro_
helium leakage or pnewmatlc _y_tem com_onenl ruDture) _% of the time.
O Chan_e the ava_leOillty of ignition source fallowing 9rosa leakaoe
of propellant zn eft com_rtnent form I._ to @.I.
o Reduce bleed valve/ant,Lf[ood valve failure rate to _he lower Be%
cmnf_dence lim,t eslabii_hed by the failure rate data base.
U O Increase heat exchanger ruotu_e/gross leakage fs1!ure rate _y one
order of magnitude (i.e., multiply failure rate by IO). NOTE: Thi_
great variation in Failure rate i_ to il!u_trate _he insensli_i_y u_
the ted event to chan_es in the heat exchanger failure rate.
The aen_itivlty parameters ere changed individually, and then changeQ
col!e:izvely, The results are preaented in Table _-1.
Synthe_xc 5am_llng
second melhod of assessln_ the risk model's sen_itlvlly to changes in
Da_Ic event failure _robabllilles is throughoul the u_e of synthetic samollng
technique_ such as Monte Carlo. Monte Carlo relies on the _generatlon of rando_
5ample of basic event failure probabilities from a_ro_riaie distributors. For
each set of basic event probmbilities, a lea event Is calculated. If :ufficlent
_amo1e (e.g. sets of basic mvent arobabilltles) are drawn, a distribution _ay be
determined for the too evenl. More de_ail} regarding this technique _rovided in
_ppen_ix J.
Various distributions were used to reDresent the basic event failure
proDa_ilities Io assess sensltiviiies In the fault tree model. The resulting
to_ event distribution exhibited that _ of the to_ event probabilities were
e×_ecled to occur between 1.4@E-_4 and 4.SQE-Q3. Thls range wa_ com_uted by
TEM_C co_e u_ing e "Latin Hy_ercube" _ampl/ng lalgorithm. The camDuted point
estimate value in O_FT_ wa_ Z.2ee-03. The range confirms that variations in too
event _robabillty are subtantlally, small. This increases the confidence in that
goint estZmate data used _n the analyels oives a _alrly accurate representation
af e_pected system performance.
Other TEMhC :onauter run was ore:anted in _o_endix J for general reference.
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4.5 IMPORTANCE CALCULATION OF O_MIN_NT EVENTS
_y _CC_}_rg O,_ thG_e _eni} which aFe tbm Com,nant remit:burp,s t_ :og
e_ent prcb_Dz_t_, acccrding to their ta_ortance ranking, one can _r_r:t:re
:hose de_£gn effort_ which r_¢uc_ r_k mo_t e_Fect_vely. Two me_sures of
_m_¢rtance ere _elected to _[lu_trate thz_ technique. Fus_ell-_;e_ely _
_e_ected {o represent a Quantitative measure (e._. Imoortance is ba_ed on the
_gned _robab_l_t_es>. Qualitative or structural _mportanc_ :_ al_
s_mmarlzed. The _esulls of these COmputation: are Dnes_nted in Tables 4-_a a_d
4-2b for the _us_eli-Uesely an_ _tructural measures, respectively. The
e_pce_on5 used to comDute these values are discussed in SectIom _._._.
_,,S.I Results af Fussell-Vese[y Im_)ortance Rank:n(;
Fu_sel-U_=ely Importance was computed for all basic events appearlmg in
c_ts _et_ of probability I@ -B or greater.
The highest ranking basic even( is leakage through tO2 system _eals. This
is closely followed by failure of a?_ c=m_artment 3-way #olenoid pi_ot valves
which control orbiter valves. The "vent-to-port" failure mo_e of the valves may
over_ressurize the aft compartmemt-_f _he vent door fails to rel_eve
overpressure condition, Most olher major terms are associated with le_ks or
ruptures in the balance of LO2/LH2 system components, seals and piping.
4,5._ Results of Structural Importance Ranking
It is necessary for ¢omputatianal purposes, to limit structural rank,ng to
those basic events uhich appear in sequences above 3.B E -@S, or the presence of
too many s_ngLetons immediately below this truncation l_mit causes the
importance value to approach zero. It is important to observe that those basic
events which a_ear in singleton Cut sets are all g_ven a structural _mportance
of I. This is an inherent limitation of structural imporiance, but the measure
dce_ provide some insight for those dominant basic events a_pearing above the
truncation limit.
The highest ranking ba=ic events are CNDEZXI6 and VENTP_NEL which
corresponds to the presence of an ignition source in %he aft compartment and the
ability oF the aft commartment to,relieve ovePpres_ure, respect;rely. These
basic events appear in most of the purser5 above the truncation limits and are
exoecte_ to be very high in structure! importance.
Loss of HPOT seal pur_e due to gross depressurization of the pneumatic
control assembly also ranks high in structural importance. _ll remain_n_ basic
event_ rank equally since they al_ a_pear in one and only one doubleton purser.
These events are primarily related to propel_an¢ leak_ or component ru_ture_
w,thin the eft comparlment.
PObR QU .R 
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SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS SUMMARY
Descri priori af Basic
Event CM m_je
Seal fail ure rate reduced to 20_ lover
confidence i nter"val valve of 1.71E : 5
fail ureslhour ( preyiousi g 2.09E- 5
fail ure/hours)
Probability of orbiter vent panel failimj to
relieve pre_,_sure on demand = 0.I inst_d of 1.0.
This condition foilo_,_ gro,_s leakage or
component rupture in hellum pneumatic sgstem.
Change protmbtlity of igmfion given a major
propellant spill In the orl)lter from 1.0 to O.
This affects ba=ic e_ent CNDEZXIG.
Reduce bleed wd_ and anti-flood valve fail ure
rate by one order of nn_Kjnitude.
I ncrease fatlure rate of all electrical lelec-
ironic equipment bg e fec_or of I 0
Pneumatic r_utator failure rate reduced from
1.1 6E -4 fedlure_/hour to 1.10 E -4
fail urss/hour.
-J i • = i
Increase heat exchanger failure rate bv one
Nay Top Event
Preblbilitu
Z.56E- 3
1.66E-3
1.93E-3
2,37E-3
i
I "'
I • Ckange WithResp_.ct to Baseline
-Z.9_
-329_
-.41
Ne_ligi b] e
order of magnitude.
Collective change of items I ) thru 6).
-53._
2.43E- 3
2.42E- 3
2.49E-3 +2.5,'_
-2.5%
-20,_
TABLE 4- 2a LHSC F2230402
SUMMARY OF HIGHEST RANKING BASIC EVENT
IMPORTANCE VALUES
0 USING FUSSELL-VESELY MEASURES o
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Basic Event
-- _.,. ....
VENTPANEL
CNDEZXIG
FLOEOSLK
CNDVZXIG
SPWPXDP
MPBVP3LK
MPBVPSLK
MPBVP ILK
ii .......
Description
I I I I I I I
VENT DOOR ON ORBITER AFT COMPARTMENT
FALLSTO I::_LIEVEPRESSUREWHEN
COMPARTMENTOVERPRESSURIZATtONOCCURS.
THIS EVENT IS APPLICABLE DURING ALL PHA_S
OF FLIGHT. THE MECHANISMS AND DETAILS
REGARDINGFAILUREREMAIN UNDEVELOPED.
=,=,,, ,,= =,,
AN IGNITIONSOURCEIS PRESENT TO IGNITE
PROPELLANT RELEASEDWITHIN THE ENGINE
COMPARTMENTS. THE PRIMARY SOURCEOF
IGNITIONARE THE HOT SURFACES OF THESSME
PREBURNERS,AND HOT GAS MANIFOLD.
FLAN6E FAILURES IN THE L02 SYSTEM WITHIN
THE MAIN EN61NECOMPARTMENT RESULT IN
LEAKAGETHROU6H SEALS. LEAKAGETHROUGH
SEALS COMBINEDWITH AN IGNITION SOURC.= IS
ASSUMEDTO BE CATASTROPHIC.
AN 16NITIONSOURCEIS PRESENT TO IGNITE
PROPELLANTLEAKS WITHIN THE ORBITER.
SOURCESOF IGNITION HAVE NOT BEEN
IDENTIFIEDFORLEAKS IN THIS LOCATION.
PILOT VALVES ON ORBITERPNEUMATIC
ACTUATORS SPURIOLISLYVENT TO PORT,
DEPRESSURIZINGPNEUMATIC SUPPLY TO THE
ACTUATORS AND RENDERINGVALVE CONTROLS
INOPERATIVE. THIS BASIC EVENT REPRESENTS
THESUM TOTAL OF ALL PILOT VALVES ON
MANIFOLDS FORORBITERVALVE ACTUATORS.
GROSSLEAKAGE THROUGHCOHP0NENT SEALS
CAUSE DEPRESSURIZATIONOF THE HELIUM
SUPPLY SYSTEM. LEAKAGE CONFINED
INTERNALLYTO THECOMPONENTiS NOT
INCLUDEDIN THESEBASIC EVENTS. THE BASIC
EVENT REPRESENTSTHE"SUM TOTAL OFWELDS
IN A SECTION OF HELIUMSYSTEM PIPING AS
DESCRIBEDIN THEFAULT TREE. EACH VALVE
WAS ASSUMEDTO HAVE ONESEAL,
tmportance
3.SE-O I
2.0E-01
6.6E -02
4_E-02
4.4E-02
4. I E-02
4.0E-02
,4.0E-02
TABLE 4- 2a
SUMMARY OF HIGHEST RANKING BASIC EVENT
IMPORTANCE VALUES
"0 USIN6 FUSSELL-VESELY MEASURES o
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FLGEFSLK
MPSEFSLK
MPBYO,SLK
MPBVFSLK
MPBEOPRP
FLGEJSLK
"Descr:tptlon'
COf'IPONENTSSUCHAS VALVES AND RELIEF
DEVICES ON THEOXIDIZERSYSTEf'I WHICH ARE
LOCATED IN TIIE ENGINECOHPARTHENT
RUPTURE OR LEAK. RUPTURE IS SUFFICIENTTO
CAUSE MAJORLOSS OF L02.
FLANGEFAILURESIN THELH2 SYSTEH WITHIN
THE MAIN ENGINECC¢IPARTPIENTRESULT IN
LEAKAGE THROUGHSEALS. LEAKAGETI-LI_OUGH
SEALS CCI_IGIN£DWITH AN iGNITION SOURCEIS
ASSUHED TO BECATASTROPHIC.
= , i,
COHPONENTSSUCHAS VALVES AND RELIEF
DEVICES OF THELH2 SYSTEH WHICH ARE
LOCATED IN THEENI31NEcor'IPARTI'IENT LEAK
OR RUPTURE. RUPTURE ISSUFFICIENTTO CAUSE
HAJ(_ LOSS OFLH2,
i • i , i ,i ill |
COHPONENTSSUCHA5 VALVES AND RELIEF
DEVICES ON THEPROPELLANTSYSTEM WHICH
ARE LOCATEDIN THEORBITERRUPTURE OR
LEAK. RUPTUREIS SUFFICIENT TO CAUSE
HAJOR LOSS OF PROPELLANTFROM EITHER THE
LQ2 OR LH2 SYSTEMS,
i i i i ii ,==l ,==
PROPELLANTSYSTEH PIPING ASSOCIATED
WiTH THE L02 SYSTEM IN TIE rtAlN ENGINE
COHPAI:tTMENTRUPTURES, THEREBY
RELEASINGLIQUID INTO THE ENGINE
COPPARTMENT, RUPTURE IS SUFFICIENT TO
CAUSE MAJOR LOS'SOF PROPELLANTFROH
THE LO'2SYSTEM.
, .. ,,
3. IE-02
2.3E -02
2.1E-(T2
2, IE-02
2.0E-02
1,8E-02FLANGE FAILURES IN THE 6H2 SYSTEH WITHIN
THE HAIN ENGINECOHPARTPENT RESbl.T IN
LEAKAGE THROUO'HSEALS, LEAKAeE THROL_H
SEALS CC¢I_INEDWITH AN IGNITION SOURCEIS
ASSUMED TO BE CATASTROPHIC.
3 ..F,=E-02
°, .•.i _
TABLE4- 2a
SUMMARY OF HIGHEST RANKING BASIC EVENT
IMPORTANCE VALUES
o USING FUSSELL-VESELY HEASURES o
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BssioEvent
ii ii i
SPVLPCDR
SPVCPCDP
SPVRPCDP
BDPEFXRP
BDP EOXR P
MPBEJPRP
Description
i| |.
LEAKAGE OR RUPTURE CAUSES SOLENOID
VALVES INTHE PNEUMATIC CONTROL ASSEMBLY
(PCA) TO DEPRESSURIZE THE HELIUM SYSTEM,
DEPRESSURIZATIONMAY OCCURTHROUGH
CRACKS IN THEVALVE WALLS OR THROUGHTHE
VALVES"WELDEDCONNECTIONSTO PCA PIPING.
,, , ,,,,,
BURST DIAPHRAGM LEAKS _ PREMATURELY
RUPTURES SO AS TO CAUSE PROPELLANT
SYSTEM PRESSUREBOUNDARY FAILURE. THIS
FAILURE CAN OCCURIN BOTH THE L02 AND LH2
SYSTEMS.
PROPELLANTSYSTEM PIPING ASSOCIATED
WITH THE 6H2 SYSTEM IN THE MAIN ENGINE
COMPARTMENTRUPTIJI_S. RUPTURE IS
SUFFICIENT TO PREVENT LH2 TANK,
PRESSURIZATION.
Importance
|
1.6E--02
1.6E-02
1,6E-02
1.5E-02
1.6E-02
I.$E -O2
, -
":-L-_*
: :..'-
TABLE 4-2B
SUMMARY OF HIGHEST RANKING BASLE EVENT
IMPORTANCE VALUES
o USING 5TRUCTURAL HEASURE5 o
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8estC Event , = Ds_,_r',_ptlon .... tmP'crtence
CHOEZX_6
VENTPANEL
FLGEJSLK
SPVCPC_P
SPvt.PCDP
SPVI_CDP
CNOVZXI6
CONOITONAL P_06ASILII"Y THAT AN IGNITtON SOURCE IS PI_SENT
TO I_NITE PROPELLANT I_[LEA,_ED WITHIN THE MAIN E'N(31NE
P_Ili_A_y o-_sOjRCEOF IHNITION 15 HOT SURFACES OF S_'I_
PREBUP.NER5. COM_USTION I=RODUCT EXHAUST PlPlN(}, J_TC.
VENT _ ON (_81TER AFT CCtlPARTHENT FAE.S TO RELIEVE
PP_$SURE WHEN C_IPARTI_NT OVERPR£$SURIZATION OCCUlt.
FLAle6E FAtLUgJ_S RESULT _NLEAKAQE THROU6fl 61t2 SVSTEPI
SEALS, L£AKjI_.,_ THR_ _ALS C0tIl_INIEO Wil_I AN IGNITION
SOURCE L_ ASSI.I1_I) T08E CATASTROPHIC. Ties BASIC EVENT
REPRESENTS THE SL¢'I TOTAL OF FLAN6E-R£LATED FAILURES
WITHIN THE AFT C(2'lPARTt_NT.
LEAJCAGEO_ Rt,mll.,_.E CAUSES SOLENOID V_LVE5 iN THE
PNEUMATIC CONTROL ASSEI'I_LY (PCA) TO 0EPRESS_I_ZE
HELIUtl SYSTEr't.
CCNfllT;ONAL PR0_ASIt.ITY THAT AN IC._IITK_I SOURCE IS
I_t_SENT TO INGNITE PI_I_I.LANT RELEASED WITHIN THE Ol:_Sl_R
FUSELAGE. $C_C_[$ CF I_NII"tON HAVE NOT DE[N II_NTIFIEDFOR
LE_r_$ IN THIS LO_ATI_.
BURST DIAPHRA61"I LEAKS CR PREMATURELY _JPl"LIRES SO AS TO
CAU_ PROPELLANT SYSTEM PI_I_URE BOLI4DN_.¥ FAILL_E. THIS
FAILURE CAN OCCUR IN 8OTH THE L02 _ LH2 SYS1_I.
F1LAN6EFAILI,I_J_S _SULT iN LEAKA6E 11'IgOUGH S_AL$. LEAKAGE
SEALS CCf_INED WITH AN li_|Tt0N SOURCE I5 ASSi._O
TO lie CATASTR_HIC. THE_E BASIC EVENT_ I_P_E_NT THE SL_
TOTAl. OF Ir_AN_E-RF.LAI"ED FAILURES (:F _,OTH _ LI(]I.IIO FU_
AND OXIDIZER SY_TEt_ WITHIN THE AFT COt'_AR_T.
_.10 E -O2
4,40 E -O3
2.97 E -03
2.t7 E -03
(EACH)
T,9R E -03
9,gO E -4
[EACH}
9.90 E -04
(EACH)
£ SC.F2230402
_ i._,
TABLE 4-2b
SUMMARY OF HIGHEST RANKING BASIC EVENT -
IMPORTANCE VALUES
o USING STRUCTURAL MEASURES o
8esic Event
I"PBEOPRP
I'IOBVP 1LK
I_VP_LK
MOBVP_LK
=.,PVVPXOP
De_'tOLlon
C_ENTS SUCH AS VALVES ANO I_ELIEF DEVICES CN THE
PR_ELLANT SYSTEM WHICH ARE LOCATED ;N THE HAI.N
ENGINES RUPTIjRI: OR LEAK. I_L,IPTTJ_.EiS SUFFICIENT TO CAUSE
PIAJO_ LO=_SCF PROI_LLANT FRCPI EITHER THE L02 0P. LH2
SYSTEt_.
., ,m ,.,
_ti;_I_UL/,_IT SYSTEM PlPtN6 ASSOCIATED WITH "TYIEMAIN
EN61HE R_PTURES. THEREBY RELEASING LICUIO OXIDIZER iNTO
THE AFT C_I'_PART'_NT. RUPTURE IS SUFRCIENI" TO _AU_
MAJCR LOSS OF ;:R0PEI.LANT FROM THai L02 $_M.
COMPCtRNTS 5"UCHAS VALVES AHO RELIEF OEVtC.JESON THE
I:::_R0PELL_NTSYSTEM WHICH AI_ LOCATED IN TI_ CflBITER
RMPl'tJ_ O_ LEAK. _PTI,IRE IS SUFFICIENT TO C,*,U_3E._CP.
LOSS OF PR01_LLANT FROrl EITHER THE L02 CA LH2 SYSTEM.
61_SS LE'Ar,A6E _ COr_Ce_NT _ALS CAUSES
OEPRE$$U_IZATICH OF TIE HELIU'I SUPPLY SYSTEM.
_ILOT VALVES (_I CI:_ITER PNEUMATIC
ACIIJAT(;_I_3 SPt,IRiOI.I_LY VENT-TO ;PORT,
0EPI_URIZlN6 aMEUMATIC SLq_PLY TO THE
ACTUATOR_ AH0 I_I_F.JRII_VALV_ C0t4_$
IMCi=EPvkTNE.
9.90E -04
9._E_4
9.90 E
Ll4_qC-_Z230d
Section S
SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION
CR_F_rence _2)
The MFP5 f_rn_=he_ &_e _re_=urdnt gas at the condition5 necessary far
_rooer opera(ion of the Main Propulsion Syste_ <MRS) from the beginning of
gro_nc operations until successful return of the Shultie Orbiter to Earth. The
_PP5 cons&ate of the _ternal tank (ET), the Space Shuttle _aln engine (SSME),
_n_ :h_se comDonent5 of the Orb|tar which connect the ET to the 55ME an_ _rovLC_
the necessary service: for saf_ operation w_thln the normal Space Trans_ortatio_
5y3to_ {_TS) requirements. The _y_te_ also includes th¢ Facility equipment and
the Qrou_d support equipment (GSE) necessary for =erv:cing the Helium
9ressurlzation System and _rovidi_g the necessary ET fuel and o×_dizer
pressurization prior ta SSME Igniltcn, The MPPS must allow the SSME to shut
Oown _a?ely during _ormal operation and protect the engine from catastrophic
damage _hen malfunctions _ithin the engine or in any supporting system are
detected. Where po_slb|e, the system must _rovi_e backup to malfunctioning
systems and allow ¢ont_nuatlon ore mission or allow the M_sslon to be safely
aborted.
o,
The MPPS is designed to provide pressurization services from _r_or to SSME
ignztlon throughout ascent and insertion. Pressurization services terminate
_ith successful separation of the ET and ourge _f th_ residue| _ropellc_: i_
the Orbiter feed lines and the SSME. ET seoaration occurs a_proxi_ately 8
_lnutes after lift-off at the vehicle velocity state vector of Z5,7_ ft/sec and
an altitude oF S5 n. mi. The MPP5 has the ability to overcome failures, u_ch
aliows successful mission co_Dletion or safe abort, depending uoon the ti_e =t
which a failure occurs. The mission a_ort mo_es and strategies will be
discussed.
This _ectzon _as adapted fro_ Reference 22, _ith background from Ref. G.
A description of systems operations, ohysicel characteristics end
s_gn_ficent failure modes _s provided in the para_ramhe below.
5.1 LH2 _NO L02 PROPELL_NT FLOW FUNCTION5
The LH2 and LO2 systems are o_erationalLy very similar. Both systems draw
pr_pellant fro_ their respective external tanks and both direct the flow through
orbiter ptolng into the ma_n engine assembly. The systems very slightly in I}
external tank/orbiter interface connections, and 2) provisions for P060
suppression. Other d_fferences are noted in Table 5-1.
Figure_ 5-1a, b, and S-2a, b, are simplified schematics illustrating the
main _ropellant process flow for the LH2 and L02 system_ for ground and flight
configurations.
ORIGINAL PAGE IS
or Poo QUALIW
LMSC-F_?_
.- .',
5.1._ Propellant F_ow Path
D_r:ng f!Ight, _rooellani I_ drawn from the e.-,_er-al tanP _ET) tMr_ugh an
EV, cr=_%e _ d_:onnact valve. The f_w 15 _t_t equai[y lntc three _e3er_ta
_atn_ _r_ e common Man_fo[d. Each flow _ath c_re_onas to one of these main
Prlcr to r_ach_ng the main _ng_ne, each propellant flc_'_a_ lhroug_ a
Drev_iv¢ (=,e., one prey=lye per flo_ Dath to the englne). The prey=lye= are
_-sta_[e valves _n that they can only assume a full e_en er full closed
poszt_on. The full close_ Dosltlon Serves an isolation function. When f=ll
open, a Flow _ath t_ the rain engine is maintained.
O_wnstream of _he _revelves, the flow enter5 _me suction side of a low
pressure turbo pump. _ second high _re_ure pum_ _rau_ the propellant fro_ the
Io_ pressure pump d_scnarge and d_rect_ _ost of the flow towards %he main burner
through _ rain flow control valve. The _a_n proce$_ flow confiour_t_on _s
schcnat_cally _dent!cal for b_th the LH2 and L02 llne_. All three engines are
likewise _dentical in configuration.
S.I.2 Propellant Pressure Boundary
/."
",j:.:;',
The ET contains the l_ouid _ropellants, liquid hydrogen (LHZ) fuel and
l_uld oxygen (L02) oxidizer _ t.he required ratio (approximately S:I), and
sups!/as them w_th %he groper ten, stature, density, and pre=sure required to
prevent PumO cavitation to the three Space Shuttle _ain _nglnes (SSME'_) from
lift-off through ascent to maln engine cutoff (MEC0). After MECO, the ET is
jettisoned, enters the Earth's atmosphere, and impacts in a remote ere= of the
Indian Ocean,
The L02 tank is located in the forward part of the ET. It contains
aogro_Imate_y l,_SI,2_ _ounds of liquid oxygen. The tank feeds a
17-:nch-d'iameter feed line pasming from the botto_ of the tank through the
_ntertank structure, then exte?nai to the aft right-hand ET/Orblter dzs¢onnect.
The _ntartank _s a cylindrical structure which houses the ET instrumentation
co_oonents and provides in umbilical Dials that interfaces with the 65E arm for
heliun gas supply, hazardous gas detection, and gaseous hydrogen boil off during
grelaun¢h operations. The LH2 tank, whic_ is located aft, ¢ontalns
approximately ZZ?,ES_ pounds of liqui_ hydrogen and =upplles fuel through a
I?-inch-diameter Feed line to the aft left-hand dlsconnect.
Because of the great difference in denszty of fuel and oxidizer, the
hydrogen tank contains one-slxth the total weight of propellants and is
ap_roxi_atley 2.7 tl_e= the volume of the L02 propellant tank, The L0Z tank is
Located forward to obtain a favorable center of gravity (e.g.) location for the
entire vehicle.
U •
The Propellant Piping in the Orbiter consists of manifolds, distribution
l_nes and valves which circulate groDel/ant to condition the system and route
the fuel and oxsdizer through prey=Ires to each of the three SSME's. T_+.
subsystem also cons_sCs of the distribution lines and valves which furnish
gressurant gas to the ET after SSME ignition and until MECO.
ORIGINal PAe£ iS
POOR
LblSC-F223@
..-._
5. I,_ Controi :f M_jor Mechanical Cc_Do_ents
Vel,es w:thln the _aln proc._. _-- Flew ar_ hydraullca_-ly cr pneu_+.:cally
i A • . ._'?t ;J,eO, 37" _0,_
F!zw l_ regula%eo by aaju_t_g the s_eed on the hLQh pressuce pum_. The
high _res_ure Cum_ consz5%_ of a prab_rnerltub:ne _ump Mechenl_M From L02 and
LH2 e:..tract_o_ _;nes. The o×idAzer flow _s ad]usteO by d throttlzno valve: a
pre_urner o_d_z_r va|ve _h_ch controls the rata of comDust%on l_ the _unp
preburner and thu_ p_mp s_eed, The h_gh pressure Dump confzgurat_cn_ are
_ae_t:c_| for _he L02 an_ LH2 system_.
the _ow pressure oxiazzer _umo Is driven by an extraction line from the
d_scharge of _he h_gh _ressure oxidizer lurbooump.. The _ow pressure LH2
turOooump is driven off the mazn ang_ne burner combustion pressure. Exhau@t_
from the iurbopuMo are combined with _he a×haust5 fro_ the LH2 an_ LOZ
preburner} and recycled _nto the Main engine burner.
._,_-_
_.I.¢ External Tank Pressur:za_on
This _ac_on descr_bea the ores}urization of the L02 amd LH2 tanks.
Effect_ of failures assume that all three engines are running. Engine out
Failure Modes are _%_cussed in Section _.S
S.I.4.1 L02 Tank
High pressure liquid oxyQen from the HPOT is fed to the MCC and the
pre6urner DumD. Small quantities are bled through the anti-flood valve (_FV) to
the heat exchanger (HEX). Part of the resulting gaseou_ oxygen (GO2) is u_mO
for PoQo _uopress_on, and the rest is routea through the oxygen FCV'_ for
pressurization of the ET (Ref 17, p. 1.2-1).
The LOZ tank pressurization line proviaes the means of transporting the
oressurant to the ullage area to assure the re_uired L0Z interface pressure and
tank pressure. (RAP. B, p, P-B) Lo_s of ullage pressurant flow from the period
of angzne start to one second after lift-off could v_olate the IB.3 p_q minzmu_
ullage pressure requirement al lifl-off plus one second causing potential tank
damage (shear buckling) with the potentia_ for TPS loss and eventual tank
rupture. (Ref. 7, p. 4-1@A) Loss of L02 ullage pressure during flight couId
result in ET structural failure.
0ascribed below are the major constituents and failure _odes of the L02
tank pressurization subsystem,
Comoonents Form_nq G02 Pressure Boundary
Major external leakage of G02 components (line segmente, flex couolinqs,
bellows, se_ls) _ay cause ioss of 602 and poss_ble _tructural failure of the L0Z
tank. (Raf. B, p. PA-B)
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F_llur_ cf one _QZ engine _o|atlon chec_ ,/_ive t_ oDen woul_ prevent
cre_r;=_t_o_ _s from that _glne from reacnLn_ tn_ tenk. Th!s =ould also
c_e =_i_i_[e ruot_re of SSME he_t e_cnanger c=_l al|ow_ng m_...ture of fuel r:c_
e._s_: _ ant LOS, _R_f. ;B, _. 35_
Each pressure sensor controls a fLo_ control valve ?or on_ o? the three
,_rb_ter _al_ engines. _t engine starl, the three orblt_r flo_ c_ntrcl val:,e_
are ,closed _ince t_e tanks ar_ _re_surized. (Ref. 8, p. E-B:,
To malnta_n t_e deslr_d u11age pressure, the fto_ contro] valves are
aut_mat_cally opened if the Lank pressure Oroos to of the control band, There
is n,_ manual controi for the LO2 flow control va£v_s. _Re?. 17, p. Z.l-4)
Fa:Lure o_ a single L02 pre_surant Flow control valve to o_en to increase
503 pressurant f!ow will not affect the system. A _ecomd valve fa_ling closed,
or a GO2 engine isolation check valve faillng closed in another engine will
result in io_ ullage _essure, possibly violatln_ the ET _tructural safety
factor. 611 3 flow conlrol valves failing closed may result in ET structur_l
failure and loss o? crew/vehicle. (Ref. _8, p. 3B5)
-,:7,._'..;-
clogged orifice in one leo of a flow control assembly result_ xn las_ of
only 1/2 flow capacity of one valves. Other valve_.will _alntaxn aaequate ET
pressure. (Ref. 18, p.5_7)
Body bur_-through of a L02 flow control valve caused by Zmpact of particles
or excessive GOZ temQeratures _lll cause loss of GO2 pressurant to ET, Release
of hot BO2 into orbiter aft bay may result _n overpressurization and orbiter
structural damage. Hot H02 impingement may cause damage to surroundinQ
_ystem/camponents, (Ref. IB, p. _8)
O_sconnect Valve
The L02 tank pressurization disconnect transmits pressurant flow from the
0rbi_er to the external tank in f_ig_t and from the Qround during tank
prepressur_=at_on ooerationao The ET/0rbiter interface consists of a
2-in.-diameter disconnect valve. The disconnect contains coaxial _op_ets which
are held o_en mechanically when the disconnect halves are engage_ an_ cLo_ed
_lth spr&ng force once disengaged. Sem|ing is accomplished _y metalmto-metal
seal with Internal gas _ressure assisting the effectiveness of the seal, The
gas tr_Dped between the two _oppei closures during disengagement _s allowed to
dump freely. Attar umbilical separation the Orbiter half of the disconnect
serves as a closeout for the main engine pressurization system, preventing
contamination of this system during atmospheric exposure. The tank half of the
disconnect prevents loss of pressurant from the tank, _Lnlmiz_ng thrust reaction
on the tank during tank separation and _ree fall.
-i[
E_ternal leakage caused by seal _racSure can _o=sibly reduce ullage
oressure. Th_s reduction is not _uffi¢ient to be or:flea!, since the matlng
flange design restricts the flow path to O.008 s_uared inches with total seal
failure. Failure of the disconnect 'to re_ain open during ascent can result in
posslble rupture of the pressurl2ation line and low L02 ullage pressure, This
can leas to posstb!y early L02 depletion and SSME shutdown, There is a
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possibility of the loss of cre_/vehlcle it the llne ruo_ures an_ :he aft bay
_m_ar_Ment IS Overoresso_|_, _%_Mre cf the d_sccnnect :_ clo_e curing ET
_eoaretLcn wi_l r_sult _n co_tam,rat_n of the Orbiter _ressur:zatzon _ne
_urLog ?eentry,
C_f?_ser _sse_y
cvllndrtc_I _xffu_er £_ {ccatec internal to the _02 tank et the
_re_ur_z_t_on Izn_ outlet, The _iffuser _s e_uIDpe¢ uzthe _erforaLe_
cylindrical core u_th Morm than I_0@ h_Les. The external portion of the
d_ffuser _ a _esh screen. The diffuser reduce_ _he entrance velocity ot the
incoming pre_urant gas to provide unlf_rm distribuILon Of the gase_ $_ the
ullage. _ pressure reducilon orifice Is locateO at the inlet to the d:ffu_er to
avoid problems wilh high Mach NuMber flow in the pressurized l_n_. (Ref. _, _.
P-7]
Structure| f_ilure of the diffuser assembly or screen couiO c_use loss o_
ca_ab_l=ty to diffuse pressurant flow which would result _n ullage pressure
collapse. (Ref. 8, O. P6-7)
Vent/Reli_f Valve
The L02 vent/relief valve i: a normally clo_ed, springlloaded valve which
is actuated open by Ground Support E=uzpment (_SE) helium prior Lo
prepressurzzatlon and launch.
The valve is held ooen'_uriflg loading to allow the escape of purge and
pressur_nt gas as _ is di_Dlaced by the propellant and the pro_ellant boil-off.
In the event that the tank pressure gets too high, the valve =ili relieve
to protect the tank structure. The tO2 relief pressure i_ 2_ +- I _plus or
m,nu_ I ) gsi_. The L02 valve vents directly to the atmosohere. (Ref. ]7,
_. 2.3-1)
For valve relief node operations, the two slope valve design utilize_ a
primary _en_tng PilOt and a secondary slave p_lot. The primary pilo_ use= local
ambient Dressure as e reference pressure (sensed at a_b_ent pressure sense
port}. The primary pilot provide= control so that valve relief w_ll occur. The
secondary pilot allows flow to the main g_ston in resoonse to signal fro_ the
•primary pilot during relief cgeratlon. The pr:mary and secondary =1lot inlets
are connected to the main valve inlet cavity. (Ref. 17, p.2._-l)
The inlet OP the vent/relief valve is fastened to the L02 tank forward dome
oG_ve cover_late. The valve outlet i= tee connected to plenums on opposite
sides of thc nose fairings to provide non-proPulsive venting. (Ref. B, p. P-7)
Failure of the vent/relief valve to remain closed or structural failure of
the valve assembly resulting in external leakage u_i cause loss of ulla_e
pressure. (Ref. 7, pp. Ph-I1 - PA-IB]
The L02 vent/relief valve position indicator switch tolerance allows valve
to indicate closed when it may be open up to _.3_ inches. This condition could
allow undetected ullage gas leakage prior to launch. Hot BG2 may autoignlte TPS
during flight.
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S.!._.2 LH2 Tank
_or _,t_rnaL _a_.ag_ o? CHZ components C!zne segments, flex c_uplzn_s,
Oei!_, _e_ _e! c_e Io_s of 6HZ and possible structural ?allure oF the L_Z
F_llure o_ an engine tsolatlon check valve to oPe_ would prevent
_re_r_z_tlon _a_ from that engtme from reaching the tank. Faziure efa _econd
check .alva or a fi_ control valve in another englne will result _n
_nsuff_c_ent LHZ ullage pressure. (Ref. In, 0,341)
Flow Control Uaives
Each pressure sensor co_trol_ a flow control valve for one of the three
crofter ma_n e_g_nes. _t eng_n_ start, the t_ree orbiter flow control valve_
are clc_eO s_nce the tanks are Qres_urlze_ (Ref. @, D.'E-91)
To me_ntaln the de, trod ullage pressure, the flow control valve} are
automatically ooened _f the tank pressure dro_ out of the conlrol band,
LH2 ?low control valves can be manually ooened by the crew if necessary.
17, o. 2.1-4)
The
(Ref.
Failure of a }ingle LH2 pre_surant flow control valve to open to increase
_HZ pres_ur_n_ flo_ w_ll not affect the system, A =_u_.d valve fa_l_mg cio_e_,
or a GH2 engine isolation check valve failing closed in another engine will
result in insufficient ullage pressure, resulting _n 3 SeME shut_own. All 3
flow control valves failing close_ may result in ET _tructural failure end loss
o? crew/vehlcle. {ReF. In, p. 338}
clogged orifice in one leg of a flow conlrol assembly resulkm in io_a of
!12 the flow capacity from one engine. Pressurization flow from the other two
englne} u111 ma_ntaln aOeQuale ET preasure. (Ref. IB, p. 34Q)
Oisconnect Valve
The LH2 tank oressurization disconnect transmits oressuran_ flow from the
Orbiter to the external tank in flight anO from the ground during tank
prepressurlzation o_erstlons. The ET/Orbiter interface consists of a
2-_n,-diemeter disconnect _alve. The d_sconnect conte_ns coaxial poppets which
arc held open mechanically when the disconnect halve_ are engaged and cloee_
with spring force once disengaged. Sealing is accomplished by _etal-to-metal
seal with internal g_s oressure a_i_ting the effeclivene_s of the seal. The
gas treDoed between the two poo_et closures during disengagement is allowed to
dump freely. _fter umbilical _eparation the Orbiter half of the disconnect
_erve_ as a closeout for the main engine pressurization system, preventing
contamination of thlS _ystem during atmospheric exposure. The tank half of the
disconnect prevents loss of pressurant from the tank, minimizing thrust reaction
on the tank during tank seoarati0n and free fall.
External leakage caused by seal fracture can possibly reduce ullage
pressure. This reduction _s not sufficient tO be criticaL. _ince the mating
?lange design re_tricts the flow path to 0._08 square inche= with total seal
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failure. Failure o? the dlsconnect to remain corm during ascent can result in
pesthole r_cture of the _ressurl:_tlon iLne _no LOw LH2 ullage _r_s_ur_. Tn_
c_m l_d t: Ocs_z_le early LH3 Ce_l_t_on and SSME shutdowm. There _s a
DO_SL_I_t'_ of t_e iQ_@ Qf crewiv_ntcle if ine l_ne ru_._ures an_ th_ _ft b_y
comDart_en_ zs _ver_r_s_ur_zeQ, Failure _f th_ d_conmect _o close during ET
_eOar_t_n w_ r_uit _n C_m_aM_n_tlOn Of CrOfter _me_surl=_tAon line _urlng
reentry.
cyl_ndr_cal diffuser is located internal tO the LH2 tank at the
prc_surz_atlom ILne outlet. The diffuser is e_OlDDed wAth a _erforated
cyllndrlcal core wlth mor_ than IS@8 holes. The e_ternal port,on o? the
d_ffus_r i= a mesh screen, The diffuser reduces the entrance velocity of the
incoming pressursnt gas to provld_ uniform distr_bullon of the gase_ in the
uila_e. A pressure reduction orifice is located az the Inlet to the diffuser to
maintain back pressure on the ores_urization llne. {Ref. 8, p. P-10)
Vent/Re!_ef Valve
In the event of excessive _ahk pressure, the valve will rei;eve to protect
the tank structure. The LH2 relief and reseat pressures are 3B *- t psig and _t
psig (minimum). The LHZ valve vents through the ETlground carrier umbillcal
prior to launch. _Ref. ;7, p. 2._-I)
For valve relief moor operations, the tun -*mOo valve de_i_n uti!i=e_ e
primary sensing 0ilOt and a secondary slave Oilot. The primary _ilot use_ local
ambient pressure as a reference pressure (sensed at ambient pressure sense
por_). The =r_mary p_Iot provides control 4o that valve relief w_ll occur. The
secondary p_lot allows flow to the ma_n piston in response to a signal from the
primary oilot during relief operation, The primary and secondary Dilot &nlet_
are connected to the main valve inlet cavity. (Ref. |7. p. 2.3-I )
Failure of the vent/relief valve to remain closed or structural failure of
the valve assembly resulting in external leakage will cause _ los: oF ullage
_ree:_re. (Re_. B, _p. Ph-5@ - Ph-SS}
The LH2 vent/relief valve _0silion indicator switch tolerance allows valve
to indicate closed when it may be corn u: to @.30 inches. This conditiom could
allow undetected ullage gas leakage during flight.
HPOT He¢_ Exchanger
See AOoendix E for details.
S.2 SUPPORT SYSTEMS
Support systems ere those systems and individual comoonents which are
essential to the ooeration of the :rLt_cal mechanical c_mpnmen_.. F_mmpl.. _
such _y_tem= Lnclude _ha pneumatic and "r_-_....... mic _o'*r_....... E!ec-+rical
instrumentation en_ control (El&C) and electrical Dower (EP) are sometiMe_
considered supgort systems in that they act mainly to suoDort the function of
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the crzt_caL mech_n:cal compcments. However, due to the comp!e_Lty of these
_y_M_ _h_ their int_rr_i_tIcn5 w_th system5 out_e the SS_P, E!_C _ E_ _L[[
c.:. I c_,eumatic Syit__m
The Pneumat:: <Helium) Pressurezatlon 5ubsyslem conslsts of helium _uOply
ta_ _e_u_stors, check valves, contro! valves, and d_s:r_but_on !_nes. The
s_bsys±em su_PLLe_ helium used w_ih_n t_e englne for purging the h:gh-ores_ure
o:,_d:zer tur_o_um_ (HPOT; ;nter_ediata _eal, for _urgi_g :he eng_e after shut
_own, _nO for actuat_no the va|ves durzng emergency shutdown. The balance of
the hel_um _s used to actuate the _neumat_cally o_arated _ro_ellant valve_
ulth_n _he Propel!ant Oel_very Subsystem and tc _re_suriz_ the propellant Izne_
_rlor to r_-emtry.
brief descr_ptlon of each of those functions is oroviOed in the
paragraph5 below. A simplifleO _chemat_c of the pneumatic system is illustrated
_ Figure 5-4.
Control of Pneumatically Actuated Ualvem
Helium pressure _s used to close the ETl0rblter disconnect valves and
orooellant prevaives. These valves are closed only once during launch.
Disconnect valves ere closed a few seconds prior to ET separation followin9
MECO.
Under normal fligh_ condillons, prevalves are opened at T-I@ seco_Os {to
allow propellant flow to the main engines). The valves remain open until MECO
cond_t:ons are met. The valves then are actuated to a fully closed posit_on.
If emergency shut_own of an engine is required, prevalves will be seouent_al!y
closed follow,rig SSME valve closure.
Fa_l_re of the _ne_matic system will cause both di}connect anO prevalves to
_emain in _he open position.
The hetZum system also _rovides supply pressure to pogo system valves
descr_be_ _n Section S.3._, Loss of valve control and post MECO charging is
considere¢ to De a cateetroohic event.
Control of HvdrauliCal_v Aci_aled Valves
55ME valves are regulated by the engine controller using hydraulic supply
pressure. _ sudden drop in hydraulic _ressure will cause pneumatic backuo to
the valve actuators to be initiated. A pneumatic shutdown of the engznes occurs
when a hydraulic Lock condition has occurred and engine isolation i_ required.
descr_ptlon of thls process is provided in Sections 5.Z.2 and S.4,5.
HPOTP Intermed_a%q _eel Purq_
The h_gh pressure oxidizer turbopumD !5 9cwered by the cx_d::=r pre_urmc?.
Combustion of LOZ and LH2 in the preburner creates a hydrogen rich mixture at
the harsh temperatbre and pressure of 14_S deg. R and 5180 PSIA, respectively.
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The xPQT pumps L02 at an outlet tempematur_ and premsure of l_d o_g. R and _GZ_
_:x_n_ of o,_dlzer _n_ iurbLne gas xa prevented by a _ynamLc _haft semi
cac;ag_ t_a: _ o_iween the _a_n pu_p _nd the turo_ne. The e_a[ package
cDn_=_5 _f • !_byrinth-type primary cxldizer seal, a purge_ controlled-ga_
_ntermed_ate semi, and two controlled gap turbine hot-g_= _eal_. _ra:_ cav_tz_
uzth c_erbcard crash i_nes are [posted between the _r_mary oxidizer seal an_ the
_nter_ed_ate _ea£, between _he _nter_edzate sea_ and the secondary turbine _ea_,
ar_ _etween the _econ_ary and primary turbine _eal_. To further Lnaure _gai_st
the _ixzng o_ oxtdlzer _nd turbine ga_, a hetium purge is a_l_ed _etueen the
elem_nt_ o; the intermediate seal during engine o0eratlon. (Ref. 21, p, 1-22)
Ourlng grounO o_erat_onm, the intermediate seal cavity to _urged u_lh
n_:rogen to remove any residue! air or moisture mnd to inert the _ystem. This
purge _eo_um ihange_ %o hEliUm immediately p_oceding engine start. 5tart i_
In_iblte_ by tnab_llty to verify adequate purge pressure durtmg _ropellent
ccndltioning. (Ref. II, p. 2-_I)
The Limit control _ystem initiates shutdown for loss of intermediate seal
_urge pressure, e×cessive _econdary seal cavity pressure or primary LOZ drain
pressure or HPOT turbine discharge temperature exceeding h_gh or low limits.
(Ref. II, p. :-2B)
If recline limits are being violated and =uto-=hu_down nms oeen _nnibite_
due to an engine loss or earlier crew decision, immediate crew action zs
required to shutdown thai engine. It _s possible _hat complete engine failure
will occur so _ulckly that neither the crew nor the ground will have tlme to
react (Ref. 17, p. I.I_-3). Lose of the HPOT intermediate seal _urge _ur_ng
engine shutdown could poteniially cause nz×ing of L02 end _urblne gases
re_ulting :n possible engine damage. However, los_ of the engine shutdown gurge
woulO occur only _f the SSME LIMIT CONTROL ENABLE/INHIBIT switch was Zn _he
INHIBIT posilion.
conplete failure of the secondary seal may not result in an engine loss
wLth the l_m_ts i_h:bited, since the hot gas st_ll _uet _a_s the primary seal
_nd the _ntermediate seal to get to the L02 In the gulp. Thus, if the engine _s
run_in_ w_th limits inhibited and the secondary seal redline %s violated, but
the intermediate seal redline 1s not violated, the engine has a high likelihood
of running until m safe abort region i_ reached (Ref 17, p. 1.1_-3).
5.2.2 Hydraulic Sy$1eM
The hyOraulic system is included Zn the mode[ only to the exkent to which
it services the flow control valves. Only the piping and other mechanical
pressure boundary components within the 5$ME'= have been revieued. The
hydraulic system also services other portions of _he =hurtle which are not
re|ated to the operation of flow control valve= in the main engine. These
functions are not _nc_ude_ in the faul_ i,'e_.
ORIGINAL PAGE IS
OF POOR QUALITY
LMSC-F223,
U
5.-3 PRESEURE CONTROL
5.3.1 Fr_ur,, 5ens_n 0 _"
subnea,,ent e...p los t ¢,n.
L02 Tank
L02 [an_ _ressure _s _alntained by the tank ullage _res_ure transducer
contr01 ¢Ircu_% prov101ng _screte pressure/flo_ control valve oDem (full f[o_)
and closed <reduced flo_) s,gnals _n accordance wLth the _ensed tank pressure.
The external tank contalns four ullage pressure transducers with three of the
four transducers used for controlling the operation of the flo_ control valve_.
Each _ransducer is deOlcat_d electronically a_igne_ to an engine end _rovldes
direct control ?or that engine's flow contro| valve. Th_ _ourth transducer is
switched _nto the ccntrcl clrcu_t _hould a ullage pressure transducer failure
occur prier to launch. (Ref. 7, p. _-I)
The L02 tank has gau_e type transQucers, The gauge transducers have
individual ambient sense _orts that can fall due to _luggin9 from contamination
or icing and could result in a transducer reading low, (Ref, _, O. E-10)
Failure oP one sensor reading lower khan actua| tank pressure will o_en the
corraspond_n_ FCU early. Tank pressure will remain within nominal l_mzts with
one failed sensor. !f two or three sensors read lower th_r_ actual pressures ano
the vent/relief valve fail_ closed, tank overpressur%zation w, ll result. Relief
valve operation could cause lose of usable propellant. (Ref. B, p. E-A-41)
T_o or three sensors reading higher than actual pressure _ilI cause flow
control valves to shut off too soon causing tank underpressurization. (Ref. 8,
p. EA-B)
LH2 Tank
LH2 tank pressure _s maintained by the tank u_lage pressure transducer
control circuit _rov_din_ discrete pressure/flow control valve open (full flow}
and closed (reducad flow) signals in accordance with the sensed tank pressure.
The crew is provided with an override switch whlch provides backup for the
condition of two failures in the tank ullage pressure tranducers/flow control
valve circuits to provide aOeouate oressurant to the LH2 tank. The switch
by-passes the control for the pressure/flow control valves and commends all of
the pressure flow control valves to the normally open (full flow) position. The
_witch would be operated if the C & W gave an indication of lowering mainfold
pressure. The external tank contains four ullage pressure transOucers with
three of the four transducers use_ for controllin@ the operation of the flow
control valves. Each transducer is dedicated electronically assigned to an
engine and provides direct control for that engine's flow control valve. The
fourth transducer is s_itched into the control circuit should a ullage pressure
transducer failure occur prior to !punch. _Ref. 7, p. B-I)
Fa_lure of one sensor reading lower than actual tank _re_sure w_ll open the
corresponding FCV early, Tank pressure will remain within nominal limits with
one failed sensor. If lwo or three sensors read lower than actual pressures,
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,_o of t_ree _e_sors read_n_ n:gher than actual pressure w,[] cause fl:w
c:.nt_oL .._!ve_ t._ _h_t o_? too 5oom c_us_n_ tank underpr_ur_z_t_, (_.
5._.2. Pressure R_lef
The _r_pellant tank vent/roller valve assemblies grovLdes t_O functions,
vent an_ tel:of. The vent function _s only utilized during propellant Ioa_:ng
launch countaoun and hold periods, and the relief functlo_ i_ useO to orotect
the ta_ structure when the vent _ cl_sed by auto_atlcal|y reducing.t_e ullag_
_ressure in the event t_at it exceeds a preset value.
Our_ng flight the vent valves assume their normally closeO gosltton and act
as safety rellef valves to protect against overoressur_zatlon. Failure of LOZ
or LN2 relief funct_on_ would result ;n tank overgressurizatlon'Lf a secondary
_yste_ fazlure {ze. flow control valve faziure} exist=. (Ref. B, P-_-lS, SZ)
,:..',._
5._ P060 SUPPRESSION
PoQo _s _el?-Induced long_tu_inal oscillation involving major vehicle
co_oonents, structure, feedl|nes, _urbopump_, _nO englne. Pc;= r::u!_= in
unde_rable low freouency oscillations (typically S to 2SHz) with _otentially
detrimental effects on the vehicle crew': ability to function and on vehicle
structure and components. (Ref. II, p. 2-_27)
Loss of Pogo suppression capability from one engine after liftoff is
considered to resull in structural oscillations and feedline _re_ure of
un_red:ctab[e _lltude which can lead to loss of crew/vehicle. (Ref. 23.
p. _-7)
G02 Pogo sugpreseor system Xs incorporated into the LO2 Feed syste_ at
the NPOT _n_et, The system utilizes a gas fil_ed ac:umulator to suppress
vehicle-induced flow oscillations. 60Z tapped off the heat exchange i_ used as
the Dressurization medium following an initial heliuR Orecharge. The system
controls liquid leve[ in the accumulator by means cf =n overflow llne which
routes overflow fluid_ through /he rec_rculation isolation valve (RIV) and the
L02 bleed line to the manifold feedline ugstream of the _revalves. (Ref. 9,
_. I-7) Refer to F_gure S-S.
The Pogo suporession system consists of a flan_ed accumulator, standpipe.
heliu_ orecharge valve package, 602 control valve, a reclrculation i_olation
valve, and two recirculation control valves. The engine controller controls the
v_Ives. (Ref. 9, p, 1-7)
• The acCUmUlator is chilled by L02 H,ir+- 0 =-_inm chit}dew- oper_t_ c ..
convection czrculation _zthzn the accumulator, with Qg_i_nal cycling of the
recirculation xsoiation valve, allows the accumulator to fill to the
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reclrculat_en L_ne !_vel. This te,,el _ _u_f_ctent t_ Oreclu_e g:: _nge_tlcn at
_t_rt. _e?. _, p. Z-I_G) _t terM:nat_O_ 0? englne ch_lloo_n, T-12.S seccn_,
the F_o r_cLrcul_t_on contro| ,,,_tves are cpeneO. (Ref, 17, p. 2._-7)
Ourteg engine sta-_, charglmg of t_e accumulator _tth hei_um _ CeleFed bV
2.4 _ec_cs after the engine _tart _nal tc permit the en_z_e to r_ch a _e[[
_ehaved portion o? _t_ _re_sure/f!ow transient, fiL that point, the contrclle_
_tonaLE helium flow through the helium precherge valve. Helium entering the
accumulator forces the L02 lave| down tc the n_m,naL operatIn_ _os_tion _n
a_roximate!7 Z._ second_. (R_f. il , p. 2.2-B)
The hel_um precharge _ utilized in the riO2 Pogo _uDpre_sor system to
_rov_de a ra_zd charg_ and lhereOy af?ord Pogo _rot¢ctlon during liFtoff and the
early part of the fl_ght until oaseou_ oxygen _s available from the englnc heat
exchanger. The helium prechrarge valve (HPV) _s also used to provide hel_um gO
the acCu_ui_tor _S a _ost charge at engine shutdown. The HPU conta_n_ a
IS-m_cron filter at the helium znLeto (Refo 17, p. l.E-@)
The hel_um prechar_e solenoid valve also controls the normally o_en GO2
control valve. _hen the solenoid is de-energized, GO2 is _upplied to the
accumuLalor. (Ref. II, p. _.Z-B)
The G02 Control Valve (FICV) provides gaseou_ oxygen pressurant to the Pogo
accumulator during engine operation after _he engine heat exchanger _s
Functioning. fi bleed orifice provides fail-safe valve actuation to the open
po_tion. Pneumatic pressure to the closing s_ae or the actuator i_ also
applied to the opening side of the bleed orifice. This will cause the valve to
reopen approximately Z seconds after the _plic_tlon of closing pressure.
(Ref. |7, _. I._-9)
The _ormalLy open Recirculation Isolation Valve (RIV) _s actuated closed by
the sane pneumatic pressure that opens the normally closed Oxidizer Bleed
Valve. RIV o_ening during engine operation is ensured by routing gaseous
oxyge_ from the overr_de port of the GCV to the opening side of the RIU actuator
_hen the 6CV _s opened. (Ref. I_, p. _.6-E)
5.5 ELECTRIChL INSTRUMENTATION _NO CONTROL tEl&C1 FUNCTIONS
The SSMP EI&C system can be generally classified as perform_n9 one of the
followin 9 critical functions:
I) Propellant flaw rale/mlxture regulation
2) Englne shutdown on demand, and
3) Thrusl vector adjustnenl (gimbaling, throttle-up etc.)
_) E_ternal fuel tank separation actuation,
brief description of each of these systems operationa and associated
hardware is provided in the sections below. Functions provided by the on-Ooard
general purpose co,Drier (GPC) will only be de#orloed tnasfar e_ system
interfaces are concerned.._nalysis of the 6PC and EI&C functzons (_vlonics
System) not strictly su_ortin_ SSMP operation _.s outsi_e the scope of this
effort. The bounc_ar_es of EI&C functions included _n the analysis are snown--_n
5-6.
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5.5,! _vlmn:zs System Foature_ an: mist?aces
| • T_e _r_mary f!:_ht system (PFS) design :s based on _ cen_ral_zeO
_e_ of _u_-reounda_% _enerai-_ur_o_e com_uter_ CGPC'_) uLtr_n
_he oa_a oroces_,m_ _y_m ,OP_ w_zcn Drovlce5 the Or_mary mode
of occulting fi_ghl-crtti¢_l _nsom cats, oroce_s_ng the _ata,
end, finally, g_nerat_g an_ dellverzn 9 g_dance, navigation, an_
con:r:l (_N&C} commam_s to the var:ou_ vehl:|e control element_.
'..
_.° hdOit_o_ally, a single @PC ulth Indeoendently deslgneC and coded
Fl_ghl sofiware called the backuO _11ght _y_tem (SFS). is available
_o take over vehicle control through _he primary bus struclure ?ro_
the FFS, _f necessary.
The OF5 bus _tructure contains 24 se_arale _erlal Oigital Ln_ut/
output (I/C) buses including elght fligh%-critical (@N&C) and five
_ntarcomouter (ICC) buses, which provide for sensitive data
commun_¢aZioms and control through the @PC redundant set. The
three engine interface units and two master events controller_ are
cro_-strapaed to _he four Flight Critical (FC) buses and proviso
_nterface services between the 6PCs ana the Main Eng,ne Controllers
an_ associated event_ _equencing functions.
4. The various multiply redundant inertial navigation and flight control
_ensors and affectors mu_t be in a consten_ state of reedlness to
perform the _ault _etect_on, _solation, and reconFiQuratZon (FOIR)
functions.
_o The av$on_ca and nonavion_c_ system manegemenl tSM) funcz_om is
performed in conjunctzon _zlh the operational ln@tmum_tat_on (OI).
A three-string eleclrtca| Sower distr_butlon and control _ystem
_rovtde_ s_ngle _ault-_oleran_ _ower to non-flightmcrzt:cal systems
and dual fault-tolerant _ower to flight-critical system_.
_.S.2 Provellant Flow RalelMi_lure Control
The SSME's can be throttled _ver a range af 6S 1o 10@ percent of rate_
Oowem level in I-percent increments. _t sea level, _he engine tnro_tle range _
restricted by nozzle flow se_aralion. The 6S-percent throtlle 5ett_ng _
re?erred to as mz_mum _ouer level (MRL).
_II three engines normally receive the same throttle commen_
_multaneously. The co_mand comes from the 6PC's to the MEC's. Ourlng certain
contingency ooerations, man.el cre_ control of en@ines is Do_s_le by use of the
soeeO _rake/MEC handle. Throttling reduces veh_c|e Ioa_s during maximu_
aeroayna_c _ressure, [imLts lonoztud:nal acceleration to 3 _'s during boost,
and make5 it passible to abort with all maLn engines thrusting or with one
engine out.
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T:-,e ==nt.".sL_er ;s an electron!.zi =azl. a_e m._unt_ -_n each _._ME _n_ c._n:az=_
_..-.......... . .... :cerate_ ;n conjunction _.ith _g,n_ s_nsors vat.,,.5
controL, .=h_c_._u_, _nc mon_torln.g. T_e ccnzr_ler orev_e_ e_,gir,_ f_gnt
an_ or._e!_ant mi.,ture ratlo c_ntrol, _ensor e_c:tet_mr,, -:a!ve _:tuator an_
_:mri ._nltcr :_n:r_[ _i_naZ_, engine perfcr_anceli_It monitoring, en_oarO
engine .:bec!.'_ut _n¢ response to ve_Lcle CoMman_ an_ transmLSSiC, n of engine
_la_as, anO _rfon_ance and Maintenance data.
Each englne controller r_¢elve5 engine command5 tr_nsmltted _y the droller
GPC'_ t_r_ugh _n engine tnterfa:e unzt CEIU_ dedzcated to that e_zne
¢ontr_E_er. T_e engine controller provxde_ xt_ own comman_s co the ma_n engine
::m_nent_, _nG:ne Oats are _en_ tc the englne controller, where the data are
_toreO _n a vehicle data table (VOT) in the ocntro[ler'_ computer _emory.
Con:toiler _:atus compiled by the engine controiler's comouter are ei_o added to
the ve_Icle data table. The ve_i=le data table i_ _er_od_caily ouk_ut by the
contmolier to the E_U for transmission to the orbiter 6PC's.
The EIU is a soeciellced mult+Olexer/demult_plexer (MOM) that Interfaces
_ith the ¢n_ter 6PC'_ an_ with the engine controller. When engine commands are
received by the E_U, the data are held in • buffer u=t_i the _IU recei_ an
orbiter 6FC request Per data. The EIU then sends data to each crblter 6P_.
E_ch E!U i_ de_cat_d to one 55ME and communlcate_ only with the engine
con_rc£1er that control_ the SSME. The EiU'_ have no interface _ith each other.
The controller provldes responsive control oP engine thrust and mixture
ratio t_rougnout the digltal com_uter in the controller, updating the
Instructions to the engine control elements 5_ times _er second (evey 2_
_l_isecond_}. Engine rel_abillty _s enhance_ by • dual redun_n_ syste_ _hat
allows normal ooeratlon after the first failure and a fail-_afe _h_tdown after a
second failure. High-reliab_lity el¢ctron_c part= are u_ed throughout the
controller.
The 6ig%tal comouter i: programmable, allowing modification of engine
control equations and oonstant_ by chan_e !o the stored grogram (software),
controller t_ packaged tn a _eaied, pressurized chapels a_d _s cooled by
convection her% iron:Per through _In ?in_ a_ part of t_e ma_n chassi:. The
electronics are dlstributed on functional modules with special thermal and
vibration _rotection,
The
The centroller _s div_¢ed into five _ubsy_tems: Inoul electronxcs, output
_iectronlcs, computer interface e!ectromlc_, digital com_uter, and Dower supply
electronics, Each subsystem is _u_licated to provide dually redundant
caoa_Iilty, _ siM_lifled redundancy diagram of the controller i_ Figure 5-7.
Theln_ut etectronlc5 receive date from all engine sensors, condtt;on the
_ignals and convert tO digital values for Dr_ce_ing Dy t_e digital computer.
Engine control _en=ors are Oual-re_undant, and _aintenance data sen_ors are
non-redundant.
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The outp_: e!'_tron_=-- ". convert "he. ccm_ut=r c_gl:al c¢_trol camm_nc_ =n_o
The c_mDuter l_ter_=ce _letron_c_ control the F[o_ _? da=a _zthlm t_e
controller, _nout dat_ to the computer, and c.mDuter outpuk command_ to the
out_ut e[_ctr-o_,,_. They al_o Prcv_de the ccnzroiier _mterface wttn the veh%cle
engine e[ectronlcs Imterfece _nlt for "ecelvLng engine c_m_anc_ _icn are
tri_ie-redun_ant ceannels frcm the ve_icle _nd transmlsslon o_ engine st_tu_ _n:
data through dual-redundant channei_ to the vem_cle. The computer interface
electrcnlc_ Include_ the watchdog t_mers that determlne _hi_h channel of the
duai redundant mechanization is in control.
0urlng _relaunch, the orbiter @PC's will look al both pr:mary end _e_omdary
data. Los_ of e:ther Or$mary or =e_nCary data w_ll result :n data _ath f_Lure
and e_ther engine _gm_tton znhlb_ or launch pad shutdown of all three SSME's.
_t T-0, the orbiter 6PC's will request both Dr_mery and secondary data from
each EIU. For no failures, only primary dale are looked at If there _ a idea
of _r_mary data (_c_ can occur between the engine con%roiEer Channel
electronzc_ and SSME SOP), then _he secondary date are exam_ne_.
5.S.5 Engine [_olation on Demand (Shutdown)
Engine :hukdoun is initiated when pre-emteb_i:hmd _=r:metrlc c_nditions
_redlZne_) are met and orooe=sed through the controller, Pro_ellant ?lo_ to the
engines is then cut off by means of the engine flow valves and the orbiter
prevalve_ on the LO2 and LH2 system line_. This effectlvely isolate= %he
external tanks an_ orbiter plumb:ng from the engines.
The controller may fail to generate a shutdown commend if I) the engine
interface unit (EIU) or general _ur_ose comouter (BPC) fails to _end the =romer
signals, 2) the electric Dower _s lost to the valve_/¢=ntroller, and 3) zf the
pre-establz_hed rmdlinms ere violated.
The shutdown seeuence _s initiated when m_mimum power level {MPL) is
delecteO, MPL i= currently set to _ of full Bower. Engines may oleo be shut
down if h_gh temoer_tur_ is _etected on either high _ressure _ump turbine
exhau=t. Other shutdown parameters Xnclude low ma_n burner/ chamber pressures
and low tank level.
More discussion regarding system response to shutdown of one or more
englnes is proviOed in Section S.
_.5.4 External Tank Se_eratlon
External tank detachment from the orbiter _s controlle_ by the GPC.
flctivat_on of ET/or_iter =yrotechnic= occurs after isolation of disconnect
flaooer valves an_ MECO enables the f_rim O.
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Tur.bi,_n_ cu_vste_
Th_ _b_bi_ 5'/_teM lS Ln=L1_te_ ]_st orL_r Ic seoarat_on by cow-ands fro_
t_e Orbiter. The Lumoie valve arm CO_Ma_ _i _c,_tlated S sec_ndi after MECO i_
confirmed by the @FC's and she valve _ire co_mand i_ in_tiated ] _ecc_d later.
_eF. 7. p. 5-1g)
The f:rsl crblt_r :o_mend arms tme c_rcuzt Dy energizing the sw_tcn module
relay. This cLo_ the two normally open rel_y contacts _hlch ccmplete_ _he
firing circuit tc the NAS_ Standard 0etonator (NSO_. The second comman_ i_ the
¢:re command which activates the NSO and fires the pyro cartridge that _pen_ a
t_o-=nch valve mounted on the ogzve ?orwar_ r_ng forging. The residual G02 z_
_ented _n t_e _Z a.<_s prov_a_g the reou_red tumble thrust.
5.G MAIN ENBINE SHUTDOWN
The two Failure situations discussed _n thi_ 5ectlon, one and two enQine
shutdowns, _re analyzed because each is related to the MPPS. However, they are
grouQed together for this remor_ because they aopear to represent a cross
section o_ m_sm_on techniques. Failure to _hut down an engine Illustrates
redundancy and two-englne shutdown p_ses a real-tiMe _i_i_n de_z_ion.
S.G.t Failure to Shutdown a Single Engine
Engine shutdown, whether inlt_ated by the controller or by :raw command, _
a safe reapon_e to an unsafe operating condition. Serious conseouence_ May
result if a ma_n engine fa_Is to shut down on demand. To overcome such a
failure, several shutdown methods have been designed into engine ooeration.
Emergency engine shutdown may be _nitlated From mny steady state or
:rendition thrusl level, including engine _tar_. The engine shutdown sequence
i_ _nltiatea by the controller u_on receipt of a vehicle shutdown command or
engine parameters which exceed predetermined redline lim_t_. If the controller
cannot accomplish shutdown via hydraui_c actuators, it wliL perfor_ shutdown
w_th helium pneumatic pressure v_a the Pneumatic Control _semOly (PCA). If
Malfunctions are such thai the enQine zs still o_erating, the crew can Lake
acllon, first, by cutting off electrical power to the engine and, f_nally, by
ctosln_ the _revaiv_ to _top the fuel flow.
S.B.2 Two Engine Shutdowns
Other considerat_on_ aside, the three engine_ on the Shuttle represent
redundancy. However. this _S true only for a slngle-engLne-out _ituat_on; _,e. ,
the Shuttle c_n safely return to the launch site or _erform one of the othe?
preoLannea abort5 on t_o engines. If two engines :hut d=_n, or the sec_,;d
engine Must be abut down by t_e crew, a safe abort is possible only of _he
Orbiter ha_ achieved the velocity threshold that would allow at treat a TAL
abort on the one remaln_ng engine. Thus, _houLd a _econd engine dr_ft out of
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sate _Oerstlng b_unOarles betwmen _e time the f_r}: engine 5huts Oo_ _nd the
t:_e _-e ascent trajectory -eache_ _ingle-_glne T_L. _is=lon oOeratlo_s
=er_nn_i _nd the ¢re_ may have a ,ery c!_l_ult Ceci_i_n to Make.
C_n_i_r _ _cen_m1_ Beglnnin_ _it_ th_ shutdown of Q 51ngle emglne _¢Qn
_ter _Ft-_FF. _he_ thl_ _ve_t _ccur_, the Oroiter c_mouters _end a comma_ %0
inhtbi_ ihut_o._n _f either of the ot_er t_o engines.
T_ enable a second automat,c _hutdo_n, the inhtblt _? one or both of the
re_alning engines must ?a_l. This i_ a cre_ible situ_tlon _ a COMmunication
Oat_ ?ail_re _etwe_n the Orbiter 6PC's and en e_gin_ ha_ occurred, For t_e _a_e
-eason. t_e crew _o_|d also be unable to inhibit engine shutdown. Such a
situation expcse_ the flight to the _osslb,llty of a second automa%_c shutdown.
Premumlng the remaining two englnes h_ve been inhibited _rom an automatic
_hu%down. ground operations per_om_el and the crew will monitor engine
parameters to ieentlfy oFf-nomlnal ooeretions cf e:ther of the two remainin G
e_ines. The ices of _ntermediate _eal purge is a singularly serious
malfunction. If this happens, the crew may have to _hut down the second engine,
even at the risk of a dangerous abort. Another conceivable, though
hygothetlcal, sltuatLon is the shutdown of a second engine w_th a contained
failure.
Thus, t_e two-engines-out situation can result in a Loss of life or vehicle
if the event occur_ between lift-off and slngie-englne TAL.
5.? GROUNO OPERATIONS (MPS)
Flight preparations between T-B hours and the end of ET pressurization
consist _rimarily of four major funcilons:
I. System purge
2. System =hiildown
3. Pro_ellant fill
4. ET Pressurization
Apoendix F describes the individual tasks and readings needed to
successfully ac¢om_li_h these o0eretions. Propellant Pill is the process by
which the external tank (LOZ and LH2) is slow and quick-f_lled to I_8% level,
Chllldow_ is the process by which system pi_Ing and components are cooled by the
Drooeli_nts in order to _inimize thermal shock, Failure to properly chili
_ropellant _ysiem Dressure boundary may result in gro:s leakage or pi_tn g
rupture due to ovarstress conditions. System purge and anti-icing is _erformed
to preven_ the accumulation of contamination (mainly water) from plugging lines
u_on the introduction of pro_ellents.
P_eu_atic System _SE used i_ the MPmS consists of three i_de_endent
subsystems. T_o of the subsystems are identical. The L02 and LH2 ET
_repreesur_=aton syubsy_%ems provide gaseou_ helium to their resoecttve tank in
order to Oressurize th_se tanks sufficiently to permit SSME start. The _SE than
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_he =q_.=ar: _e_lun 5f_te_ ts #re_suri:=_ crlor tO filg_ 3/ the tn;r3 _E
_ub_y_te_ :_e _r_arv hel_ _re_ur_=at_on recuctLon end bcttle _!_ Q_ne!.
The5 p_ne! regulate5 helium oomn to, _i_ _ _ _s_O tn_ou_n t_c, O_#al'e!
csrc_zts. The nel_un flo_ z_ controlleC _y _hutcff vaive5, _hlCh _re .:._ened anc
.o-._ by the LP_ in order [c pre_surzze the cnDe_rd he[:um tanY5 _:tno_
e,,c_e_ng te_o_r_ture l_ts. The _eiluM _5 _rovlced by _ ps:_ faci!_ty
scarce.
5.B ,_[SSION P,CCOMOOATION_ OF IN-FLIGHT FAILURE_
The _ace $hutti_ Mt_Lon ha_ _een designed to.ac¢cm_ate ooeretzcnal
fatture_ wzth1_ the flight _7_tem_. Durzng the a_cent-to-orbzt #ha_e of a
M!estc_, a 5_r_e5 of a_ort _tra_e_e_ has _e_n dev:_ed to ensure a "fa_l
operatzonal-fai[ _afe" capabZllty. Simply _tate_, the strate_tem may be OefzneO
a_ follow_:
I) Return to launch _ite (BTLS} i: the in_tlal abort node, which allow_
the veh,cle tc _bort anytime after launch and to return _o the KenneCy 5_ace
Canter (K_C) runway. The constant_ are (a) _he loss of no m_r_ ÷h_n _,. e-gzne
and {b) _ufficxent naln engine propellant to _teer the Shuttle on a return
course tO KSC with t_m _eslred po_tion and veloczty state prior to engine
cutoff. Although a critical failure may occur earl_er, the: node _i! not be
activated until approximately 2 m_nutee 30 seconds afler lift-off _hen the _ol_d
roc_:et boo,tars {SRBs) have burneO oul and _eparaled fro_ the Shuttle.
2) Transocaanlc abort landing (TAL) _ the second abort MOde ano cveria_
the _TLS ca0abilz_y at a_raxi_ately • _inutes after _ifi-_ff. This _ode
prov:de_ thm capability for the Orbiter to lan_ at a conlin_ency s_te, generally
tn North Africa or Spa_n. Thi_ o_t_on is u_ually act_veteo following a crit_cel
system £a_lure in order io land a_ soon a_ _o_slble. Thi_ _ode has full
capability to accommodate one failed engine an_ a limited capability to
accommodate two failed engine: (velocities aDprox_ately > l_,00_ _t/_ec).
3) Abort once around (AOA) orovldes for an abort landZn_ at Edwards Air
Force Base or at White 5an_: by achieving ihe deslre_ hyperson$¢ suborbital
Flight statm at MECO, Thi_ mode, whzch Drovlde_ engine-out accommodation
similar to T_L, _ _nitiated because the vehicle flight energy state ha_
_ro_re_sed pas_ the autoguidance T_L capabilzty (velocity aoproxz_ately ) 2@,000
ft/se¢).
4) Abort to orbit (ATO), the final made, _ an oOtlon from the AO_, If
_uff_c_ent cnmoard propulsion ca_abilily exists and the crztlcal failure does
not effect _ss_on comg_et_on, the Orbiter will be oraoelled bv the Orbital
ManeuvertnQ Syste_ tOMS) engines to the desired orbit after ET se_aratlon. The
_s_Ion may _e continued or aborted, depending on the crLtlcal_ty of the system
f_llure.
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Section
RISK ASSESSMENT
7_5_ _ type,ca[iF _eflned a_. the _r_uct of the crobab_1_ty of am event
:cc_rr_ce _nd tn_ _everlty o? zt_ consequences, or
R_k = Probabi!itv ,. Severity EQuation 6-I
For thz_ 5tuOy, the r_sk :5 a loss of l_?e and:or vehicle due to a
c_m_:nat_on of MPP_ relate_ ?axlure_. The orobab_ty t_ that o? [a_ o_ l=?e
_ior veh_c£e durzng a m_on. Severity t_ _e_ured _n ter_ of the nu_er oF
_ctent_al ?at_itle5 anO hardware Ic_e_ resulting from a catastrophic ?ailure.
_quati_n G-I za, he.ever, e _tm_Ist_ re_re_emt_ttcn of r_k. The
_everzty of an acc_en_ varie_ a_ a function o? the _g_tf_c failure _cenari_.
or conoinat_on, Con_dcr, for example, a catastrophic Ios_ of engine thrust
wzthln the _r_t fe_ _econ(s fo[lowlng llft-off. The _everlty of thzs failure
w:_l vary de_enQ_mg on whether or nol the STS has cleared the launch facility.
T_m,ng of the failure is junk one crucial factor in asse_stnQ the total
re_ultlng damage. Risk can thus be redefine_ a: the sum of the riaks created
durln_ v_rlou_ stages of the _tS_iO_, or
_.Zsk = _ (F × S}i E_uation 6-2
_here F = The nroDab_l_ly of cata_Iropnzc failure during a m_ss_om
t_me _nterval "_"
= The ,,evertty of the catastro{:hic Cailura (_ur_ng interval "i'.
Throughout thi_ section, emnhasls will be nlace_ on consequence aa a
_nctiom of mlsSlOn _ime.
6.1 LhUNCH _NO PREL_UNCH TIME SE_UENGE
An event tree may be used as a method of depicting the various outcomes {or
levels of severity) for ti_e dependent fa_lure_. F_gures 6-Ia and 6-Ib show a
t_me-se_uence event tree re_resenting _cen_rio_ which would result _f a
catastrophic accident occurred aurlng the different %n_ervals of the mtasion.
The lower branche_ re_resent either e failure to successfully avoi_ a
cakastroohlc event or a ?ailure to accomoli_h a critical recovery o_eration
(e.g., abor_ landing). Uoner branche_ re_resent succe_5.
Two _e0arate event trees are Oeve|ooed to _rovide some distinction between
those event_ _h_ch are not recoverable or inmadtately catastrophic (_.e. F,re.
exo_o_ion, aft co_oart_ent over_res:urizat&on and other non-recoverable events}
and those events for which an abort i_ nossible. Leakage and ruoture of
orooellant system or other nressure boundary create _ituatzon_ in which the
recovery t_me i_ very compres_eq. F_gure _-la, therefore, renre_ens_ fairly
straight forwar_ outcome statu_ zn whlc_ an tmmed&ate cat_troDhy i_ expected.
F_gure G-Ib, however, includes many Dotential abort scenamtos. The conseq_ence_
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ere ::m:l_r!y dememcen: cn :he tl_e _ha_e. :hat :2 grouncl fac:l_t:e._ =_
"_. _,;r= =-e=u=_ -= _t-empeed : :,e. =TL-S, TRL =,_
_h[cn =u_e_s ._re _z=l:camle to t_e v_r_ou_ _ra_cme_ of tn_ =ven_ tree. "he
e.,_c_re ::me_ fur e_ch basic even_ zn the cu:set_ _5 then car_fu!ii rev_weO t_
ensur: th_: ;r_&_r _rcbabi[_tze5 are as_zgne_ ?or each of the tlme int=r'/al}
_q_r to Am_e_ozx C_ Tebl= C-5 For ti_e-cha_e_ orc_ab_l_t:_. Tabie_ E-!_ _nd
_-!U _emtlf_ the DertLrant cut,elm for each event tree branch. :t _s
_eca_sary, for practical ouroose_, to t_umcate cutseLs wmose _roba_!st=e_ ?_
_£=w l@ -B.
The orobabLlity of an outcome state &: the _roduct of all event tree
bramches !:_¢ing to that state. The probab_l_ty of each branch of the tree _
obtained by se_ect_nq the ap:ro:r_ate portxcns of the mas_er fault tree and
apolyzn9 proOabl!ttles to the bas:c event_ corre=oondlng to the reSpeCtive
_xOosure t_mes (_.e., time [ntervat_). Abort scenarios have not been
Dro_abill)tzcally _uant_fled since these are outsiOe the 5coo= of ana£ysi_. For
t_me Interval_ between T + 3@ _e=ond= and zero thrust, fault tree orobabilities
were adjusted For fractional exposure tzmes {e.g. subdivisions of fl_gh_
pma=es). The fraction_ are mhown along side the Fault tree mnemoni:: on the
event trees.
6.1.1 Basl_ for 0iViSlon of Time Intervai_
The div_slons _hown in the event tree represent time intervals wh,Ch define
distinct outcomes. [m other words, by subdividing the txme interval= further,
one would obtain the _ame number of outcome :tates, but a greater number ¢f
_div_Ouai _equen=em dependent on the subdivided time interval; no slgmiFicant
additional information regarding risk _s obta_ne_ from such a sub_ivis£on.
The tome-line fo_ our mission profi|e begins with flight OmeparetJon
ooerai_cn_ at a_prox_mately T-B hour_. Majo_ flight _re_aratlon o_eratxons,
_nc!ud_ng cryogen fill, =ysLem purging an_ initial system checkout are oer_ormed
me=nly during the znterva| between T-@ hours and crew boarding at T-2 hours.
Th_s interval Xs chosen as a convenient segment of time because any catastroph:c
accidents resulLing during the:e six hours Ortmarily affect the ground suCgort
e_uioment and launch facility. _t the time of crew boarding, the consequences
of • major accident would at least potentially _nclude loss of flight crew
life. Other consequence categories are Zdentifie_ in Table B-2.
Time intemval_ during ignition and the flight are similarly divided _nto
milestone change_ in the accident oulcome. From T-I@ seconds until the time STS
clears all groun_ facilitlee, a catastrophic acc:Oent may not be llmzted solely
to the loss of STS and crew. _round Facilities may be affecte_ from ecattered
debris follo_lng e_Ol@=ion. The 5TS is conservatively assumed to pooe no threat
to the ground facklit_es end. non-crew members after 30 seconds. All other
F_zght operetlons and :e_uences are grou_eG i_,_v o =_,:g_e _me xn_ervai which
extem_s until MECO and ET separation, it Is important to note _hat unsuccessful
amort landing scenarios have risks associated not only w_th the STS/crew, _ut
potentially with _ersonnel, faci[itles, ana olher hardware at the abort land:no
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T + 2.S m_nutes to T ÷ _.@ mtnute_
T + 4.@ m_nute_ _o zero thrust
6.1,_ Conse=uence Data
As prsvlOusly discussed, consequence are measured as ex_cte_ number of
f_t_!It_ _n_ mar_w_re/fac_|it_es lo_ses (in S_. N_ attempt _ made _n thl5
anal/sL_ to c_mbtne the_e two cateQor_es of lossea.
5ome con_ervative a:sumptxons are maOe regarding Iom: of human l_fe
Foli_wlng an accident:
CatastroDhlc explosions/t_res on the launch pad between T-B
hours and crew boardlng at T-2.| hour_ ere as=umed to
cause only hard.are damage,
Catastr_phlc ex_osions/f:res between the iime of crew
boarding and engine _tar_ sequence are a_uned _c _au_e
death of crew.
AccLdents occur:ng belween engine start and T+3_ seconds are
assumed to cause death of crew. _Oit_onaliy, de_emd_ng on
the time of failure, fly_ng debris, e×Oloszon fregmemts and
shock waves a_e assumed to damage surrounding bu_Idlngs and
_tructures and ootentlalty cause _ddltional injuries/deaths.
Major accident_ after T÷50 seconds ere assumed to affect
only the crew with the exception of potent;el loss of groumd
_ersomnel at aborl landing site: if abort is possible.
S_milarly. hardware and facilities are affecled according to the ,ntervaJ.
Any catastro=h_o ex_losXon mrzor to T+30 second: affecte the STS plu= the pad.
Exc=_t for _bort landing scenarios, only the 5TS and shios in the trajectory
footprint are assumed _o be affected once the 5T5 has cleared the launch
fac_l_ty.
h summery of consequence data is provided in Table B-3. These losses are
reflecte_ _n term_ of a probability density function discussed later _n this
sectlon.
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T_ :;_:_'._c_ s_t_Qorle$ are then quanttfL_o scccrdtn_ _ thet_ rlsk
•,_ue _n; Ez_at_en G-:. The _ever_ty _ b_seC on the e._ect_ human _d
har_were [_sses s_ect_£e_ _n Tao_ _m_. The aggregate _romabl/t_y ef each c_
_he :s-_ecuenCe sat_gor_e_ _s _no_n _r both human an_ _ardware lQ_e_ _n te_les
_-4a _d E-_O, r_ect_ve!y. [t t_ _moortant to note that the _O_e_ _re
Str:c:_y re_rB_en_e_ By tho_e fa_lur_ reDre_ente_ Dy the EC_Q_ or _ni_ mRS.
OtPer r_ not _tth_n the _coQe defined b_ the fau_l tree c_t set_ are
necessarily mot factored _nto the_e re_ul(_.
Two _eoarate estimates oF aggregate probabtl_tie_ _re ¢resented :n Table_
_-i_ an_ 5-[b tn order t_ d_t_m_u_sh between events zn which _ucce_ful a_ort
ues acrzeved a_d those event_ which e_O tn ultimate loss of l£fe/vehtc_e. _Io
attemot is mace to cuant_fy the ltkel_hoo_ of successful abort !ending given a
cz_amttng failure. Therefore t_e s_eclfted total probabt!_ty (for each of the
co_seouence categor_s) ts orov,ded to show a range of prooabi_t_es with and
_thcu% a_ort recovery.
_bort landings can at bemt _e exoected &o reduce overall rt_k of
MPPS-?elated a_etdmnts by le_s than I_%. The importance of abort landing
:oward_ risk reduction varte_ depending on the syste_ _nvolved. MPP5 fat_ure_
are seldom -ecoverable ones and, therefore, _borl _canarZGs Druvi_ ,_znur
overall risk reduction. Mo_t failure probability con_ributZon_ are due to
_on-recoverable fat!ur_ such as immedlat_ explosions or aft compartment
cver_re_sur_zatton events. In total, non-recoverable evani_ are more tha_ one
oraer of _egnttude higher than recoverable event_, or events _n _h_ch abort
|amd_ng ts a viable oOIton.
R_sk to human tile, as may be exoected, i_ ei_o_t exclusively th_ re:ult of
Loss of 5TS crew. The exue_te_ loss of l_fe due to MPPS failure zs More than
one de_th per hu_red flight_. _ re$_dua£, but inslgnlft_ant, rt_k ia oo#ed to
other per_on_ _n the general viclniiy o? _he Launch fac_t_ty if a ca_astrooh:_
e:<oLoston occur_ during the first 3_ seconds of flight.
Risk to hardware consists _r_marily of the iols of the 5T5 vehicle and
payload (note: _ayLoad Ios_ ts not included in co_t estimate_ of STS Loss).
The average Loss mar _aunch is estimated to be a_roximately $3M. Facility
damage is th_ next greatest source of _enetary loss to_alling under se.1 M oar
l=uncn. The remeinlng sequences contribute mlntmally to the total expected
losses.
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Table 6- I a
EYENT TREE QUANTIFICATION
USING FAULT TREE CUTSET$
FOR EXPLOSION, OVERPRESSURIZATION AND
OTHER NON-RECOVERABLE EYENT5
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Event Tree Branc-n
(ficlure6--Ia)
A
B
C
ApplicableCutsets
CND4ZOIG
CND4ZOIG
FLOEO5LK
SPVVPXDP
VENTPANEL
MPBVPSLK
MPBVP ILK
MPBEO6LK
CNDE_IG
M PBEFSLK
MPBVO6LK
MPBVFSLK
MPBEOPRP
FLGEJSLK
SPVCPCDP
8PYRPCDP
.SPVLPCDP
BDPEOXRP
CNDEZXIG
MPBEJPRP
ACCRPXDP
TNKVPODP
TNKVP6DP
TNKVP IDP
TNKVP8DP
TNKVPEDP
TNKVP2DP
TNKVP7DP
TNKVPgDR
ACCLPXDP
TNKVP3DP
TNKVP4DP
ACCCPXDP
MPBVJSLK
MPBEFPRP
FLGENSLK
FLGTNSLK
GSEUXXST
!GSEUXX,ST
..I
!CNDEZXIG
iVENTPANEL
MPBVP3LK
VENTPANEL
YENTPANEL
CNDEZXlG
FLGEFSLK
CNDEZXIO
CN[)YZXIO
-CNDVZXIG
CNDEZXIO
CNDEZ'XIG
BDPEFXRP
VENTPANEL
VENTPANEL
VENTPANEL
VENTPANEL
VENTPANEL
VENTPANEL
VENTPANEL
VENTPANEL
VENTPANEL
VENTPANEL
CNDEZXIG
CutsetP rooaDllity
1.24E-05
8.94E-06
8,32E-06
8.07E-06
8,07E-06I
6.57E-06
5,84E-06
4,39E-06
3.98E-06
3.90E-06
3.72E-06
3.65E-06
3.30E-06
3.30E-06
3,30E-06
3,07E-06
3,07E-06
2.99E-06
2.68E-06
2.58E-06
2.68E-06
2.68E-06
2.68E-06
2.68E-06
2,68E-05
2.68E-06
2.68E-06
2.68E-06
2.68E-06
2.68E-06
2.68E-06
2.67E-06
2.52E-06
2.19E-06
2.19E-06
TOTAL
2,02E-04
mMPBEN3LK
MPBVNSLK
MPBLP3DP
MPBRPSDP
MPBCP IDP
MPBENPRP
FLGI'JSLK
FLGEO,SLK
SCHVP6RP
$CHVP$RP
ACCCOMRP
ACCLOMRP
ACCROMRP
SLVCFXOP
SLVCOXOP
SLVLFXOP
6LVRFXOP
SLYLOXOP
SLVROXOP
MPBVOPRP
MRBYJPRP
REGRP3CS
REGVPXHI
REGRPSOP
REGLPSOP
REGLP2C,S
REOCP IC6
REORP90P
REGCPTC_
REGCP lOP
REGCP70P
REGLP8CS
REGRP9CS
REGLP20P
TPSROXRP
TPSRFLLK
TPSLOXRP
IP_FLLK
TP$COXRP
TPSCFLLK
MPBEO6LK
MPBVNPRP
:FLSEFSLK
MPBVFPRP
MPBEFSLK
MPBTNPRP
MPBVOSLK
MPBVFSLK
PNVRFZC6
Table &- Ia
VENTPANEL
VENTPANEL
VENTPANEL
CNDORLK
VENTPANEL
VENTPANEL
CNDVZXIG
YENTPANEL
3NDGRLK
CNDGRLK
CNDVZXIG
CNDGRLK
CNDGRLK
CNDGRLK
2
2.19E-06I
2.19E-06]
i
2,IfE-O6I
2.07E-06 I
2,07E-061
!.73E-06
1.46E-06
1,24E-06
I.IOE-06
I.IOE-06
1.05E-06
1.05E-06
1.05E-06:
9.19E- 07
9.19E-07
9,19E- 07
9.19E-07
9.19E-07
9.19E- 07
8.19E-07
7.74E-07
7.00E-07
7.00E-07
7.00E-07
7.00E-07
7.00E-07
7,00E-07
7,00E-07
7.00E-07
7,00E-07
7.00E-071
7.00E-071
7.00E-07
7.00E-07
6.77E- 07
6.77E-07
6.77E-07
6.77E-07
6.77E-07
6.77E-07
6.57E-07
6.42E-07
5,84E-07
5.75E-07
4.39E-07;
3.98E-07
3.98E-07
3.90E-07
3.76E-07
LMSC-P-223040
iPNV3ODCS
iPNVLOZCS
PNVLFZC.-S
,PNV3JDCS
PNVROZCS
PNVCFZCS
PNVCOZC5
PNV 3FDC_,,6
MPBEOPRP
8DPEFXRP
BDPEOXRP
MPBLP3LK
MRBRPSLK
MPBCP ILK
MRBTJPRP
!MPBEFPRP
MPBYP2LK
MPBVP4LK
f'IPBVP6LK
PRBROSLK
PRBRFSLK
PRBCF6LK
PRBLF$LK '
PRBLOSLK
PRBCO,SLK
MPETNSLK
I'IPBTJSLK
PAVOTXPA
FILRCPLK
FI LLCPLK
FILCPCLK
FLGTOXLK
CNDEZXtG
FILLFYRP
F ILRFYRP
FtLCFYRP
FILROYRP
FILCOYRP
FILLOYRP
I'IPBCP2LK
MPBRP6LK
WLDEJXLK
BLOIRORRG
BLOCOGRG
BLOLOGRG
BLOLORRG
8LOROGRG
BLOCORRG
Table 6- la
CCN.DGqLK
CNDGRLK
CNDGRLK
VENTPANEL
VENTPANEL
VENTPANEL
CNDGRLK
VENTPANEL
VENTPANEL
VENTPANEL
CNDGRLK
WLDEOXLK
VENTPANEL
VENTPANEL
3
_.76E-07
3,76E-07
3.76E-07
3.76E-07
3.76E-07
3,76E-07!
3.75E-07
3.76E-071
3.76E-07
3.72E-07
3.07E-07
3.07E-07
2.98E-07
2,98E-07
2.98E-07
2.66E-07
2.52E-07
2,52E-07
2.52E-07
2.52E-07
2.45E-07
2.45E-07
2.45E-07
2.45E-07
2.45E-07
2,45E-07
2,44E-07
2,44E-07
2,44E-07
2.27E-07
2.27E-07
2.27E-07
2.19E-07
1.76E-07
1,74E-07
1,74E-07
1.74E-07
1,74E-07
1.74E-07
1.74E-07
1.60E-07
1.60E-07
1,42E-07
1.40E-07
1.40E-07
1,40E-07
1.40E-07
1,40E-07
!.40E-07
LMSC- 2304C
IMPBLP4LK
:TNKVP3DP
_TNKVP t DP
ITNKYPgDp
TNKVP8DP
TNKYP2DP
TNKVP6DP
TNKYP?DP
TNKVPEDP
TNKVPODP
HGMEZSLK
MPBLP4DP
MPBCP2DP
I'IPBRP6DP
MPBVOPRP
WLDENXLK
MPBVFPIRP
WLDVP3LK
WLDVP 1LK
WLDVPSLK
CNDVZXIG
MPBRPXLK
MPBLPXLK
MPBCPXLK •
MPBTOPRP
WLDVJXLK
PRVLP20P
PRYLPgOP
PRVRP30P
PRVRPOOP
PRVCP IOP
PRVC,PSOP
PRVHFXOP
PRVOOXOP
PRVVPXOP
PNVRPMRG
PNVCPMRO
PNVLPMRG
WLDVNXLK
WLDVPXLK
WLDVFXLK
HEXCOPRP
HEXROPRP
HEXLOPRP
MPBTF,SLK
=FLOTFXLK
MPBTOSLK
WLDTNXLK
WLDEOXLK
Table 6- I a
YENTPANEL
HUMRPXHC
HUMCPXHC
HUMLPXHC
HUMLPXHO
HUMLPXHC
HUMCPXHC
I-IUMCPXHC
HUMRPXHC
HUMRPXHC
VENTPANEL
VENTPANEL
VENTPANEL
CNDGRLK
CNDGRLK
VENTPANEL
YENTPANEL
VENTPANEL
WLDVOXLK
HUMRPXHC
HUMLPXHC
HUMCPXHC
CNDGRLK
YENTPANEL
VENTPANEL
IVENTPANEL
VENTPANEL
VENTPANEL
VENTPANEL
VENTPANEL
CNDMXXTM
C'NDMXXTM
CNDMXXTM
VENTPANEL
CNDVZXI6
CNDGRLK
CNDGRLK
CNDGRLK
CNDORLK
4
I .,37E-07
1.34E-07
i .34E-0"7
1.34{-07
1,34E-07
1.34E-07
1.34E-07
1.34E-07
1.34E-07
1,34E-07
I.19E-O?
9.19E-08
9.19E-08
9.19E-08
8.19E-08
8.I?E-08
5.75E-08
5.05E-08
4.94E-08
4,9,_E-08
3,88E-08
3,78E-08
3.78E-08
3.78E-08
3.76E-08
3.67E-08
3.62E-08
3.62E-08
3.62E-08
,3.62E-08
3.62E-08
3,62E-08
3.62E-08
3,62E-08
3.62E-08
3,21E-08
3.21E-08
3,2tE-08
3.04E-08
2.77E-08
2.72E-08
2,47E-08
2.47E-08
2,47E-08
2,44E-08
2.44E-08
2.44E-08_
1.89E-08
1.76E-CI_I
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rablo ,_- I a LMSC-F'223_I
V
T_D_FL_Z
TPDLFLSZ
TPD_FLSZ
TPDOOLSZ
TPDLOL$Z
TPDROLSZ
MPBRPSLK
MPBLP3LK
MP BCP lLK
WLDI'JXLK
WLDEFXLK
ICKVLPXCL
CKVCPXCL
CKVRPXCL
MPBRP6LK
HUMRPXHC
HUMLPXHC
HUMCPXHC
CNDEZXI6
HUMRPXHC
1,61E-08
1.61E-08
1,61E-08
1.61E-08
1.61E-08,
1,49E-08
1,49E-08
1,49E-08
1,26E-08
1.20E-081
I.16E-08
1.16E-08
I.16E-08
8.01E-09
D
MPBCP2LK
MPBLP4LK
MPBTFPRP
WLDVOXLK
WLDVFXLK
- 'wLDvP4LK
WLDVP2LK
WLDVP6LK
PLGLOPCL
PLGCOPCL
PLGROPCL
WLDTOXLK
WLDEFXLK
FLGEOSLK
$PVVPXDP
YENTPANEL
I"IPBVPSLK
MPBVP 1LK
HUMCPXHC
HUMLPXHC
CNDGRLK
CNDGRLK
CHDGRLK
-VENTPANEL "
VENTPANEL
VENTPANEL
:CNDGRLK
CNDGRLK
CNDEZXI G
VENTPANEL
MPBVP3LK
VENIPANEL
VENTPANEL
8,01E-09
6.87E-091
6,64E-091
&8BE-09I
2. :2E-Ogl
2.72E-09
2,72E-09
2.72E-09
1.97E-09
1,97E-09
1,97E-09
1.78E-091
1,20E-09
1.29E-04
9.32E-05
8.68E-05
8.42E-05
8,42E-05
2.0SE-05
MPB F..O,SLK
CNDEZXII:)
MPBEFSLK
MPBVOSLr-,
MPBVFSLK
MPBEOPRP
FLGEJ,SLK
5PVCPCDP
rSPRPCDP
SPVLPCDP
BDPEOXRP
CNDEZXI6
MPBEJPRP
ACCRPXDP
TNKVPODP
INKVP6DP
;CNDE2XI6
;FLGEFSLK
CNDEZXIG
CNDVZXIG
CNDVZXIO
CNDEZXlG
CNDEZXIO
BDPEFXRP
VENTPANEL
VENTPANEL
6.85E-05
6.09E-05
4.57E-05
4.15E- 05:
4.06E-05;
3,88E-05
3.80E-05
3,44E-05 !
3.44E-05
3.44E-05
&20E-05
3,20E-05
3,11E-05:
2.80E-05
2.80E-05
2.80E-05
5
ITNKYP IDP
TNKVP8DP
TNKVPEDP
TNKVP2DP
TNKVPTDP
TNKVPgDP
ACCLPXDP
TNKVP3DP
TNKVP4DP
ACOCPXDP
MPBVJSLK
MPBEFPRP
iFLGENSLK
_FLGTNSLK
MPBENSLK
MPBVNSLK
MPBLP3DP
MPBIRPSDP
MPBCP IDP
MPBENPRP
FLGTJSLK
FLGEOSLK
6CHVP6RP
SCHVP5RP.
ACCCOMRP
ACCLOMRP
ACOROMRP
MPBVOPRP
MPBVJPRP
RE6CP I 0,8
:RECAP ! OP
REOCP7C.5
REOCP?OP
REGLP2C8
REOLP20P
REGLPS(_
REOLP80P
REORP3C,,S
REGRP30P
REGRP9CS
REORPgOP
REGVPXHI
TPSCFLLK
TP$LFLLK
TPSRFLLK
TPS(X)XRP
TPSROXRP
TPSLOXRP
MPBEOSLK
Table _,- I
VENTPANEL
VENTPANEL
VENTPANEL
VENTPANEL
VENTPANEL
VENTPANEL
YENTPANEL
VENTPANEL
CNDEZXIG
VENTPANEL
YENTPANEL
YENTPANEL
CNDGRLK
VENTPANEL
VENTPANEL
CNDYZXIG
YENTPANEL
CNDGRLK
2.80E-05i
2.80E-05
2.8C, E-05
2.80E-05
2.80E-05
2.80E-05
2.80E-05
2.80E-05
2.80E-05
2,80E-05
2.79E-051
_,63E-05 I
2.29E-051
2.29E-05
2.29E-05
2.29E-05
2.20E-05
2.15E-05
2.I5E-05
1,80E-05
1,52E-05
1.29E-05
1,14E-05
1. t4E-05
I.I0E-05
I.IOE-05
I.IOE-OS I
8.54E-06I
8.07E-06 I
" .3OE-OSl
7.30E-06 I
 .zoE-o61
7.30E-061
7.30E-06
7.30E-06
7,30E-06
7.30E-06
7.30E-06
7,30E-06
?.30E-06
7.30E-06i
7.30E-0_
7.06E-0(
7.06E-0(
7.06E-061
7.06E-061
7.06E-061
7.06E-06 I
6,85E-06!
LMSC-F22304C
6
T_blo _,- l a LM$C-F22304
V
IMPI_VNI_RI:'
'FLGEFSLK
MPBVFPRP
MPBEFSLK
MPBTNPRP
MPBVOSLK
MPBVFSLK
PNVCFZCS
PNY LOZC8
PNV3NDCS
PNV3ODCS
PNV_FDC,S
PNVCOZCS
PNVRFZCS
PNVROZC,S
PNV3JDCS
PNVLFZC5
MPBEOPRP
BDPEFXRP
BDPEOXRP
MPBLP3LK
MPBRPSLK
MPBCP ILK
MPBTJRRP •
MPBEFPRP
MPBVPZLK
MPBVP4LK
iMPBYP6LK
PRBROSLK
PRBRFSLK
PRBCF,.SLK
IPRBLF$LK
PIRBLO,SLK
PRBCOSLK
MPBTNSLK
MPBTJSLK
PAVOTXPA
FILRCPLK
FILLCPLK
FILRCPLK
FLGTOXLK
CNDEZXIG
FILLFYRP
FILRFYRP
FILCFY P,P
FILROYRP
FILCOYRP
FILLOYRP
MPBCP2LK
CNDGRLK
CNDVZXIG
CNDORLK
CNDGRLK
CNDGRLK
CNDGRLK
CNDGRLK
CNDGRLK
YENTPANEL
YENTPANEL
VENTPANEL
CNDGRLK
VENTPANEL
VENTPANEL
VENTPANEL
CNDGRLK
WLDEOXLK
trlVENTPAh_
7
6.09E-06 I
6.00E-06 I
4.57E-06
4.I5E- 06
4,15E-06
4.06E-06
3.92E-06
3.92E-06
3.92E-06
3.92E-06
3,92E-06
3.92E-06
3.92E-06
3.92E-06
3,92E-06
3,92E-06
3,88E-06
3.20E-06
3,20E-06
3.10E-06
3.10E-06
3.IOE-06
2,77E-06
2,63E-06
2.63E-06
2.63E-06
2.63E-06
2.55E-06
2.55E-06
2.55E-06
2.55E-06
2.55E-06
2.55E-06
2,54E-06
2.,54E-06
2.54E-06
2.37E-06
2.37E-06
2.37E-06
2.29E-06
1,84E-06
1,81E-06
1.81E-Od
1.81E-06
1.81E-06
1.81E-06]
1.81E-06
i,67E-06
IMPBRP6LK
WLDEJXLK
BLORORRO
BLOCOORG
BLOLOOR8
BLOLORRG
BLOROeRQ
BLOCORRG
MPBLP4LK
TNKVP3DP
TNKVPIDP
TNKVP9DP
TNKVP8DP
TNKVP2DP
TNKVP6DP
TNKVP7DP
IrNKVPEDP
TNKVPODP
HOMEZSLK
MPBLP4DP
MPBCP2DP
MPBRP6DP
MPBVOPRP
MPBVFPRP.
WLDVP3LK
WLDVPILK
WLDVPSLK
CNDVZXIG
HPBRPXLK
MPBLPXLK
MPBCPXLK
MPBTOPRP
WLDVJXLK
PRVLP20P
PRVLPgOP
PRVRP30P
PRVRPOOP
PRVCP 10P
PRVCPBOP
PRVHFXOP
PRVOOXOP
PRVVPXOP
PNVRPMRG
PNYLPMRG
PNVCPMRG
WLDVNXLK
WLDVPXLK
WLDVFXLK
HEXCOPRP
YENTPANEL
YENTPANEL
HUHRPXHC
HUMCPXHC
HUMLPXHC
HUMLPXHC
HUMLPXHC
HUMCPXHC
HUMCPXHC
HUMRPXHC
HUMRPXHC
VENTPANEL
VENTPANEL
VENTPANEL
CNDGRLK
CNDGRLK
VENTPANEL
VENTPANEL
VENTPANEL
WLDVOXCLK
HUMRPXHC
HUMLPXHC
HUMCPXHC
CNDGRLK
YENTPANEL
VENTPANEL
YENTPANEL
VENTPANEL
IVENTPANEL
VENTPANEL
VENTPANEL
CNDMXXTPI
CNDMXXTM
CNDMXXTM
VENTPANEL
CNDVZXIG
8
1,67E-06I
1.48[-o6I
7.4eE-Oel
1,46E-06 I
146E-Oel
1.46E-06I
1.46E-Oel
1.46E-06 I
1,43E-06 I
i.40E-OeI
1,40E-06 i
1,40E-06 !
1,40E-06
1.40E-06
1.40E-06
1.40E-06
1.40E-06 I
1.40E-06I
1.24E-061
9.59E-07
9.59E-07
9,$9E-07
8.54E-07
6.00E-07
S.27E-07
5.15E-07
S, ISE- 071
4,05E-07,
3,94E-071
3.94E-07
3.9_IE-07
3.92E-07
3.83E-07
_.77E-07
3,77E-07
3,77E-07
3,77E-07
3,77E-07
3,77E-07
3.77E-07
3.77E-07
3.77E-07!
3.3SE-07
3.35E-07
3,38E-07
3,17E-07
2,88E-07
2.84E-07
Z.58E-07
LMSC-F'22304(
T_blo__ I_ LMSC-F'223040
U
H_XRCIF'RI:'
HEXLOPRP
MPBTFSLK
FLSTFXLK
MPBTOSLK
WLDTNXLK
-WLDEOXLK
CNDGRLK
CNDGRLK
CNDGRLK
CNDORLK
Z,5_E-O7
2.58E-07
2.54E-07
2.54E-07
2,54E-07
1.97E-07
1.84E-07
ITPDCFLSZ
TPDLFLSZ
TPDRFLSZ
TPDCOLSZ
TPDLOLSZ
1.68E-07
1.68E-07
1,68E-07
1,68E-07
1.68E-07
TPDROLSZ l
MPBRPSLK HUMRPXHC "' I
MPBLP3LK HUMLPXHC I
MPBCPILK HUMCPXHC 1
CKVLPXCL 1
CKVCPXCL l
.58E-07
155E-07
.55E-07
.55E-07
.20E-07
,20E-07
E
CKVRPXCL
MPBRP6LK
PIPBCP2LK
MPBLP4LK
MPBTFPRP
PN2ROZOP
PN2COZOP
PN2LOZOP
WLDVOXLK
WLDVP2LK
WLDVP4LK
WLDVP6LK
WLDVFXLK
WLDVP4LK
WLDVP2LK
WLDVP6LK
WLDTOXLK
WLDEFXLK,,
SPYCPCDP
!$PVRPCDP
ISPVLPCDP
,BDPEOXRP
BDPEFXRP
AOCRPXDP
ACCLPXDP
ACCCPXDP
MPBCPIDP
SCHVP6RP
$CHYPSRP
MPBLP3LK
MPBRP5LK
HUMRPXHC
HUMCPXHC
HUMLPXHC
CNDGRLK
CNDMXXTM
CNDMXXTM
CNDMXXTM
CNDGRLK
VENTPANEL
VENTPANEL
VENTPANEL
CNDORLK
VENTPANEL
VENTPANEL
VENTPANEL
CNDGRLK
.. CNDGRLK
CNDEZXIG
CNDEZXIG
VENTPANEL
'VENTPANEL
VENTPANEL
YENTPANEL
VENTPANEL
1,20E-07
8,35E-08
8.35E-08
7.17E-08
6.92E-08
4.49E-08
4.49E-08
4.49E-08
4,05E-08.
2.89E-08,
2.89E-08
2,89E-08
2,84E-08'
2,83E-08
2,83E-08i
2.83E-081
1.86E-08
1.25E-081
1,41E-06
!,41E-06
}.41E-06
1.32E-06
1.32E-06
i.15E-06
I, 15E- 06
1,15E-06
8.85E-07
4.70E-07
4.70E-07
1,28E-07
1,28E-07
9
1.29EL05
II
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LMSC-F22304£
U
MPBCPILK
MPBLP4LK
MPBCP2DP
MPBLP4DP
MPBRP6DP
MPBRPXLK
MPBLPXLK
MPBCPXLK
PRVLP20P
PRVLPgOP
PRVRP30P
PRVRPOOP
PRVCPIOP
PRVCP80P
PRVHFXOP
PRVOOXOP
PRVVPXOP
WLDVP4LK
WLDVP2LK
WLDYP6LK
iYENTPANEL
VENTPANEL
VENTPANEL
IYENTPANEL
VENTPANEL
HUMRPXHC
HUMLPXHC
HUMCPXHC
VENTPANEL
VENTPANEL
VENTPANEL
¥ENTPANEL
VENTPANEL
VENTPANEL
VENTPANEL
VENTPANEL
VENTPANEL
YENTPANEL
1 .Z8E-07
5.89E-08
3.g4E-08
3.94E-08
3.94E-08
1.62E-08:
t.62E-08;
1.62E-081
1.55E-08
1,55E-08
1.55E-08
1.55E-08
t,55E-08
1.55E-08
1.55E-08
1.55E-08
1.55E-08
I. 16E-09
I, 16E-09
1.16E-091
" • • . "i
• i
•.. ,. .,_ "
10
. . : • . . • . •
• , . ..
Tablo 6-1 b
EVENT TREE QUANTIFICATION USIN6
FAULT TREE CUTSETS FOR RECOVERABLE EVENT5
LMSC-F22304(
_ventTreeBranch CUTSET5 CUTSET
(Fiqur_6._--_._bI ,PP,QBAB.,IUTY
A I:OTAL F()P,A
I'IPBRPXLK
MPBLPXLK
MPBCPXLK
SPVLP3DC
SFVCP IDC
:SPVRPSDC
MPB CP 1LK
MPBLP3LK
,MPBRPSLK
'MPBRP6LK
MPBCP2LY,
MPBLP4LK
CNDFXXTF
CNDFXXTF
CNDFXXTF
CNDFXXTF
CNDFXXTF
CNDFXXTF
CNDFXXTF
CNDFXXTF
CNDFXXTF
CNDFXXTF
CNDFXXTF
CNDFXXTF
PNVLPMR6
CNDFXXTF
CNDFXXTF
CNDFXXTF
CNDFXXTF
IHUMCPXHC
HUMLPXHC
MPBVPlLK
IMPBVPSLK
iHUMCPXLK
HUMLPXHC
HUMRPXHC
iHUMRPXHC
HUMCPXHC
:HUHLPXHC
CNDFXXSR
iCNDFXXSR
CNDFXXSR.
CNDFXXSR
CNDFXXSR
CNDFXXSR
CNDFXXSR
CNOFXXSP,
CNDFXXSR
CNDFXXSR
_CNDFXXSR
;CNDFXXSR
_CNDFXXTF
CNOFXXS_
CNDFXXSR
CNDFXXBR
CNDFXXSR
MPBVP3LK
HUMCPXHC
Hi.ClRPXHC
SDLEFT
SDCENT
SDCENT
•SDRI6HT
SDRIGHT
SDCENT
SDCEN f
SDRI6HT
SDRI6HT
SDLEFT
SDLEFT
,SDLEFT
CNDFXXSR
,SDPJ6HT
SDP,16HT
_SDLEFT
'SDCENT
i _.
HY2LOJCD
HY2CFJCO
HY2CFWCD
HY2ROWCD
HY2ROJCD
HY2COJCD
HY2COWCD
HY2RFJCD
HY2RFWCD
HY2LFJCO
HY2LOWCD
HY2LFWCD
SDLEFT
PNVRPM_6
LCK2RFZCD
CK2LFZCD
CK2CF2CD
.I
2.25E-O7
3.48E-0(_
3,48E..-08
3 ABE-08
1.92E-08
1,86E-.08
1,86E-.08
1.37E-08
1,37E-08
1,37E-08
?.39E-09
7,39E-Og
6.33E-09
1.59E-10
1.59E-t0
1.SgE-!0
I.SgE-I0
I,SgE- I0
1,5QE-I0
1.59E-I0
1.59E-10
I,$9E-I0
I.SgE-_Q
1 .SgE-1C
13gE-I¢
1.35E-I C
I,35E- i (_
4.87E- 11
4,87E-II
4,87E-II
T=b1_6- I
LMSC-F'2230.
B
MPBRPXLK
MPBLPXLK
MPBCPXLK
SPVLP3DC
SPVRPSDC
SPVCP IDC
rlPBCPILK
HPBLP3LK
MPBP,PSLK
MPBRP6LK
MBBCP2LK
I"PBLP41.K
CNDFXXTF
CNDFXXTF
CNDFXXTF
CNDFXXTF
!CNDFXXTF
CNDFXXTF
CNDFXXTF
CNDFXXTF
CNDFXXTF
CNDFXXTF
CNDFXXI"F
:CNDFXXTF
PNVLPHR6
CNDF×XTF
CNDFXXTF
CNDFXXTF
CNDFXXTF
HUMRPXHC
HUMLPXHC
HUI'ICPXHC
HUMLPXHC
I'IP{)VPSLK
MPBVP ILK
HUMCPXLK
HUMLPXHC
HUMRPXHC
HUMRPXHC
HUHCPXHC
HLC'ILPXHC
!¢NDFXXSR
,CNDFXXSR
CNDFXXSR
CNDFXXSR
CNDFXXSR
CNDFXXSR
CNDFXXSR
CNDFXXSR
CNDFXXSR
CNDFXXSR
CNDFXXSR
CNDFXXSR
CNDFXXTF
¢NDFXXSR
CNDFXXSR
CNDFXXSR
CNDFXXSR
MPBVP3LK
HUMRPXHC
HUHCPXHC
SDLEFT
SDCENT
SDCENT
5DRI6HT
SDRIGHT
SDCENT
SDC_NT
SDRIGHT
5DRIGHT
5DLEFT
SDLEFT
5DLEFT
CNDFXX:SR .
SDRI6HT
SD_GHT
:SDLEFT
:SDCENT
TOTAL FOR B:
HY2LOJCD
HY2CFJCD
HY2Cr_CD
HY2ROWCD
HY2ROJCD
HY2COJCD
HY2COWCD
HY2RFJCD
HY2RPWCD
HY2LFJCD
HY2LOWCD
HY2LFWCD
SDLEFT
PNVRPHR6
CK2RFZCD
CK2LFZCD
CK2CFZCD
7.I9E-07
1,05E.-07
1.05E-07
I.OSE-07,
5.75E--08
5,57E-OB
5,57E-08
4.12E-08
4.12E-08
4.12E.-08
2,22E-08
2.22E-08
1.90E-08
2;.40E-09
:3.40E-Og
3,40E-Og
3,40E-Og
3.40E-Og
3,40E-Og
3,40E-Og
3 AOE-Og
3 ._X)E-O9
3,40E-09
,3,40E-09
3,40E-09
2,88E-09
2,88E-09
1.04E-.Og
1.04E-09
1.04E-og I
2
C
MPBRPXLK
MPBLPXLK
MPBCPXLK
SPVRPSDC
$PvcP IDC
SPVLP3DC
MPBCPlLK
MPBLP3LK
HPBRP5LK
PtoBI_P6LK
MPBCP2LK
MPBLP4LK
CNDFXXTF
CNDFXXTF
CNDFXXTF
CNDFXXTF
CNDFXXTT
CNDFXXTF
CNDFXXTF
CNDFXXTF
CNDFXXTF
CNDFXXTF
CNDFXXTF
CNDFXXTF
PNVLPMRG
CNDFXXTF
CNDFXXTF
CNDFXXTF
CNDFXXTF
Tablo 6- tb
HUMRPXHC
HUMLPXHC
HUMCPXHC
MPBVPSLK
MPBVPILK
HUMLPXHC
HUMCPXLK
HUMLPXHC
HUMRPXHC
HUMRPXHC
HUMCPXHC
HUMLPXHC
CNDFXXSR
CNDFXXSR
CNDFXXSR
CNDFXXSR
CNDFXXSR
CNDFXXSR
CNDFXXSR
CNDFXXSR
CNDFXXSR
CNDFXXSR
iCNDFXXSR
!CNDFXXSR
CNDFXXTF
CNDFXXSR
CNDFXXSR
_CNDFXXSR
CNDFXXSR
HUMRPXHC
HUMCPXHC
MPBVP3LK
SDLEFT
SDCENT
SDCENT
SDRI_HT
SDRIBHT
SDCENT
SDCENT
SDRI6HT
,b-'D_OHT
SDLEFT
SDLEFI
SDLEFT
CNDFXXSR
SDRtGHT
SDRI6HT
SDLEFT
SDCZNT
TOTAL FOR C:
HY2LOJCD
HY2CFJCD
HY2CFWCD
HY2ROWCD
HY2ROJCD
HY2COJCD
HY2CC_qCD
HY2RFJCD
HY2RFWCD
HY2LFJCD
HY2LOWCD
HY2LFWCD
SDLEFT
PNVRPMRG
CK2RFZCD
CK2LFZCD
CK2CFZCD
LMSC-F2230_
5.39E-07
7 84E-08
7,84E-08
7.84E-08
4,18E-08
4.10E-08
4,31E-08
3.0C_E-08
3,0gE-08
3.0gE-08
I,(:,8E-08,
1.66E-081
1,43E-08
2.55E_09
2,55E-09
2,55E-09
2.55E-09
"2.51_E-09
2.5SE-O I
2.55E-09I
2,55E-09[
2,55E-09)
2.55E-09
2.SSE-Og
2.55E-og
2.16E-og
2.I6E-OCj
7.79E-I0
7.79E-I0
7,79E- I0
3
0SEPINHIBIT
SEPINHIBIT
SEP_NHIBIT
CKTHFFCD
CNDTUFCO
CNDTUFCO
CNDTUFCO
CNDTUFCO
MPBRPXLK
MPBLPXLK
MPBCPXLK
SPVLP_D¢
SPVRPSDC
SPVCP IDC
CKTOO_CD
CKTHFFCD
MPBCP I LK
MP_LP3LK
MPBRPSLK
CNDTUFCO
CNDTUFCO
HPBCP2LK
MPBP.PSLK
MPBLP4LK
CNDTUFCO
'CNDTUFCO
CNDTUFCO
CNDTUFCO
CKTOOFCD
SEPINHIBIT
I-IUMTSXHC
HUMTSXHC
HUMTSXHC
HUMTSXHC
HUMP,PXHC
HUHLPXHC
HurICPXHC
HUMLPXHC
MPBVPSLK
MPBVP 1LK
CNDTUFCO
CNDTUFCO
HUMCPXLK
HUMLPXHC
HUMRPXI-IC
PNVTFFDC
PNVTOFDC
HIIMCPXHC
H.RIRPXHC
HUMLPXHC
SP 130XFE
SP230XFE
SPI3FXFE
SP23FXFE
CNDTUFCO
CNDTUFCO
SP 130XFE
SP230XFE
SP 73FXFE
SP23FXFE
MPBVP3LK
HI_RPXHC
HIJMCPXHC
HUMTSXHC
HUMTSXHC
HUMTSXHC
HUMTSXHC
TOTAL FOR D: I ,65E-05 l
2 ,g3E-<)6
2.93E-06
2.g3E-06
,9-3E-O6
2.03E-06
2,03E--06
1.47E-09
1ATE-07
] .47E-07
I ATE-.07
1,48E-08
1.48E-08
1,48E-08
8,14E--09
7.gOE-Og
7,90E-09
6,77E--09
6.771Z-Og
5.83E-09
5,B3E-09
5.83E-Og
5.07E-09
5.07E-09
3.14E-09
3.14E-Og2.6gE-o9i
4
LMSC-F22304C
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E:
HY2LOWCD
HY2ROdCD
HY2LOJCD
HY2LFJCD
HY2LFWCD
HY2ROWCD
HY2COJCD
HY2COWCD
HY2RFJCD
IHY2RFWCD
HY2CFJCD
HY2CFWCD
CK2COZCD
CK2LOZCD
CK2ROZCD
CK2CFZCD
CK2LFZCD
CK2RFZCD
PN2LOZOP
PN2ROZOP
PN2COZOP
PN2LFZOP
PN2CFZOP
PN2RFZOP
HY2CFWCD
HY2RFWCD
HY2COJCD
HY2P.OJCD
HY2C(_#CD
HY2P.(7_CD
HY2CFJCD
HY2RFJCD
HY2LFJCD
HY2LOJCD
HY2LFWCD
HY2LOWCD
CK2COZCD
CK2LOZCD
CK2ROZCD
'CKT3ODSP
CKT3FDSP
MPBRPXLK
MPBRPXLK
MPBLPXLK
MPBCPXLK
SPVRP5DC
SPVCP 1DC
CNDMXXTM
CNDMXXTi'I
CNDMXXTH
CNDI'IXXTM
CNDMXXTM
CNDMXXTM
CNDMXXTM
CNDMXXTM
CNDMXXTM
CNDMXXTI'I
CNDMXXTM
CNDMXXTM
_CNDMXXTM
CNDMXXTM
CNDMXXTM
CNDMXXTM
CNDMXXTI'I
CNDMXXTM
CNDMXXTM
CNDMXXTM
CNDMXXTM
CNDMXXTH
CNDMXXTM
CNOMXXTM
CNDMXXTM
CNDMXXTM
CNDMXXTM
CNDMXXTM
CNDMXXTM
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FIGURE 6-1a: MISSlONTIME SEQUENCE EVENT TREE
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TABLE 6-2
Definition of Consequence Categories
and $pecific Consequences
HUMAN LOSSES
C - Mission Crew
6 - Erou_d Sut:Dort Team
- Other persons in v|ctnity susceotible to
?atalitte,._ i_urred during RTL$ abort landing
or explosions _uring flight near the launch
facility.
(32 = Other Derso_s in vicinity eusceDtible Lo
fatalities incurred during TAt abort landing
03 - Otherpersonsinvicinitysusceptibleto
H/4RI_NAI_ELO'3SE5
S - Soace Trsn_orLIUon System
F = 6round Facilities and Sul_ort Equipment
Lt "Abort Landing Fecliit|es - ;qTLS
L_ - Abort LandtngF=¢iltties - TAL
L3,, Abort Landing FactltUes - orbit abort
M1- Mlscllllsneouscl4lm40eresultingfrom disperlionof"
ex_losiondebrispriorto T + _Os.
M 2" Miscellaneous dama¢jereeulUn<Jfrom dispersion of
explosion debrl_ when STS is on _e launch pad
TABLE 6-3
Consequence Data Summary
LMBC-P.2304
Hur'1AN LOSS
(Expected Number of Fatalities)
,, ,,, ,,
TIME (t.) _ Crew
-8 hoursto
-2 hours
Ground
Support
Team
I
Other
NIA
STS
i
HARDWARE LO,_
(Million Dollars LoSt)
[
i Ground Abort Landing
Faciiitles(31! Facilities(4)
I II I
N/A 1300 500 _ N/A
-2 hoursto 7 ( I) NIA 1300
-10 seconds ne_llgible
500 NIA
MisI
(
I0
(
10
7 ( I ) N/A 1300 500
- 10 second_
+30 seconds n_Iigible
| ,,
+30 secon=ts to 7 N/A (2) 1300 N/A
+2.5 minutes 6.5e- 7
+ 2.5 minutes to 7 N/A negligible 1300
+ 4 minutes
w.4 mir_utesto 7 NIA negligible 1300 N/A
+ 8,I minutes
NIA (
I0
N/A (
.Oi
So i(6)
r_eglig
so (6)
naglig:
+B.l minutes to 7 N/A N/A 1300 N/A SO
alert landing
I
NOTES:( 1) Reference 34, Table 10-3, Case No. I.
(2) Reference 34, Table I 0-3. Modify Ec I_ scaling by 1.78e-4/1. t e-3 to accommodate Figur,
6- Ia. branch C probablItyof hazard versus thatcornputed in Tab le IO- 3,
(3) Reference (to be provided).
(4) RTLS, TAL and OrbitalAbort landingsites.
(5) Assume $ I0 million per Incidentfor surrounding buildings& structures.
(6) Reference34, Table 10-3, takecomputed value ofPl for stage I and assume $ IOM per inclO
OIRIQtt_L PAGE IS
OF _ OUAUTY
LHSC F2230402
TABLE: 6-4a
Aggregate Probabilities and Risk
[Cateqor_
,app_c_le
probabilit_$
(F_. _,-,t a)
i_ubtota|
appl'k_le
sequer_e
probabflitk.s
(F_. 6- mb)
Su,b_,otai
!oT_'
RISK_
Expired NO.
'of Ti_es lost
_='v'.,:,_¢_;l'ff:,._of PtPP_-Related Eyent$ Potentt_tTU le.='_tngto Lo_$ of Human Life-
Successful kbor_ ScLmario
C G
2.02£-4
2.0"5E-3
I .2<JE-5
2.26E-3: o.ooE.o o.ooE+o O.ooE+o _o.oo[.o
2_-oE-7 0.QOE+O 0.(_0E_0 0.0£_:+0
2_-_-7 o.ooE.o o.oo_*o, , 0..00E*0
_'.0E*00 '0.0E;00 " 0._+00
2.2"_E-7
7.1_(-7
8.8<JE"12
! .72E-9
8.2"3E-6
o.o_+o_ o_+oo o.o_+o0
iCategert]
a_lk:able -
s_quen_ 2.02E-4
,_rd_xtlttte= 2,0_E-3
subtotal 2._6E-3
_b 2_5E-7
s_luecoe 7.19E-7
prob,ddltt_ 5_39E-7
(Fkj.s- __) _.od£-4
e..._,-_
_ui>totai I .t 4E-4
I=Y'ol:)abflttUof 1_=_3-Re_ted Events PotentiaT1Nleading 1o Loss of Human Life:
C ,G 01 ;02 03
o.oo_+ol
2.25E-?
2.25E-7
TOTAL
Lof__iy.s]os_ _ { .,
* (:_rw_l from T_h_ 6-3
O.OOE+O ,' [3:.OOE-_,O OpOE+O
5..38E-7 1.04E:-4 0._'..6
.:2_E:-7 ! .04E-4,
_.4_.-o-,,1 1o_-._ .... e.:=-o6
TABLE 6-4b LHSCF22_0402
[Cat,_or9
[_pplicable
Isequence
_-'obabgifie$
(Fig. 6-I=)
applicable
sequence
probabilities
(rig. 6-tb)
_ubtotal i
AQgregate Probabilities and Risk
Probability of PIPPS-Related EYenl_ Potent_atl_ Leading to Loss of H_rdware _r Fa_ilitle._
Successful Abor_ Scenar_
s ' ,.. !L!, L3 .... _M_ , _M2
- - - 2.0ZE-d '-
2.02_-4
2.05E-3
.29E-5
2.26E-_
2.25£-7
7.1_E-?1
8.8<)E-I 2J
1.72E-91
!r
2.0"2E-4
'_.o=-4
2.2'3£-7
:L2
i
O.OOE+O
O.OOE+OI
o.ooE+o!
0.00E_O
.O.OOE+O
O.OOE+O
2.o2E-4 o.oo¢._
-- r--
d.ooiE_o .OOE+O
ITOT_ I
Exacted loss
of hae*(l_are
$H) "
2.3E-Zl 21oc-4t O.OE+Oi o.oc+ol""o.oE+OL _._-4t o.oE+o
1 t
* _iV_l from Table S-3
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PROBABZLZBTZC RISK kSBEBSMENT
PROOF-OF-CONCEPT STUDY
_IO,/.,YS Z 8 REPORT
I. 0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This document focuses on the transfer of the Probabilistic Risk
Assessment (PRA) methodology to a Space Shuttle environmen_
utilizing the Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) and Hydraulic Power Unit
(HPU) as typical examples of spacecraft subsysUems. This volume
presents specific PRA findings of this proof-of-concept study and
attempts to answer the following question: Can the PRA meUhodology
be transferred to a space system?
The study results resembled those of previous PRAs accomplished
in other industries. The study produced a quantification of the
frequency of certain undesired end states, along with a ranking
of specific subsystem failure modes by their contribution to the
risk of these end states.
For the APU, the study indicates that five failures account for
about 80% of the total risk of Loss of Crew/Vehicle (LOC/V) during
a typical flight. An additional five failures account for over
90% of the total risk. The common hazard associated with the
first five failures is hydrazine leakage into the aft compartment.
This creates the potential for fire, as demonstrated at the
conclusion of the STS-9 mission when there were two APU fires.
The HPU has two failures that represent over 98% of the contri-
bution to LOC/V. These contributions could arise from common
cause lube oil contamination in two HPUs by fuel leaking into
the gearbox, or by introduction of foreign substances into the
gearbox, and from turbine wheel failures.
The APUs are about two orders of magnitude more of a risk to the
safety of the Shuttle than are the HPUs. The bulk of the risk
from the APUs arises from the potential for fire from any hydra-
zine leaks which manifest themselves as a fire during entry.
The PRA results indicate that for both the APU and HPU, only
a few failures account for the majority of the risk during a
typical flight. The results illuminated no new areas of concern
or failures not previously known, but do identify the high risk
failure scenarios that map the paths between the end states and
individual APU and HPU failures.
The PRA, therefore, provided a quantitative way of prioritizing
the known safety concerns and failure modes. It also provided
an estimate of the magnitude of risk of each safety concern.
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2.0 INTRODUCTION
McDonnell Douglas was selected by the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA) to assess the Probabilistic Risk
Assessment (PRA) methodology when applied to a space system.
The PRA has been in use by other industries for many years. The
study attempts to provide insight to answer several questions.
One of these questions is: Can the PRA methodology be trans-
ferred to a space system?
This volume provides information for the evaluation of the PRA
methodology transfer, the benefits to be gained from application
of PRA methodology, and the information necessary for the FMEA/
CIL comparison described in Volume II. Volume I discusses the
management aspects of the study as related to the results.
Volume IV documents the PRA preparation instructions.
Pickard, Lowe, and Garrick, Inc. (PLG), a firm experienced in the
use of the PRA technique in other industries, was selected as a
subcontractor to provide the expertise and software analysis
tools necessary to adapt the PRA methodology to the Space Shuttle
environment.
Two subsystems were chosen for this proof-of-concept study:
a. The Orbiter Auxiliary Power Unit (APU), designed and
manufactured by the Sundstrand Corporation as a
subcontractor to Rockwell International Corporation, and
b. The Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) Hydraulic Power Unit (HPU),
also manufactured by the Sundstrand Corporation but under
contract to United Space Boosters Incorporated (USBI).
The system configuration of the APU and HPU used in this study
was that which existed as of January 1986. The "Improved" APU
and post-51L flight modifications to the APU were not analyzed,
except as specifically noted elsewhere in the report.
The PRA process offers a different type of risk analysis tool
available to industries or agencies who must deal with risk
assessment. The PRA begins with the consideration of effects
that are deemed undesirable. The analysis proceeds from the
top down through the system or systems via scenario paths that
ultimately lead to the failed component or assembly. The
process proceeds to the lowest level of detail that time,
effort, funds, or available data permits.
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The Probabilistic Risk Assessment involves:
a. An integrated model of the responses of an engineered
system to disturbances during operation
bo A rigorous and systematic identification of the levels of
damage that could conceivably result from those responses
Co A quantitative assessment of the frequency of such
occurrences and of the uncertainty in that assessment
Although the PRA process produces a quantification of risk, the
actual numbers produced are not the only important results.
The important results from a risk management perspective are:
a. The insight gained into the system under study
b. The frequency of occurrence of the damage states
Co The relative ranking of failure scenarios and component
failure modes
d. Identification of failure modes which account for the
majority of the risk
e. How well the risk is known (uncertainty of the results)
The PRA is a decision-making tool for managing the risk associated
with the system under investigation. It points out weak areas in
the system, and aids in deciding where "fixes" are warranted. The
numbers produced are valuable to the extent that they give a
decision-maker a way to decide what is important and what is not
important. Resources may then be allocated based on specific needs
such as reduction of high risk, cost, or schedule impact.
The next section summarizes the conclusions and insights gained
into the transfer of PRA methodology to these Shuttle subsystems,
as well as insight gained into the APU and HPU risk. The indivi-
dual risk contributors which comprise 99% of the risk to LOC/V
were ranked according to their contribution to the likelihood of
the damage state. The risk contributors that collectively
represent 1% of the risk were grouped.
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The remaining sections, 4 through 11, describe the APU and HPU
system configuration used for this study, the PRA methodology, the
application of that methodology, and the conclusions and insights
that were obtained during the course of this study.
Assumptions are inherent to any analysis and PRA is no exception.
Assumptions were made to define the boundaries of each system, the
system interfaces, the boundary conditions of the interfaces, and
the general modeling guidelines used to conduct the study. These
assumptions and guidelines are described in detail in Appendix A
and are discussed where appropriate in Sections 5 through 11.
The results presented in this volume are intended to be
representative of the kind obtained by a PRA and not indicative
of actual Shuttle results. The numerical predictions of LOC/V
from the pilot study are not deemed reliable, because the data-
base used was uncer_ified, the various designs and diagrams had
not been subjected to any configuration conUrol, and the PRA
process itself was not conducted with any peer review or manage-
ment oversight function. For this reason, any risk numbers or
probability curves discussed in the later volumes of this report
are purely representational in nature, and should not be used for
hardware certification, flight readiness review, nor should they
be regarded as being an accurate expression of the reliabirity
of either the APU or HPU. The results are intended only as a
"template" to test fit the PRA methodology, and should not be
taken out of context or used for any other engineering purpose.
rl
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3.0 SUMMARY ¢ONCLUSIONS AND INSIGHTS
This section presents a summary of the technical conclusions and
lessons learned concerning the transfer of PRA technology to the
Space Shuttle. It also provides insights into the risk posed by
operation of the Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) and Hydraulic Power
Unit (HPU) on a typical Shuttle mission, and lessons learned which
may be of value for implementing PRA on other space systems.
3.1 PRA TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
The PRA techniques (such as fault trees and event trees) applied in
this study have reached various states of sophistication through
application in the nuclear, chemical, and aircraft industries.
Space Shuttle systems, their interfaces with each other, with
operators, and with operating procedures, share much in common
with systems in these industries. It was, therefore, expected
that PRA techniques could be applied to the Space Shuttle; the
difficulty of the task was the unk/_own.
A successful application of PRA techniques requires a balance of
knowledgeable PRA personnel and system experts; each must acquire
some of the skills of the other. This proof-of-concept study
successfully demonstrated the adaptation of PRA techniques on two
Shuttle subsystems in the following manner: The damage states on
which the study was based were identified; the study groundrules
and constraints were developed; the PRA models were developed; the
historical records of past missions and of the APU and HPU were
obtained and analyzed; action items were generated to resolve
important issues concerning hydrazine and its properties; data-
bases were developed to compile and correlate failure history
data; the models were quantified; the uncertainties in the data
and models were developed using probability distributions; the
risk profiles were obtained; and the contributors to the Shuttle's
risk due to the APU and HPUwere identified and ranked.
PRA may be considered an "engineering art" in which the combined
skills and knowledge of many are required to apply the basic PRA
techniques in combinations which accurately and logically model the
risk posed by the system. There were no standard "cook book" pro-
cedures for applying PRA techniques to the Space Shuttle systems.
A generalized set of PRA techniques were developed as part of this
study which may have application to other space systems.
This study identified and documented how failures initiated by
the APU or HPU can propagate through a subsystem to cause
3-1
degraded performance, shuttle damage, or mission curtailment.
This was accomplished by identifying damage states, and by identi-
fying failure scenarios emanating from initial failures in the APU
or HPU that lead to the damage states. The damage states used in
this study were Loss of Crew/Vehicle, and Loss of Mission. Loss
of mission was further divided into intact abort, Primary Landing
Site (PLS) entry, and launch scrub. A risk profile, which
represents the likelihood cf the damage s:ate occurring and the
uncertainty about that likelihood, was assessed for each of these
damage states. The study was able to divide the mission into
stages that allowed the assessment cf risk for ascent as distinct
from orbit and entry. The PRA addressed mechanical, electrical
and electronic failures, interactions caused by functional and
spatial relationships, and failures of multiple components due to
a common cause.
It should be noted that additional damage states could have
been selected which, for example, allow for the identification
of equipment damage and subsequent cost of repairing failures.
Additional damage states such as these add unnecessary
complexity when one is primarily interested in damage states
that pose risk of LOC/V. However, the techniques appear quite
capable of quantifying risk to equipment just as reliably as
they handle the more serious cases.
3.2 CONCLUSIONS AND INSIGHTS INTO THE RISK OF THE APU AND HPU
The PRA results present risk-related information about the APU
and HPU in several ways. They provide risk profiles, a ranked
order of scenarios contributing to the risk profiles, a ranked
order of APU/HPU failures contributing to the failure scenarios,
and a ranking of component failure modes that contribute to the
risk profile.
The risk profiles for loss of crew/vehicle for the APU and HPU
are shown in Figure 3-1. These data are proof-of-concept study
results and are not to be used for engineering, design evalua-
tion, or flight certification. The contribution of HPU risk to
the Shuttle is clearly much lower than the contribution of APU
risk, even with uncertainties included.
3.2.1 Inslahts Into APU Risk
What are the major risk contributors of the APU? Table 3-1, at
the end of this section, presents the APU risk contributors
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(failure modes) that contribute over 99% of the likelihood of
loss of crew/vehicle during a flight. The risk from all other
contributors combined, therefore, makes a negligible contribution
to the overall risk associated with APUs. The first three major
ccntributors are: (!) hydrazine leakage into the aft compartment
from at least one APU during orbit or entry with potential for
fire or corrosion damage to other equipment, (2) hydrazine leak-
age into either isolation valve solenoid cavity, and (3) failure
of the APU turbine wheel. This includes all failures of the
turbine such as bearing seizure and fragmentation of the wheel
causing shrapnel damage to other equipment. Hydrazine leakage
contributes about four times more to risk than all the others
combined. Therefore, reducing either the likelihood or effects
of this leakage would provide the most benefit in terms of risk
reduction for invested resources.
The large (74.6%) contribution from the general category of
hydrazine leaks downstream of the isolation valves, and the
desire to rank the risk contributors to a finer detail, led
to a second iteration. Table 3-2 identifies, more specifically,
the risk points of leakage downstream of the isolation valves.
For example, 71.6% of this risk can be attributed to the first
three leak sources. Fuel leakage into the fuel isolation valve
remains high on the risk table.
Hydrazine leakage was the initial failure in many scenarios.
The PRA identified and documented the leakage related scenarios
via event sequence diagrams and event trees as shown in
Appendices B6.3 and B6.4, respectively. Table 3-3 summarizes
the quantified result of this process by presenting the percent
of the LOC/V risk attributable to each category of scenarios
and the percent contribution of the categories of scenarios
attributable to individual APU failure modes. The risk profile
was also broken down directly into failed components or
assemblies as shown in Tables 3-1 and 3-2.
The LOC/V risk from APUs is clearly dominated by leakage of
hydrazine leading to the cascading effects of fire, hydrazine
corrosion, hydrazine decomposition reactions, and possibly
detonation. These effects were assessed to lead to failure of
either an adjacent APU or other flight critical equipment in
the aft compartment with a relatively high frequency. This
assessment resulted from historical Shuttle data and from the
recognition that the aft compartment is very crowded. The
compartment contains main propulsion equipment, electronics, and
exposed wiring whose insulation (such as Kapton) is susceptible
to the damaging effects of hydrazine. All are in close proximity
3-4
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to hydrazine sources. There are no effective barriers between
the hydrazine sources and the rest of the equipment in the aft
compartment. When the Shuttle descends to an altitude of about
60,000 feet during entry, sufficient atmospheric oxygen is
• available to support combustion of free hydrazine in the aft
compartment, provided that an ignition source exists. The APUs
themselves provide sufficiently hot surfaces to ignite leaking
hydrazine. The effects of hydrazine ignition were dramatically
demonstrated by the two APU fires that occurred at the end of the
STS-9 flight.
The study also revealed that propagating failure effects from
common cause failures (as revealed in the APU failure history
database) led to a risk that was far greater than would be
expected if APUs were failing independently. The benefits
of redundant APUs are not being realized. The STS-9 fire
demonstrated that a single hydrazine leak can fail two APUs.
Restricted lube oil flow has affected the same APU on two
separate missions due to contamination introduced during
ground servicing. Restricted circulation of lube oil due to
contamination has already caused a launch scrub. However, it
is recognized that procedures have been instituted to minimize
the possibility of lube oil contamination. In addition, a new
design in the seal cavity drain of the Improved APU will
eliminate the common fuel and lube oil seal drain that exists
on the present APUs.
Since hydrazine leakages can occur from any one of the APUs and
a single leak can lead to LOC/V, the presence of three APUs
(two of three of which are required to operate), from a purely
mathematichl point of view, is more detrimental to flight safety
than are two. Even without cascading failures, a configuration
in which one out of two must operate for success tends to be more
reliable than a two out of three configuration. One approach
that would significantly reduce the risk would be to affect a
design wherein each of the three APUs is independently capable of
supporting the demands of the Orbiter hydraulic system. Another
less rigorous approach might be to erect barriers to isolate each
APU from the rest of the aft compartment. The barriers would
also serve toreduce the detrimental effects of shrapnel produced
by turbine breakup while operating during the flight.
Because of the high probability of hydrazine leakage, inspection
and leak check procedures should be reviewed for adequacy. Another
approach is to certify that the vehicle is capable of operating
throughout the flight envelope (ascent as well as entry) on a
single APU. This would result in significant reduction in the
risk of LOC/V as determined from this study. The study results
3-5
were heavily influenced by the assumption that two APUs were
required for safe flight.
Further results of this study are discussed in Section 8 of this
Volume and include APU risk associated with launch scrub and with
the ascent phase of a typical flight. This Section has summarized
the orbit/entry phase which poses the greauer risk to flight.
3.2.2 Insiahts Into HPU Risk
The HPU has been assessed as posing very little risk of loss of
crew/vehicle. Table 3-4 presents a breakdown of the risk profile
into its risk contributors (failure modes). Two failures contri-
bute over 98% of the risk posed by the HPU. These two failures
are lube oil circulation restriction due to common cause contami-
nation, and failure of the HPU turbine wheel. As in the APU this
includes all failures cf the turbine including wheel fragmentation
leading to shrapnel damage to other equipment. The risk from all
other failures combined, therefore, makes only a 2% contribution
to the LOC/V risk due to the HPUs. Table 3-5 provides a break-
down of the risk profile into scenarios and the HPU failures
associated with the scenarios.
The risk posed by the HPUs appears to be far less than that of the
APU for five fundamental reasons.
a. Risk is directly proportional to f_ight duration. The HPU
operates in-flight for about 3% as long as the APU.
be The dominant contributor to APU risk is not appropriate to the
HPU. The risk from hydrazine leakage on the APU is associated
with the long duration that hydrazine must be contained during
orbit, coupled with the potential for fire during entry. The
HPU need contain hydrazine for only about 2 minutes during
ascent and the environment around the HPU in the aft skirt is
purged with nitrogen to prevent fires.
Co The SRB aft skirt is much less crowded with flight critical
equipment than the Orbiter aft compar-,ment, and the two HPUs
appear to be well separated. In addition, damage from the
shrapnel spray pattern is minimized by the orientation of the
turbine wheel. Therefore, cascading effects from either hydra-
zine leakage or turbine fragmentation have relatively little
chance of harming a second HPU or flight critical equipment.
do The HPU is similar in design to the APU and is constructed by
the same manufacturer. The APU requirements for duration of
service and ability to cope with the environmental extremes of
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ascent, orbit, entry and landing are more demanding than is
required for the HPU. From a reliability viewpoint, the HPU
appears to have a large design margin.
eo The HPU undergoes a stringent post flight disassembly and
refurbishment. It also undergoes a thorough pre-flight
reassembly and checkout procedure. The failure history
indicates that these procedures are effective in reducing the
frequency of failures during hot fire tests as well as flight,
despite the detrimental effects of immersing the HPUs in sea
water at the end of each flight. Essentially, new HPUs are
flown each flight.
3.3 PRA IMPLEMENTATION LESSONS
The application of PRA to a Shuttle subsystem yielded some lessons
about methodology, data acquisition, and management aspects of this
study which may be of benefit for future application to PRA in
other space systems.
3.3.1 Methodoloav Lesso_
A number of challenges appeared during the course of this study and
several insights were gained into the PRA process as applied to an
aerospace subsystem as a result. They are as follows:
a.
b.
C.
d.
Multi-stage modeling may be required in which the risk model is
divided into stages. In this study these stages were defined
on the basis of mission time intervals. Each time interval was
characterized by a different APU mode of operation, a different
set of flight rules, and different potential damage states.
Evaluation of cascading failure effects, such as hydrazine -_
leakage which can propagate damage, requires extensive (
modeling and analysis of physical processes. The results of i 54.
these analyses then must be converted to a form suitable for \
use in a risk model. D
The highly interactive nature of the APU with its
surroundings requires careful event tree design to capture
all important dependencies.
Coupling of propagating failure effects with random equipment_
failures requires highly coupled fault tree and event tree Jmodels.
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Some of the challenges were typical of any first-of-a-kind study.
A PRA cannot be completed without a thorough knowledge of the
system, its interfaces, procedures, operator interactions and
failure and success history. All task members must share some
degree of this knowledge, as well as to acquire certain PRA
skills. The unfamiliarity with the relative importance of
various APU/HPU failure modes caused a number cf false starts
with respect to the risk model development. In particular, the
study task group could nct draw on a deep well of experience to
unambiguously define, on the first try, which aspects of the
scenarios could be treated by event trees, which by fault trees,
which by data, and which by physical process modeling.
The study task group believes that the optimal use of the
techniques has not yet been found and that application of PRA
techniques will continue to evolve toward an aerospace specific
methodology.
3.3.2 Data Acquisition Lessons
Although manned spaceflight dictates a certain level of record
keeping in support of safety and reliability, it was known from the
outset that data collection and validation was no small driver in
the successful completion of the study. Databases developed to
support the needs of various organizations are not necessarily in
the format needed to support a PRA. In addition, the type of data
needed for a PRA can be distinctly different from that required
for other types of analyses. This is especially true when dealing
with spatial considerations of the subsystem under study.
Examples of further data difficulties encountered are as follows:
ao Some failures were written against the APU, using its part
number rather thanthe specific component part number, with-
in the APU that failed. Extra time was required to identify
the actual component that failed.
b. Incomplete failure records or partial data entries were not
uncommon. Extra time was required to resolve the issue, or
the data was eventually discarded for lack of substantiating
information.
Co
Different data sources use different computer software and
hardware. This hampered the task of automating the data
for compiling and sorting.
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do Inconsistencies exist in formatting. Failures were tied to
an _ mission or mission date, not a calendar date.
Run times were in different units of time. Extra time was
required for correlating failures and tabulating data.
e. The inability to determine exactly when design changes were
implemented made data screening difficult. What component
design should be used to establish failure rates?
f. It was difficult to use "borrowed" data base material which
lacked proper documentation (e.g., data file size, content
and attributes). Extra time was required to establish
electronic data transfer.
go Access to the data sources was difficult. NASA vendors are
reluctant to provide information without formal authorization
and, in most cases, without compensaUion.
A great cost savings could be realized in conducting a PRA if the
appropriate data could be assembled into coherent and consistent
electronic databases that are easily accessible.
3.3.3 Management Aspeats
Successful performance of a PRA requires continuous interaction
among members of the PRA study group. These members must have a
great depth of understanding of the system under investigation,
as well as being thoroughly familiar with PRA methodology and
techniques. The model development and data analysis requires a
disciplined and organized effor1:_ each step and intermediate
result must be well documented.
While individual team members may work on different aspects of
the analysis, all aspects must merge into the same risk model.
All these factors point to the necessity for continuous,
effective intra-team communication in order to achieve a
coordinated effort. There is, of course, an additional need
for effective communication between the study team and other
NASA or contractor organizations from which the team=ust
acquire needed information.
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TABLE 3-1
IMPORTANCE RANKING OF APU FAILURES
LOC/V - WHOLE FLIGET - ISt ITERATION
Page 1 of 2
COMPONENT/ABSEX_LY
FAILURE RIBK CONTRIBUTORS
Fuel System Leak Into Aft Compartment From
Location Downstream of Isolation Valve
Leak Into Fuel Isolation Valve Solenoid
Cavity
Turbine Wheel Failure
Leak Into Primary Valve Solenoid Cavity
(GGVM Detonation)
Primary Valve Fails Closed at APU Start
Lube Oil Circulation Restricted
Fuel Tank GN2 Fill Q.D. Leakage (Low Fuel
Tank Pressure)
Any MPU Fails High at APU Start*
Fuel Tank Diaphragm Leakage
Secondary Fuel Valve Fails to Open at APU
Start
Heater Pair 116/117 Fails Off on Orbit
Any MPU Fails High While APU is Running*
MPU 1 Fails Low at APU Start
Loss of Power to Secondary Fuel Valve at
APU Start
74.6
3.8
2.4
2.3
1.8
1.3
1.2
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.7
0.6
* Later information indicates that MPU fail high may not
be a credible failure mode
3-10
15
16
17
18
19
2O
21
22
23
24
25
T_BLI 3-1 (Concluded)
COMPONENT/_BEXBLY
F]tZLURZ I_BK CONTRIBUTORS
Loss of Power to Fuel Tank Isolation Valves
at APU Start
Fuel Tank GN2 Leakage
Fuel Pump Bypass Valve Fails to Close After
APU Star_
Heater Pair 111/112 Fails Off On Orbit
Secondary Fuel Valve Controller Output Fails
Off at APU Start
Fuel Isolation Valve Fails to Close at APU
Shutdown (GGVM Large Leak)
Fuel Isolation Valve Leaks at Closure After
Ascent
Loss of Power to Secondary Fuel Valve While
APU is Running
Primary Fuel Valve Controller Output Fails
On While APU Running
Secondary Fuel Valve Controller Output Fails
Off While APU Running
All Other Failures
Page 2 of 2
CONT-
RIBUTION
0.6
0.08
0.08
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.I0
Total 100.00
NOTE: Proof-of-concept study results. Not approved
for design evaluation or flight certification.
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ZXPORT)_TC y. P.),NKZNG OF ]_PU FA'rLUREB
LOC/V - WHOLE FLIGHT - 2nd ITERJtTI'ON
COMPONENT/UGFJGSLY
FAILURE RISK CONTRIBUTORS
Leakage From Gas Generator Injector Tube
Leakage From Fuel Lines and Fittings
Leakage From Fuel Pump
Leak Into Fuel Isolation ValveSolenoid Cavity
Leak Into Primary Valve Solenoid Cavity (GGVM
Detonation)
Primary Valve Fails Closed While Pulsing
External Leakage From GGVM
Lube Oil Circulation Restricted
Fuel Pump Shaft Seal Detonation
Fuel Tank GN2 Fill Q.D. Leakage (Low Fuel Tank
Pressure)
Heater Pair 111/112 Fails Off On orbit
Heater Pair 116/117 Fails Off On Orbit
Fuel Tank Diaphragm Leakage
Secondary Fuel Valve Fails To Open At APU
Start
MPU 1 Fails Low At APU Start Valves At APU
Start
Loss Of Power To Secondary Fuel Valve At APU
Start
Loss of Power To Fuel Tank Isolation Valves
At APU Start
Page 1 of 2
% CONT-
RIBUTION
35.5
23.3
12.8
4.0
3.3
3.1
3.0
2.8
1.8
1.7
1.6
1.4
i.i
0.9
0.7
0.5
0.5
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RANK
18
19
2O
21
22
23
24
25
21;
27
28
29
3O
TABLE 3-2 (Concluded)
COMPOII'ENT/_ S F..I_ LY
F_TLUPJ RZBK CONTRZBUTORB
Turbine Wheel Failure
Fuel Tank GN2 Leakage
Fuel Pump Bypass Valve Fails To Close After
APU Start
Subtotal
Leakage From Fuel Line Flex Hose
Secondary Fuel Valve Controller Output Fails
Off At APU Start
Leakage From Fuel High Point Bleed Q.D.
Leakage From Fuel Test Port Q.D.
Fuel Isolation Valve Fails To Close At APU
Shutdown
Fuel Isolation Valve Leaks At Closure After
Ascent
Loss of Power To Secondary Fuel Valve While
APU Is Running
Primary Fuel Valve Controller Output Fails On
While APU Is Running
Secondary Fuel Valve Controller Output Fails
Off While APU Is Running
All Other Failures
Total
Page 2 of 2
% CONT-
RIBUTION
0.4
0.4
0.3
99.1
0.30
0.09
0.05
0.04
0.04
0.04
0.04
0.01
0.01
0.28
100.00
NOTE: Proof-of-concept study results. Not approved
for design evaluation or flight certification.
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Page 1 of 4
TABLE 3-3
IMPORTANCE RANKING OF IPU FAILURE BCENARIOS
LOC/V - WHOLE MIBSIOI_
FAILURE SCENARIO ]P..ZBK CONTRIBUTORS
% CONT-
RIBUTION
Hydrazine leak downstream of fuel isolation
valves and into aft compartment during orDit or
entry that leads to failure of two APUs or
flight critical equipment
Contributors:
a. Leakage from any one APU (100%)
Hydrazine leak as above, but from _wo or three
APUs concurrently
Contributors:
a. Leakage from combinations of two APUs (91%)
b. Leakage from three APUs (9%)
Hydrazine leak from a single APU as above, with
an independent failure of another APU
Contributorm_
a.. Hydrazine leak in one APU, with equipment
failure of another APU while running (see
below for breakdown into APU failure modes)
(ss%)
bo Hydrazine leak in one APU, with star_
failure of another APU (see below for
breakdown into APU failure modes) (12%)
Equipment failure of two APUs during orbit,
entry, or landing (failures not related to APU
start)
ao Lube oil circulation restricted on two APUs
(16_)
bo Primary fuel valve fails closed while
pulsing on one APU and fuel tank GN2 quick
disconnect leaks on another APU (7%)
39.1
26.5
6.4
5.0
3-14
$TABLE 3-3 (COlSt:i.llued)
FAILURE BCZlq]_IO RIBK CON'I'lq.TBUTOILS
Ce Lube oil circulation restricted in one APU,
and primary fuel valve fails open while
pulsing on another APU (6%)
d. Primary fuel valve fails closed while
pulsing in two APUs (6%)
ee Primary fuel valve fails closed while
pulsing on one APU, and fuel tank diaphragm
leaks on another APU (4%)
fe Lube oil circulation restricted in one APU,
and fuel tank GN2 quick disconnect leaks on
another APU (4%)
ge Fuel tank diaphragm leak on one APU, and
fuel tank GN2 quick disconnect leaks on
another APU (3%)
he Next 36 scenarios have combinations of lube
oil circulation restricted, tank diaphragm
leaks, primary fuel valve closure, nitrogen
leak from fuel tank, MPU failures, turbine
failures, and loss of power to fuel tank
isolation valves (34%)
Fail to start one APU at TIG-5 in orbit and
equipment failure of second APU while running
Contributorsz
IKPORTANT &PU BTART F_ILURE8:
ae Secondary fuel valve fails to open on
demand to start (ISt)
b. MPU I fails low on demand to start (14%)
Ce Electric power to secondary fuel valve
fails at start (11%)
d. MPU 1 fails high* (gt)
Page 2 of 4
% CONT-
RIBUTION
4.0
Later information indicates that MPU fail high may
not be a credible failure mode
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TABLE 3-3 (Continued)
FAILURE SCENARIO RISK CONTRIBUTORS
e. MPU 2 fails high* (9%)
f. MPU 3 fails high* (9%)
g. Fuel pump bypass valve fails closed (9%)
h. Fuel pump bypass valve fails open (9%)
i. Electric power to fuel tank isolation valve
fails at start (7%)
IMPORTANT _PU EQUIPMENT FAILURESz
j. Primary fuel valve fails closed during
pulsing (19%)
k. Fuel tank GN2 fill quick disconnect fails
open (13%)
1. Heaters fail off by common cause (14%)
m. Lube oil circulation restricted (12%)
n. Fuel tank diaphragm leaks (8%)
o. Fuel tank nitrogen leakage (3%)
p. MPU 2 fails high* (3%)
q. MPU 3 fails high* (3%)
r. Turbine wheel failure (3%)
Hydrazine leaks into isolation valve solenoid,
auto-decomposes, ruptures valve cover, and
contents of fuel tank are dumped into aft
compartment
Contzibutormz
a. Leakage into solenoid cavity (100%)
Page 3 of 4
% CONT-
RIBUTION
3.8
Later information indicates that MPU fail high may
not be a credible failure mode
3-16
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TABLE 3-3 (Concluded)
F).ZLUI_ SCENARIO I:tZBK CONTR_'BUTOR8
Turbine comes apart at normal speed during
entry; shrapnel and hydrazine effects fail
a second APU or flight critical equipment
Contributors:
a. Turbine wheel comes apart and escapes
housing (I00%)
Hydrazine leak from two APUs as above, with an
independent failure of another APU
Contributors:
ae Leakage with equipment failure of APU while
running (100%)
Turbine comes apart at normal speed during
ascent; shrapnel effects fail a second APU or
flight critical equipment
Contributors:
a. Turbine wheel comes apart and escapes
housing (100t)
Equipment failure of one APU during ascent and
another during orbit or entry
Contributorsz
ae Breakdown of APU failures provided
previously
All Others
TOTAL
Page 4 of 4
% CONT-
RIBUTION
3.1
1.9
0.9
0.9
8.4
i00.0
NOTE: Proof-of-concept study results. Not approved
for design evaluation or flight certification.
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RANKING
1
2
3
TULE 3-4
IMPORTANCE RANKING OF EPU
FAILURE MODES
L088 OF CREW OR VEXICLE
CON_ONENT/USEMBLY
RISK CONTRIBUTOR8
Lube oil circulation restricted
Turbine wheel failure
Primary control valve transfers
closed while pulsing
All other failures
Page 1 of 1
% CONT-
RIBUTION
55.0
43.0
1.0
1.0
TOTAL I00.0
NOTE: Proof-of-concept study results. Not approved
for design evaluation or flight certification.
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Page i of 1
TABLE 3-5
IMPORTANCE RANKING OF wPU FAILURE SCENARIOS
RANK
m
1
LOC/V
m
F_LUI_ SCENARIO RISK CONTRIBUTORS
Equipment failure of 2 HPUs on the same SRB
between lift-off and SRB SEP
Contributors and % Contribution to Scenario i:
Re Common cause restriction of lube oil
circulation causing bearing overheat and
failure of rotating equipment in the
gearbox (99%)
% CONT-
RIBUTION
56.8
2 Turbine failure leading to shrapnel induced
failure of a second HPU or other flight
critical equipment between lift-off and
SRB SEP
Contributors and % Contribution to Scenario 2:
"a. Turbine fragmentation at normal speed
(1oo%)
43.0
3 All Others 0.2
TOTAL I00.0
NOTE: Proof-of-concept study results. Not approved
for design evaluation or flight certification.
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4.0 SYSTEM DESCRXPTIONS
This section provides a brief technical description of the two
Space Shuttle subsystems which were the subjects of this pilot
study. These two subsystems, the Orbiter Auxiliary Power
Unit (APU) and the Solid Rocket Booster Hydraulic Power Unit
(HPU), are similar in form and function, and share many common
hardware components. However, there are also numerous differ-
ences between them, due to the HPU,s less demanding operational
requirements. The HPU operates for about 2.5 minutes during
a flight, whereas the APU operates for approximately 1.5 hours.
In addition, it is not necessary for the HPU to start or run
under zero gravity conditions.
The two subsystems are discussed separately in Sections 4.1
through 4.6. The reader desiring a more detailed description
is referred to the references listed in Section 12.0.
4.1 APU SYSTEM DESCRIPTION AND OVERVIEW
The Space Shuttle Orbiter has three independent hydraulic systems
similar to those found on large aircraft. These hydrauli c systems
are used to actuate the Orbiter aero-surfaces, throttle and gimbal
the Orbiter main engines, deploy and steer the landing gear, apply
the landing gear brakes, and retract the external tank/umbilical
plates when the external tank separates from the Orbiter.
Power for the Orbiter hydraulic systems is provided by three
identical APUs, one for each hydraulic system. These APUs and
their controllers are mounted on the forward bulkhead of the
Orbiter aft compartment, as shown in Figure 4-1, and generate
power by means of a catalytic reaction of liquid hydrazine.
4.2 APUMISSION OPERATIONS
The APUs are operated by the Orbiter flight crew, using flight
deck controls and displays. The APUs cannot be controlled by
ground command uplink. However, extensive telemetry on APU
status is available to Space Shuttle ground controllers.
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In a typical flight, the three APUs are s_arted 5 minutes before
lift-off and operate throughout the launch phase. They are shut
down after the Orbital Maneuvering Systen (OMS) orbit insertion
burn when hydraulic power is no longer required. The APUs are re-
started for the deorbit burn and entry, and are shut down shortly
after landing. In addition, one APU is usually run briefly the day
before de-orbit to support a checkout of the Orbiter flight control
system.
While the APUs are operating, they obtain lube oil cooling from
three separate water spray boilers, one for each APU. During the
inactive period on orbit, APU fluids are maintained within desired
temperature ranges by thermostatically controlled heaters.
4.3 APU DESIGN AND FUNCTION
The APU is designed to achieve a high output of power in a
compact package. It accomplishes this by means of a catalytic
reaction of liquid hydrazine. This reaction produces a high
velocity flow of hot gas, which is used to spin a turbine. A
speed reduction gearbox transmits the power of the spinning
turbine to the associated Orbiter main hydraulic pump.
Each APU consists of the following subassemblies:
(a) Fuel tank and fuel lines
(b) Fuel isolation valves (two in parallel)
(c) Fuel pump
(d) Gas generator valve module (two control valves)
(e) Gas generator
(f) Turbine
(g) Gearbox
(h) Electronic controller
(i) Exhaust duct assembly
(j) System of heaters for orbit thermal control
(k) Post-shutdown cooling system for the fuel pump/valve module
(i) Hot start cooling system for the gas generator injector
(m) Fuel/lube oil seal cavity drain system
Figure 4-2 is a schematic diagram of the APU system.
Since the APU interfaces directly with other subsystems, the
diagram also depicts the APU boundary limits for the purposes
of this study.
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The hydrazine fuel supply is stored in a 28-inch diameter
titanium fuel tank and is pressurized with nitrogen during
servicing. The gas pressure provides star_ capability through
the fuel pump bypass valve until the fuel pump is running, and
acts against the tank diaphragm to positively expel fuel to the
APU. The fixed-displacement APU fuel pump provides a constant
flow of hydrazine to the Gas Generator Valve Module (GGVM) after
the initial bootstrap start. Approximately 325 ibs. of fuel is
loaded into each fuel tank for a typical mission.
The APU turbine speed is controlled by the GGVM. The valve module
consists of two flapper-type valves in series. The primary or modu-
lating valve downstream of the pump is normally open and allows
flow to the secondary or shutoff valve. The secondary valve is
normally in by-pass, which directs hydrazine flow back to the pump
inlet. In the powered state, it allows hydrazine flow to the gas
generator. The APU controller cycles the primary valve to maintain
proper turbine speed (about 74,000 rpm). In the high speed mode,
the controller cycles the secondary valve uo maintain a speed of
about 81,000 rpm. For safety, the primary valve will begin pulsing
again to maintain a speed of about 83,000 rpm if the secondary
valve fails open. The gas generator (GG) is a pressure vessel
containing a granular catalyst. Hydrazine flowing into the GG is
decomposed by the catalyst, producing hot gases which are directed
to the turbine assembly.
The dual-pass turbine assembly converts hot gas kinetic energy
into mechanical shaft power at the desired speeds to operate the
hydraulic pump, APU lube oil pump, and APU fuel pump.
The speed-reducing gearbox contains gears, bearings, seals, and
a scavenger lubrication system. The gearbox is pressurized
with nitrogen to prevent vaporization of the lubricant. A lube
oil pump circulates the lube oil to the hydraulic system water
boiler for cooling. The gearbox has a make-up pressurization
system consisting of a small GN2 bottle and a solenoid shutoff
valve actuated by the controller.
The APU electronic controller provides turbine speed control
based on rotational speed sensors, logic for APU startup and
shutdown, signal conditioning, gas generator catalyst bed
heater control, gearbox make-up pressure control, and mal-
function detection capability (flight crew alert signals to
the Orbiter caution and warning system). Each controller is
located remotely from its respective APU. One is located in
each of the three aft avionics bays.
4-5
The APU fuel tanks are mounted on the sidewalls of the Orbiter
aft compartment. Fuel tanks are located 7 to 9 feet away from
their respective APUs.
The exhaust duct assembly directs the APU exhaust products over-
board through an exit a_ the upper aft fuselage skin. Exhaust
duct assemblies i and 2 are located on the port side and duct 3
is on the starboard side of the aft fuselage at the base of the
vertical stabilizer.
All APU fluid components (pumps, valves, lines) are equipped
with thermostat-controlled heaters to maintain fluid tempera-
tures in proper ranges during the APU quiescent period on orbit
and pre-launch. Heaters are also used to maintain the gas
generator bed at a proper temperature for APU star_-up.
The fuel pump and gas generator valve modules are maintained
below 200"F during the heat soakback period, after APU shut
down, by a water spray system consisting of two water tanks
and associated lines, switches, thermostats, and timers.
This system is only required on orbit when convective cooling
is insufficient to cool these components. Temperatures above
200"F can cause partial decomposition of the hydrazine fuel,
with potential for detonation at APU start-up if hydrazine
bubbles have not collapsed as the APU cools down.
A single water tank with lines to all three APUs is provided
to cool the gas generator injector should an APU restart be
required before the gas generator can cool naturally. Control
is via the APU controller. Starting a hot APU without this
cooling risks detonation of the APU.
4.4 HPU SYSTEM DESCRIPTION AND OVERVIEW
The Space Shuttle SRB Solid Rocket Motor nozzle steering is
controlled by the SRB Thrust Vector Control (TVC) system.
The SRB TVC System for each SRB consists of two HPUs, two
servoactuators, and two APU control assemblies. The HPUs are
located on the SRB aft skirt between the two servoactuators, as
shown in Figure 4-3. Each HPU is driven by a hydrazine-powered
turbine. The HPU provides hydraulic fluid flow to the servo-
actuator to obtain the proper thrust vectoring.
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The two servoactuators provide nozzle gimbaling in the SRB rock
and tilt axes (one dedicated servoactuator for each axis).
Each HPU is dedicated to a single servoactuator during normal
operation. If a single HPU fails, the remaining unit increases
its power output and controls the nozzle position in both the
rock and tilt planes at slightly reduced gimbal rates.
4.5 HPU MISSION OPERATIONS
The HPUs are started by a signal from the Launch Processing
System (LPS) and operate autonomously through the SRB boosu
phase. The HPUs are not controlled by the crew or ground
command uplink. However, extensive HPU telemetry is available
to Space Shuttle ground controllers.
In a typical flight, the four HPUs are started 31 seconds
before lift-off and operate until HPU power deadfacing at SRB
separation (approximately 2 minutes after lift-off).
4.6 HPU DESIGN AND FUNCTION
The HPU is very similar to the Orbiter APU, but differs in the
following ways:
a.
b.
o.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
j.
k.
1.
m,
No active cooling of any kind
No external insulation, except on the fuel tank
No fluid system heaters
Smaller fuel tank
Simpler electronic controller
No automatic overspeed or underspeed shutdown
No flight crew control or monitoring interface
No in-flight restart capability
Different type of fuel control valves
Different speed selection scheme
One fueltank isolation valve rather than two in parallel
No active gearbox pressurization system
Stronger turbine containment ring
The Hydraulic Power Unit comprises the following subassemblies:
ao
b.
C.
Fuel Supply Module (FSM)
Fuel Isolation Valve (FIV)
Fuel Pump
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g.
h.
i.
j.
Gas Generator V_ive Module (two Control Valves)
Gas Generator
Turbine
Gearbox
Electronic Controller
Exhaust Duct Assembly
Fuel/Lube Oil Seal Cavity Drain System
A schematic diagram of the HPU System is provided in Figure 4-4.
The FSM is a spherical pressure vessel, 15 inches in diameter,
which contains approximately 32 pounds of hydrazine (N2H4)
at mission start. The FSM is pressurized with GN2 to deliver
the N2H 4 to the HPU fuel pump at start up. Fuel Is introduced
to the HPU by electrically commanding the fuel isolation valve
and the secondary control valve open. The GN 2 pressure provides
start capability through the fuel pump bypass valve until the
pump is running. The fixed-displacement fuel pump, driven by
the turbine/gearbox, provides a constant flow of hydrazine to
the valve module after the initial bootstrap start.
The power generating portion of the HPU is referred to as
the APU. The APU consists of a fuel pump, a gas generator valve
module (which consists of a primary and a secondary speed
control valve connected in series), a gas generator, a dual
pass turbine, a fixed-ratio gearbox, and various check, service
and relief valves to effect control for the APU.
Turbine speed is controlled by the Gas Generator Valve Module
and the HPU controller. The primary or modulating valve
downstream of the pump is normally open and allows flow to
the secondary or shutoff valve. The secondary valve is normally
in by-pass, which directs hydrazine flow back to the pump inlet.
In the powered state, it allows hydrazine flow to the gas
generator. The HPU controller cycles these valves to maintain
proper turbine speed.
The HPU controller, located in the Aft Integrated Electronics
Assembly (IEA)of the SRB, provides control of the HPU. The
IEA is located on the exterior surface of the SRB casing,
above the aft skirt. It monitors the turbine speed through
signals received from two Magnetic Pickup Units (MPU) located
on the APU turbine shaft and controls the fuel flow to the
APU. Fuel flow is controlled by opening and closing the pulse
(primary) control valve and/or the shut off (secondary) control
valve. Prior to HPU start-up, the primary valve is normally
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open and the secondary valve is normally closed. The fuel
isolation valve and the secondary control valve are opened at
star_-up, allowing pressurized fuel from the FSM to flow to
the gas generator. As the turbine reaches i00 percent speed-
(74,000 rpm) a signal from the controller pulses the primary
control valve to maintain i00 percent speed.
A reduction or loss of primary HPU hydraulic pressure will
cause closure of a switch in the associated servoactuator
which will inhibit the secondary HPU I00 percent circuit and
enable its Ii0 percent (79,200 rpm) primary, valve controller
circuit. This increased APU speed provides additional
hydraulic flow capacity for driving two servo-actuators.
Restoration of hydraulic pressure in the failed system will
move the servo-actuator switching valve back to the primary
position allowing the formerly failed system to again supply
hydraulic pressure to its actuator.
The secondary control valve is controlled by the 112 percent
control circuit. A primary valve-open failure will cause
the APU speed to increase. When the shaft speed reaches 112
percent (80,640 rpm) the secondary valve and control circuit
will maintain that speed.
The exhaust duct assembly directs the APU exhaust products
overboard through an exit at the outboard side of the SRB aft
skirt.
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5.1
STUDY METHODOLOGY
THE PURPOSE OF PRA
The purpose of Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) is to provide
a basis for making decisions. When PRA is applied to existing
euuipment, like the Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) and Hydraulic Power
Unit (HPU) subsystems, the purpose is to identify and evaluate the
risks and to assure that any weak spots are not overlooked. These
results can be used to make day-to-day decisions, for example,
how to allocate scarce resources, to improve performance, reduce
cost, or increasesafety.
5.2 THE STRUCTURE OF A DECISION
Like most other engineered systems, a space vehicle necessarily
involves a degree of risk in its operation. Intelligent design
and operating decisions can, however, control the amount of risk.
Sometimes it is possible through a flash of insight to change or
simplify a design in a way that not only reduces risk but also
improves performance and reduces the cost. Often, however, risk
reduction involves increased cost or reduced performance. The
task of engineering, mission operations, and program management
is to strike an optimal balance between risk, cost, and perform-
ance. The balance is struck and fine-tuned through day-by-day
decisions, as the design, construction, and operation continue.
In the flash of insight cases, the decisions are easy to make.
In the usual case though, tradeoffs are required. In these
situations, it is useful and necessary to have quantitative
measures that show how much risk is being weighed against how
much cost and performance. These variables are often difficult
to analyze and require complex models to quantify. Cost, for
example, increases by redesign but may be reduced by future
performance at reduced risk. All these variables can and should
be quantified for informed decisions about resource allocation.
Figure 5-1 shows the anatomy of a general decision problem.
Each decision option brings with it a certain risk, cost, and
performance. If these three factors were precisely known, it
would be easy to make the decision. What makes the problem
interesting in real llfe is that these variables are never
known with complete certainty. It is important, then, to
quantify these uncertainties as part of the input to the
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decision analysis. Figure 5-1 also shows the uncertainties
quantified in the form of probability curves. Each option can
be characterized by a triplet of three probability curves. The
decision maker must then choose which triplet (i.e., which
option) he prefers. The role of PRA, as shown in the figure, is
to provide the assessment of risk, including uncertainty, as of
the input to decision problems. Strictly speaking, PRA per se
is limited to the risk part of the problem, but the same quanti-
tative way of thinking, the same probabilistic methodology, can
be applied to the cost and performance factors as well.
Quantification is thus a necessary part of optimal decision making.
It also serves admirably as a discipline for separating facts and
evidence from hunches and wishful thinking; for discriminating
between information that is truly relevant to risk and that which
is irrelevant or convenient rationalization: and very importantly,
for providing a uniform framework and language for documentation
and communication among all parties involved in the project•
5.3 THE QUANTITATIVE DEFINITION OF RISK
A probabilistic risk assessment of the APU and HPU equipment is
fundamentally the same ms a PRA of anything.else since, in all
cases, we seek to answer the same three basic questions:
a. What can happen; i.e., what can go wrong?
b. How likely is it to happen?
c. If it does happen, what are the consequences?
The answers can be grouped as a triplet,
where
<s i, L i, x i>
si - a name and/or description of the ith scenario; i.e.,
an answer to "what can happen"
Li - the likelihood of the ith scenario
x i - the damage state, i.e., a measure of the damage
consequent to the ith scenario
Each such triplet thus constitutes "an" answer to the three
questions. The set of all possible such triplets then constitutes
"the" answer to the questions. This set may therefore be adopted
as the quantitative definition of risk.
5-3
Notionally, if we use braces, (}, to denote "set of" and R to
denote "risk", then we may write
R = ( <s i, L i, xi> ).
Applying this definition, a PRA of the APU and HPU is a list cf
all the possible scenarios that we can envision originating in
failure or malfunctions of the APU or HPU equipment and, along
with each scenario, a measure of its likelihood and its con-
sequences. Damage states (xi) , likelihoods (Li), and scenarios
(si) are discussed in the following three sections.
5.4 THE DAMAGE INDEX, x i
In the case of the APU and HPU, the damage state, x, of most
interest is Loss of Crew or Vehicle (LOC/V). Other damaqe states
involved in this study include Intact AborZs (IA), entry at next
Primary Landing Site (PLS) opportunity, and launch delay or Launch
scrub (LS).
5.5 QUANTIFYING LIKELIHOOD:
FORMAT
THE PROBABILITY OF FREQUENCY
To quantify the notion of likelihood for APU and HPU scenarios,
we adopt the "probability of frequency" format. That is, we
imagine a model or thought experiment in which we have launched
many millions of shuttles under varying ccnditions. At the end
of this experiment we could look at the records and ask "in what
fraction of missions did scenario s i occur?".
We shall denote this fraction by ¢i, and call it the "frequency"
of scenario i, expressed in units of occurrences per mission.
The _i are thus the output of our thought experiment.
If we had actually run this experiment, we would know these
frequencies exactly. We have not run it but have, instead, the
benefit of 24 successful shuttle missions and numerous tests.
Thus, we know something about these frequencies but do not know
them exactly. This gives rise to uncertainty about predicting
the likelihood of success of future APU and HPU performance.
We also have the benefit of a data base of APU and HPU malfunc-
tions, and of analytical calculations about the equipment and
the consequences of failures. Additionally, we have the benefit
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of numerous tests of individual APU and HPU components, and the
opinions and insights of experts who have been working with
Shuttle systems and equipment for many years. We have knowledge
of similar equipment used in other applications, and finally, we
have outgeneral engineering knowledge.
All this information can be used to make inferences about the
numerical values of the frequencies, _i" The format in which
such inferences are expressed is that of a probability
distribution, hence the name "probability of frequency format."
Such distributions will typically have the appearance of Figure
5-2. We refer to these curves as "state cf knowledge" curves
since they express our total knowledge (and lack of knowledge)
about the values of the parameters _i, based on all the infor-
mation sources mentioned above.
These curves constitute an important numerical output of the PRA,
which is sometimes called a risk profile. They are one set of
information useful for a decision analysis. However, of equal or
greater value is what is learned in the process of arriving at
these curves.
The discipline and rigor of getting these curves, assembling
the information, and asking the right questions, produces great
clarity and communication. It allows us to make decisions with
all of our knowledge brought to bear, rather than with our
knowledge of worst case scenarios only.
Furthermore, the structured, scenario-based methodology allows
us to determine the reasons that the probability distribution
has the shape that it does. That is, it allows us to identify
the scenarios and equipment that contribute to the risk profile,
and to rank the contributors to risk in order of importance.
5.6 IDENTIFYING SCENARIOS
According to our definition of risk in terms of a set of failure
scenarios, the first and most important step in a risk assessment
is to identify these scenarios. First, any scenario that we can
describe in a finite number of words is actually a category of
scenarios. Thus "the pipe breaks" is a category that includes
as subcategories, "the pipe breaks longitudinally," "there is a
double-ended guillotine break," "the pipe breaks in such and such
location," etc. Our first principle therefore is that the word
"scenario" is taken to mean "category of scenarios."
5-5
h.a-
mm
ml-
mZ
OuJ
E_
°m
u
Z
IJJ
L_
IJ.
O
Z
_J
14J
IJ.
Z
14J
L_
IJ.
14J
-r.
i--
O
LL
IJJ
.J
O
14J
IdJ
--d
O
Z
LL
O
IdJ
h-
h-
E_
,m
IJ.
5-6
'¢
!
I.
ii
]
II
F
]-
li
]..
l
1.
i.
t
I_
A second point is that since our objective is to identify all
possible significant scenarios, any method that helps us do that
is good. Any new way of looking, any new way of categorizing
that helps us be sure we have not overlooked any significant
scenarios is good, so it is perfectly all right to use more than
one approach to scenario identification.
A third point is that in any specific PRA application there are
likely to be a huge number of possible scenarios. Clearly then,
the scenario list must be organized in some way to allow it to be
analyzed efficiently. How this is done in any instance is partly
a matter of personal preference and partly a matter of modeling
skill. A general methodology for this structuring of scenarios
is presented in Section 5.7.
5.7 STRUCTURING THE SCENARIO LIST
To structure the scenario list for the APU and HPU, we adopt the
following concepts.
a. What we call a scenario is by definition a departure from
the "as planned" flight of the vehicle.
h. Any such departure from plan must originate in some
initiating failure as in Figure 5-3.
Co From each such initiating failure, or initiating event, a
"tree" of possible scenarios emerges as shown in Figure 5-4.
The branch points in this tree represent further events
which can be new failures, independent of the initiating
event, or which can be dependent or cascade failures. A
cascade or dependent failure is one which happens as a
consequence of the original failure.
These three concepts provide us with key ideas for structuring the
set of scenarios; namely, first define a finite set of possible
initiating failure categories and then define, from each initiating
failure category, a finite set of subsequent failure scenarios.
Since each initiating failure is a category, just as each scenario
is a category, we can achieve finiteness by Judicious definition of
the categories. The categories should be mutually exclusive and
complete. Thus, any actual physical initiating failure must fall
in one and only one of our set of initiating failure categories.
Similarly, any actual emerging scenario must fall in one and only
one of the finite set of scenario categories that we define for
that initiating failure.
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We refer to the process of defining a complete and finite set
of mutually exclusive categories as "partitioning" the set of
possible scenarios. Let us then continue our line of thought
by looking more deeply into how this partitioning can be
accomplished. We begin with the initiating failures.
do The initiating failure must occur in some part or subsystem
of the vehicle and it must occur at some time or during some
phase of the mission. Thus, we can label an initiating
failure by saying what happened and when it happened.
e. Furthermore, by parJ:itioning the mission time and the set
of possible failures into discrete units we can establish a
categorization scheme for initiating failures.
5.7.1 Master Loaic DiaGrams
For the purpose of the present study we have partitioned the
mission time into five mission phases: prelaunch, ascent, orbit,
entry/landing, and post wheelstop.
To partition and structure the set of possible failures, i.e.,
the "what happened" coordinate of the initiating event, we
adopt a device called a master logic diagram (MLD). This
device allows us to systematically think out a question like:
During ascent, how can LOC/V occur? At the top level of
Figure 5-5, for example, LOC/V can occur cnly if there is loss
of thrust, loss of control, loss of structural integrity, etc.
Thus, at the second level we have partitioned the set of
possible failures. In the third level, each of these partitions
is subdivided further, and so on. The boKtom level provides
failure mode categories associated with an APU or HPU.
The lowest level of breakdown constitutes a complete set of
discrete initiating failure categories. For the present study
we pursue only those few of these categories that involve
initiating failures in the APU or HPU equipment.
In this way, for example, we arrive at the following APU and
HPU initiating failures, which have the potential to lead to
one of the damage states:
a.
b.
c.
Turbine overspeed
Fuel (hydrazine) leak
Exhaust gas leak
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Spurious overspeed or underspeed shutdown (APU only)
Other failures leading to permanent shutdown of APU or
HPU
Included in hydrazine leaks are those that cause hydrazine to
enter the aft compartment, go overboard, cr enter the solenoid
cavity of solenoid valves.
Once the initiating events are thus defined the next step is to
define the set of possible scenarios emana:ing from each. For
this purpose two further diagrammatic devices are used: Event
Sequence Diagrams (ESD) and Event Trees (ET).
5.7.2 Event Sequence Diaarams
Event Sequence Diagrams are flow charts that diagram the initial
failures, subsequent independent events and cascading events that
could occur to form a scenario. The ESD graphically presents the
flow of all reasonable combinations of events; i.e., all reason-
able scenarios. It associates each scenario with a damage state.
The example event sequence diagram of Figure 5-6 shows a diagram
of boxes and lines. The words in each box may be interpreted as
a question asking if the event occurs. Horizontal lines leading
from left to right between boxes indicate a "yes" answer (Y in
Figure 5-6) to the question. The next event to the right, there-
fore, would follow a successful event of the left box. Vertical
lines indicate a "no" answer to the question. The next event
down, therefore, would follow a failure event in the top box.
A path of lines and boxes from the initiating failure to and
including a damage state is called a scenario.
This study identified and structured scenarios that incorporated
three types of propagating (dependent) failures. The first type
is called a "functional interaction." In this type, the first
piece of equipment to fail (e.g., a driver for the APU secondary
fuel control valve) causes the second piece of equipment to
stop working (e.g., the secondary valve) because the second
piece depends on the first piece to function: i.e., the driver
provides electric power that keeps the secondary valve open.
The second type is called a "spatial interaction." In this
type, a second equipment failure occurs by virtue of the first
equipment failure because of the spatial proximity of the two
pieces of equipment. For example, the second APU can fail by
virtue of a leakage and fire from another APU. The third type
of dependent failure is called a "common cause" failure. In
this case, two or more pieces of nearly identical equipment
5-12
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fail nearly at the same time (e.g., during the same mission)
because of an identified defect, mechanism, or cause common to
both. For example, fuel pumps can leak hydrazine in any or
all APUs during _he same mission because the shaft seals provide
a common weak spot. Such occurrences are correlated because of
the single cause and should not be treated as independent,
uncorrelated occurrences.
5.7.3 Event Trees
Although an event sequence diagram contains virtually all the
information needed to adequately depict scenarios, it is not
helpful for answering questions about the likelihood of
scenarios. In order to do this, an event sequence diagram is
converted to an event tree. As shown in Figure 5-6, the
events along the top of the tree correspond to the boxes (i.e.,
failure categories) in an event sequence diagram. Sometimes
these "top events" represent multiple boxes in the event
sequence diagram. An event tree is amenable to computerized
quantification of the likelihood of the scenarios. Each path
from "HL" to a damage state in the event tree of Figure 5-6
is a scenario.
Below each topevent in the event tree there are one or more
nodes, or branch points. Each node represents a decision about
the occurrence or non-occurrence of its associated top event in
that particular scenario, and is associated with a likelihood.
The likelihood of occurrence of that top event in each scenario
(i.e., for each node below the top event) depends on the sequence
of events that come before in the scenario -- these likelihoods
are "conditional" likelihoods. The likelihood gives the fraction
of time that each of the two branches at that node is followed.
We therefore refer to the conditional likelihoods of the nodes of
the event tree as "split fractions".
5.8 MULTISTAGE MODELING
The operating configuration.of the APU and the Shuttle changeover
the duration of a mission, and the scenarios leading to damage
states change during the mission. Before launch the APU and HPU
s_ar_ and run briefly. Scenarios during this time would lead to
launch scrub or, much less frequently, to loss of crew or vehicle.
During ascent, APU and HPU scenarios would be characterized by
routine failure and would lead to aborts, Primary Landing Site
(PLS), or LOC/V. In orbit, APUs do not run except for a brief
period for Flight Control System (FCS) checkout. Scenarios are
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dominated by standby failures such as leakages, heater failures,
and thermostat failures. Damage states are typically PLS entry,
with a remote chance of LOC/V caused by APU problems. During
entry, the APUs are started and run. During the lower part of the
entry, the flow of air into the compartment containing the APUs
creates a chance of leakage-induced fires. During entry, there-
fore, this additional failure mode must be modeled along with
those failures that could occur during ascent.
Since both scenarios and damage states change with each phase of
the mission, event sequence diagrams are developed for each
phase. In some cases, event trees are also developed for each
phase. In this study we found that four event sequence diagrams
could be approximated by two stages, "Stage A" and "Stage B", as
shown in Figure 5-7. The damage state of Stage A, which begins
at APU start prelaunch and continues through APU shutdown after
ascent, provides the initial conditions for Stage B. For
example, a leakage may occur during Stage A which, in accordance
with flight rules, requires that an APU be declared lost and a
PLS entry occur. Stage B begins with the presumption that one
APU is leaking and the mission time for which the scenarios are
quantified is that of a curtailed mission representative of a PLS
entry rather than that of a full mission.
Each stage is represented by one or more event trees, as
indicated in Figure 5-8.
Multistage modeling allows us to identify failures that contribute
to the risk profile of a particular part of the mission, provide
risk profiles for each stage of the mission, identify scenarios
that would span the entire mission (i.e., one APU fails on ascent
and one APU fails on descent), and provide the risk profile of the
entire mission.
5.9 DETERMINATION OF SPLIT FRACTIONS
Each node in an event tree requires a split fraction. These
split fractions are determined directly or by constructing a
logic model for the node to support development of the split
fraction. We use the probability of frequency format described
earlier to express our state of knowledge about the split
fractions. If the top event at a node is simple enough or if
sufficient data exists at the node level, then the probability
distribution for the split fraction is estimated directly. When
the top event at a node represents a complex system, a detailed
model of the system is required to break the system down into its
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component parts. This model defines how failures and successes of
component parts (called basic events in the language of PRA) affect
the failure and success of the top event. Several traditional
methods are available for this. Fault Tree analysis is one of the
more prominent ones, and is the one used in this analysis. Figure
5-8 indicates this by pointing out that a fault tree dealing with
certain parts of the APU is associated with a node.
5.9.1
The basic concept in fault tree analysis is to find out about a
complex unit, for which we have little information, by looking
at component parts about which we have much more information.
Therefore, a fault tree is developed down to the level at which
statistical failure and success data may be used to obtain
frequencies of the basic events. Basic events are denoted by
circles in Figure 5-8. We do not develop a basic event for every
conceivable failure mode at a subcomponent level if statistical
data exists at the higher component level.
The parameters that we wish to know about with respect to the
basic event are called "running failure rate" and "demand
failure rate." A running failure rate is defined as the number
of failures of a component per unit time. It may represent a
component that is operating or one on standby. A demand failure
rate is the number of failures of a component per demand on it
to actuate, energize, start or stop. For example, items such as
solenoid valves usually are characterized by both parameters: a
demand failure rate when the valve is first called upon to open
and a running failure rate as it operates.
These parameters are multiplied by either the duration of
operation (for running failure rate) or the number of demands
(for demand failure rate) to obtain an "unavailability". These
unavailabilities are combined, as defined by the gates in a
fault tree, to obtain the split fraction for the top event at
the node.
In general, the frequencies of basic events like split fractions
are expressed as probability distributions. These distributions
express our state of knowledge about the frequency of each basic
event. They are developed by applying whatever analysis,
calculations, experience, relevant testing, and engineering
judgment is available.
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5.9.2 Bares' Theorem
Bayes' Theorem is a fundamental law of logical inference. It
provides a mechanism for updating probability distributions
which express our current state of knowledge in order to
incorporate additional knowledge. Thus, if actual flight data
or hot fire test data are available in addition to a previously
developed frequency distribution for a basic event or a top
event, they can be combined by a "statistical inference"
process using Bayes' Theorem (References I00 and 106). The
Bayesian approach is capable of taking into account both
engineering judgment about the event frequency and empirical data
such as the actual number of failures that were observed
during operation of the APU.
5.9.3 Expert Opinion
Section 5.5 introduced the notion that the format for quantitative
expression of knowledge is a probability distribution. Using this
format, the PRA team's state of knowledge about the frequency of
each event is expressed as a probability curve. The curves are
based on the total body of evidence, data, experience, analysis,
and information that is available. Included in this total body
of evidence are the engineering judgments of systems experts.
This differs from "formal" or statistical evidence, which is
generally given in terms of so many failures out of so many
tries or hours. Both formal and informal evidence are ultimately
combined, through Bayes' theorem, to arrive at the final state of
knowledge probability curves.
The question arises as to how the experts' judgments are elicited
and quantified. In cases where we have lots of statistical evi-
dence, expert knowledge is not an important issue. However, it is
often the case that informal evidence is a necessary supplement
to sparse data. In some cases, it may be all that is available.
In the latter case, the elicitation and quantification process
must be done with some care and structuring. The following five
part process has proven effective and was used-for this PRA.
a. Motivating the experts - explain the importance of the
assessment, its confidentiality, and the fact that
information (not commitments or predictions) is the goal.
bo Structuring the discussion - define the question to be
answered about the parameter of interest, verify that the
question can be answered, define the units or scale for
5-19
answering the question, and explicitly define the inherent
assumptions in the question.
Co Preconditioning the experts - informal discussion of the
parameter of interest to detect biases and induce the
expert to reveal his true judgments.
d. Encoding - ask questions to encode the experts' judgment.
e. Verifying - construct the probability distribution and
verify that the experts believe it is valid.
In this project, a research step occurred before the expert
opinion group was convened. Written ques=ions were formulated
during the evolving scenario identification and st_ac_uring pro-
cess. Some of these questions had to do with certain phenomena
initiated by an APU failure that could potentially contribute to
cascading of damage in the aft compartment. Examples of these
questions are:
a. Under what conditions can hydrazine leakage cause fire
in the aft compartment?
b. What is the potential damage done by a fire?
Co What are the conditions leading to turbine rotor failure?
What is the energy of the fragments? What is the spray
pattern? What is the potential for containment?
de What damage can be caused by uncontained shrapnel and
the accompanying release of hydrazine?
The systems experts performed the necessary research and analysis
to answer these questions. The answers were documented to serve
as a basis for the development of conditional probability
distributions.
In preparation for the meeting to elicit exper_ opinion, a
detailed set of specific scenarios and.required probabilities
were defined. Where possible these were reviewed by the systems
experts before the meeting. The moderator began the meeting by
introducing the purpose of the discussion, methodology of PRA,
and the role of the systems experts.
The moderator then began the discussion of the first scenario.
He made sure that everyone in the room understood this scenario
exactly and the physical phenomena it is designed to represent.
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He made sure similarly that each parameter in this scenario
(mainly the split fractions) was thoroughly understood. Then,
focusing on one parameter at a time, he asked the experts to
discuss the evidence and attempt to quantify this evidence in
terms of probabilities of the occurrence of the scenario. For
example, the moderator described a scenario in which both control
valves failed in the open position causing a turbine runaway and
turbine disc fragmentation. He then asked the team what would
happen and what was the likelihood of the fragments being
contained.
The object was to obtain a team consensus. Thus, individual
members initially proposed different distributions, reflecting
different interpretations and weighings of the evidence.
However, with enough discussion, a single distribution was agreed
on that represented the team's state of knowledge as a whole.
It is the moderator's job, of course, to manage this process so
that all available knowledge is incorporated into the distribution.
The results of the meeting, the definitions of the scenarios and the
parameters, the specific evidence relevant to each, and the group's
probability distributions were documented. This provided a basis
for reflection, reassessment, and the collection of new evidence.
The outcome of this process was a set of probability distributions
that represented the group's knowledge of the likelihood of the
spatial interaction split fractions in the event trees.
5.10 QUANTIFYING SCENARIOS
The frequency of each path (scenario) in an event tree is obtained
by multiplying the frequency of the initiating event (in occur-
rences per mission) by the "split fractions" at every node along
the path.
In Figure 5-9, _(I) is the frequency of initiating failure I. Out
of all scenarios, starting at I, f(AII) is the fraction in which
event A happens, given the initiating failure, I. The quantity,
l-f(AII) ks then the fraction in which A does not happen.
Our convention is that B means "not" B. Out of all scenarios in
which I and A happen, f(BIIA) is the fraction in which event B
does not happen, and so on. Proceeding in this way, if the path
S is I A B C D, as shown in the figure, then the frequency,¢(S),
of this path is given by the equation in the lower left corner of
Figure 5-9.
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The process of quantifying scenario frequencies then is just the
numerical evaluation of equations of this type.
In a multistage model the scenarios may be grouped according to
their damage states. The _(s)'s are then added to yield the
frequency of each damage state. For example, the _(s)'s of
scenarios that lead to LOC/V are summed to give uhe total
frequency of LOC/V.
A more accurate estimation of total LOC/V frequency is obtained
for Stage B in a multistage model if the PLS damage state is
divided into groups called damage bins. Each damage bin is
characterized by a particular kind of damage to one or more APUs.
For example, this study used three such bins. One characterized
by an APU lost, one characterized by one or more APU's leaking,
and one characterized by one APU lost and one leaking. Of course,
a bin in which everything is OK is also defined.
The frequency of each bin is the sum of the frequencies of its
constituent scenarios. Each bin serves as an initial condition
to the next stage of the model.
The frequency of LOC/V of Stage B for this study is then a combi-
nation of the contributions of the four bins (three damage bins
and the OK bin) that were the output of Stave A. If we define CB
as the frequency of LOC/V for Stage B and _n(Bin i) as the
frequency of Bin i from Stage A, then
CB (LOC/V)
where
4 L
= Z _A (Bin i) Z _jB
i=l j =i
(LOC/VI Bin i)
cjB (LOC/VIBin i) is the frequency of scenario j from a total of L
scenarios that lead to LOC/V, given Bin i as an initial condition.
The total LOC/V frequency is the summation of CA (LOC/V) and CB
(mOClV).
5.11 RISK DIAGNOSIS
Having assembled the risk profile per Sections 5.1 through 5.10,
it remains to interpret the risk curves and determine the
contributions to risk. Figure 5-10 illustrates this process. A
similar figure would apply to each damage state.
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The LOC/V risk profile itself, (Figure 5-10a) provides a great
deal of information. We know that the risk is not as great as the
space to the right of the curve and not as low as the space to the
left of the curve. We expec_ it to be about where the "hump" of
the curve is. We have, therefore, bounded the possibilities and
told the decision maker how certain we are of the risk.
Furthermore we can identify the risk profiles of the individual
scenarios that are the most important contributors to the total
risk profile (Figure 5-10b). Scenarios that are not the most
important contributors to the total risk profile should receive
less priority and less attention. That is, scenarios that have
frequencies toward the left tail of the risk profile should not
receive immediate attention. Identification of scenarios as
important or unimportant contributors to a damage state is
possible because an event tree unambiguously associates each
scenario with a damage state.
The use of event trees also allows easy identification of the top
events that contribute to each high-risk scenario (Figure 5-i0c).
To find which components of the APU or HPU that are most important
to each top event, the split fraction model is investigated (Figure
5-10d). This is facilitated by a cause table (Figure 5-10e) which
delineates in ranked order from most frequency to least frequency,
the individual components and contributions of components that
contribute to the top event. The fractional contribution of each
combination of components or individual component to the top event
in a particular sequence is derived from this table. More depth
of information about why a component has a particular failure rate
is found in the data analysis (Figure 5-10f).
Components of high ranking that contribute to important scenarios
should receive the most attention for possible corrective actions.
Components that are ranked low in any important scenarios or do not
appear in any important scenarios (no matter how high the ranking)
should receive lower priority.
In this way the PRA results help establish the allocation of
resources for effective risk management.
5.12 SUMMARY OF PRA METHODOLOGY
The previous ten sections discussed the PRA methodology employed
in the APU/HPU risk assessment. This section summarizes this
methodology in terms of a procedure shown in Figure 5-11. The 14
steps of the procedure are listed as shown.
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Step 1: Study System
A detailed study of the system forms the basis of the rest of the
PRA. This study includes such aspects as system failure modes,
modes of operation, interaction with the ground controllers, inter-
action with and dependencies on other syszems, failure history,
maintenance, testing, design changes, refurbishment, environmental
conditions when operating and when not, and surveillance and
inspection activities.
Step 2: Define Scope
As with any other analysis or evaluation, the scope cf effort
(what is to be included and what is to be excluded) and the
guiding groundrules and assumptions are identified. Minor
changes to these are acceptable as the project progresses when
more is learned about the system that is under assessment.
Step 3: Damage State ud Mission Stage Identification
A key element in defining the work to be done for the rest of the
PRA is identifying the damage states of interest and defining the
mission stages to be analyzed. This is not considered part of
Step 2 because considerable technical work must be done in order
to establish an appropriate definition of mission stages.
Steps 4,
5, & 6 Scenario Structuring
The development of initiating failure categories, event sequence
diagrams and event trees that identify scenarios leading to damage
states was described in Sections 5.7 and 5.8.
Steps
7&8 Split Fraction Modeling
The use of fault trees to model the top events and the develop-
ment of scenario-dependent split fraction models were discussed
in Section 5.9.
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Steps 9
and 10 Data Development
This study developed data for three t_es of events. The first
type (Step 9) was for random equipment failure for each APU (or
HPU). The second type (Step 9) was for common cause failure of
two APUs (or HPUs) together. The third type of data (Step I0)
was for cascading effects associated with a failure that by virtue
of its proximity to other components could cause other components
to fail. Such events are called spatial interaction events in this
study. They result from phenonema such as fires, hydrazine decom-
position, hydrazine chemical attack, other chemical reactions, hot
exhaust gas, and shrapnel from turbine rotor failure. Section 5.10
described the methodology of data development and of determination
of the values of the split fractions.
Risk Quantification
Combining data with the model, developing the split fractions
from fault trees and quantifying the multistage event tree model
was described in Sections 5.8, 5.9, and 5.10. The result of Step
13 is the risk profile for each damage state.
Step 14 Risk Diagnosis
The procedure and usefulness of disassembling the results to find
the constituent contributors to the risk profile was described in
Section 5.11.
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6.0 AUXILIARY POWER UNIT (APU) SCENARIO PRESENTATION
J
For purposes of this analysis, APU operations were divided into
five mission phases (prelaunch, ascent, orbit, entry, and post
landing), as shown in Figure 6.0-1.
The model was developed using five mission phases; however, it
was concluded that quantification could be accomplished using
only two, as shown in Figure 6.0-1, in order to reduce model
complexity. Stage A extends from APU prelaunch start-up to APU
post-ascent shutdown. Stage B extends from the end of Stage A to
APU post landing shutdown. The periods prior to APU startup pre-
launch, and after APU shutdown post landing were omitted from the
analysis due to APU non-operation.
In the subsections below, the methodology described in Section
5.0 is traced step-by-step through an analysis of the APU Sub-
system. The results of this analysis provide the framework or
model, which can then be evaluated using the failure frequency
data described in Section 7.0.
Section 6.1 details the ultimate damage states selected for the
analysis. Section 6.2 details the Master Logic Diagrams (MLDs)
developed to show how APU-related initial failure categories
can lead to these damage states.
The event sequence diagrams are presented in Section 6.3. These
are flow diagrams illustrating the scenarios leading to different
damage states as a consequence of various categories of APU fail-
ures. The APU failure categories and different damage states
developed in the event sequence diagrams provide the framework for
development of the event trees, presented in Section 6.4.
The event trees establish the decision points (called nodes) for
which specific probabilities (called split fractions) must be
determined in order to arrive at overall probabilities for the
ultimate damage states. The event trees are similar to decision
diagrams -- each decision point must be answered by a "yes/no"
question. Each path through the event tree results in either a
damage state or a state of no damage, based on the cumulative
effect of all failures in that path.
Determination of each event tree decision point, or split fraction,
depends on a logical combination of events, which is expressed in
the form of a fault tree. Development of these fault trees, or
split fraction models, is presented in Section 6.5.
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Section 6.6 deals with the analysis of a special class of events
called Spatial Interaction Events (SIEs). These are events by
which a failing APU can cause damage to other APUs or to
other vital equipment in the Orbiter aft compartment. The
mechanisms of such occurrence might be shrapnel, fire, chemical
attack, and hot gas impingement.
6.1 DAMAGE STATES
A damage state is the outcome of a scenario. A damage state
is usually an undesired event selected because of a need to
understand its frequency of occurrence.
The ultimate damage states selected for this study were not
peculiar to the APU or the HPU under study, but were of a broad
category which would encompass any of the Space Shuttle's sub-
systems. In addition, the damage states were selected to be
consistent with the NASA Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
as defined in NSTS 22206 (Reference 29). The ultimate damage
states selected were:
ao
b.
Loss of crew and/or vehicle
Loss of mission
Loss of mission implies that the ability to perform all or a
substantial portion of the payload-related activities was lost.
However, _his study did not address any particular payload.
Loss of crew/vehicle is self-explanatory.
These damage states were examined for each of the five mission
phases (defined for the analysis as prelaunch, ascent, orbit,
entry, and post landing) to determine which damage states were
applicable during each of the phases. The results are presented
in Table 6.1-1.
Loss of mission was not judged to be a viable damage state for
the entry and post landing phases.
Once the damage states for the phases were defined, the next step
in the study was to develop a set of Master Logic Diagrams (MLDs)
using the ultimate damage states as the Top Events. This process
is discussed in Subsection 6.2.
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Table 6. I-i
DAMAGE STATE APPLICABILITY
DAMAGE
STATE
Loss of
Crew/
Vehicle
Loss of
Mission
SPACE S_OTTLE MISSION PEASE
PRELAUNCH
(I)
X
X
Launch
Scrub
ASCENT
(2)
X
X
Intact
Abort
First
Day
P_
Entry
ORBIT
(3}
X
X
Enter
ASAP
Next
PLS
Entry
Minimum
Duration
Flight
ENTRY
(4)
X
NIA
POST
LANDING
(s)
X
N/A
6.2 MASTER LOGIC DIAGRAM DEVELOPMENT
6.2.1 General DeveloPment p;ocess
With a set of ultimate damage states established for each mission
phase, the next step was to determine if and how failures initiated
in the APU system could contribute to these damage states. The
MLD served to guide and document this thought process. Appendix
B6.2 contains the MLDs developed for this study.
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The ultimate damage states established for each mission phase
represent the "top events" of the MLD for that phase. The approach
taken was to develop the second level of each diagram in the form
of broad general categories, rather than immediately focusing on
the APUs. This "top down" approach keeps the analyst open to the
possibility of unanticipated failure effects involving the APUs.
It also allows the diagrams to serve as a general framework for
analysis of other Space Shuttle systems. Just below the top event
is the "second level" which comprises six general Shuttle functions
whose failure would cause the top event. Some of these Shuttle
functions were not developed further, as there appeared to be no
relationship between the APU and those events.
The third level of the MLD identifies more specific Shuttle
functions that depend, in part, on APUs. Succeeding levels extend
this breakdown into ever more specific Shuttle functions, until
specific APU system failures begin to appear in the diagram at
leveis 6 and below. In some of the simpler diagrams, APU failures
appear earlier.
Many MLDs were developed that dealt with physical processes about
which there is some uncertainty. These physical processes are
related, in some way, to the top events. All such points of
uncertain dependency were noted, and documented in the form of
technical issues to be resolved. Completion of the final
analysis depended on resolution of these issues by the best means
available. This involved in-house analysis, a data search for
technical references, and reliance on expert opinion.
MLDs can be developed to any level of detail desired, down to the
smallest, and seemingly most insignificant part, to show possible
failure paths that lead to the top event. The purpose of the
MLDs, however, was not to delineate all failure modes that could
cause the top events. Their purpose was to identify broad
categories of initial failures, as discussed in Section 5, from
which to begin the the more detailed identification of scenarios
and the delineation of failure modes (in the fault trees)
associated with the scenarios.
The completed MLDs served as a reference for the next step in
the analysis, the development of Event Sequence Diagrams, as
well as serving as a continuing reference source through the
ensuing analysis process. Their importance in the PRA process
should not be underestimated.
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6.2.2 _LD Descriptions
As a general rule, an MLD was developed fcr each damage state
defined for each mission phase. The intact abort damage state
for ascent (Phase 2) was further subdivided into specific abort
modes, and an MLD was developed for each. This served to
clarify the contribution of APU failures to ascent abort modes.
The MLDs, as developed, are provided in Appendix B6.2. They are
outlined in Table 6.2-1 and discussed individually below.
Table 6.2-I
MLD DEFINITIONS
MLD
1
2
5
6
7
8
DAMAGE STATE
Loss of Crew/
Vehicle
Loss of Mission
Loss of Mission
Loss of Mission
Loss of Mission
Loss of Crew/
Vehicle
Loss of Mission
Loss of Crew/
Vehicle
Phases
1 and 2
Phase 2
Phase 2
Phase 2
Phase 1
Phase 3
Phase 3
Phases
4 and 5
DESCRIPTION
Prelaunch and Ascent
Return To Launch Site (RTLS)
(Ascent)
Transatlantic Abort Landing
(TAL) (Ascent)
Abort Once Around (AOA)
(Ascent)
Launch Scrub (Prelaunch)
Orbit
Orbit
Entry and Post Landing
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1 - Loss cf Crew_ehicle - Phases _ and 2
MLD #1 (Appendix B6.2-1) depicts how APU failures can lead to
loss of crew and vehicle during the prelaunch and ascent phases.
The overall functional effects of APU failures contributing to
loss of crew and vehicle were determined to fit into three broad
categories: (1) loss of thrust_ (2) loss cf control_ and (3)
loss of vehicle structural integrity, of _hese three, only loss
of vehicle structural integrity applies tc the prelaunch time-
frame. All three categories apply to the ascent phase.
For the prelaunch phase, loss of crew/vehicle scenarios involve
high high energy detonations of equipment in or near the aft
compartment, such as the Orbital Maneuvering System (OMS) propel-
lant tanks. One source of such a detonation could be shrapnel
from an APU turbine coming apart, or a fire from an APU fuel leak.
There may be other possible sources of OMS tank detonation, but
this study was only concerned with those possibilities emanating
from the APU. During ascent, the high-ener_j detonation failure
modes still apply, and other failure effects leading to loss of
crew and vehicle become possible. Included were: (1) Loss of
multiple hydraulic systems due to multiple APU failures. This is
shown in the MLD as loss of three hydraulic systems. As a conser-
vative groundrule, this was later changed to require loss of only
two, should the failure occur prior to Main Engine Cut Off (MECO);
(2) Loss of critical electronics due to APU exhaust leaks or due
to a fire resulting from APU fuel leaks. Fire was later deter-
mined not to be credible during the prelaunch and ascent phases
due to the prelaunch aft compartment nitrogen purge; (3) Two
engines unable to throttle up after the "thrust bucket" due to
APUs failing during _his critical period. Ascent performance
margins are also a factor here.
KLD 2 - Loss of Mission, RTLB - Phase 2
MLD #2 (Appendix B6.2-2) shows how failures of one or more APUs
can lead to an RTLS abort. Two scenarios are established. The
first involves loss of thrust during the initial part of ascent,
within which an RTLS can be accomplished (i.e., before "Negative
Return"). The operational effect of one APU shutting down during
ascent is the inability to change the thrust level (i.e., throttle
setting) of a main engine. Should one APU shut down during the
"thrust bucket" main engine throttling, (generally 65% of full
throttle), the reduction of total thrust available to the launch
vehicle can lead to an RTLS abort. As was shown in MLD #I, this
is also dependent upon vehicle ascent performance margins for the
6-7
particular mission involved. The second scenario involves the
impending (predicted) loss of critical systems. In this case, the
Mission Control Center (MCC) invokes an RTLS abort in an effort to
return the vehicle to the launch area because of the impending loss
of two or three hydraulic systems due to impending failures of two
or three APUs. Examples of impending failures of APUs are large
fuel leaks or fuel tank pressurant gas leaks.
MLD 3 - Loss of Mission, TAL - Phase 2
This MLD (Appendix B6.2-3) is similar to the RTLS MLD (MLD 2)
discussed above, except that the MCC abort mode invoked is a
Transatlantic Abort Landing. In _e case cf the "stuck throttle"
scenario, this means that for one engine's thrust set to the
"thrust bucket" thrust level as a result of an APU failure,
vehicle performance margins for this particular mission allow a
TAL to be achieved rather than an RTLS.
In the case of the impending APU failure scenario, more time is
available before the two or three hydraulic systems are lost than
was the case in MLD #2; i.e., the leaks are slower, allowing a
TAL to be achieved rather than an RTLS abort.
The TAL abort mode is considered safer and, therefore, more
desirable than the RTLS abort mode. However, because of the
flight path, the time before landing is longer. The flight rules
call for invoking the most desirable abort mode that the predicted
time to failure will allow.
MLD 4 - Loss of Mission, _0_ - Phase 2
The only viable scenario in this MLD (Appendix B6.2--4) is an Abort
Once Around invoked by the MCC to return the vehicle before two or
three hydraulic systems are lost. This is similar to the TAL and
RTLS scenarios discussed above. However, in this case, the impen-
ding loss of the hydraulic systems allows time for a 90 minute AOA
in preference to a less desirable TAL.
MLD $ - Loss of Mission, Launch Scrub - Phase I
This MLD (Appendix B6.2-5) displays ways that APU failures or
anomalies can result in a launch scrub by violating the Space
Shuttle Launch Commit Criteria (LCC). Any of the APUs can shut
down, resulting in violation of the hydraulic pressure criteria
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and an automatic launch scrub. An APU may also suffer a
performance degradation, which violates one of the APU performance
redlines and results in a manual launch scrub. Another possibility
is excessive use of APU fuel due to lengthy launch holds. These
launch holds could be caused by problems with APUs, or by problems
with any other launch vehicle or ground launch system.
MLD 6 - Loss of Crew/Vehicle - Phase 3
Failures on orbit can lead directly to loss of crew and vehicle, or
eliminate a function that is necessary for safe ent_l and landing.
Most APU-caused failures fall into the latuer category. MLD 6
(Appendix B6.2-6) shows direct loss of vehicle resulting from loss
of control, or from high-energy detonations during orbit. Also
shown are failures that jeopardize safe entry and landing.
Included in this category is the loss of thrust necessary for the
deorbit burn (branch J is shown on MLD #8) due to failures of the
OMS and the Reaction Control System (RCS) backward-firing (+X)
jets. The diagram postulates damage to these systems due to APU
hot exhaust leaks or APU high energy release. The high energy
release category includes energetic shrapnel from the APU turbine
or gearbox. These apply during the Flight Control System (FCS)
checkout run only. It was later determined that the gearbox is
not a credible source of such high-energy shrapnel.
Other failures that affect entry and landing fall under the cate-
gory of loss of control. This includes loss of OMS/RCS control
and loss of aerosurface control. APU failures that can lead to
these conditions include hot exhaust leaks that can damage
electronics, fluid tanks or fluid lines, and APU fuel leaks which
can lead to fires during entry. A fuel fire is not credible on
orbit due to the lack of ambient oxygen.
The "loss of vehicle structural integrity" category postulates an
explosion of an OMS or RCS fuel or oxidizer tank due to APU hot
gas leaks or shrapnel.
MLD 7 - Losm of Mission - Phase 3
The Loss of Mission while on orbit can involve either a critical
situation requiring entry as soon as possible, a loss of
redundancy requiring entry at the next Primary Landing Site (PLS)
opportunity, or a loss of instrumentation requiring a Minimum
Duration Flight (MDF). As can be seen in MLD #7 (Appendix B6.2-
7), various APU failures can contribute to these situations.
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The impending failures that result in the need to enter as soon as
possible include impending loss of all three hydraulic systems due
to fuel tank leaks or fuel pressurant gas leaks. The objective in
this situation is to effect a landing before the malfunctioning
systems are totally lost. The same type of APU failures, if they
affect only one or two hydraulic systems, will result in a decision
to deorbit at the next PLS opportunity. This is to avoid a pro-
longed orbit stay with critical system redundancy lost.
The declaration of. an MDF considered here is the result of instru-
mentation failures that effect insight into the status of the APUs.
It does not involve direct failures of the APUs themselves.
MLD g - Loss of Crew/Wehi=le - Phases • t_d S
This MLD (Appendix B6.2-8) depicts how APU failures can lead to
loss of crew/vehicle during the entry and post landing phases.
The overall functional effects of APU failures leading to loss of
crew/vehicle were determined to fit into three broad categories:
(1) loss of OMS/RCS deorbit thrust; (2) loss of control; i.e.,
OMS/RCS control, aerosurface control, or braking/steering rollout
control; and (3) loss of vehicle structural integrity.
All three categories apply to the entry phase. Loss of thrust no
longer applies after the deorbit OMS burn, and loss of control no
longer applies after Wheel Stop (WS). After WS only high energy
detonations caused by APU-generated shrapnel, fire, or hot exhaust
leaks can lead to loss of vehicle. APU failures after shutdown
were not considered in this study.
The "loss of thrust" category of entry failures is identical to
that discussed for MLD #6. It involves APU-caused high energy
shrapnel or hot gas leaks which damage the OMS and RCS systems.
The "Loss of Control" category is also similar to that discussed
under MLD #6, but with the additional possibility of APU fuel
leaks causing destructive fires in the aft compartment. Other
additions to this category include loss of landing gear deploy
before touchdown, and loss of braking and steering before wheel
stop. This is assumed to result in loss of crew and/or vehicle.
The steering and braking systems depend on the Orbiter's hydraulic
systems, and are thus vulnerable to APU failures. The landing
gear deploy system, however, has a pyrotechnic system as a backup
to the hydraulic system.
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The MLD also postulates damage to the vehicle structure due to
an APU fuel tank rupture, or an OMS/RCS fuel or oxidizer tank
explosion caused by APU shrapnel, hot gas leaks, or fuel fares.
6.3 EVENT SEQUENCE DIAGRAMS
Event Sequence Diagrams (ESDs) illustrate sequences of events
leading from initial failure categories, defined by the master
logic diagrams, to damage states. They tell how an initial fail-
ure (i.e., failure mode) causes a damage state (an effect). When
quantified by the use of event and fault trees, the scenarios and
the events within the scenarios can be ranked with respect to
their importance to a damage state such as loss of crew/vehicle.
6.3.1 Interpretation of the ESDs
The ESDs were developed representing five mission phases in four
stages as follows:
ae
bo
Co
d.
Stage 1 represents the prelaunch and ascent phases, and
includes the time from APU start at TIG-5 minutes to
APU shutdown after the OMS-I burn. The duration of this
stage was taken to be approximately 18 minutes.
Stage 2 represents the orbit phase, and includes the
time from APU shutdown on orbit to APU start, 5 minutes
before the deorbit burn. The duration of this stage
was assumed to be about 5 days.
Stage 3 represents entry, descent, and landing phases,
and includes the time from APU start before the deorbit
burn to wheelstop. The duration of this stage was
taken to be about 50 minutes.
Stage 4 includes the time from wheelstop to crew egress,
during about I0 minutes of which the APU continues to run.
The ESDs we developed solely from the perspective of APU perfor-
mance during the mission. Interfacing systems and scenarios that
couple'performance margins of other systems with the APU were
considered out of scope. For example, coupling the scenarios of
HPU failures with APU failures was not attempted in this study.
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It should be pointed out that the ESDs discussed below model the
APU mission in four stages, rather than the two stages ultimately
employed for the final event tree modeling. The ESD development
process provided APU system insight, which allowed subsequent
model simplification without significant loss of modeling accuracy.
The thought process employed in the development of the ESDs, as
discussed below, is more important than the specific model stage
in which the scenarios reside.
The boxes in an ESD ask questions about the occurrence (or non-
occurrence) of a category of events. For example, the question in
Appendix B6.3-I, "Hydraulic System OK?.", may be viewed as asking a
a large number of questions. Each question would refer to a com-
ponent in the hydraulic system. For example, one might ask if the
pump itself is OK. ESDs illustrate the overall flow of events that
lead from an initial APU failure to shuttle damage states such as
LOC/V and PLS entry. They are not meant to illustrate the detailed
logic that is involved in determining combinations of failure modes
that lead to APU failure. This is achieved in the split fraction
models described in Section 6.5.
6.3.1.1 Interpretation of Initial Failure Categories
The questions relating to the initial failure categories are
found in the boxes across the top of the ESD. The categories are
phrased as'questions such that a successful event (i.e., no
initial failure) receives a "yes" answer to the question and a
horizontal line is then followed to the next event. For example,
the initial failure categories of equipment failure, turbine
overspeed, fuel leakage, and exhaust gas leak are represented
in Appendix B6.3-I as follows:
aQ
b.
c.
d.
e.
No permanent APU failures? (equipment failures)
No recoverable APU failures? (equipment failures)
Turbine speed control OK?. (turbine overspeed)
Fuel boundary remains intact? (fuel leak)
Exhaust gas boundary remains intact? (exhaust gas leak)
The question "hydraulic system OK?" is also asked, even though the
hydraulic system is out of the scope of this PRA, to demonstrate
how an ESD can diagram the interdependencies between subsystems
and include sequences of events that cross subsystem boundaries.
A line pointing downward from an initial failure category that an
initial failure has occurred (i.e., a "no" answer to the question).
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A sequence of boxes and lines that follow the arrows from initial
failure to a damage state is called a scenario. A success of the
APU occurs when, according to the principles of scenario struc-
turing described in Section 5, all the answers to the questions
across the top (see Appendix B6.3-1) are "yes". Since the boxes
across the top represent a complete set of initiating failure
categories, then in the absence of initiaUing failures the APU
must have operated successfully. Any scenario that has a vertical
(down) line must, therefore, be less than completely successful.
The actual "damage" of the scenario depends on the number and type
of subsequent failures and the timing of these failures. The ESD
explicitly shows cascading failures associated with spatial inter-
actions as well as functional dependencies and independent failures.
6.3.1.2 Diagramming Dependencies in an ESD
An example of a functional dependency is shown in the sequence
initiated by a failure of the hydraulic system. The failure mode
is one that causes a hydraulic pump seizure before an underspeed
shutdown can occur. This situationcould potentially be caused
by a sudden large rupture of a hydraulic fluid line. Should a
seizure of the hydraulic pump occur, the kinetic energy of the
system could possibly cause a rupture of the APU turbine rotor.
This is represented by the question "APU turbine intact?" in
Appendix B6.3-I. Thus the APU turbine functionally depends on
avoidance of catastophic hydraulic pump seizure. Of course a
more obvious functional dependency is that hydraulic system pump
operation depends on APU operation.
An example of a scenario that includes cascading damage is shown
if the APU turbine is not intact. A negative answer to the
question "APU turbine intact?" means that the turbine rotor has
come apart and the pieces have not been contained within the
turbine housing. In that situation, the APU has failed and
hydrazine has escaped into the aft compartment. The questions
then concern whether the leak was isolated (say by secondary valve
or isolation valve closure), whether there is sufficient oxygen in
the aft compartment to support combustion, and whether the other
conditions necessary for a fire are present.
If a fire cannot occur, the ESD recognizes that damage in the aft
compartment may be caused by shrapnel from the turbine. Other
causes of damage in the aft compartment may be from detonation of
an APU resulting from the heating effects of the decomposition
reaction of hydrazine with materials that act as a catalyst,
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hydrazine reaction with electrical insulation causing open circuits
or hot shor_s in "flight critical equipment", and even effects of
impingement of hot gas from exhaust duct leakage on flight
critical equipment or APU circuitry. The term "flight critical
equipment" is defined for this study to be any component or groups
of components that are not part of the APU or HPU and whose failure
directly causes a LOC/V in conjunction with failures in the
scenario. If a fire can occur, then it is also recognized as a
phenomenon that could cause the failure of other equipment in the
aft compartment. More detailed discussions of phenomena relating
to cascading damage are provided in Section 6.6.
6.3.1.3 Modeling Spatial Interaction Events in an ESD
Spatial interaction events (SIE) denote potential failures of
equipment by virtue of their spatial proximity to phenomena such
as fires, shrapnel, and hydrazine reactions that tend to cause
cascading damage.
The spatial interaction phenomena considered in this study are as
follows:
ao Hydrazine reaction with materials in the aft compartment
causing deterioration of either wire insulation or other
material in the aft compartment following hydrazine
leakage.
bQ Exothermic hydrazine decomposition reaction in an oxygen
poor environment following hydrazine leakage.
Co Fire in the aft compartment caused by hydrazine combustion
following hydrazine leakage.
dQ Shrapnel caused by turbine rotor failure at either normal
speed or turbine runaway conditions.
eo Detonations caused by compression of hydrazine bubbles, leak-
age into solenoid cavities of the fuel isolation or control
valves, hydrazine overheating from fires, stuck-on heaters,
or hydrazine decomposition reactions, hot restarts without
gas generator cooling, and APU starts with gas generator
catalyst bed temperature or pressure too low.
Of) Leakage of hot gas into the aft compartment caused by
exhaust duct failure.
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The ESD also recognizes that certain failures may cascade and
cause other failures. For examgle, shrapnel generation and
detonations will often cause hydrazine leakage into the aft
compartment which, in turn, could result in either a fire or
decomposition reaction which, in turn, could cause another
detonation, etc. A more detailed discussion of the damage
potential of these events is found in Section 6.6.
Below the SIE in Appendix B6.3-1 is a triangle with a Greek or
English character printed within. This denotes a transfer to
another place in the ESD that has another triangle with the same
character within. The ESD for spatial interaction events is
found on page 2 of Appendix B6.3-I. This diagram asks questions
concerning the number of APUs that have failed and whenher flight
critical equipment has failed as a result of the phenomena
contributing to spatial interactions.
Page 2 of Appendix B6.3-1 first asks if spatial interaction has
failed flight critical equipment. Then it asks if two APUs have
failed as a result of the initial failure and the spatial inter-
action. The model assumes a LOC/V if either occurs. Finally,
the ESD asks if two, one or no APUs have failed as a result of
the initial failure, spatial interaction, and potential
independent failure of another APU.
6.3.1.4 Permanent/Recoverable Failures:
Flight Rules
Interpreting the
Page 2 of Appendix B6.3-1 indicates that t_he damage state LOC/V
would occur if two APUs failed during ascent. Flight rules
require that certain APUmalfunctions would cause the Mission
Control Center (MCC) to declare an APU to be lost for the
remainder of the mission, unless it was needed to provide a
second APU for landing. These malfunctions are called
"recoverable failures" (RF) to distinguish them from equipment
failures that inherently incapacitate the APU in such a way that
it cannot be recovered during the mission. The latter failures
are called "permanent failures" (PF).
A fundamental groundrule for this study was that permanent
failures of two APUs any time during the mission except after
wheelstop would be considered a LOC/V.
6-15
The examples given so far show how an ESD diagrams functional
dependencies, cascading damage, and spatial interactions.
Independent failures ark diagrammed in a similar manner.
Although the combination of two or more failures occurring
independently is probably of lower frequency than dependent
failures, the ESD recognizes their pouential. The PRA assesses
the frequency of the scenarios by the use cf event trees, split
fraction models and failure history data later in the study.
Suppose, for example, that an APU is declared lost by flight
rules because of a spurious shutdown. That same APU could also
be leaking hydrazine. Appendix B6.3-I represents a declared
lost APU by a vertical line under the box with the question:
"no recoverable APU failures?". The "L" transfer then leads to
the next question, which is about whether the hydrazine fuel
boundary remains intact. A leakage in this scenario (one that
follows a spurious shutdown but with no other failures) would
be a second failure of the APU, occurring independently; that
is, not caused by or related to the spurious shutdown.
All scenarios in the APU ESDs ask if hydrazine leakage, or exhaust
gas leakage, or both can occur. This recognizes that virtually
any APU malfunction or failure can also be accompanied by the
initial failure categories of hydrazine and exhaust gas leakage.
The ESDs account for the three APUs in the orbiter and they
diagram scenarios in which failures can occur in more than one
APU during the same mission. The shadow boxes of the initial
failure categories across the top of Appendix B6.3-1 are the
diagrammatic devices used to illustrate this. The diagram is
read left to right for each APU.
In summary, ESDs are capable of illustrating scenarios that
include failures, malfunctions, flight rule considerations,
multiple sub-systems, dependent events, cascading damage, spatial
interactions, human actions, and damage states for each stage of
the mission. The remainder of Section 6.3 describes the events
found in the APU ESDs for Stage I, Stage 2, Stage 3, and Stage 4.
Since, as discussed above, hydraulic system failures were
included for illustrative purposes only, the following discussion
will not include hydraulic system-initiated scenarios.
6.3.2 Staae I: Prelaunch and Ascent (Mission Phases 1 and 2)
The ESD in Appendix B6.3-I covers the mission between 5 minutes
before liftoff when the APU starts prelaunch, and when the APU
shuts down following the OMS-I orbital insertion burn.
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6.3.2.1 Scenarios Initiated by Permanent APU Failures
This initiating failure category includes a number of failures of
APU equipment that are no_ recoverable during the mission. These
would include, for example, failure to start the APU, failures of
pump, valves, turbine, and gearbox to continue running, lube oil
system plugging, fuel line plugging, and underspeed shutdown. It
would also include failure to successfully shut down an APU after
MECO. A complete description of all initiating failures included
in the model of this category is presented in Section 6.5.2. This
category does not include hydrazine leakages to the aft compart-
ment or into valve solenoid cavities. It does not include turbine
runaway events and events that would cause MCC to declare an APU
lost when it is still potentially operable.
Two specific pieces of equipment, the gearbox and the turbine,
have been singled out for additional attention in the diagram
because certain failure modes of these components could
potentially lead to spatial interaction events. The following
describes the scenarios in Appendix B6.3-5 that are beneath the
box with the question: "No permanent failures?".
The next event beneath this category asks if the gearbox is OK.
This event includes all failure modes of the gearbox. A negative
answer to this question could mean that the gearbox has failed
in a way that could cause rapid seizure of the turbine shaft.
Therefore, the question: "APU turbine remains intact?" is asked.
A negative answer means that the gearbox failure may (or may not)
have cause_ an energetic failure of the turbine rotor with
subsequent escape of the pieces from the APU housing. If the
gearbox is OK, then the ESD asks about independent turbine
failure at normal turbine speed. If the APU turbine remains
intact, then the diagram shows that a permanent failure (PF) has
occurred and transfers to questions about leakage.
If the turbine does not remain intact, the same questions related
to cascading failure phenomena and spatial interaction events as
those described in Sections 6.3.1.2 and 6.3.1.3 become relevant
in order to describe the various sequences of events that could
arise from turbine failure. Tracing through the ESD from page 1
of Appendix B6.3-I to page 2 of that figure and B6.3-2, the
diagram recognizes that, indeed, further damage might not occur
to other APUs and flight critical equipment, leaving only the
initial failure of an APU. It is also recognized that subsequent
failures occurring as a consequence of shrapnel or leaking
hydrazine could lead to a LOC/V.
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6.3.2.2 Scenarios Initiated by Recoverable APU Failures
This initiating failure category includes those APU malfunctions
that are included in the flight rules as reasons for MCC to declare
an APU lost, but also leaves the APU poUenuially operable should a
second APU be required for landing. This category excludes
hydrazine leakages; those have been assigned their own initial
failure category. The recoverable failure category includes the
following malfunctions:
ae Underspeed or overspeed shutdowns that can be unambiguously
identified as spurious. That is, they are caused by electri-
cal or instrument malfunction that causes the APU controller
to close the secondary control valve in an otherwise success-
fully operating APU.
be Gas generator bed temperature cannot be maintained above
70"F for an APU start.
Co The lube oil outlet pressure is greater than 150 psia during
APU operation.
de The pressure drop between the gearbox and the lube oil
outlet is less than 20 psi during APU operation.
e. The lube oil outlet temperature is greater than 375"F or the
gearbox bearing temperature is greater than 400"F.
fe Turbine speed cannot be maintained between 95% and 121%
while running.
g. Gearbox pressure is less than 2 psia before APU start.
None of these malfunctions have been singled out as a credible
precursor to spatial interaction events; therefore, the ESD
transfers to questions about leakage.
6.3.2.3 Scenarios Initiated by Turbine Speed Control Failure
Category
This initial failure category includes all failures that cause an
overspeed of the APU turbine. The combinations of control valve,
controller, electric power and other failures contributing to
turbine overspeed are in the split fraction models described in
Section 6.5.2.1.
5-18
FF
r
N
r
I
i
11
F
I"
I.
li
E
[
L.
[
In general, it appears that both the primary and secondary control
valves must fail in the open position to cause an overspeed.
Closure of the isolation valves is not sufficient to prevent an
overspeed because enough hydrazine is present downstream of these
valves to continue powering the turbine. It also appears that a
single failure of the secondary valve stuck in mid position will
not cause an overspeed because most of the fuel is direcned back
to the pump inlet. It was determined than a failure of the primary_
valve seat such that the seat dislodges and keeps the secondar%-
valve from closing is first, highly unlikely, and second, more
likely to block the flow path than to cause an underspeed shutdown
than to cause an overspeed. Therefore, this event was included in
the assessment of fuel line plugging as part of the permanent
failure category,.
Should an overspeed condition occur, then an APU overspeed trip
can prevent caUastrophic turbine runaway. This is quesnioned
in the box "overspeed trip avoids runaway?". If the answer
is positive, then the ESD asks about fuel leakages that are
independent of the overspeed event. If overspeed trip is not
successful, then the turbine speed would be expected to reach
over 136,000 rpm in about 200 milliseconds. At this speed,
the APU turbine is unlikely to remain intact. The expected
event is that the turbine rotor would come apart in a small
number (e.g., three) of pieces and the pieces would not be
contained by the containment ring, nor by the turbine housing
itself. Shrapnel would enter the aft compartment accompanied
by hydrazine which would escape the APU through the holes
created by the pieces of turbine rotor. The shrapnel tends
to spray in a pattern that subtends a 30" arc centered on the
turbine wheel plane of rotation.
Some of the shrapnel could be energetic enough to puncture the
large cryogenic liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen lines that are
within the spray pattern of the turbine shrapnel. If the outer
shell and inner lining of these fuel lines are punctured, the
results expected are overpressurization of the aft compartment
because of the vaporization process or the explosive chemical
reaction of oxygen and hydrogen causing a loss of structural
integrity to the vehicle. Shrapnel could also be sufficiently
energetic to damage flight critical electrical/ electronic
equipment in the aft compartment, other compartment-mounted
equipment, as well as the APU fuel tanks. Shrapnel penetration
of the OMS deck is also possible.
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Hydrazine leakage would not be expected to cause a fire in the
aft compartment during ascent because the compartment is purged
with nitrogen and low atmospheric oxygen conditions are quickly
attained as the shuttle gains altitude. However, hydrazine is
capable of a chemical reaction that tends to strip Kapton
electrical insulation from wires. The potential for LOC/V
dramatically increases if a hydrazine fuel tank is punctured or
the leak in the failed APU cannot be isolated. These potential
scenarios have been summarized on the ESD aU the bottom of
Appendices B6.3-I and B6.3-2, and described in Sections 6.3.1.2
and 6.3.1.3 above. More detailed discussion about individual
phenomena is presented in Section 6.6.
6.3.2.4 Scenarios Initiated by Hydrazine Leakage
This initial failure category includes hydrazine leakage from any
part of the APU into the aft compartment, into the fuel pump seal
drain line, and into the isolation valve or control valve solenoid
cavities. The situation in which hydrazine contaminates and causes
blockage of lube oil is included within the permanent failure cate-
gory. Scenarios resulting from hydrazine leakage follow a negative
answer to the question: "Fuel boundary remains intact?". They are
summarized on page 3 of Appendix B6.3-I and described below.
If the leaking APU has not itself failed; i.e., a negative
response to the question "Leaking APU failed from other cause?",
the ESD asks if any other APU has failed. It does this because
flight rules indicate that different responses are required if
an APU has already failed. If no other APU has failed (the
expected situation), then the question "Leak detected and APU
shutdown before fuel quantity and tank pressure depleted?" is
asked. Negative answers to this question include the following
scenarios:
RB Leak is not detected and APU fuel quantity is depleted or
tank pressure drops below 70 psi before APU is shut down.
This represents a permanent failure of an APU and would
probably release a great deal of hydrazine into the aft
compartment.
bo Leak is detected but the leak is so large that the fuel
quantity is depleted or tank pressure drops below 70 psi
before MECO (flight rules do not allow an APU to be shut
down before MECO for a fuel leak). This represents a
permanent failure of an APU and would probably also release
a great deal of hydrazine into the aft compartment.
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C. Hydrazine leaks into one of the valve solenoid cavities,
decomposes, causes a pressure increase inside the valve
and eventually ruptures the valve. If this occurs in an
isolation valve, the entire contents of the fuel tank could
be dumped into the aft compartment. This would certainly
be a permanent failure of an APU with a substantial chance
of damaging flight critical equipment or a second APU. If
the rupture occurs in one of the control valves, then the APU
would be failed, but the amount of hydrazine released into
the aft compartment would be limited unless an isolation
valve also failed to close. An underspeed shutdown of the
APU would command the isolation valves to close.
Positive answers to the question; "Leak detected and APU shutdown
before fuel quantity and tank pressure quantity and tank pressure
depleted?" include the following scenario: The leak is detected
and the APU is shutdown post-M_CO with sufficient fuel and tank
pressure to complete the mission. In this situation, the ESD
asks if the leak is successfully isolated. This question refers
to two situations. A leak downstream of the isolation valves
will be isolated only if both isolation valves close. A leak
upstream of the isolation valves cannot be isolated. An isolated
leak is treated as a recoverable failure (RF). A leak that cannot
be isolated is a permanent failure. If no other APU has failed,
then flight rules require that the APU be restarted and run to
fuel depletion. If another APU has failed, then this requirement
is waived so that the leaking APU may be available for landing.
If the answer to the question: "Other APU already failed?" is
affirmative, then there are fewer options and fewer scenarios than
discussed above. In this situation, there is one APU failed and
one leaking. Flight rules direct either a landing at the next PLS
opportunity, if the leaking APU can support the required run time,
or an intact abort if the leaking APU can support only a limited
duration of flight. If the answer to the question: "Remaining
fuel quantity sufficient to support landing?" is negative, then a
LOC/V would result.
If the answer to the question: "Leaking APU failed from other
cause?" is affirmative, then only questions concerning the
potential of spatial interactions need to be asked because the
leaking APU has failed.
All leak scenarios shown on page 3 in Appendix B6.3-I lead to
questions about the potential for fire. These questions are asked
to complete the qualitative development of scenarios even though
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their likelihood of occurrence is negligible during ascent owing
to nitrogen purging of the aft compar_menU. After the questions
concerning fire, the ESD asks questions about the spatial inter-
action events that were described in Sections 6.3.1.2 and 6.3.1.3
above.
6.3.2.5 Scenarios Initiated by Exhaust Gas Leakage
This category includes failures in the exhaust gas duct or tur-
bine housing that allow hot gas to flow into the aft compartment.
Damage to APUs and flight critical equipment may be caused in
two ways. First, hot gas impingement on electronic equipment
may cause component failures. Second, a very large leak could
potentially overpressurize the aft compal-_.ment and lead to
sidewall or bulkhead failure or hydrogen detonation. Section
6.6 discusses these phenomena in more detail.
Since exhaust gas leakage itself does not inherently cause failure
of an APU, the ESD models all potential scenarios from this
initial failure category as spatial interaction events on page 2
of Appendix B6.3-I. These have been described in Section 6.3.1.3.
6.3.2.6 Defining the Damage States for Prelaunch and Ascent
Page 4 of Appendix B6.3-I is reached after scenarios for all
three APUs have been checked. This is indicated by the transfer
triangle the letters AD within. The objective of this part of
the ESD is to determine the appropriate damage state that should
be assigned to the previous sequences of events covering the
three APUs. If any failures occur or any redlines are violated
before launch, then the scenario would be associated with a
launch scrub. If an APU fails after launch (a yes answer to
"Has liftoff occurred?"), then questions regarding the time or
altitude become relevant for determining the damage state. If
a failure occurs any time during ascent except in the "thrust
bucket", the appropriate action is for the shuttle to continue
to orbit, deploy any deployable payloads, and enter at the next
primary landing site opportunity. This is termed "PLS" in the
ESD. An APU failure in the thrust bucket has been assumed to
result in an intact abort.
Sequences of events that lead to one APU failed and one impending
APU failure (e.g. leaking hydrazine into the aft compartment),
are assumed to lead to a PLS if the impending failure is not
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projected to occur before wheelstop. If, in the estimation of
MCC, the impending failure will not suppor_ a PLS, then an intact
abor_ ks the assumed damage state. These assumptions are consis-
tent with the stated mission flight rules. The type of abort
called by the MCC depends on the altitude and flight performance
margins at that point in the mission. The possible options are
abo_c to orbit, abort once around, return to launch site, or
transatlantic abort landing. Of course, an impending failure
that will not support either a PLS or an intact abort is actually
a permanent failure and, when coupled with another failure, is
assumed to lead to a LOC/V. A spurious shutdown of an APU before
MECO was assumed to have the same effect as a permanent failure
when determining damage states. If no APU failures occur but
instrumentation supporting APU telemetry has failed, then the
flight rules direct the MCC to declare a minimum duration flight.
The success or failure of such instrumentation was beyondthe
scope of this study's quantitative assessment.
6.3.3 Staae 2: Orbit fMission Phase 3)
The ESD presented in Appendix B6.3-2 describes APU related
scenarios on orbit in terms of three time intervals:
a. After APU shutdown and before FCS checkout page 1 of
Appendix B6.3-2. The APU is not operating but must
perform heating and cooling functions, and maintain
system integrity.
be During FCS checkout (page 2 of Appendix B6.3-2), one APU
is run for about 3 to 10 minutes in order to provide
power to check out the hydraulically-actuated aero-
surfaces in preparation for entry.
Co After FCS checkout (page 4 of Appendix B6.3-2), the APU
is not operating but must perform heating and cooling
functions and maintain system integrity.
6.3.3.1 Scenarios Initiated by Failure of a Fuel Isolation
Valve to De-energize
Should a fuel isolation valve fail to de-energize after APU
shutdown, the crew follows Flight Rule 10-11C. If power is not
removed from the valve solenoid within about 20 minutes, a local
detonation of stagnant hydrazine may occur due to overheating.
The crew restarts the APU and attempts two underspeed shutdowns
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to close the valves. If the valves do not de-energize after the
second attempted underspeed shutdown, the APU is allowed to
continue running until fuel depletion.
The ESD models this situation by first asking: "Hot restart with-
out detonation?". A negative response to this question indicates
that either the hot restart was not attempted soon enough or a hot
restart led to a detonation. The latter can occur if the injector
cooling system failed to adequately cool the gas generator
injector nozzle so that hydrazine detonated upon contact with the
hot injector. In this situation, the ESD recognizes the potential
spatial interaction events caused by t_he hydrazine decompostion
in the aft compartment and shrapnel from thedetonation. These
spatial interaction events are shown on page 6 of Appendix B6.3-2,
and are same as those in Appendix B6.3-I except that the potential
for fire is not shown for orbit.
A successful hot restart withou_ detonation leads to the question:
"Underspeed shutdown closes valves?". A positive answer means
that the APU is OK and the ESD then asks about the next potential
initial failure. A negative answer leads to a series of questions
concerning possible failures of the APU while it is running to
fuel depletion. A running APU does not allow local hydrazine
heatup because of the heat transport afforded by flowing hydrazine.
However, any running APU is always subject to the same initial
failure categories. Therefore, the initial failure mode found on
page 1 of Appendix B6.3-2 that follows "Run APU to fuel depletion"
is similar to that of ascent shown on page 1 of Appendix B6.3-I.
Should the APU shutdown at any time before fuel is depleted, a
detonation is assumed to have occurred and the spatial interaction
questions are asked. A detonation was not assumed for hydrazine
or exhaust gas leakages.
6.3.3.2 Scenarios Initiated by Hydrazine Overheating After
Shutdown
Heat from the hot portions of the APU; (e.g., the injector, gas
generator, or turbine) tends to flow toward the fuel pump and gas
generator valves via thermal conduction because convective heat
transfer does not occur on orbit in the aft compartment and heat
transfer away from the APU by radiation is a slow process. The
stagnant hydrazine in the fuel pump or GGVM may rise to above the
decomposition temperature, resulting in the formation of bubbles.
The fuel pump/GGVM cooling system was designed to maintain tempera-
tures in these parts of the APU below 200"F. Tests show that this
temperature is reached about 30 minutes after APU shutdown in orbit.
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The question: "Hydrazine does not overheat after shutdown?,, is
answered affirmatively if the fuel pump/GGVM cooling system
operates successfully. In that case, the ESD leads to questions
about other initial failure categories. If cooling fails, then
the question: "Overheating does not cause detonation?" is asked.
An affirmative answer means that detonation has not occurred and
the failure is considered recoverable.
There is a possibility of detonation if the APU is started while
hydrazine temperatures are above 200". If the hydrazine is
allowed to cool to below 200"F before start, no detonations are
expected.
An APU with a failed fuel pump/GGVM cooling system is considered
recoverable if needed during entry, descent and landing.
If the answer to the question: "Overheating does not cause
detonation" is negative, then the spatial interaction questions
are asked with consideration to detonation, shrapnel, hydrazine
decomposition, and chemical attack.
6.3.3.3 Scenarios Initiated by Overcooling After Shut_own
Heating of the APU fuel lines, water lines, lube oil lines and gas
generator are provided during orbit to maintain hydrazine, oil,
and water above minimum acceptable levels. Gas Generator heating
is required to assure an acceptable temperature for APU startup.
Failure to maintain water temperature in the fuel pump/GGVM cooling
system above freezing is considered to be a failure mode of the
GGVM and fuel pump cooling system and is included in the failures
discussed in the previous section. Flight rules call for the APU
to be considered lost under the following conditions:
a.
b.
Co
d.
Fuel tank or fuel line temperature less than or equal to 35"F
Fuel pump temperature less than or equal to 35"F
Lube oil temperature less than or equal to O'F
GGVM temperature less than or equal to 35"F
Hydrazine freezes at 35"F. If a portion of the APU has frozen,
and subsequently heats up, local uneven thawing could cause a
line rupture (hydrazine expands when thawing). Lube oil loses
its fluidity at 0"F and an APU start at low temperatures could
cause gear bearings to overheat. However, these failures are
believed to be recoverable if a second APU is absolutely needed
to avoid landing with a single APU. They are not considered to
be causes of spatial interaction events.
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6.3.3.4 Scenarios Initiated by Hydrazine Leakage Before
FCS Checkout
Fire scenarios are not relevant for hydrazine leakage on orbit.
The other hydrazine related phenomena discussed in Sections
6.3.1.2, 6.3.1.3, 6.3.2.4, and 6.6 are relevant to orbit. Unlike
ascent, however, an APU with an isolatable leak could be
restarted and run to fuel depletion if no ouher APUs have failed.
If leakage occurred and was detected before APU shutdown during
ascent, then the ability to isolate the leak is assessed soon
after APU shutdown. If the leak can be isolated, and sufficient
fuel and tank pressure remain to complete a landing, then the
APU is considered recoverable. Otherwise, the APU is considered
permanently failed. In either case, the APU is considered lost
and the flight rules require a landing at the next PLS opportunity.
Spatial Interaction event questions are asked to complete the
scenario.
If the leak is not isolatable, then the question; "APU fuel quan-
tity and tank pressure can support start and landing?" is asked.
A landing at the next PLS opportunity is required by flight rules.
If the fuel is insufficient and this is the first APU to exhibit
a permanent or recoverable failure, the APU will be star_ed, and
run to fuel depletion. If another APU has already been lost, then
the ESD leads to the spatial interaction questions on page 6 of
Appendix B6.3-2. If the fuel is sufficient and another APU has
been declared lost, the APU will not be restarted, but thermal
conditioning in preparation to support entry and landing will
occur. Spatial interaction questions are asked following all
unisolatable leaks.
Unisolatable APU leakage occurring after APU shutdown while in
orbit is described in the ESD, with the same scenarios as
described above for unisolatable leaks occurring before APU shut-
down. After APU shutdown, leaks that occur downstream of the
isolation valves would release only a limited amount of
hydrazine. In fact, the leak may even seal itself until entry.
Scenarios initiated by these isolatable leaks are treated in the
Stage 3 ESD.
An APU with unisolatable leaks, and that cannot support landing is
restarted and run to fuel depletion if no other APU has been
declared lost. This may involve a hot resUart so the question
"hot restart without detonation?" is asked at the bottom of page 1
of Appendix B6.3-2. This question involves failure of the injector
cooling system. Failures of an APU that would cause a spurious
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start of the APU while the injectors are still hot are also
included in this question and in the subsequent questions on pages
5 and 6 of Appendix B6.3-2.
The sequences of events related to failures during APU operation
while running to fuel depletion are presenued on page 5 of
Appendix B6.3-2. They are similar to the Stage 1 sequences with
the following exceptions:
a. Recoverable failures are irrelevant.
b. All sequences lead to questions concerning spatial inter-
actions. The outcome of spatial interaction questions is
either LOC/V or one APU permanently failed.
Co Questions about fires are not asked, but the potential for
hydrazine to remain frozen in the aft compartment and
either combust or decompose to cause further damage during
descent is recognized.
6.3.3.5 Scenarios During FCS Checkout
FCS checkout is performed if no APU has failed or been declared
lost up to that time in the mission. Page 2 of Appendix B6.3-2
shows the scenarios related to FCS checkout. Shadow boxes are
not shown because only one APU is used for FCS checkout.
If the running APU fails, then the ESD questions whether it also
exhibits a leak. An isolated leak would release a limited amount
of hydrazine into the aft compartment. An unisolated leak would
be a much larger threat to flight critical equipment or a second
APU during descent.
If the running APU exhibits a recoverable failure or does not fail
at all, then the ESD asks: "fuel boundary remains intact?". Page 3
of Appendix B6.3-2 shows the leakage scenarios. If the leak is
severe enough that fuel quantity or tank pressure can no longer
support a start and landing, then the APU is considered perma-
nently failed and the ESD refers to possible subsequent failures
associated with spatial interactions. If the leak is small enough
that fuel quantity and tank pressure remain sufficient after APU
shutdown and the leak is isolated, then the failure is recoverable
and spatial interaction questions are asked. If the leak is not
isolated, the APU is restarted and run to fuel depletion.
Questions about hot restart without detonation and subsequent
potential spatial interactions are then asked.
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6.3.3.6 Scenarios Following FCS Checkout
The APU used for FCS checkout must successfully shut down, cool
down, and maintain fluid system temperatures above minimums. The
other APUs must continue to maintain temperatures above minimums
before and during FCS checkout. Scenarios associated with these
functions are shown on page 4 of Appendix B6.3-2, and are essen-
tially identical to those shown on page 1 cf that ESD.
6.3.3.7 Defining Damage States for Orbit
A negative response to the question on page 1 of Appendix B6.3-2,
"no APUs failed or declared lost by mission rules?" indicates
that FCS checkout will not be performed and the portion of the
ESD labeled "deorbit discriminator" is entered. The deorbit
discriminator is also entered from page 4 of Appendix B6.3-2
after scenarios that deal with the post-FCS checkout time interval.
The deorbit discriminator is found on page 7 of Appendix B6.3-2,
and defines the damage states for each scenario in Stage 2. If
one APU is lost either permanently or by flight rules, a landing
at the next PLS opportunity is assumed. If two APUs are perma-
nently failed, a LOC/V is assumed. If all APUs are OK, but the
MCC loses the ability to monitor APU status more than 72 hours
prior to deorbit, then a minimum duration flight is declared. If
loss of ability to monitor APU status occurs within 72 hours of
orbit, the mission proceeds normally. Otherwise, all three APUs
are considered OK to support entry.
6.3.4 Staae 3:
Phase 4}
Entry. Descent. Landing to WheelstoD (Mission
Appendix B6.3-3 describes scenarios associated with the time
interval from APU start at deorbit TIG-5 minutes to wheelstop.
The scenarios are presented in terms of failures to start the
APUs after orbit (page 1 of Appendix B6.3-3) and failures during
APU operation (pages 2 through 5 of Appendix B6.3-3).
6.3.4.1 Scenarios Involving Readiness of APUs to Start
These scenarios arise largely from flight rules 10-23, 10-24,
and 10-28, and from the Entry Checklist (JSC-18540). Normally,
one APU will be started at deorbit TIG-5 and the remaining two
at 13 minutes before Entry Interface (EI-13). Flight rules,
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however, provide for different start times for various APU
failures. These are summarized as notes i, 2, and 3 on page
1 of Appendix B6.3-3. The following discussion applies to
page 1 of Appendix B6.3-3. An affirmative answer to the
question; "2 or 3 APUs ready for start?" means that the flight
rule-enforced delays apply to no more than one APU. The ESD
then asks if the first attempted start of an APU at TIG-5 is
successful. If it is, then the ESD asks if at least one other
is ready to start at EI-13. The start failures at EI-13 are
modeled as part of the questions on pages 2 and 3 of the ESD.
A negative answer to the question "2 or 3 APUs ready for start?"
implies that either all APUs are delayed due to flight rules
or two APUs are delayed. A delay of all APUs is indicated by
a negative answer to the question_ "i APU ready for start?".
In this situation, the ESD asks if APUs are ready to start at
EI-13. It is assumed that at least two APUs would be started
before TAEM to support landing. A positive answer to the
question "i APU ready for start?" is followed by a question
about whether the APU is successfully started using all avail-
able start techniques.
An affirmative answer to the question; "2 or 3 APUs ready for
start?" is followed by the question of whether the first APU to
attempt start does so successfully. If the APU starts, then the
other two start attempts are made at EI-13. If the first APU to
attempt starting fails, then the ESD asks if the second APU to
attempt start does so successfully. If this one also fails to
start, then alternate start techniques are employed in an attempt
to provide at least one operable APU before the deorbit burn. If
both APUs still do not start, the ESD points out that flight rules
recommend a one orbit delay to decide on a work-around. Flight
rules do not provide guidance on the course of action to be taken
if a one orbit delay fails to provide a work-around. Therefore,
the ESD conservatively assumes that a LOC/V would result if a
work-around cannot be found for at least one APU. If one APU is
successfully started and one has failed, the ESD recognizes that
the running APU would operate with a depressurized hydraulic
system until EI-13.
This diagram and the accompanying notes 1,2, and 3 model the number
of APUs that have successfully started at TIG-5 and the number to
be started at EI-13 or Terminal Area Energy Management (TAEM). The
start and run failure-initiated scenarios are presented on pages 2
through 5 of Appendix B6.3-3 and described below.
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6.3.4.2 Stal_c and Run Failure Scenarios
The initial failure categories for Stage 3 are identical to those
of Stage 1. With the exception of the hydrazine ieakage initial
failure category, the subsequent scenarios are also essentially
identical. These have been described in Sections 6.3.2.1,
6.3.2.2, 6.3.2.3, and 6.3.2.5. The scenarios during this stage
are influenced, however, by flight rules that do not apply to
ascent or orbit. For example, if one APU has failed before or
fails during descent, the remaining two APUs will operate at high
speed star_ing at TAEM and automatic shutdown will be inhibited
during the remainder of descent and landing. Furthermore, hot
restarts will be attempted during descent to assure two APUs
operating before TAEM. This consideration is shown on page 2 of
Appendix B6.3-3. Should the answer to the question "2 or more APUs
operate OK?" be negative, then the questions: "start recoverable
APU before TAEM ?" and "recovered APU runs OK?" are asked. A
negative response to either question would result in a LOC/V
according to the groundrules of this study.
Hydrazine leakage scenarios are described below and are presented
on page 3 of Appendix B6.3-3.
6.3.4.3 Hydrazine Leakage Scenarios in Stage 3
This initial failure category includes hydrazine leakage from any
part of the APU into the aft compartment, the fuel pump seal drain
line, and the isolation valve or control valve solenoid cavities.
The situation in which hydrazine contaminates and causes blockage
of lube oil flow is included within the permanent failure category.
The scenarios also include the situation in which a leak may have
developed on orbit but is not detected until entry. Such
situations are modeled as a leak that is detected before blackout.
Scenarios resulting from hydrazine leakage follow a negative
answer to the question; "fuel boundary remains intact?".
Many leakage locations allow hydrazine to be released into the aft
compartment during entry. The potential for fire as the shuttle
descends becomes quite an important consideration for determining
the consequences of hydrazine leakage. Furthermore, certain
materials in the aft compartment such as Kapton electrical wire
insulation are vulnerable to chemical attack by hydrazine.
If the leaking APU has not itself failed; i.e., a negative
response to the question "leaking APU failed from other cause?",
the ESD asks if the leak was detected before blackout. If so, and
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there are no previous APU failures, then the flight rules indicate
that the APU would be shut down. If the leak is isolated and the
remaining fuel quantity and tank pressure are sufficient to
support landing, then the APU is potentially recoverable at TAEM.
Recovery would be attempted, however, only if a second APU is
needed for landing.
A negative response to the question "fuel quantity and tank
pressure sufficient to supporl: landing?", includes the following
situations:
a.
be
A severe leak such that insufficient fuel remains to support
landing.
Hydrazine leaks into one of the solenoid cavities, decom-
poses, causes a pressure increase inside the valve, and
eventually ruptures the valve. If this occurs in an isola-
tion valve, the entire contents of the fuel tank could be
dumped into the compartment. This would certainly be a
permanent failure of an APU, with a substantial chance of
damaging flight critical equipment or a second APU. If the
rupture occurs in one of the control valves, then the APU
would be failed, but the amount of hydrazine released would
be limited unless an isolation valve also failed to close.
An underspeed shutdown of the APU would command the
isolation valves to close.
If a leak-is not isolated by shutting down the APU and the
remaining fuel quantity and tank pressure are judged by MCC to
be insufficient to support landing, then the APU would be hot
restarted and run to fuel depletion. The potential for detonation
exists if the injector cooling fails or a spurious APU start
occurs without sufficient injector cooling. If the APU cannot be
restarted, it is considered to be permanently failed. Running an
APU with an unisolatable leak to fuel depletion limits the amount
of hydrazine available to cause damage in the aft compartment.
Therefore, the inability to do this results in a higher potential
for loss of a second APU or flight critical equipment.
An APU with an unisolatable leak that is judged able to support
landing is not required to be restarted. Since it appears that
relatively small leaks can allow enough hydrazine accumulation
in the aft compartment to cause a damaging fire, this course of
action increases the chance of loss of flight critical equipment
or additional APUs. Flight rules indicate that any time an
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unisolatable leak causes the tank pressure to reach the minimum
start pressure (I00 psia), the APU is to be star_ed so that it
is available to support landing.
The ESD shows different scenarios for the situation in which a
leak is detected before blackout but an APU has previously failed
or been declared lost. The leaking APU would not be shut down.
The rationale given in the flight rules is to avoid risking a
star_ failure and, thereby, having to land with a single APU. Even
though the chance of fire might be greater than if the APU is shut
down, the flight rules indicate that this is preferable to the
chance of failing to start the leaking APU and attempting a
landing with only one operating APU. The results of this study
(see Section 8) suggest that the conditional probability of a fire
that damages a second APU or flight critical equipment, given a
leak, is far greater _han the probability of failing to s_art an
APU. Therefore, this flight rule may, in fact, increase the risk
of LOC/V in the situation of one APU lost and one leaking.
Leaks that occur at lower altitudes and after blackout are treated
differently by flight rules than those that occur before blackout.
Leaks from the seal cavity with no previous APU failures require
that the leaking APU be shut down. If an APU has previously
failed, then the leaking APU would not be shut down. Leaks into
the aft compartment do not require the APU to be shut down. If
the answer to the question "leaking APU failed from other cause?"
is affirmative, then only questions concerning the potential of
fire and other spatial interactions need to be asked.
All leak scenarios shown on page 3 of Appendix B6.3-3 lead to
questions about the potential for fire in the aft compartment.
After the questions concerning fire, the ESD asks questions about
the spatial interactive events. These are shown on page 4 of
Appendix B6.3-3 and are identical to the questions asked on page 2
of Appendix B6.3-I and described in Sections 6.3.1.2 and 6.3.1.3.
6.3.4.4 Defining Damage States for Stage 3
The damage states relevant for Stage 3 are LOC/V and OK. A
scenario's damage state depends on the number of APUs failed and
the timing of those failures. Page 5 of Appendix B6.3-3 diagrams
the logic used to define the damage states.
Two APUs lost before touchdown is considered by the model to
result in a LOC/V. If only APU number 1 is lost, then nosewheel
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steering is lost, but the crew can successfully steer by
differential braking. If no more than one APU is losU, the model
results in a successful mission.
If APU number 3 and APU number 1 are lost or if APU number 3 and
APU number 2 are lost before wheelstop, the model assumes a
successful mission with one half normal braking power. If all
three APUs are lost before wheelstop but after touchdown, the
model assumes a LOC/V caused by inability to brake and steer.
6.3.5 Staue 4: WheelstoD to Qr@w E_r_@s (_ission Phase 5)
The APU normally runs for a short time (approximately I0 to 20
minutes) after wheelstop. However, if an APU is leaking the APUs
are shutdown as soon as possible after wheeistop. The crew
remains with the vehicle for up to about 40 minutes after APU
shutdown. Appendix B6.3-4 shows the ESD for this stage. Only
those scenarios that can cause a catastrophic event such that the
Orbiter explodes or is consumed by fire are of concern in this
stage. Failures of APUs cannot cause loss of crew or vehicle,
unless the failures lead to such a catastrophic event. This stage,
therefore, is included for illustration only. Quantification of
such scenarios is beyond the scope of this study. The initial
failure categories are shown across the top of Appendix B6.3-4.
They are as follows:
a.
bo
Co
de
Failure of APU turbine to remain intact -- this includes all
failures that could generate shrapnel from the APU turbine.
Leakage of hydrazine during and after APU shutdown -- this
includes all hydrazine leaks that could potentially lead to
catastrophic fire.
Exhaust gas leaks -- this includes all large exhaust gas
leaks that could potentially cause overheating and
detonation of hydrazine within an APU.
Hydrazine overheating after APU shutdown -- this includes
scenarios in which leakage causes a fire which, in turn,
causes a detonation and events, such as failure to deenergize
an isolation valve, that lead to a detonation of hydrazine
without previous hydrazine leakage.
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Following failure of an APU turbine to remain intact, the ESD
questions whether shrapnel is contained, whether a fire occurs and
whether either one could cause catastophic Orbiter damage. A "yes"
to the last question results in a LOC/V. Otherwise, the APUs are
considered to have completed their mission. Examples of scenarios
that would be catastrophic are:
a.
bo
co
Explosion of fuel/oxidizer in the OMS or RCS propellant tanks
after being punctured by shrapnel
Detonation of hydrazine in the APU fuel tanks leading to a
fire that destroys the aft fuselage
Fire caused by leaking hydrazine that overheats the fuel/
oxidizer in the OMS or RCS propellant tanks
Following leakage of hydrazine, the ESD questions the occurrence
of a fire and whether the fire causes catastrophic damage.
Following an exhaust gas leak, the ESD questions if the hot gas
caused a detonation, whether the detonation resulted in a fire,
and whether the fire caused catastrophic damage.
Following overheating and detonation of hydrazine after APU shut-
down, the ESD questions if the detonation and fuel leak resulted
in a fire, and if the fire caused catastrophic damage.
6.3.6
Section 6.3 has discussed the event sequence diagrams used to
develop and illustrate scenarios that begin with initial failures
of the APU and eventually lead to one of five damage states. The
damage states are OK, launch scrub, intact abort, enter at next
PLS opportunity, and LOC/V. A typical Shuttle mission was divided
into four stages for the purpose of modeling with ESDs. The
modeling stages are prelaunch and ascent, orbit, entry through
wheelstop, and wheelstop through crew egress.
Although ESDs are useful for the development and communication of
scenarios, they are not adequate for quantifying the risk of the
APU. Event trees and split fraction models are used for this and
are discussed in the next two sections.
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6.4 APU EVENT TREE DEVELOPMENT
The ESDs presented in the previous section were developed to
clearly describe the sequential flow of events for APU-initiated
scenarios that could lead to LOC/V, launch scrub, intact abort,
land at next primary landing site opportunity, or a successful
mission.
Event trees were developed from the ESDs to facilitate quantifi-
cation because established computer programs were available for
obtaining frequencies of scenarios expressed in the form of
event trees. Because quantification is the goal of an event
tree, the top events need not have a one-to-one correspondence
with the boxes in the event sequence diagrams, and the top
events need not be shown from left to right in their expected
order of occurrence. Instead, the top events can represent an
individual box in an ESD, a group of boxes in an ESD, or a
breakdown of an individual box. The order of the event tree
top events was established to best capture the inter-event
dependencies and facilitate the development of scenario-dependent
split fractions.
The construction of event trees, particularly in a multi-stage
model as described in Section 5, depends on the analysts' skill
and experience, knowledge of the data, and knowledge of the split
fraction models. The objective is to best utilize the available
data to obtain an accurate estimate of the frequency of each
scenario.
6.4.1 Two-Staae EveDt Tree Model
Section 6.3 includes descriptions of the potential scenarios
during the time frame from 5 minutes before launch (i.e., APU
start) to APU shutdown after wheelstop. It was found that two
event tree stages, called Stage A and Stage B, could adequately
serve as a framework for quantification of these scenarios.
Stage A served as a quantitative framework for those scenarios
characteristic of the time from 5 minutes before launch to APU
shutdown after the OMS-I orbit insertion burn. This event tree
includes start failures, failures to continue running after
start, recoverable failures, and failures to successfully close
the fuel tank isolation valves upon APU shutdown.
Stage B served as a quantitative framework for those scenarios
characteristic of orbit, entry, and landing through APU shutdown.
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It includes start failures, failures to continue running after
start, recoverable failures, and attempts tc recover APUs.
Combining the ESDs from orbit, entry/landing, and post wheelstop
does not compromise the accuracy of the estimates of the damag_
state fractions. The ability to identify whether certain failures
occurred in orbit or during entry/landing is lost. However, for
the purposes of this study, this is not considered to be a
significant loss.
The quantification of Stage A results in determination of the
fraction of ascents that end in each damage state. The quanti-
fication of Stage B results in determination of the fracnion of
flights that end in each damage state.
The Stage A Event Tree (Appendix B6.4-1) consists of the initial
event, which is the attempted star_ of the APUs in the Orbiter,
followed by 21 top events, and ends with the damage state of each
sequence. The damage state is shown in Appendix B6.4-1 as an "x"
below one of the following: loss of crew or vehicle (LV), launch
scrub (LS), intact abort (IA), or land at next primary landing
site (PLS). Also shown is a summary of the number of APUs leaking
(the number below NL), the number of spurious shutdowns (the
number below NS), the number of permanent failures (the number
below NF), and whether the scenario must be continued in the next
stage (an X under EL). Taken together, a line of Xs and numbers
at the end of a sequence in the event tree is called a damage
vector. Each sequence is associated with a damage vector. Two
or more sequences may have the same damage vector. A transfer in
the tree (e.g., XFRI) means that the dotted line is to be
replaced by a previously defined group of sequences. For
example, the dotted lines that end with XFRI is to be replaced by
the group of sequences and associated damage vectors to the right
of the "XI" mark beneath top event "BA". A transfer is not used
unless both the sequence of events and the associated damage
vector are appropriate to replace the dotted line. A legend is
provided on the first page of Appendix B6.4-1, Appendix B6.4-2,
and Appendix B6.4-3, that describes the top event designators and
damage state designators for Stage A and Stage B Event Trees.
In the general case of a two-stage model, each damage vector
serves not only as the end state of Stage A but as an initial
condition of Stage B. An initial condition defines the failures
that begin each Stage B quantification. In general, a Stage B
event tree must be quantified for each Stage A damage vector.
The fraction of each Stage A damage vector (which is the same as
the fraction of its associated sequence) serves as the frequency
of the initial event for Stage B. That is, the fraction of
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missions ending in each Stage B sequence is multiplied by the
same factor, namely, the damage state fraction that serves as
the initial condition for the event tree.
In most applications of a two-stage model, and this was no
exception, many damage vectors have nearly the same impact on the
Stage B model. Many of the damage vectors lead to quanuification
of Stage B with essentially the same initial failures. This
suggests that many damage vectors can be grouped together in what
are called "damage bins" and the frequencies of the grouped damage
vectors can be summed to obtain the total damage bin frequency. The
Stage B Event Tree, therefore, need only be quantified for each
damage bin rather than for each damage vector.
The damage bin is characterized by a set of failures that serves
as initial conditions for Stage B and by a fraction of ascents
that lead to the particular bin. Having accepted the notion of
"binning", it was also recognized that certain damage vectors have
low frequency of occurrence and may conservatively be represented
by a damage bin with a much larger frequency of occurrence. In
this case the word "conservative" means that the status of the APUs
as characterized by the damage bin is worse than the low frequency
damage vector that it is grouped with. In this application the
following damage bins have been defined.
a. All damage vectors with an "x" under LV were grouped into a
bin for loss of crew or vehicle.
b. All damage vectors with an "x" under LS were grouped into a
bin for launch scrub.
Co All damage vectors with an "x" under IA were grouped into a
bin for intact abort.
All damage vectors with an "x" under PL were grouped into three
bins representing three groups of APU damage having similar
effects on the ability to land at the next primary landing site
opportunity. These three bins were as follows:
d. Damage vectors with one APU lost
e. Damage vectors with one APU leaking
f. Damage vectors with one APU lost and one APU leaking
All damage vectors with no failures were grouped into an "OK" bin.
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The first three bins above need not serve as initial conditions
for Stage B because loss of crew or vehicle, launch scrub, and
intact abort are the end states of interest. It is also of
•interest, however, to assess the chance that Stage A sequences
which have been declared as PLS or were OK end in loss cf crew or
vehicle. Therefore, the last four damage bins (three for PLS and
one for OK) serve as initial conditions for Stage B. Scenarios
exhibiting spurious shutdowns were grouped with bins 4, 5, or 6
depending on the scenario. A detailed description of the binning
logic is show_ in Table 6.4.1.
Damage bin number 7 served as the initial condition for the Stage
B Event Tree called Stage B7. Damage bin number 4 served as the
initial condition for the Stage B Event Tree called Stage B4.
The Stage B7 Event Tree is shown in Appendix 6.4-2 and _he Stage
B4 Event Tree in Appendix 6.4-3. These illustrate how the
initial conditions affected the number and variety of sequences
during Stage B. Only two damage bins were required to define
_he end states of Stage B. These were loss of crew or vehicle
(LV) and OK.
6.4.2 Staae A Event Tree
The Stage A Event Tree is shown in Appendix 6.4-1. It models
the time period from APU start before launch to APU shutdown
after the OMS-I orbital insertion burn.
6.4.2.1 Relationship of ESD to Stage A Event Tree
Table 6.4.2 presents a summary description of each top event in
the Stage A Event Tree (refer to Appendix B6.4-I for the event
tree itself). Table 6.4.3 relates each top event in the Stage A
Event Tree to one or more ESD questions.
6.4.2.2 Construction of the Stage A Event Tree
The assumptions, groundrules and approximations used to construct
the tree were as follows:
a. APU failure was defined as the inability to power its assoc-
iated hydraulic pump to the extent necessary to maintain
adequate hydraulic pressure at the expected hydraulic demand.
b. Two APU failures lead to loss of crew or vehicle (LV).
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TABLE 6.4.1
DAMAGE BIN I88IG_NTS-ST_GE
Number of APUs That Exhibit:
Permanent 8puzioum
Failure Leakaae Shutdown £ s_. !
0 0 0
0 0 1 X
0 0 2 X
0 1 0
0 1 1 X
0 1 2 X
0 2 0
0 2 1
0 3 0
1 0 0 X
1 0 1 X
1 1 0
1 1 1
1 2 0
X
X o
X
X
X
X
X
_otes;
le Three spurious shutdowns or one permanent failure
and two spurious shutdowns were conservatively
assumed to be LOC/V
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TABLE 6.4.2
TOP EVENT DEFINITIONS -- APU EVENT TREE - STAGE A*
Event Definition
IE
HY
TA
PA
DA
CA
HA
GA
L1
La
L3
FA
Cl
C2
Demand for APU Start
Hydraulic System Failure**
Turbine Overspeed
Equipment Failure of One APU After it Sta._ts
Failure of the Second APU After it Starts
Failure of the Second APU or Failure of Flight
Critical Equipment Owing to Spatial Interactions
Initiated by Failure of the First APU
Failure of One APU Owing to Exhaust Gas Leak
Failure of Flight Critical Equipment or the
Second APU Owing to Exhaust Gas Leak
Leakage of Hydrazine From APU 1
Leakage of Hydrazine From APU 2
Leakage of Hydrazine From APU 3
Failure of Flight Critical Equipment or Two APUs
Owing to Spauial Interactions Initiated by
Hydrazine Leakage
Hydrazine Leakage Causes Failure of APU I Given
That Two APUS Have Not Failed
Hydrazine Leakage Causes Failure of APU 2 Given
That Two APUs Have Not Failed
6-40
FF
I
I.
F
l
P
i
1;
[
l
[
TABLE 6.4.2 (Concluded)
TOP EVENT DEFINITIONS -- _PU EVENT TREE - BTAGE
_vont D4finltlon
C3
S1
$2
$3
BA
EA
MA
IA
Hydrazine Leakage Causes Failure of APU 3 Given
That Two APUs Have Not Failed
Spurious Shutdown of APU 1
Spurious Shutdown of APU 2
Spurious Shutdown of APU 3
Failure of One or Two APUs Upon Start or While
Running Before Launch
Failure Occurs in the Thrust Bucket
Failure Occurs After MECO
Intact Abort Called by MCC
Stage A Event Tree is Shown in Appendix B6.4-I.
This top event is included to show how an event
tree can include scenarios that cross subsystem
boundaries. Quantitative evaluation of the
hydraulic system is out-of-scope.
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TABLE 6.4.3
RELATIONSHIP OF STAGE A EVENT
TREE TOP EVENTS TO APU ESD i - PRELAUNCH AND ASCENT*
Event Questions from Appendix B6.3-I & Table 6.4.2
HY
TA, DA
PA, DA
CA
HA, GA
FA
Cl, C2,
C3
"Hydraulic System OK" and All Boxes Beneath that Question
"Turbine Speed Control OK" and All Boxes Beneath that
Question
"No Permanent APU Failures " and All Boxes Beneath that
Question
This event also includes the question "Fuel Isolation
Valves Close Within I0 Minutes After APU Shutdown" and
All Boxes Beneath it in Appendix B6.3-2
All questions following "SIE". They include: "SIE Does
Not Fail Flight Critical Equipment"
"SIE and Initial Failure Does Not Cause Two APUs to Fail"
"SIE and Initial Failure Does Not Cause the Second APU
to Fail With One Already Failed" the Above Questions
Relate to Spatial Interactions that Follow Failures
Involving Shrapnel.
"Exhaust Gas Boundary Remains Intact" and All Spatial
Interaction Questions Beneath It. The Spatial
Interaction Questions Now Refer Only to the Damage
Potentially Caused by Exhaust Gas Release.
"Fuel Boundaries Remain Intact"
"Sufficient Oxygen for Fire in Aft Compartment"
"Fire in Aft Compartment" and A!I Questions Following
"SIE". The Spatial Interaction Questions Now Refer to
the Damage of Flight Critical E_-uipment or APUs
Potentially Caused by Hydrazine in the Aft Compartment.
"Remaining Fuel Quantity Sufficient to Support Landing"
"Leak Isolated"
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SI, $2,
$3
BA
MA
EA
IA
TABLE 6.4.3 (Concluded)
Questions from Appendix B6.3-I & Table 6.4.2
"Leak Detected and APU Shutdown Before Fuel Quanzity
and Tank Pressure Depleted"
"Sufficient Oxygen For Fire in Aft Compartment"
"Fire in Aft Compartment"
All Questions Following "SIE". These Spatial Interaction
Questions Now Refer to Damage of an Individual APU
Potentially Caused by Hydrazine in the Aft Compartment
"No Recoverable Failures"
Spurious Shutdowns and Isolatable Leaks Were Modeled as
Recoverable Failures
The Question "Has Liftoff Occurred" and Questions Below It
This Top Event Determines the Fraction of Each Scenario
That Occurs Before or After Launch. It is Used to
Decide on Whether the Scenario Ends in Launch Scrub or
LOC/V.
This Top Event Does Not Appear on an ESD. It Was Added
to the Event Tree to Distinguish Failures After MECO
That Would Not Contribute to Intact Aborts.
"Has Thrust Bucket Started?"
"Has Thrust Bucket Ended?"
"Second APU/Hydraulics Loss Impending"
"Will Failing APU/Hydraulics Not Support PLS?"
"Will Failing APU/Hydraulics Not Support Intact Abort?"
I moli _ mm
Stage A Event Tree is Shown in Appendix B6.4-I.
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All failures except leakage and spurious shutdown have been
modeled as permanent or nonrecoverable.
The event tree was quantified from APU start (Liftoff minus
5 minutes) to APU shutdown on orbit. Failure of a fuel tank
isolation valve to close upon attempted shutdown was
conservatively modeled as a permanent failure.
A large hydrazine leak was defined as a leak for which the APU
would deplete all usable fuel before the end of the flight.
Any modeled failure of any APU that occurred before launch
was assumed to lead to launch scrl%b, with one exception.
Shrapnel and hydrazine-generated failures of flight critical
equipment from turbine overspeed were conservatively assumed
to result in loss of crew or vehicle, even if they occurred
on the pad.
With one exception, the APUs were assumed to be identical
and spatially symmetrical to each other so that frequencies
and consequences were independent of which APU had failed.
This allowed APU 3 to be assigned as the failed APU with no
loss of generality or quantitative accuracy when the failures
under TA, PA, or HA occur. The exception was leakage. The
conditional probability of failing APU 3 given a leak in APU
1 or APU 2 or both (top event C3) was lower than the condi-
tional probability of failing APU i or 2, given a leak in
either or both of these APUs. Similarly, the conditional
probability of failing APU 1 or 2 due to a leak in APU 3
(top events C1 and C2) was much lower than the conditional
probability of APU 3 failing itself.
The possibility of two APUs failing independently in the same
flight from turbine overspeed was not modeled because the
frequency of this sequence was much smaller than the frequency
of sequences leading to loss of crew or vehicle that involve
one turbine overspeed with other failures.
The frequency of failure of a running APU before launch is
approximated by a function of the ratio of time it runs
before launch to the total time from five minutes before
lift-off to APU shutdown. All start failures were modeled
as occurring before launch.
The APUs were modeled as if each one had its own auto shut-
down inhibit switch (a post-51L modification).
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Two spurious shutdowns or a permanent failure and a spurious
shutdown were assumed to result in loss of crew or vehicle if
they occUrred before M_CO. However, if one occurred after
the spurious shutdown was treated as a recoverable failure
for entry/landing. Sequences involving three spurious shut-
downs or one permanent failure and two spurious shutdowns
were not explicitly shown in the evenu tree because of the
extremely small chance of occurrence.
An APU exhibiting a malfunction which by Flight Rules
would cause MCC to declare it lost was assumed to
operate until after MECO.
Hot restarts were not modeled in Stage A since they
must occur after APU shutdown post-MECO.
If the same APU exhibits both a spurious shutdown and
a hydrazine leak, the damage vector shows it as a
hydrazine leak. This was a conservative assignment
because of the relatively high conditional probability
of cascading damage, given a leaking APU during
descent. The net affect on the quantitative results
is small because a leaking APU will not be used during
Stage B unless another APU fails.
The frequency of failures occurring after M_CO was
modeled as a function of the ratio of the time from
MECO to APU shutdown to the total Stage A time.
Any APU failure or spurious shutdown that occurred in
the thrust bucket was assumed to lead to an intact abort.
The frequency of a failure occurring in the thrust
bucket was modeled as a function of the ratio of the
time in the thrust bucket to the total Stage A time.
Any APU exhibiting a failure or a spurious shutdown
can also exhibit a hydrazine leak.
6.4.3 Description of StaQe A TOp _vent_
A summary description of each top event and its relationship to
the rest of the Stage A Event Tree is provided in this section.
The detailed model that provides the basis for assessing the
frequency of occurrence of each top event split fraction is
provided in Section 6.5. The data required to quantify these
models is described in Section 7.
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Top Event HY: Hydraulic System Failure
D
This event was included as an illustration cf how an event tree
can include scenarios that cross subsystem boundaries. A failure
of HY implies that its associated APU is useless. The event tree,
therefore, treats HY failure as if an APU has failed.
Top Event TA: Turbine Overspeed
This event occurs if both the primary and secondary fuel contr_l
valves fail in the open position while the APU is operating and
the overspeed trip fails to close the secondary valve. Closure
of the fuel tank isolation valves following an overspeed trip may
not prevent turbine runaway and shrapnel caused by turbine runaway.
The hydrazine quantity downstream of the isolation valves may be
sufficient, given the presence of bubbles or effective suction by
the APU fuel pump to allow the turbine to reach breakup speed.
Mechanical, electrical and controller causes of turbine overspeed
were included. Turbine overspeed implies that the APU has
failed. It was then appropriate to ask if the resulting shrapnel
and hydrazine escape could have caused a second APU or other
flight critical equipment in the aft compartment (i.e., top event
CA) to fail. The tree also asks if another APU could have failed
independently from the turbine overspeed either by equipment
failure (e.g., top event DA) or by leakages. Occurrence of this
event after launch and in the absence of other failures leads to
a PLS entry unless it occurs in the thrust bucket. In that case,
it leads to an intact abort.
Top Event PA: APU Equipment Failure After APU Start
This event occurs if any equipment failure or failures combine to
prevent an APU from providing sufficient power to its hydraulic
pump as defined above. For example, this event includes break-up
of the turbine rotor at normal speed. However, this event
excludes turbine overspeed, leakages, spurious shutdowns, and
start failures. This top event does not include failures caused
by erroneous commands from sources external to the APU (e.g.,
from the crew or MCC). These failures are outside the scope of
this study. The combinatorial failures included in this top event
are described in detail in Section 6.5. Occurrence of this event
after launch and in the absence of other failures leads to a PLS
entry unless it occurs in the thrust bucket. In that case, the
event leads to an intact abort.
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Top Event DAI Fmilure of Second APU after APU Start
This event asks if either PA or TA has occurred. It includes
failure of a second APU given that one APU has failed. The same
combinations of equipment failures that contribute to PA are also
relevant here. Occurrence of this event after launch leads to
loss of crew and vehicle.
Top Event C.AÁ Spatial Interaction Failure of Second APU or
Flight Critical Equipment
This event includes failure of a second APU or flight critical
equipment due to shrapnel or hydrazine induced cascading damage.
It considers the possibility that shrapnel and hydrazine leakage
could be produced by turbine rotor break-up, either in an over-
speed or normal speed condition. The sequence of events involving
both TA and CA, then, would lead to loss of crew and vehicle from
turbine shrapnel or leaking hydrazine. The sequence of events
involving both PA and CA would be caused by one of the failures
included in the PA split fraction model, namely, turbine rotor
break-up. The subsequent events are identical to those for TA and
PA, but with a different frequency.
Top Event HA: Exhaust Gas Leakage Fails One APU
This event includes the possibility that exhaust gas leakage can
fail an APU. Occurrence of this event after launch and in the
absence of other failures leads to a PLS entry unless it occurs
in the thrust bucket. In that case, the event leads to an intact
abort.
Top Event GBz Exhaust Gas Leakage Fails Second APU
This event includes the possibility that exhaust gas leakage
fails a second APU given that one APU is known to have failed
from exhaust gas leakage or from other causes. Occurrence of
this event after launch leads to loss of crew and vehicle.
Top Event LIz Hydraslne Lea_age in XPU I
This event includes leakages of hydrazine into the aft compartment
from anywhere in APU 1.
Top Event L2: Hydraslne Leakage in APU 2
This event includes leakages of hydrazine into the aft compartment
from anywhere in APU 2.
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Top Event L3: Hydrazine Leakage in APU 3
This event includes leakages of hydrazine into the aft compartment
from anywhere in APU 3.
The event tree structure involving L1, L2, and L3 includes all
combinations of APUs leaking individually or together in the same
mission. After the questions about leakage, it was appropriate to
ask about potential cascading damage caused by free hydrazine in
the aft compartment. Occurrence of any detected leakage would
cause mission control to declare that APU lost and lead to a PLS
entry, according to Flight Rules.
Top Event FA: Leakage-Induced Failure of Two APUs or Flight
Critical Equipment
This event includes those spatial interactions stemming from the
presence of hydrazine in the aft compartment that could cause
failure of at least two APUs or other flight critical equipment.
In the scenarios in which one APU has already failed, this event
includes failure of a second APU or flight critical equipment.
Occurrence of this event after launch leads to loss of crew and
vehicle.
Top Event CI: Leakage Induced Failure of APU I
This event includes spatial interaction induced failure of APU 1
from the presence of hydrazine in the aft compartment, given that
two APUs have not already failed. Occurrence of this event after
launch and in the absence of other failures leads to a PLS entry,
unless it occurs in the thrust bucket. In that case, it leads to
an intact abort.
Top Event Ca: Leakaqe-Induced Failure of &PU 2
This event includes spatial interaction induced failure of APU 2
from the presence of hydrazine in the aft compartment, given that
two APUs have not already failed. Occurrence of this event after
launch and in the absence of other failures leads to a PLS entry
unless it occurs in the thrust bucket. In that case, it leads to
an intact abort.
Top Event C3: Leakage-Induced Failure of APU S
This event includes spatial interaction induced failure of APU 3
from the presence of hydrazine in the aft compartment, given that
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two APUs have not already failed. Occurrence of this event after
launch and in the absence of other failures leads to a PLS entry
unless it occurs in the thrust bucket. In that case, it leads to
an intact abort.
In any sequence, including a leaking APU, C1, C2, and C3 are
asked in order to account for the possibility that leakage from
one APU could fail another APU. Although the leakages themselves
(occurrence of LI, L2, or L3) are potentially recoverable if
needed to support landing, the additional occurrence of el, C2,
or C3 implies a permanent, non-recoverable failure.
Top Events 81, 82, ud S3: Spurious Uhutdown
This event includes equipment failures of APU 1 (SI), APU 2
($2), or APU 3 ($3) that cause a spurious shutdown of the
affected APU. For example, MPU 1 failing high could cause the
controller to sense an overspeed and shut down the APU. It was
assumed that this condition can be identified during orbit, so
that the APU could be started if needed to have two operating
APUs during descent. Should any such shutdown occur in the
thrust bucket, an intact abort occurs. Should a spurious shut-
down occur before or after MECO, a PLS entry is assumed. Should
two shutdowns before KECO, a loss of crew and vehicle results.
Top Event BAz Failure Occurs Before Launch
This event includes all combinations of start failures of any or
all APUs. It also includes that fraction of running failures of
any or all APUs that occur before launch. Occurrence of this
event leads to a launch scrub.
Top _vent L_z Failure Occurs in the Thrust Bucket
This event includes those failures that occur in the thrust bucket
and is assumed to lead to an intact abort. It was quantified as a
function of the ratio of time in the thrust bucket to the total
Stage A time.
Top Event _z Failure Occurs after MECO
This event includes those failures that occur after MECO. This is
a significant time because the APUs are not needed for throttling
functions after the main engines have shut down. They are, however,
needed for a TVC during the MPS dump, not considered as a safety
critical event for this study. Any recoverable or permanent APU
failure occurring after MECO leads to a PLS entry.
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Top Event IA: Intact _ort Called by MCC
If one APU has failed and another was leaking before MECO, the
flight r%lles provide for the MCC to make a decision as to the
ability of the leaking APU to suppor_ a landing. If the APU leak
is large enough so that the APU will not suppor_ a landing at the
next primary landing site opportunity, then the MCC may declare
an intact abort to allow the shuttle to return as soon as possible.
Occurrence of this event leads to an intacu abort in the event
tree.
6.4.4 Staae B Event Trees
The Stage B Event Trees are shown in Appendices B6.4-2 and
B6.4-3. They model the time from APU shutdown after the orbital
insertion burn to APU shutdown after wheeistop.
6.4.4.1 Relationship of ESD to Stage B Event Trees
Table 6.4.4 presents a summary description of each top event in
the Stage B Event Trees (refer to Appendices B6.4-2 and B6.4-3
for the event trees themselves). Table 6.4.5 relates each top
event in the Stage B Event Trees to one or more ESD questions.
6.4.4.2 Construction of the Stage B Event Trees
The Stage B7 Event Tree (Appendix B6.4-2) was initiated by the
OK damage bin described in Section 6.4.1 (also called Impact
Vector i). It must represent scenarios consisting of up to two
APU failures in order to result in the LOC/V damage state. The
Stage B4 Event Tree (Appendix B6.4-3) was initiated by damage
bin No. 4, described in Section 6.4.1 (also called Impact Vector
2), which consists of Stage A scenarios ending with one APU
failed. The Stage B4 Event Tree is far simpler because we need
only represent scenarios consisting of no APU failures or one APU
failure in order to result in the LOC/V damage state.
Accuracy and completeness of the modeling and quantification
effort in those areas of the study that can potentially contribute
most to the risk are important. Standard practice in multi-stage
modeling is to estimate the potential contribution to the total
mission risk from each Stage A damage bin. This allows the allo-
cation of the study resources (e.g., manpower, time, and money)
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to those areas that are estimated to be the most important
contributors to the total mission risk.
It was determined for this study that Stage B Event Trees for
damage bins 5 and 6 need not be developed because of their
extremely low frequency of occurrence. That is, the resources
required to develop event trees and split fraction models, and to
perform quantification for bins 5 and 6 would be wasted because
these bins could, at most, contribute less than one percent of
the total frequency of loss of crew or vehicle for the total
flight.
In view of this, it was decided to allocate resources to the
detailed analysis of the top 99% of the potential total mission
risk. However, the contribution of damage bins 5 and 6 are not
neglected. They were conservatively assumed to lead to loss of
crew or vehicle when all of the contributors to the LOC/V state
for the entire flight were added up. This is standard practice
for PRA.
The assumptions, groundrules and approximations used to construct
the Stage B trees are as follows:
ao APU failure is defined as the inability to power its
associated hydraulic pump to the extent necessary to
maintain adequate hydraulic pressure at expected
hydraulic demand.
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TABLE 6.4.4
TOP EVENT DEFINITIONS - APU EVENT TREE - STAGE B*
\
Event Definition
IE
SS
DS
TB
PB
DB
CB
HB
GB
M1
M2
M3
FB
D1
D2
D3
Damage Bin From Stage A
One APU Fails to Start
Second APU Fails to Start
Turbine Overspeed
Equipment Failure of One APU After it Starts
Failure of the Second APU After it Starts
Failure of the Second APU or Failure of Flight Critical
Equipment Owing to Spatial Interactions Initiated by
Failure of the First APU
Failure of one APU Due to Exhaust Gas Leak, or GGVM
Detonation
Failure of Flight Critical Equipment or the Second APU
Due to Exhaust Gas Leak, or Valve Detonation
Leakage of Hydrazine from APU 1
Leakage of Hydrazine from APU 2
Leakage of Hydrazine from APU 3
Failure of Flight Critical Equipment or Two APUs
Due to Spatial Interactions Initiated by Hydrazine
Leakage
Hydrazine Leakage Causes Failure of APU 1 Given that
Two APUs Have Not Failed
Hydrazine Leakage Causes Failure of APU 2 Given that
Two APUs Have Not Failed
Hydrazine Leakage Causes Failure of APU 3 Given that
Two APUs Have Not Failed
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T_BLE G, 4. • (Concluded)
Definition
R1
R2
R2
T1
T2
T3
TE
PW
RE
SB
Leak in APU 1 Before EI-13 or into Pump Seal Cavity
Leak in APU 2 Before EI-13 or into Pump Seal Cavity
Leak in APU 3 Before EI-13 or into Pump Seal Cavity
Spurious Shutdown of APU 1
Spurious Shutdown of APU 2
Spurious Shutdown of APU 3
Failure of at Least One APU After TAEM-3.5 Minutes
Failure of at Least One APU After Wheelstop
Failure to Recover APU When Needed For Landing
Uninhibited Spurious Shutdown of at Least One APU
(Applies Only for Impact Vector Two)
Stage B Event Trees are Shown in Appendices B6.4-2
and B6.4-3.
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TABLE 6.4.5
RELATIONSHIP OF STAGE B EVENT TREE TOP EVENTS TO APU
ESDS 2, 3, AND 4 -- ORBIT AND ENTRY/DESCENT/LANDING*
Event Questions From Appendices B6.3-2 Through B6.3-4
SS, DS
TB, DB
PB, DB
CB
"No Permanent APU Failures"
This Box Represents Both Staz-c and Run Failures. None
of the Star_ Failures were Identified as Potentially
Leading To Spatial Interaction Events• Start Failures
were Separated from Run Failures to Accurately Quantify
Failures Which Could Not Occur After Wheelstop.
"Turbine Speed Control OK" and all Boxes Beneath this
Question
"No Permanent APU Failures" and all Boxes Beneath this
QuesUion
"Hydrazine Does Not Overheat After Shutdown"
"Overheating Does Not Cause Detcnation"
"Temperature Stays Above Minimum for Hydrazine, Lube
Oil, and Gas Generator"
"Sufficient Oxygen fur Fire in AFT Compartment"
"Unisolated Leak"
"Fire in AFT Compartment"
All Questions Following "SIE". They Include:
"SIE Does Not Fail Flight Critical Equipment"
"SIE End Initial Failure Does Not Cause Two APUs to
Fail"
"SIE and Initial Failure Does Not Cause the Second
APU to Fail With One Already Failed"
The Above Questions Relate to Spatial Interactions that
Follow Failures Involving Shrapnel
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Event
HB, GB
MI, M2 ,
M3
FB
DI, D2,
D3
TABLE 6.4.5 (Continued)
Questions From Appendices B6.3-2 Through B6.3-4
"Exhaust Gas Boundary Remains Intact" and all Spatial
Interaction Questions Beneath it. The Spatial Inter-
action Questions Refer to the Damage Potentially Caused
by Exhaust Gas Release
"Fuel Bound Areas Remain Intact" and all Spatial Inter-
action Questions Beneath it. The Spatial Interaction
Questions Refer to the Damage Potentially Caused by
Hydrazine in the Aft Compartment.
"Fuel Boundaries Remain Intact"
"Hydrazine Boundary Remains Intact"'
All Questions Beneath "Hydrazine Boundary Remains
Intact" in Appendix B6.3-2
All Questions Beneath "Fuel Boundary Remains Intact" in
Appendix B6.3-3
All Questions Following "SIE". The Spatial Interaction
Questions now Refer to Damage of Flight Critical Equip-
ment or APUs Potentially Caused by Hydrazine in the Aft
Compartment
"APU Fuel Quantity and Tank Pressure can Support Start
and Landing"
"Leak Isolated"
"Hot Restart Without Detonation" and all Questions that
Follow it
"Remaining Fuel Quantity and Tank Pressure Sufficient to
Support Landing"
"Tank Pressure Sufficient for Restart"
"Sufficient Oxygen to Support Fire"
"Fire in Aft Compartment"
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TABLE 6.4.5 (Concluded)
Event Questions From Appendices B6.3-2 Through B6.3-4
RI, R2 ,
R3
TI, T2,
T3
TE, RE
PW
All Questions Following "SIE". These Spatial Inter-
action Questions now Refer to the Damage Potentially
Caused by Hydrazine in the Aft Compartment to an
Individual APU.
"No Seal Cavity Leak" and Questions Below it in
Appendix B6.3-3
"Leak Detected Before Blackout" and Questions to the
Righ_ of it in Appendix B6.3-3
"No Recoverable Failures"
Spurious Shutdowns and Isola_able Leaks were Modeled
as Recoverable Failures
"Start Recoverable APU Before TAEM"
"Recovered APU Operates OK"
"Has Wheelstop Occurred'
D_m_
Stage B Event Trees are Shown in Appendices B6.4-2
and B6.4-3.
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Two APU failures lead to loss of crew or vehicle (LV).
All failures except spurious shutdo%_ and detected
leakages are modeled as permanent (non-recoverable).
The event tree, split fraction models and quantification
reflect the following Flight Rules (Reference 39)
wherever applicable: 10-19, 10-20, 10-22, 10-23, 10-24,
10-25, 10-27, 10-28, 10-29, 10-31, and 10-36.
A "large" hydrazine leak is defined as a leak for which
the APU would deplete all usable fuel before the end of
the mission.
APU failures that occurred after wheelstop were modeled.
However, the frequency of these failures leading to
LOC/V is believed to be negligible and is not quantified.
With one exception, the APUs are assumed to be identical and
spatially symmetrical to each other so that frequencies and
consequences are independent of which APU has failed. This
allowed APU 3 to be assigned as the failed APU with no loss
of generality or quantitative accuracy when the failures
under TA, PA, or HA occur. The exception was leakage. The
conditional probability of failing APU 3, given a leak in APU
1 or APU 2 or both (top event C3) was lower than the condi-
tional probability of failing APU 1 or 2, given a leak in
either or both of these APUs. Similarly, the conditional
probability of failing either APU 1 or 2 due to a leak in APU
3 (Top Events Cl and C2) is much lower than the conditional
probability of APU 3 failing itself.
The possibility of two APUs failing independently in the same
mission from turbine overspeed is not modeled because the
frequency of this sequence is much smaller than the frequency
of sequences leading to loss of crew or vehicle that involves
one turbine overspeed with other failures.
A spurious shutdown that occurs later than 3.5 minutes before
TAEM was assumed to be non-recoverable in time to support the
remainder of the mission.
The APUs were modeled as if each one had its own auto
shutdown inhibit switch (a post-51L modification).
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Any APU exhibiting a malfunction which by Flight Rules
would cause the MCC to declare it lost on orbit was
assumed to be started, if needed, at EI-13. Recoverable
failures occurring after TIG-5 minutes are assumed to be
restartable, if needed, at TAEM-3.5 =inures. Spurious
shutdowns that occurred during ascent cr during FCS
checkout are assumed to be started, if needed, at El-13,
with auto shutdown inhibit in effect.
Hot restarts are modeled in Stage B and include failure
of the injector cooling system and the p_tentia! for
detonation if injector cooling fails.
Any failed APU can also exhibit a hydrazine leak.
potential spatial interactions from that leak were
included in the model.
The
Automatic shutdown is assumed to be inhibited (unless
the circuit fails) for any attempted restart or any
start of an APU with another having already failed.
One APU which suffers a spurious shutdown during Stage
B with no other failed APUs will not be restarted.
Three normally recoverable failures occurring before
wheelstop are considered loss of crew and vehicle.
This is because the second and third failures would
have to occur in spite of auto shutdown being
inhibited, and would thus be irrecoverable.
Hydrazine overheating due to loss of fuel pump/GGVM cooling
is judged to be an insignificant contributor to risk. This
cooling system is employed only in certain abort cases whose
considerations are outside the scope of this study and,
therefore, is not quantified.
Stage B split fraction models were quantified independently
of Stage A. This means that independent failures of redun-
dant components that occurred in a single APU in Stage A are
treated as not failed at the start of Stage B. This is
considered an acceptable simplification because the ascent
phase (Stage A) represents less than 1% of the total mission
time during which these failures could possibly occur.
Small leakages are treated as being undetectable during stage
B. However, the model does provide for shutdown of an APU
whose pump seal was leaking before blackout. The model pro-
vides for failing an APU as a result of a leak into the
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solenoid cavities or as a result of an unisolatable external
leak. For all other leaks, a running APU is conservatively
modeled as continuing to run without being shut down or
restarted. This treatment is consistent with the experience
of STS-9 when the leak is not detected until too late to
shutdown the APUs.
6.4.5 Description of Staue B TOp Events
A summary description of each top event and its relationship to
the rest of the Stage B Event Tree is provided in this section.
The detailed model that provides the basis for assessing the
frequency of occurrence of each top event split fraction is
provided in Section 6.5. The data required to quantify these
models is described in Section 7.
Top Events SS and DS: &PUs Fail to Start
These events included all sta.-t failures of APUs either at
deorbit TIG-5 minutes or at EI-13 minutes. Event SS represents
failure of one APU to start; event DS represents failure of a
second or third APU to start, given that one APU has already
failed. These failures are malfunctions that occur from APU
equipment failures occurring at start attempt. These failures
cannot be recovered. Therefore, the occurrence of DS implies
loss of crew and vehicle. The occurrence of SS implies that
one APU is lost for Stage B and that the failure of one more
APU would cause loss of crew and vehicle.
Top Event TBz Turbine Overspeed
This event occurs if both the primary and secondary fuel control
valves fail in the open position while the APU is operating and
the overspeed trip fails to close the secondary valve. Occurrence
of this event after a previous APU failure would not require
failure of the overspeed trip because the auto shutdown function
would have been inhibited. Closure of the fuel tank isolation
valves following an overspeed trip may not prevent turbine run-
away and shrapnel caused by turbine runaway. The quantity of
hydrazine downstream of the isolation valves may be sufficient
given the presence of bubbles or effective suction by the APU
fuel pump to allow the turbine to reach breakup speed.
Mechanical, electrical, and controller causes of turbine over-
speed were included. Turbine overspeed implies that the APU has
failed. It was then appropriate to ask if the resulting shrapnel
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and hydrazine escape could have caused a second APU or other
flight critical equipment (i.e., top event CB) to fail. The tree
'also asks if another APU could have failed independently from the
turbine overspeed either by equipment failure (e.g., top event
DB) or by leakages. Occurrence of this event leads to failure of
one APU and to a release of hydrazine into the aft compartment.
Failure of another APU as a consequence of the shrapnel and
hydrazine release is treated in event CB.
Top Event PB: APU Equipaent Failure After APU Start
This event occurs if any equipment failure or failures combine to
prevent an APU from providing sufficient power to its hydraulic
pump as defined above. For example, this event includes break-up
of the turbine rotor at normal speed, and heater failures. Heater
failures were quantified for The orbit period. This event does
exclude, however, turbine overspeed, leakages, spurious shutdowns,
and start failures. This top event does not include failures
caused by erroneous commands from sources external to the APU
(e.g., from the crew or the MCC). These failures are outside the
scope of this study. The combinatorial failures included in this
top event are described in detail in Section 6.5. Occurrence of
this event leads to failure of one APU. If turbine break up has
occurred, shrapnel- and hydrazine-related spatial interaction
events are accounted for in event CB.
Top Event DB: Failure of Second APU After APU Start
This event is asked if either PB or TB has occurred. It includes
failure of a second APU given that one APU is known to have failed.
The same combination of equipment failures that contribute to PB
are also relevant here. Occurrence of this event after launch
leads to LOC/V.
Top Event CB: Spatial Interaction Failure of Second APU or
Flight Critical Equipment
This event includes failure of a second APU or flight critical
equipment due to shrapnel or hydrazine-induced propagating damage.
It considers the possibility that shrapnel and hydrazine leakage
could be produced by turbine rotor break-up, either in an over-
speed or normal speed condition. The sequence of events involving
both TB and CB, then, would lead to LOC/V from turbine shrapnel or
leaking hydrazine. The sequence of events involving both PB and
CB would be caused by one of the failures included in the PB split
fraction model, namely, turbine rotor breakup. The subsequent
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events are identical to those for TB and PB, but with a different
frequency.
Top Event HB: Exhaust Gas Leakage or Detonation of GGVM
This event includes the possibility that exhaust gas leakage can
fail an APU. It also includes the possibility that hydrazine
leaks into the solenoid cavity of one of the fuel control valves,
autodecomposes, and ruptures the valve cover such that hydrazine
escapes into the aft compartment. A large hole is conservatively
assumed to be formed and the APU is assumed to be lost.
Top Event GB: Exhaust Gas Leakage or Detonation of Isolation
Valve
This event includes the possibility that exhaust gas leakage fails
a second APU given that one APU is known to have failed from
exhaust gas leakage or from other causes. It also includes the
possibility that hydrazine leaks into the solenoid cavity of one
of the fuel tank isolation valves, autodecomposes, and ruptures
the valve cover such that hydrazine escapes into the aft compart-
ment. This leakage is assumed to be unisolatable and large. It
allows the contents of the fuel tank to enter the aft compartment.
The conditional probability of failing another APU or flight
critical equipment with the contents of the fuel tank emptie d
into the aft compartment was so large that this event has been
assigned to the loss of crew or vehicle damage state.
Top Event MI: Hydrazine Leakage in APU I
This event includes leakages of hydrazine into the aft compartment
from anywhere in APU I, except those leakages covered in HB and GB
above, and those from the fuel pump seal into the drain line.
Top Event M2: Hydrazine Leakage in APU 2
This event includes leakages of hydrazine into the aft compartment
from anywhere in APU 2, except those leakages covered in HB and GB
above, and those from the fuel pump seal into the drain line.
Top Event ME: Hydrasine Leakage in APU 3
This event includes leakages of hydrazine into the aft compartment
from anywhere in APU 3, except those leakages covered in HB and GB
above.
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The event tree structure involving MI, M2, and M3 includes all
combinations of APUs leaking individually or together in the same
mission. After the questions about leakage, it was appropriate
to ask about potential cascading damage caused by hydrazine
release. Leakage was quantified from the end of Stage A through
APU shutdown, including orbit.
Top Event FB: Leakage Induced Failure of Two APUs or Flight
Critical E_uipment
This event includes those spatial interactions stemming from the
presence of hydrazine in the aft compartmen_ that could cause
failure of at least two APUs or other flight critical equipment.
For scenarios in which one APU has already failed, this event
includes failure of a second APU or flight critical equipment.
Occurrence of this event before wheelstop leads to loss of crew
and vehicle.
Top Event Dlz Leakage Induced Failure of APU 1
This event includes spatial interaction induced failure of APU 1
from the presence of hydrazine in the aft compartment, given that
two APUs have not already failed.
Top Event D2z Leakage Induced Failure of APU 2
This event includes spatial interaction induced failure of APU 2
from the presence of hydrazine in the aft compartment, given that
two APUs have not already failed.
Top Event D3| Leakage Induced Failure of APU 3
This event includes spatial interaction induced failure of APU 3
from the presence of hydrazine in the aft compartment, given that
two APUs have not already failed.
In any sequence in which any APU is leaking, DI, D2, and D3 are
asked in order to account for the potential of leakage from one APU
failing another APU. Although the leakages themselves (occurrence
of MI, M2, or M3) are potentially recoverable if needed to support
landing, the additional occurrence of DI, D2, or D3 implies a
permanent, non-recoverable failure.
Top Events RI, Ra, R3: Seal Cavity Leaks
These events include the fraction of leakages that occur before
El-13, and those that occur through the fuel pump seal into the
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seal drain line for APU 1 (R1), APU 2 (R2), and APU 3 (R3).
Should any of these types of leakages be detected in the
absence of an APU failure, Flight Rules indicate that the
leaking APU would be shut down, and restarted only if needed
for landing. The model assumes that such restarts are made
at TAEM-3.5 minutes. Should these events occur during a
scenario that includes a previous failure of an APU, nhen the
model assumes that the leading APU will continue to operate.
Top Events TI, T2, and T3: Spurious Shutdown
This event includes equipment failures of APU 1 (TI), APU 2
(T2), or APU 3 (T3) that would cause a spurious shutdown of the
affected APU. For example, MPU 1 failing high could cause the
controller to sense an overspeed and shut down the APU. If one
APU has exhibited a spurious shutdown and no other APUs have
failed or have been declared lost, then the model assumes that
the APU experiencing the spurious shutdown is not restarted
because it is not needed. If the spurious shutdown occurs after
TAEM-3.5 minutes, then the APU is considered lost. Otherwise,
the APU will be recovered at TAEM-3.5 minutes. If a scenario
includes two spurious shutdowns before TAEM-3.5 minutes, one (the
second shutdown that occurred) represents a permanent failure
because auto shutdown would have been inhibited after the first
APU failed. The model assumes that recovery of the APU that
failed first is attempted at TAEM-3.5 minutes.
Top Event TE: Failure Oc=urs After TAEM-3.S Minutes
This event includes the fraction of all APU failures that occur
after TAEM-3.5 minutes. All such failures are assumed to be non-
recoverable. Two such failures, including spurious shutdowns,
are assumed to lead to loss of crew and vehicle. This time was
selected because analysis groundrules dictate that two APUs are
required for TAEM and the approach and landing phases of entry.
The 3.5 minute margin accounts for the injector cooling hot re-
start procedure required to restart a previously shut down APU.
The model conservatively ignores the APU cool down procedure.
Top Eve=t R= Failure Occurs after rneelstop
This event includes those failures that occur after wheelstop.
This is significant because the APUs are no longer needed after
wheelstop_ APU failures cannot cause a loss of crew or vehicle
unless the failure causes a catastrophic explosion or fire.
All APU failures that occur after wheelstop have been modeled.
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However, the frequency of failure is believed to be negligible.
Therefore, they do not contribute to the risk of loss of crew
or vehicle.
Top Event RE: Failure to Reoover APU
Event RE asks if an APU that had been shut down by MCC call cr
had experienced a spurious shutdown during entry was success-
fully restarted. It includes failure of injector cooling with
subsequent potential for detonation of the APU. Occurrence of
this event leads to a loss of crew and vehicle. The fact that
the restart was attempted indicates that the APU was needed tc
support landing.
6.5 SPLIT FRACTION MODEL DEVELOPMENT
6.5.1 Principles of Model Development
A guiding principle for the modeling and computational effort
was to place more emphasis and detail in those aspects of the
model that promised to be importan_ to risk. This meant,
for example, that many scenarios involving large numbers of
failure occurrences would not be important because of their
low associated probabilities_ Such scenarios could be quickly
estimated by a preliminary analysis using a general knowledge
of the model and the basic event data. It was not difficult, for
example, to estimate the order of magnitude of the total LOC/V
frequency from a knowledge of the event tree, APU design, and
the failure history database without going through the formal
computer analysis. However, in some cases knowledge to make
such initial assessments was not available until late in the
study. It was necessary to include such events in the analysis.
One of the most prominent examples is the case of consequential
permanent failures resulting from exhaust gas leaks. Exhaust
gas leaks were identified in the master logic diagrams as an
initiating failure and were, therefore, included in the event
trees. Their frequency of occurrence and the conditional prob-
ability of consequential failure of an APU were not assessed
until well after the event trees had been completed and while
the split fraction models were under development. Their
contribution to risk was found to be negligibly small (less
than 0.1 per cent of the total LOC/V frequency). The exhaust
leak models are, therefore, more complex than necessary.
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In developing the interrelated event tree and fault tree models,
it was also necessary to strike a balance in modeling complexity
between these two types of logic trees. This was an iterative
process that began by developing a simple first-cut event tree
and its associated fault trees. The fault trees were found to be
too complex to be analyzed easily. This led to a more complex
event tree, and the associated fault trees were found to be much
more reasonable. This iterative process was continued until a
reasonable balance was achieved.
The fault tree analysts also had to be aware of the data analysis
because, as discussed in the Study Methodology Section (Section
5), it is pointless to model components at a level below that for
which data exists. Furthermore, the availability of data in a
particular form influences the way the fault tree analyst chooses
to express the basic events. The process of split fraction
modeling is iterative and highly interactive with the event tree
development and data analysis processes.
As indicated in Section 6.4, the event tree for APU Stage A is
a logic diagram that shows the various admissible combinations
of top event occurrences and nonoccurrences that constitute
the various scenarios to be analyzed. In order to compute the
scenario occurrence frequencies, it is first necessary to compute
the appropriate split fractions for the top events appearing in
each scenario. In some cases, these split fractions are single
numbers determined from all available evidence, as described
in Section 5. In other cases, the top events represent a sub-
stantial part of the APU, and the corresponding split fractions
were computed from fault tree analyses. The paragraphs that
follow describe the fault trees that were developed for calcu-
lating the split fractions for the event tree top events. The
outcome of the split fraction models, when evaluated by the data
for the basic events, is a set of split fraction Cause Tables as
described in Section 5 and as shown in the Quantitative Results
Section (Section 8).
6.5.2 General Groundrules and Assumptions
Before describing the fault trees, it is appropriate to describe
some general ground rules, assumptions, and analysis consider-
ations that are fundamental to all of the fault trees. One of
the assumptions concerns the asymmetry in APU physical locations.
The main area in which this consideration might be significant is
in spatial interactions -- that is, in the area of cascading
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failure of an APU following the failure of some other APU. It was
decided to simplify the analysis by assuming that the APUs are
symmetrical with respect to physical location. That is, all APUs
are assumed to be co-located together in the.aft compartment in
the same way that APU i and APU 2 are co-located. This is a
conservative assumption. Because of this assumption, there is no
uniqueness to the names of the APUs. Thus, if an unidentified,
unnamed APU fails in conjunction with one of the top events in
the even_ tree (call that Event El), then that failed APU can be
"named" APU 3 without any loss of generality. The actual name of
that failed APU is of no importance in determining probabilities.
Consider now some other top event (call it E2) that appears to the
right of event E1 in the event tree. Fault tree models can now be
constructed for event E2 in which the failed APU 3 does not appear.
This represents a great simplification in the modeling process.
Another simplifying assumption is that the failure of either
isolation valve to close for APU shutdown is a permanent failure.
_his represents a slight conservatism with respect to the
potential recovery procedures allowed in Flight Rule 10-11C, but
it greatly simplifies the analysis process. Were it to have been
found that this failure mode yielded a significant contribution
to LOC/V, then the models could have been changed to reflect the
recovery process allowed in the flight rules and the calculations
revised to show the effect.
6.5.3 Treatment of Exhaust Duct LeakaGe
After some preliminary modeling and quantification cf exhaust duct
leakage, it was concluded that exhaust duct leakage would be a
negligible contributor to loss of crew or vehicle. The reasons
for this are as follows:
ao The frequency of occurrence of exhaust duct leakage either
from shrapnel or from random failure is very low (approxi-
mately one occurrence in one hundred thousand hours of APU
operation).
b. Exhaust duct leakage does not constitute loss of the APU.
C. The probability of failure of an APU or of flight critical
equipment in the aft compartment as a consequence of exhaust
gas impingement is quite low (between one in one hundred and
one in one thousand per leak).
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do Therefore, it was expected that a LOC/V due to exhaust gas
leak would occur approximately once in ten million missions.
Rather than produce a detailed quantification for such a remote
occurrence, the effort was simplified and the frequency of all
scenarios associated with exhaust duct leaks was assessed as neg-
ligible, even though a detailed model had already been developed.
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6.5.4 Treatment of Dependencies in the Split Fraction Mode_s
Prior experience shows that common cause failures tend to be
important risk contributors because multiple failures can occur as
a result of a single failure condition common to two or more units.
Usually this is at a substantially higher probability than that
associated with multiple independent failures. Hence, itwas
important to include such potential contributors wherever they
were indicated by the recorded APU and HPU failure history
databases.
In most cases the fault trees are intended to provide prob-
abilistic results that serve directly as the split fractions
for their associated top events. In some cases, however, the
fault trees provide intermediate results that must be combined
with other models to obtain the required top event split
fractions. For example, two consecutive top events in the event
tree in Figure 6.4.1 are labeled PA and DA. PA represents the
event in which one or more APUs have a permanent failure, while
DA represents the event in which at least two APUs fail given
that at least one has failed. The fault tree for PA yields the
associated split fraction directly. However, the fault tree
for DA yields the probability of at least two APU failures. To
obtain the split fraction for the DA event, divide the DA result
by the PA result, thereby giving the probability of two or more
APU failures given that one or more failures are known to have
occurred. This type of analysis also applies to the top events
HA and GA in that same event tree.
6.5.5 Treatment 0_ Order of Occurrenqe i_ the Model_
Event trees are simply logic diagrams that indicate what specific
combinations of events occur and do not occur; such trees do
not ordinarily convey any information as to the order in which
events occur. Thus, the fault tree models have to be carefully
constructed to account for order, when order is of concern. For
example, in the Stage A event tree shown in Figure 6.4.1, there
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are top events labeled TA and DA. TA accounts for the potential
for a turbine runaway, and DA accounts for the possibility of
a second independent permanent failure of an APU. Since the TA
event appears first in the event tree, the fault tree for it
models the potential for a runaway of one out of three APUs.
The DA event must then consider the implications of the order in
which the two events occur. If the TA event occurs first (which
is taken to occur with a probability of 50%), then the TA analysis
based on one APU failing out of three is correct, and the DA fault
tree must consider the potential for one APU to fail out of two APUs
(because the third APU, which is named APU 3, has already failed by
runaway). However, if DA occurs first (with a probability of 50%),
then the DA fault tree must be based on one out cf three failing,
and the TA fault tree should be based on one out of two. Since the
TA analysis is already based on one out cf three, a correction
factor must be included in the DA fault tree to correct from the
l-out-of-3 TA analysis to the proper 1-out-of-2 basis needed for TA
in this case. Xn summary, some complexity is added to the fault
trees to accurately account for the order in which top events in
the event tree could occur. Such correction factors will be found
below in a n_mber of the fault trees, and the "secondary" fault
trees needed to cover the 1-out-of-2 case for TA (and other'such
top events) are also presented below. The specific TA/DA case
mentioned here is discussed with the appropriate fault trees below.
6.5.6 Nomenclature
A special naming convention has been used in all of the fault
trees. The first two characters of the event names are the same
as the two characters in the top event for which the fault tree
was developed. For the basic events, the third and fourth
characters identify the type of component being modeled, and the
fifth character identifies the particular failure mode. For the
gates, the third, fourth, and fifth characters identify the level
of the gate in the fault tree and distinquish gates at each level.
The last (sixth) character is i, 2, or 3 to identify the specific
APU in which the component or gate resides. If the last character
is a 0, then it identifies a generic component or gate -- that is,
something (such as a common cause failure) not associated with any
specific APU.
To simplify the general appearance of the fault trees, they are
shown in full only for APU I. That detailed development is shown
as a transfer with a label of the form XYI. The other two APUs
are then represented as transfers in with labels of the form XY2
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and XY3. In those subtrees, all gates and basic events in the
subtree XYI that end with a 1 are conver_ed to a 2 or a 3 for the
corresponding subtrees XY2 and XY3, respectively.
The paragraphs that follow are divided into two main parts -- one
for the APU Stage A analysis, and one for the APU Stage B analysis.
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6.5.7 Stage A Analysis
Top Event TA: Turbine Overspeed
The first top event in the Stage A Event Tree shown in Figure
6.4.1 is TA. This event represents a specific type of APU
permanent failure -- namely, one involving turbine runaway,
where failures cause the turbine speed to increase above normal
operating levels and the overspeed protection system fails to
shut the turbine down. This particular failure mode has been
separated from all of the other permanent failures because of
the high potential for consequential failure of other APUs
or flight-critical equipment due to the high-energy shrapnel
generated by the overspeed.
The fault trees developed for TA are shown in Appendix B6.5-1
and B6.5-2. The first fault tree (labeled TA) covers the model
for the case of one runaway out of three APUs, while the second
(labeled TA-D) models the case of one runaway out of two APUs.
The second fault tree is provided to support top events to the
right in the event tree where the order in which events occur
is a consideration.
Both fault trees model runaway in terms of having both the
primary and secondary control valves failing open, together with
failure of the overspeed protection system to shut down the APU
and prevent the runaway condition. The numerical result computed
from fault tree TA directly yields the requisite split fraction
for the top event TA in the event tree.
Top Event PK: Equlpment Failure of I APU Kfter it Starts
The second top event in the Stage A Event Tree shown in Figure
6.4-1 is PA. This event represents all but two contributors to
the permanent failure of at least one of the three APUs. The
two exceptions are (1) the turbine runaway failures covered by
TA, and (2) the start failures, which are more conveniently
analyzed in the Top Event BA (the failures occurring before lift-
off and contributing to launch scrub).
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The fault trees developed for PA are provided in Appendices B6.5-
3 and B6.5-4. The first fault tree (labeled PA) models the
permanent failure of at least one out of three APUs, while the
second one (labeled PA-T) models the permanen_ failure of at
least one out of two APUs. This second fault tree is provided
to suppor_ top events to the right of event PA in the event tree
where the order in which events occurs is a consideration.
Both PA fault trees model permanent failures in terms of the
following primary failure modes:
aQ
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
j.
Fuel line blockage
Fuel pump failure
Low fuel tank pressure
Turbine fails to run
Turbine wheel shutdown failure
Gearbox fails to run
Gas generator run failure
Fuel tank isolation valves fail closed
Fuel depleted after shutdown
Common cause failure of lube oil circulation due to
contamination
The numerical result computed from Fault Tree PA directly yields
the requisite split fraction for the Top Event PA in the event
tree.
Top Event DA: Failure of m Seoond APU After it Starts
The third top event in the Stage A Event Tree is DA. This event
represents all but two contributors to the permanent failure of
at least two of the three APUs, where the two exceptions are (I)
the turbine runaway failures covered by TA, and (2) the start
failures, whichare more conveniently analyzed in the Top Event
BA (the failures occurring before lift off and contributing to
launch scrub). The only difference between this event and the
event PA is that DA accounts for at least two out of three APUs
failing, while PA accounts for at least one out of three APUs
failing.
In the event tree, the PA event represents the probability of an
independent permanent failure occurring in at least one APU, and
the DA event represents the probability of an independent
permanent failure occurring in at least two APUs given that at
least one is known to have occurred. The scenario in which PA
occurs and DA does not occur represents the case in which exactly
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ione APU has an independent permanent failure. The scenario in
which both PA and DA occur represents the case in which two or
more APUs have independent permanent failures. When the TA event
occurs in the event tree, only the DA event is questioned with
regard to the occurrence of a second permanent failure as a result
of an independent cause. In this case, it is not addressed via
Event PA. This is simply an analysis convention tha_ was adopted
for convenience; this situation could jus_ as well have been
addressed by using PA.
The fault trees developed for DA are shown in Appendices B6.5-5
through B6.5-7. Appendix B6.5-5 is the fault tree DAI that
applies to the first (uppermost) node for DA in the event tree
and models the permanent failure of at least two out of three
APUs. Appendix B6.5-6 is the Fault Tree DA2 that applies to the
second (lower) node for DA in the event tree. This models
the second permanent failure that occurs in conjunction with the
turbine runaway failure modeled by the TA event, and the fault
tree is in the same basic form as the PA Fault Tree. The Fault
Tree DAT in Appendix B6.5-7 models the case of two permanent
failures out of two APUs, which is provided to support top events
to the right of event DA in the event tree where the order in
which events occur is a consideration.
The fault tree for DA2 in Appendix B6.5-6 is the first illustra-
tion of the logic required to account for the order in which
events occur, as discussed in Section 6.5.1. If event TA occurs
first, then the TA l-out-of-3 fault tree model is correct, and
the DA logic must consider 1-out-of-2 failure logic. This
situation is shown on the right side of the diagram in Appendix
B6.5-6. If, on the other hand, DA occurs first, then the TA
l-out-of-3 logic must be corrected to l-out-of-2 logic, and the
correct logic for DA is l-out-of-3. This situation is shown on
the left side of that diagram. The correction factor represented
by the basic event DATCF0 is the ratio of the result from the
TA-D tree to that from the TA tree.
All of the fault trees needed for the DA event model permanent
failures in terms of the following primary failure modes:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
Fuel line blockage
Fuel pump failure
Low fuel tank pressure
Turbine fails to run
Turbine wheel shutdown failure
Gearbox fails to run
Gas generator run failure
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i.
j.
Fuel tank isolation valves fail closed
Fuel depleted after shutdown through a gearbox shaft seal
Common cause failure of lube oil circulation due to
contamination
The numerical result from Fault Tree DA1 in Appendix B6.5-5 must
be divided by the numerical result from Fault Tree PA to obtain
the split fraction needed for node 1 for _he event DA; this split
fraction is the conditional probability of two or more permanent
failures given that one or more permanent failures have occurred.
The numerical result computed from Fault Tree DA2 in Appendix
B6.5-6 directly yields the requisite split fraction for node 2
of Top Event DA in the event tree.
Top Event CA: Failure of a Second APU or Flight Critical
Equipment Due to Failure of the First APU
The fourth top event in the Stage A Event Tree is CA. This event
represents the consequential permanent failure of flight critical
equipment or of at least one APU following the permanent failure
of one other APU.
The CA fault tree is shown in Appendices B6.5-8 and B6.5-9.
Appendix B6.5-8 is the Fault Tree CA1 that applies to the first
(uppermost) node for CA in the event tree and models the con-
sequential failure of flight critical equipment or of at least
one other APU following the nonrunaway permanent failure of one
APU (from Event PA). Appendix B6.5-9 is the Fault Tree CA2
that applies to the second (lower) node for CA in the event
tree. This models the consequential permanent failure of flight
critical equipment or of at least one other APU following a
turbine runaway failure (from Event TA). Separate fault trees
are required because the potential for consequential failure
following a turbine runaway is higher than that for other forms
of permanent failure. The numerical results computed from both
Fault Trees CA1 and CA2 directly yield the requisite split
fractions for nodes 1 and 2 of Top Event CA in the event tree.
Top Event _,,3kz Failure of One APU Due to Exhaust Gas Leak
The fifth top event in the Stage A Event Tree is HA. This event
represents the failure of at least one APU as a consequence of an
exhaust gas leak in at least one APU. The model is based on the
realization that the potential for a non-leaking APU to fail is
extremely remote. Thus, the model only accounts for failures
of APUs that are themselves experiencing hot gas leaks. This is
also a very low frequency, as described earlier.
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The fault trees developed for HA are shown in Appendices B6.5-I0
and B6.5-II. The first fault tree, HA1, models the permanent fail-
ure of at least one out of three APUs as a consequence of exhaust
gas leaks, while the second, labeled HAT, models the permanent
failure of at least one out of two APUs as a consequence of exhaust
gas leaks. This second fault tree is provided to support top
events to the right of event HA in the event tree where the order
in which events occurs is a consideration.
The numerical result computed from Fault Tree HA1 directly yields
the requisite split fraction for the Top Event HA in the event
tree.
Top Event GA: Failure of a Second APU or Flight-Critical
Equipment Due to Exhaust Gas Leak
The sixth top event in the Stage A Even_ Tree is GA. This event
represents the failure of at least two APUs as a consequence of
exhaust gas leaks in at least two APUs, given that at least one
APU is known to have failed as a consequence of a hot gas leak.
The model is based on the realization that the potential for a
non-leaking APU to fail is extremely remote. Thus, the model only
accounts for failures of APUs that are themselves experiencing
hot gas leaks.
The fault trees developed for GA are shown in Appendices B6.5-12
through B6.5-16. Appendices B6.5-12 through B6.5-15 show four
different fault trees. The numerical results computed from the
four faul% trees are used in the same manner, as described above,
for event DA to provide the requisite split fractions for the
four nodes of Top Event GA in the event tree. The Fault Tree GAT
shown in Appendix B6.5-16 is used in the same manner as described
above for Fault Tree DAT for event DA.
Top Events L1, L2, L3z Le_age of Hydrazine Prom APU 1, 2, or 3
The seventh, eighth, and ninth top events in the Stage A Event
Tree shown in Figure 6.4.A are Lk, where k can be i, 2, or 3.
This event represents the independent occurrence of a fuel leak
in APU k. Rather than consider the logic for these three top
events in terms of a fault tree or a set of three fault trees,
it was much simpler to express the logic in terms of a simple
event tree as a means of representing the probability values
needed for the various combinations of leakage occurrences.
Event Tree LK ks shown An Appendix B6.5-17. The split fraction
to be used for each node for each top event is shown at that
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node. Lambda represents the failure rate with which independent
leakage occurs, and "t" is the time interval of interest over
which the leak can occur. Beta represents a common cause factor,
which is a measure of the conditional probability that a second
APU has a fuel leak given that one is already known _o be
leaking. Lambda and beta can both be derived from the Shuttle
flight history data, as discussed in Section 7.0.
An important characteristic of the split fraction formulas given
for the various nodes in Appendix B6.5-17 is that the scenario
probabilities shown for all scenarios involving exactly one
leaking leaking APU are all identical. The same is true for the
scenarios with exactly two leaking APUs. Also, the sum of the
probabilities for all eight scenarios is exactly one.
Using the leakage split fractions listed is simply a matter of
matching the nodes in that figure with the corresponding nodes
in the event tree in Figure 6.4.1. That is, the split fraction
P21 for node 1 of the event L2 is matched to all nodes in the
event tree for which L2 occurs when L1 does not occur. Likewise,
the split fraction P22 for node 2 of the event L2 is matched to
all nodes in the event tree for which L1 does occur. A similar
approach is used for the nodes for L3.
Top Event FA: Failure of Flight-Critical Equipment Due to
Xy_razine Leakage
The tenth top event in the Stage A Event Tree is FA. This event
represents the permanent failure of flight critical equipment
as a direct consequence of a fuel leak in one or more APUs. No
fault tree was constructed for this event since the requisite
split fraction is simply one number that depends only on the
specific leakage conditions for the scenario being analyzed.
The development of those single split fractions is discussed in
Section 7.0.
Top Events Cl, C2, C3_ Failure of I APE Due to Hydrazine Leakage
The eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth top events in the Stage A
Event Tree are Ck, where k can be I, 2, or 3. This event repre-
sents the consequential failure of APU k due to a fuel leak in
one of the APUs (the leak can be in APU k, in some other APU, or
in some combination of both -- the specific condition depending
entirely on the particular event tree scenario being analyzed).
A generic fault tree applicable to all of the Ck event tree nodes
is presented in Appendix B6.5-18. The numerical result computed
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from Fault Tree Ck directly yields the requisite split fraction
for the appropriate nodes of Top Event Ck in the event tree.
Top Events Sl, 82, 83: Spurious Shutdown of APU i, 2, or 3
The fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth top events in the Stage A
Event Tree are Sk, where k can be l, 2, or 3. This event repre-
sents a specific type of APU recoverable failure -- namely, one
involving a spurious overspeed or underspeed trip of the turbine
in APU k. This condition causes an immediate, automatic shutdown
of the affected APU, but that APU can be recovered during Stage B
by setting the associated automatic over/underspeed control
switch to the inhibit position. This particular failure mode has
been separated from all of the other recoverable failures because
of the immediate, automatic loss of the affected APU (recoverable
failures from fuel leakage do not result in immediate, automatic
shutdown of the affected APU).
The generic fault tree developed for Sk is shown in Appendix
B6.5-19. This diagram, like others described previously, takes
event occurrence order into account in those scenarios in which
some other failure is identified as occurring in conjunction with
the spurious overspeed or underspeed trip. If the other failure
occurred first (with 50% probability), then the occurrence of the
spurious trip requires a failure of the inhibit circuitry. If the
spurious trip is first, then the inhibit circuitry is considered
not to have been activated. The basic event DARAT0 provides the
necessary factor for correcting the probability obtained from the
other event in the event tree, in the same manner as described
previously. The numerical result computed from Fault Tree Sk
directly yields the requisite split fraction for the Top Event Sk
in the event tree.
Top Event BA: Failure of One or Two APUs Before Launch
The seventeenth top event in the Stage A Event Tree is BA. This
event represents a correction factor to distinguish between
failures occurring before and after lift-off. The prior events
in the event tree account for all run failures, regardless of the
time at which they occur while the APUs are running. Failures
occurring before lift-off ordinarily result in launch scrub,
while failures occurring afterward can result in a variety of
damage states, depending on their severity.
The fault tree developed for BA is presented in Appendices B6.5-
20 and B6.5-21. Two trees are shown: one (labeled BA0 in Appendix
B6.5-20) that applies only to the first node for the BA event in
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the event tree and the other (labeled BAn in Appendix B6.5-21)
that applies to all other nodes. The BA0 fault tree accounts for
all star_ failures which are not otherwise taken into account in
the fault trees developed for all other top events in the event
tree. Start failures, of course, all occur before lift-off and
are, therefore, prelaunch failures that ordinarily lead to launch
scrub. Such failures are not considered elsewhere in the event
tree logic. The BAn fault tree accounts for the start failures
and the proportion of run time that constitutes the pre-lift-off
period. This is a simple time ratio--the ratio of pre-launch run
time to the total Stage A run time. The pre-launch run time is 5
minutes, while the post-launch Stage A run time is 13 minutes,
yielding a ratio of R = 5/18 for scenarios in which one APU has
failed. The ratio becomes 2R - R 2 for scenarios in which two
APUs have failed. The numerical result computed from Fault Tree
BA directly yields the requisite split fraction for Top Event BA
in the event tree.
Top Events EA, M.A: Failure Occurs in Thrust Bucket, and Failure
Occurs After MECO
The eighteenth and nineteenth top events in the event tree are
EA and MA. These events identify failures that occur in the
thrust bucket (EA) and post MECO (MA). These are, like the event
BA, simply time ratios. The event EA is the ratio of time in the
thrust bucket to the total Stage A run time. The time in the
thrust bucket is about 0.5 minutes, and the total Stage A run
time is 18 minutes. This gives a ratio of 0.5/18, or 0.028, for
the numerical value of the split fraction for the event EA. The
run time following MECO is approximately 5 minutes, which gives
a ratio of 5/18, or 0.28, for the numerical value of the split
fraction for event MA.
Top Event IA: Intact Abort Called by MCC
The last top event in the event tree is IA. This event identifies
failures that, in the judgment of ground personnel and the flight
crew, cannot suppor_ landing at the first PLS, thereby resulting
in an intact abort. This is a judgment call made by MCC at the
time that the failure occurs. It is beyond the scope of this
study to evaluate in-flight decisions made by MCC. Therefore,
a conservative (50 - 50) chance that this event would lead to an
intact abort was assigned. Although this may be conservative, it
does not significantly affect the overall frequency of intact
aborts, which is dominated by failure in the thrust bucket.
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6.5.8 Staq_ B AnalYsis
As discussed in Section 6.4.1, the analysis of the Stage A Event
Tree leads to quite a few damage vectors. However, these damage
vectors were combined into four damage bins that form the initial
conditions for the analysis of Stage B. These four initial
conditions for the Stage B analysis are defined in Table 6.4.1.
The Stage B Event Trees were developed for damage bins 4 and 7,
as discussed in Section 6.4. Each damage bin constitutes the
initial condition for a Stage B quantification. Each event tree
has potentially different split fraction models that form the
basis for quantifying that event tree.
Before discussing the individual initial conditions, it is
appropriate to discuss certain considerations that apply to all
of the initial conditions. In many cases, the fault trees
needed for the Stage B analyses are the same or very nearly the
same as the corresponding fault trees for Stage A. In all such
cases, the primary emphasis in the discussions that follow is
to identify the differences between the fault trees for those
two stages. The recovery Event (RE) at the end of the Stage B
Event Trees refers to recovery from failures that occur during
Stage B; recovery from Stage A failures is taken into account
in the fault trees in a manner consistent with the flight rules.
In Stage A, start failures were included in the Event BA as a
basis for identifying launch scrub conditions. In Stage B, all
start failures are taken into account at the beginning of the
event trees, in Top Events SS and DS. Start and run failures
were separated so that the time ratios used in events like TE
and PW could be applied solely to probabilities that are time-
based, with no demand failures involved. Since the PB and DB
Events account for all run failures for the full duration of
Stage B, there is no need to include run failure considerations
in the fault trees for the RE Event; only failures to restart
on demand (if required) need be considered in RE. For initial
conditions other than Bin 7 (also called Impact Vector 1), the
Stage B analysis is begun with at least one APU failure (either
permanent or recoverable) having occurred during Stage A. Under
such circumstances, the over/underspeed auto trip switch would
have been set to inhibit automatic shutdown. This means that
spurious conditions which would otherwise cause an automatic
shutdown of the affected APU (such as MPU 1 failing high or low)
would be inhibited and, thereby, prevent shutdown from occurring.
However, if there ks a failure of the inhibit circuitry, then
such a condition can still cause a spurious shutdown. In this
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case, such a shutdown is a permanent failure because there is
no way to inhibit the faulty signal. Such contributions to
permanent failure have been included in the SB Fault Tree. One
final comment about the analysis of Impact Vector 1. For all
scenarios involving Mk (fuel leak) and Tk (spurious automatic
shutdown), the analysis has been simplified by conservatively
assu_ing that the leak occurs first, which means that the
spurious trip is a permanent failure.
6.5.8.1 Initial Condition 7 (Impact Vector l)
Based on the discussion in Section 6.4, initial condition 7 (from
Damage Bin 7) is defined as follows:
All three APUs successful at the end of
Stage A
The fault trees developed to support the associated event tree in
Appendix B6.4-2 for this initial condition are discussed below.
This initial condition is referred to in the fault tree diagrams
as Impact Vector i.
Top Event SSz One APU Fails to Start
The first top event in the Stage B Event Tree is SS. This event
represents a specific type of APU permanent failure -- namely,
failure of one or more APUs to start on demand. This particular
failure mode had to be separated from the run failures covered
by Top Events PB and DB so that the time ratios used in Top
Events TE and PW would be applied only to run-time failures and
not to a combination of run-time and demand failures.
The fault tree developed for SS is shown in Appendix B6.5-22.
This diagram is essentially the same as the one developed for
the start failures in the Top Event BA for Stage A, with a few
exceptions as described below. In Stage A, any kind of failure
of the primaryvalve was considered grounds for scrubbing the
mission, including cases in which the primary valve fails open.
In Stage B, however, such conditions (the valve failing open)
would not cause start failure because the secondary valve would
begin cycling and take over control of fuel flow.
The other change was to remove the basic event in which the
secondary valve leaks before APU startup. If that happens, fuel
leaks into the gas generator and causes it to heat up. In that
case, the APU is not started because of the danger of fuel
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detonation. In Stage A, that leads to launch scrub. In Stage B
that simply delays startup of the APU until the injector spray
system can cool the temperature down to an acceptable level.
Thus, this would not be a failure unless another.APU fails and
either the injector spray cooling system fails or the APU fails
to start for some other reason. This third-order failure scenario
was judged to be of too low a probability to be of any pracUical
concern and was removed from the analysis.
The numerical result computed from the Fault Tree SS directly
yields the requisite split fraction for Y_he Top Even_ SS in the
event tree.
Top Event DS: Second APU Fails to Start
The second top event in the Stage B Event Tree is DS. This event
represents a specific type of APU permanent failure -- namely,
failure of two or more APUs to start on demand. This particular
top event is used in conjunction with the top Event SS to be able
to distinguish between cases in which only one start failure
occurs versus cases in which two or more failures occur.
The fault tree developed for DS is shown in Appendix B6.5-23.
This diagram is essentially the same as the one developed for
Top Event SS except that the simple OR gane for the top event
has been changed to a 2-out-of-3 gate. All other aspects of
the fault tree are exactly the same.
The numerical result computed from the Fault Tree DS must be
divided by the numerical result from Fault Tree SS to obtain the
split fraction needed for the Top Event DS; this split fraction
is the conditional probability of two or more start failures,
given that one or more start failures are known to have occurred.
Top Event TB: Turbine Overspeed
The third top event in the Stage B Event Tree is TB. This event
represents a specific type of APU permanent failure--namely, one
involving turbine runaway,, where failures cause the turbine speed
to increase above normal operating levels and the overspeed pro-
tective system fails to shut the turbine down. This particular
failure mode has been separated from all of the other permanent
failures because of the high potential for consequential failure
of flight-critical equipment or other APUs due to the high-energy
shrapnel and subsequent hydrazine release generated by the over-
speed.
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The fault trees developed for TB are presented in Appendices B6.5-
24 through B6.5-26. Appendix B6.5-24 presents the fault tree
(labeled TBI) that applies to the first (uppermost) node for TB in
the event tree and models a turbine runaway failure of at least
one out cf three APUs. Appendix B6.5-25 presents the fault tree
(labeled TB2) that applies to the second (lower) node fcr TB in
the event tree. This models a turbine runaway failure that
occurs after an APU start failure (Event SS). The fault tree in
Appendix B6.5-26 models the case of one turbine runaway out of
two APUs, which is provided to support top events to the right of
Event TB in the event tree where the order in which events occur
is a consideration.
The fault trees in Appendices B6.5-24 through B6.5-26 are iden-
tical to the corresponding fault trees developed for Stage A.
The fault tree in Appendix B6.5-25 is identical to tha_ in
Appendix B6.5-26. The numerical results computed from Fault
Tree TB directly yield the requisite split fractions for the
two nodes of Top Event TB in the event tree.
Top Event PB: Equipment Failure of One APU After Start
The fourth top event in the Stage B Event Tree is PB. This event
represents all but four contributors to the failure of at least
one of the three APUs, where the four exceptions are: (1) the
turbine runaway failures covered by TB, (2) the start failures,
which are analyzed in Top Event SS, (3) leakage events, and (4)
spurious shutdowns.
The fault trees developed for PB are presented in Appendices B6.5-
27 and B6.5-28. The first fault tree (labeled PB) models the
permanent failure of at least one out of three APUs, while the
second one (labeled PB-T) models the permanent failure of at
least one out of two APUs. This second fault tree is provided
to support top events to the right of Event PB in the event tree
where the order in which events occurs is a consideration.
The fault trees developed for the PB Top Event are essentially the
same as those developed for Stage A. The major exception to this is
the portion added to account for failures occurring during the on-
orbit portion of the mission. These failures include heaters that
fail on and heaters that fail off. The fault tree also includes
fuel and lube oil leaks and the inadvertent hot restart of an APU.
The numerical result computed from Fault Tree PB directly yields
the requisite split fraction for the Top Event PB in the event
tree.
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Top Event DB: Failure of Second APU After Start
The fifth top event in the Stage B Event Tree is DB. This event
represents all but four contributors to the permanent failure of
at least two of the three APUs, where the four exceptions are as
identified for Top Event PB. The only difference between this
event and the Event PB is that DB accounts for at least two out
of three APUs failing, while PB acco%Lnts for at least one out of
three APUs failing.
In the event tree, the PB Event represents the probability of
an independent permanent failure occurring in at least one APU,
and the DB Event represents the probability of an independent
permanent failure occurring in at least two APUs, given that at
least one is known to have occurred. The scenario in which PB
occurs and DB does not occur represents the case in which exactly
one APU has an independent permanent failure. The scenario in
which both PB and DB occur represents the case in which two or
more APUs have independent permanent failures. When either the
SS or the TB Event occurs in the event tree, only the DB Event is
questioned with regard to the occurrence of a second permanent
failure as a result of an independent cause; that is, this case
is not addressed via Event PB. This is simply an analysis
convention that was adopted for convenience; this situation could
just as well have been addressed by using PB.
In the above paragraph, the term "independent" refers to
independence with respect to other top events in the event tree.
That is, it is not intended to preclude the potential occurrence
of common cause failures within the contex_ of the PB and DB
analyses themselves. It simply means that the PB and DB permanent
failures have been modeled such that they are independent of
other top events.
The fault trees developed for DB are shown in Appendices B6.5-29
through B6.5-32. Appendix B6.5-29 presents a fault tree (labeled
DB1) that applies to the first (uppermost) node for DB in the
event tree and models the permanent failure of at least two out
of three APUs. Appendix B6.5-30 presents a fault tree (labeled
DB2) that applies to the second (middle) node for DB in the event
tree. This models the second permanent failure that occurs in
conjunction with the turbine runaway failure modeled by the TB
Event, and the fault tree is in the same basic form as the PB
Fault Tree. Appendix B6.5-31 presents a fault tree (labeled DB3)
that applies to the third (bottom) node for DB in the event tree
and models the second permanent failure that occurs following a
start failure in another APU. This fault tree is very similar
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to that shown in Appendix B6.5-30, except that the other failure
(failure to start) is definitely known to have occurred first,
and this knowledge simplifies the model. The fault tree in
Appendix B6.5-32 models the case of two permanent failures out of
two APUs, which is provided to suppor_ top events to the right cf
Event DB in the event tree where the order in which events occur
is a consideration.
The fault tree for DB2 is another illustration of the logic
required to account for the order in which events occur, as
discussed in Section 6.5.1. If Event TB occurs first, then the
TB 1-out-of-3 fault tree model is correct, and the DB logic
must consider 1-out-of-2 failure logic. This situation is shown
on the right side of the diagram in Appendix B6.5-25. If, on the
other hand, DB occurs first, then the TB 1-out-of-3 logic must
be corrected to 1-out-of-2 logic, and the correct logic for DB
is 1-out-of-3. This situation is shown on the left side of that
figure. The correction factor represented by the Basic Event
DBTCF0 is the ratio of the result from the TB-D Tree to that
from the TB Tree.
The fault trees developed for the DB Top Event are essentially
the same as those developed for Stage A. The only exception to
this is the adaptation needed to address the added node for the
case in which a start failure (via Top Event SS) occurs first,
and this fault tree is very similar to the DB2 Fault Tree. Since
the DB Fault Tree depends on the subtrees for each separate APU
in the PB'Event, it follows that the DB Event also automatically
includes the on-orbit additions described above for the PB Event.
The numerical result from Fault Tree DBI must be divided by the
numerical result from Fault Tree PB to obtain the split fraction
needed for Node 1 for the Event DB; this split fraction is the
conditional probability of two or more permanent failures given
that one or more permanent failures are known to have occurred.
The numerical result computed from Fault Trees DB2 and DB3
directly yield the requisite split fractions for Nodes 2 and 3
of Top Event DB in the event tree.
Top Event CB: Failure of the Second _PU or Failure of Flight
Critical Equipment Xnitiated By Failure of the
First &PU
The sixth top event in the Stage B Event Tree is CB. This event
represents the consequential permanent failure of flight critical
equipment or at least one APU following the permanent failure of
one other APU.
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The CB Fault Tree is presented in Appendices B6.5-33 through B6.5
35. Appendix B6.5-33 presents a fault tree (labeled CBI) that
applies to the first (uppermost) node for CB in the event tree
and models the consequential failure of flight critical equipment
or of at least one other APU following turbine break-up of one APU
at normal speed (Event PB). Appendix B6.5-34 presents a fault tree
(labeled CB2) that applies to the second (middle) node for CB in
the event tree. This models the consequential permanent failure
of flight critical equipment or at leasU one other APU following
a turbine runaway failure (Event TB). Appendix B6.5-35 presents
a fault tree (labeled CB3) that applies to the third (lowest)
node for CB in the event tree and models the consequential failure
of flight critical equipment or at least one other APU following
permanent start failure of one APU (Event SS). Separate fault
trees are required for the various nodes because the potential for
consequential failure following a turbine runaway is higher than
for permanent failures taken into account in the PB Event, and the
probability of consequential failure following star_ failures is
assessed to be negligibly small. The numerical results computed
from the CB Fault Trees directly yield the requisite split
fractions for Nodes 1 through 3 of Top Event CB in the event tree.
Top Event HB: Failure of O_e &PU Due To Exhaust Gas Leak
or GGVMDstonat_on
The seventh top event in the Stage B Event Tree is HB. This
event represents the failure of at least one APU as a consequence
of an exhaust gas leak in at least one APU, or as a consequence of
external fuel leakage produced by a detonation resulting from fuel
leaking into the solenoid cavity of either GGVM valve.
The model for the first part is exactly the same as that developed
for Stage A. The second part was not included in the Stage A
analysis because it was judged to be a very low likelihood event
during that part of the mission because of its very short duration.
It would take time for the fuel to leak into the solenoid cavity
and for the subsequent fuel decomposition and detonation to occur.
For Stage B, however, it has a higher likelihood of occurrence
because of the longer duration--most particularly during the long
on-orbit period. Because of the knowledge acquired concerning the
very low likelihood of failure as a consequence of exhaust gas
leaks, it became clear that Event HB is dominated by the solenoid
detonation event.
There are two classes of solenoid detonation events that can
occur. One involves the GGVM; the other, the isolation valves.
In the case of the GGVM, the consequential external fuel leakage
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is smaller (because of closed isolation valves) and is much more
apt to result in failure of only the leaking APU. In the case
of the isolation valves, the consequential external fuel leakage
is much more massive (coming directly from the fuel tank because
of the inability to isolate the leak) and is expected to fail
more than just the leaking APU. Based cn these considerations,
it seemed reasonable to cover the GGVM case in the Event HB,
which addresses single APU failures, and to include the isolation
valve case in Event GB, which covers multiple APU failures.
The fault trees developed for HB are presented in Appendices
B6.5-36 through B6.5-40. Appendix B6.5-36 presents a Fault Tree
(labeled HBI) that applies to the first (uppermost) node for HB
in the event tree and models the permanenK failure of at least
one out of three APUs as the primary consequence of an external
fuel leak caused by detonation in the GGVM as a result of fuel
leakage into one of the two solenoid cavities.
Appendix B6.5-37 presents a fault tree (labeled HB2) that applies
to the second node for HB in the event tree. This models, in
conjunction with another permanent failure (from Event PB), the
permanent failure of a second APU as the primary consequence of
an external fuel leak caused by detonation in the GGVM because of
fuel leakage into one of the two solenoid cavities.
Appendix B6.5-38 presents a fault tree (labeled HB3) that applies
to the third node for HB in the event tree and models, in
conjunction with a turbine runaway failure (from Event TB), the
permanent failure of a second APU as the primary consequence of
an external fuel leak caused by detonation in the GGVM because of
fuel leakage into one of the two solenoid cavities.
Appendix B6.5-39 presents a fault tree (labeled HB4) that
applies to the fourth node for HB in the event tree. This
models, in conjunction with a permanent start failure of one APU
(from Event SS), the permanent failure of a second APU as the
primary consequence of an external fuel leak caused by detonation
in the GGVM because of fuel leakage into one of the two solenoid
cavities.
Separate fault trees are required for the various nodes to
properly account for the order correction factors. The exhaust-
gas-leak portions of the event trees are exactly the same as
those developed for Stage A. The new fuel-leak portions simply
identify the ways in which fuel can leak into the solenoid
cavities and account for the resultant potential for detonation.
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The numerical results computed from the HB Fault Trees directly
yield the requisite split fractions for the various nodes for
the HB Event.
Top Event GB: Failure of Flight Critical Equipment or Second
APU Due to Exhaust Gas Leak or Valve Detonation
The eighth top event in the Stage B Event Tree is GB. This event
represents the failure of at least two APUs as a consequence of
an exhaust gas leak in at least two APUs, or as a consequence of
massive external fuel leakage produced by a detonation resulting
from fuel leaking into the solenoid cavity of one of the isolation
valves in an APU.
The model for the first part is exactly the same as that developed
for Stage A. The second part was not included in the Stage A
analysis because it was judged to be a very low likelihood event
during that part of the mission because of its very short duration.
It would take time for the fuel to leak into the solenoid cavity
and for the subsequent fuel decomposition and detonation to occur.
For Stage B, however, it has a higher likelihood of occurrence
because of the longer duration of the on-orbit period. Because of
the knowledge acquired concerning the very low likelihood _f
failure as a consequence of exhaust gas leaks, it became clear
that Event GB is dominated by the solenoid detonation event.
As discussed for the HB Event, there are two classes of solenoid
detonation events that can occur. One involves the GGVM, the
other the isolation valves. In the case of the GGVM, the con-
sequential external fuel leakage is smaller and is much more apt
to result in failure of only the leaking APU. In the case of
the isolation valves, the consequential external fuel leakage
is much more massive (coming directly from the fuel tank) and is
expected to fail more than just the leaking APU. For scenarios
involving both the HB and GB Events, those two events can most
reasonably be treated as separate, independent events. That is,
the numerical result from the GB quantification directly provides
the requisite split fraction for the Top Event GB in the event
tree (which is considered acceptable because the exhaust gas leak
probabilities are so very small with respect to the solenoid
detonation considerations).
The fault trees developed for GB are presented in Appendices B6.5-
41 through B6.5-46. Appendices B6.5-41 through B6.5-45 present
five different fault trees to support scenarios involving no other
failures to the left of it in the event tree and Events HB, PB, TB,
and SS. These fault trees are very similar to those developed for
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the Event HB. The numerical results computed from those five fault
trees provide the requisite split fractions for the five nodes of
Top Event GB in the event tree. No conditional probabilities are
computed as was done in the Stage A analysis. The Fault Tree GB-T
presented in Appendix B6.5-46 is used in the same basic manner as
described above for Fault Tree DB-T for Event DB.
Top Events MI, I(2, ME: Hydrazine Leakage from APU I, 2, or 3
The ninth, tenth, and eleventh top events in the Stage B Event
Tree presented in Figure 6.4.2 are Mk, where k can be i, 2, or 3.
This event was analyzed in exactly the same manner as was done
for Stage A, and the event tree used for representing the
requisite split fractions is shown in Appendix B6.5-47. To use
the leakage split fractions listed in that appendix, it is simply
a matter of matching those nodes in that figure with the
corresponding nodes in the event tree in Figure 6.4.2. The Split
Fraction P21 for Node 1 of the Event M2 is matched to all nodes
in the event tree for which M2 occurs when M1 does not occur.
Likewise, the Split Fraction P22 for Node 2 of the Event M2 is
matched to all nodes in the event tree for which M1 does occur.
A similar approach is used for the nodes for M3.
Top Event FBz Failure of Flight Critical E_uipment Due to
spatial Interaction Initiated by Hydrazine
Leakage
The twelfth top event in the Stage B Event Tree is FB. This event
represents the permanent failure of flight critical equipment as a
direct consequence of a fuel leak in one or more APUs. No fault
tree was constructed for this event since the requisite split
fraction is simply one number that depends only on the specific
leakage conditions for the scenario being analyzed. The develop-
ment of those single split fractions is discussed in Section 7.0.
Top Events Dl, D2, D3z Hydraslne Leakage Causes Failure of
APU I, 2, or 3 Given That Two APUs Have
Hot Failed
The thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth top events in the Stage
B Event Tree are Dk, where k can be i, 2, or 3. This event
represents the consequential failure of APU k due to a fuel leak
in one of the APUs. The leak can be in APU k, in some other APU,
or in some combination of both. The specific condition depends
entirely on the particular event tree scenario being analyzed.
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)A generic fault tree applicable to all of the Dk Event Tree nodes
is presented in Appendix B6.5-48. This fault tree is exactly the
same as that developed for the Stage A analysis.
Top Events RI, Ra, R3: Leak in APU I, 2, or 3 Before EI-I3 or
Into Pump Seal Cavity
The sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth top events in the
Stage B Event Tree are Rk, where k can be l, 2, or 3. This event
represents the shutdown of an APU because of a small fuel leak.
Included in this category are all pump seal leaks. Also included
are small leaks that occur before EI and are detected. The
generic fault tree for this event is presented in Appendix B6.5-
49. The probability that a leak occurs before EI given that a
leak has occurred is taken to be a time ratio:
TEI- TTIG_ 5
TSD - TTIG_ 5
(SD = SHUTDOWN)
This fraction is conservative (small) in that it is based on
the time TIG-5 rather than some average of the start times
from TIG-5 to EI-13. The value of this fraction is 25/66,
or 0.38.
Top Events TI, T2, T3: Spurious Shutdown of APU I, 2, or 3
The nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty-first top events in the
Stage B Event Tree are Tk, where k can be i, 2, or 3. This
event represents an APU recoverable failure involving a
spurious overspeed or underspeed trip of the turbine in APU k.
This condition causes an immediate, automatic shutdown of the
affected APU, but that APU can normally be recovered later
during Stage B by setting the associated automatic shutdown
switch to the inhibit position. This pa_icular failure mode
has been separated from all of the other recoverable failures
because of the immediate, automatic loss of the affected APU.
The generic fault tree developed for Tk is shown in Appendix
B6.5-50. This fault tree is essentially the same as that
developed for the Stage A analysis.
Top Events TE, PW: Failure of at Least One APU After TAEM-3.5
Minutes; Failure of at Least One APU After
Wheelstop
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The twenty-second and twenty-third top events in the event tree
are TE and PW. These events identify failures that occur during
TAEM (TE) and post wheelstop (PW).
The split fractions for the TE Event simply involve time ratios.
The specific manner in which the ratio is used depends on the
specific scenario being analyzed. The fundamental probability (a
time ratio) is defined as follows:
P1 =
TSD - TTAEM_3. 5
TSD - TEI_I3
(SD = SHUTDOWN)
Based on this formula, the following expressions can be used to
calculate the split fractions for the associated scenario
condit_zns:
Pl • • • • " •
1 of 1 fails after TAEM
1 of 2 fails after TAEM
2 of 2 fail after TAEM
The above estimates are conservative (high) in that they are based
on EI-13 in the denominator instead of some average value between
TIG-5 and EI-13. The value of the fundamental probability is
taken to be 20.5/54, or 0.38.
In the case of PW, a simple time ratio can be used for scenarios
having APUs failing for causes other than fuel leaks, while a
more complex formulation is needed for scenarios involving fuel
leaks. A simple time ratio is not adequate in the case of fuel
leakage because of the time delay inherent in accumulating
sufficient hydrazine in the aft compartment to cause damage
given the onset of a leak. For cases involving a simple time
ratio, the following fundamental probabilities are defined:
PT i
TSD - TWS
TSD -TTAEM_3. 5
• for failures occurring after TAEM-3.5
PF
TSD - TWS
TSD - TTIG_ 5
• . . for all other failures
Based on these formulas, the following expressions are used to
calculate the split fractions for the associated scenario
conditions:
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°PT ...... 1 of 1 event that occurs after TAEM-3.5
also occurs after wheelstop
2P T - pT 2 • . 1 of 2 events that occurs after TAEM-3.5
also occurs after wheelstop
PT 2 2 of 2 events that occur after T_M-3.5
also occur after wheelstop
PF ...... 1 of 1 event oc_ars after wheelstop
2P F - PF 2 . . 1 of 2 events occurs after wheelstop
PF 2 ..... 2 of 2 events occur after wheelstop
The value of PT is 10/20.5, or 0.49.
or 0.15.
The value of PF is 10/66,
For cases requiring the more complex formulation (that is, when
fuel leakage is involved), their bases can be described using the
diagram presented in Appendix B6.5-51. The horizontal scale is a
non-linear time scale. The vertical scale at the right indicates
the total amount of fuel leaked, while the scale at the left
indicates the total amount of leaking fuel accumulated in the aft
compartment. The shaded region labeled T in the center represents
uncertainty in the threshold amount of fuel required in the
aft compartment to support combustion. Line L1 indicates a leak
occurring on-orbit. In orbit, the vent doors are open, so leaking
fuel can exit the aft compartment. It is not until after the vent
doors are closed for deorbit that fuel can begin to accumulate in
the aft compartment, as indicated by line AI. Line A1 intersects
threshold region T at some point between TAEM and wheelstop,
indicating that a fire would be expected to begin before wheel-
sUop. Line A2 shows a leak occurring after EI. Hydrazine begins
to accumulate in the aft compartment immediately. That line
intersects the threshold region T after wheelstop, indicating that
a fire is expected to be delayed until after wheelstop.
From this overview perspective, the PW split fraction is computed
as follows:
T O + TTAEM_3. 5 - TTIG_ 5
X PWDWS +
T O + TSD - TTIG_ 5
TSD - TTAEM_3. 5 TSD - TWS + TBU
X
T O + TSD - TTIG_ 5 TSD - TTAEM_3. 5
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The coefficient of PWDWS is the fraction of the total Stage B time
that occurs before TAEM-3.5. PWDWS is the conditional probability
that damage from a fuel leak occurs after wheelstop, given that the
leak occurs before TAEM-3.5. The value for this probability was
evaluated from the distribution presented in Appendix B6.5-52. This
distribution was developed from a review of the leakage data in the
database. The point esuimate (mean) from this distribution is 0.7.
In the second term, the first ratio represents the fraction of the
total Stage B time that occurs after TAEM-3.5. The second ratio
represents the fraction of the post-TAEM-3.5 time that a leak
occurs late enough to permit the build-up delay of the fuel in the
aft compartment to delay T_he consequential damage until some time
after wheelstop. This build-up time, TBU, was assessed to be
about 4 minutes, based on an evaluation of available leakage
information in _he database.
Top Event RE: Failure to Recover APU When Needed For Landing
The last top event in the event tree is RE. This event covers
failure to recover APUs that failed during Stage B. This
includes failure to restart and detonation at restart. Run
failures are covered by the PB and DB Events, and consequential
failures due to fuel leaks are covered by the Dk Events.
Although there is one basic fault tree, there are three variations
of it, based on the specific scenario being analyzed. These three
forms are presented in Appendices B6.5-53 through B6.5-55; one for
the case of small fuel leaks (REL), one for the case of a spurious
shutdown (RES), and one for scenarios involving both a spurious
shutdown and a small fuel leak (RELS).
6.5.8.2 Initial Condition 4 (Impact Vector 2)
Based on the discussion in Section 6.4, initial condition 4 (from
damage bin 4) is defined as follows:
One APU permanently failed and one
APU spurious shutdown during Stage A
The split fraction models discussed below support the event tree
in Appendix B6.4-3 that was developed for this initial condition.
The fault tree diagrams refer to this initial condition as Impact
Vector 2.
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Top Event DS: Second APU Fails to Start
The first top event in the Stage B Event Tree is DS. This event
represents a specific type of APU permanenU failure -- namely,
failure of a second APU because of failure to start on demand.
The fault tree developed for DS is presented in Appendix B6.5-56.
This diagram is essentially the same as the one developed for the
start failures in the Top Event SS for Stage B, initial condition
7 (Impact Vector I). The only difference from that model is that
the top gate is based on l-out-of-2 logic, rather than the 1-out-
of-3 logic used for Impact Vector i.
The numerical result computed from the Fault Tree DS directly
yields the requisite split fraction for the Top Event SS in the
event tree.
Top Event TB: Turbine Overspeed
The second top event in the Stage B Event Tree is TB. This event
represents a specific type of APU permanent failure -- namely,
one involving turbine runaway, where failures cause the turbine
speed to increase above normal operating levels and the overspeed
protection system fails to shut the turbine down.
The fault tree developed for TB is presented in Appendix B6.5-57.
This model is essentially the same as that developed for Event
TB for Stage B, Impact Vector i. The only difference is that the
top gate has 1-out-of-2 logic instead of the l-out-of-3 logic
used for Impact Vector I. The numerical result computed from
Fault Tree TB directly yields the requisite split fraction for
the Top Event TB in the event tree.
Top Event DB: Failure of the Second APU After It Starts
The third top event in the Stage B Event Tree is DB. The fault
tree developed for DB is presented in Appendix B6.5-58. This
model is essentially the same as that developed for Event PB for
Stage B, Impact Vector I. The only difference is that the top
gate has l-out-of-2 logic instead of the l-out-of-3 logic used
for Impact Vector 1. The numerical result computed from Fault
Tree DB directly yields the requisite split fraction for the Top
Event TB in the event tree.
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Top Event 8B:
D
Uninhibited Spurious Shutdown of at Least One APU
The fourt-h top event in the Stage B Event Tree is SB. This event
represents a variation on a specific type of APU failure --
namely, one involving a spurious overspeed or underspeed trip
of the turbine in APU k. While this condition causes an
immediate, automatic shutdown of the affected APU, its effects
for Impact Vector 2 in Stage B are quite different from those
for Impact Vector 1 in Stage B. For Impact Vector I, the auto-
matic trip circuitry can subsequently be manually set to the
inhibit position so that the APU can be s_arted at a later time.
For Impact Vector 2, however, that inhibit selection was made
before any of the APUs were star_ed for the entry phase of the
mission. Thus, if a spurious shutdown occurs anyway, it means
that the inhibit circuitry was not functioning properly and that
the APU cannot be restarted. This instance of a spurious shut-
down represents a permanent failure.
The fault tree developed for SB is presented in Appendix B6.5-59.
This fault tree is similar to the fault tree for Tk in the
analysis for Impact Vector i, except that it has been changed
to account for failure of the inhibit circuitry. The numerical
result computed from Fault Tree SB directly yields the requisite
split fraction for the Top Event SB in the event tree.
Top Event KB: Failure of One &PU Due to Exhaust Gas Leak or
GGVMDetonation
The fifth top event in the Stage B Event Tree is HBI. This model
is essentially the same as that developed for Event HB for Stage B,
Impact Vector i. The only difference is that all failures of APU 3
have been deleted from the model. The numerical result computed
from Fault Tree HBI directly yields the requisite split fraction
for the Top Event HB in the event tree.
Top Event GB: Failure of Flight Critical Equipment or a Second
_PU Due to Exhaust Gas Leak or Valve Detonation
The sixth top event in the Stage B Event Tree is GB0. This model
is essentially the same as that developed for Event GB for Stage
B, Impact Vector I. The only difference is that hot gas leak of
APU 3 (the name assigned to the APU that failed during Stage A)
cannot occur, and that basic event has been deleted from the
fault tree. However, since fuel can still leak into the solenoid
cavities in the isolation valves of the failed APU, that basic
event has been retained. The numerical result computed from
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Fault Tree GB0 directly yields the requisite split fraction for
the Top Event GB in the event tree.
Top Events MI, M2, M3: Hydrazlne Leakage from APU I, 2, or 3
The seventh, eighth, and ninth top events in the Stage B Event
Tree are Mk, where k can be I, 2, or 3. This event was analyzed
in exactly the same manner as was done for Stage B, Impact
Vector 1, and the event tree depicting all admissible states is
presented in Appendix B6.5-62.
Top Event FB: Failure of Flight criti=al Equipment Due to Spatial
Intera=tions Initiated by Xydrazine Leakage
The tenth top event in the Stage B Event Tree is FB. This event
represents the permanent failure of flight critical equipment as
a direct consequence of a fuel leak in one or more APUs. No fault
tree was constructed for this event since the requisite split
fraction is simply one number that depends only on the specific
leakage conditions for the scenario being analyzed. The develop-
ment of those single split fractions is discussed in Section 7.
Top Event PW: Failure of at Least One APU After Wheelstop
The eleventh top event in the event tree is PW. This event
is analyzed in exactly the same manner as discussed in the
preceding TE and PW Events for Stage B, Impact Vector 1
(Initial Condition 7).
6.5.8.3 Initial Conditions 5 and 6 (Impact Vectors 3 and 4)
As discussed in Sections 6.4 and 8, the maximum possible collec-
tive contribution of both of these initial conditions to LOC/V
is of the order of 1 per cent or less. Neither of these
conditions can possibly make a dominant contribution to the risk
of loss of crew or vehicle. Since little significant additional
knowledge or insights can be gained by analyzing either of these
two initial conditions, there is no need to develop the event
trees or fault trees associated with either of these initial
conditions, and no such trees are presented.
6.6 SPATIAL INTERACTIVE EVENTS (SIEs)
An SIE is a propagating failure within a system or a cascading
failure into another system that results from an initiating
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failure or condition by virtue of close proximity. To be an
SIE, a consequential failure must also be initiated by means of
a physical interactive mechanism such as hot gas or shrapnel
that results from failure of or degraded operation of the system.
Thus, a detonation of fuel in one APU Gas Generator Valve Module
(GGVM) because cf an exhaust leak in another APU is a spatial
interactive event, whereas loss of an APU because of a secondary
fuel valve failure to the closed position in the GGVM is not.
The split fraction representing an SIE is modeled as a conditional
probability distribution as described in Section 5.4. The SIE
split fractions discussed in this analysis are a subset of the set
of all split fractions defined by the node points on the APU event
trees.
Three types of SIEs have been identified as significant for this
study. They are (i) events related to APU turbine breakup, (2)
events related to APU fuel (hydrazine) leakage, and (3) events
related to hot exhaust gas leakage. The impact of an SIE depends
in some cases on the flight phase in which it occurs. In these
cases, the conditional probability distributions modeling the
split fraction will vary from one phase to the next. The three
categories of SIEs are discussed in the paragraphs below.
6.6.1 Events Related to APU Turbine Breakup
The SIEs resulting from APU turbine breakup are those in which
turbine fragments directly damage other APUs or flight critical
equipment, or in which fuel leaking from the damaged APU then
damages other equipment. Leaking fuel can cause contact
corrosion, flames from decomposition, or flames from combustion.
SIEs initiated by fuel leakage are discussed in 6.6.2. SIEs
initiated by turbine fragments are reflected in the conditional
probability distributions defined in Section 7.6.1, and are
discussed below.
Turbine breakup can occur while the APU is operating in its normal
design speed range or during an uncontrolled overspeed. A breakup
at normal speed would result from installation of a seriously
flawed turbine or from the propagation to critical size of a minute
crack that was not detected in pre-installation inspection. Data
to develop these failure frequencies are presented in Section 7.6.
A breakup at overspeed would result when both fuel control valves
fail to close on command. This could result from a failure in the
valves themselves or in the APU controller. Data to develop these
component failure frequencies are presented in Section 7.5.
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The effects of an SIE initiated by turbine breakup depend on the
energy level of the uncontained fragments, the likelihood of a
fragment striking a piece of critical equipment, and the vulner-
ability of that equipment to damage. The energy level of the
uncontained fragments is determined by the speed at which the
turbine breaks up and by the energy absorbed in breaking out of
the APU housing. Uncontained fragments from turbine breakup at
normal speeds would, therefore, have significantly lower energy
levels than fragments from an overspeed breakup. The APU housing
design is a factor as well. The containmenu ring on the HPU is
26% larger than that on the APU. For this reason, the energy
levels of uncontained fragments from the APU are significantly
higher than those from the HPU.
Determining the likelihood of a fragment striking a piece of
critical equipment is a complex analytical task, but for which
Monte Carlo-based techniques have been developed. The aft
compartment is extremely crowded with not only APU fuel lines and
tanks, but with LH 2 and LO 2 feedlines, avionics bays, hydraulic
lines and numerous wiring harnesses. The probability distribution
to describe this likeli-hood was, therefore, based on all avail-
able knowledge including test and analytical data and was
developed subjectively, using the process described in Sections
5.8 and 7.6.
The vulnerability of equipment to damage is determined by the
fragility of the equipment compared to the possible energy levels
of the fragments.
Shrapnel may be generated by means other than turbine breakup,
such as APU fuel detonation in a fuel line or from a gearbox
failure. These possibilities were also evaluated and were not
considered significant.
6.6.2 Events Related to APU Fuel Leakaae
The SIEs that result from APU fuel leakage are those in which
fuel leaking from an APU damages flight critical equipment or an
APU. SIEs associated with APU fuel leakage are reflected in the
conditional probability distributions defined in Section 7.6.2.
Values assigned to the split fractions are also discussed in
Section 7.6 below.
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Another potential source of detonation is the APU fuel pump seal.
If the carbon face of this seal were to be damaged and allow
metal to rub against metal, then high temperatures or sparks
would be produced, causing hydrazine detonation within the fuel
pump. This event occurred once during testing of an APU.
The two scenarios described below may produce conditions leading
to hydrazine detonation upon restarting a leaking APU.
Scens, z'io 1:
Condition: An APU fuel leak occurs between the closed fuel isola-
tion valve and the fuel pump; the hydrazine in the connecting fuel
line leaks away leaving only hydrazine vapor or a vacuum.
Result: When the fuel isolation valve is opened just prior to
restarting the APU, the fuel will surge along the line and
compress the hydrazine vapor, perhaps causing detonation. Even
if no vapor remains in the fuel line, the action of the hydrazine
accelerating into the line past the fuel isolation valve could
introduce vapor bubbles into the fuel stream and the watem hammer
effect, which occurs when the fuel reaches the fuel pump, could
cause detonation (Reference 95).
Scenario 2:
Condition: Hydrazine leaks into the solenoid cavity of a fuel
isolation valve or gas generator control valve.
Result: A failure of the valve by means of (1) detonation of
the hydrazine induced by the catalytic action of some material
contained within the cavity, such as nickel plated iron, (2)
electrical shorting of the coil, or (3) detonation caused by
a spark. If the valve does not fail immediately, then later
when the APU is restarted, the hydrazine may have removed
enough electrical insulation to cause either a spark followed
by hydrazine detonation or simply electrically short the coil
(Reference 90).
6.6.3 Events Related to Hot APU Exhaust Gas Leakaq9
The SIEs that result from hot APU exhaust gas leakage are those
in which leaking hot APU exhaust gas damages flight critical
equipment or an APU.
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6.6.3.1 High Pressure Hot APU Exhaust Gas Leakage
It may be possible for high pressure/high temperature gas to escape
from the APU gas generator to the general environment by means of a
narrow channel connecting the gas generaUor to a high pressure
transducer. Gas within the gas generator has a design temperature
of 1700"F, and a pressure of 1300 psia (Reference 33). The gas is
expected to cool somewhat by passage _hrough the access channel.
Because of the leak location, only the leaking APU could possibly
be damaged by high pressure hot APU exhaust gas leakage. Hot gas
may damage the APU wiring insulation. This insulation is Teflon
wrapped with Kapton tape, and may be destroyed by sustained
exposure to temperatures of 500"F or above. The possibility is
considered remote and, as a simplifying assumption in this study,
the probability was considered negligible.
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6.6.3.2 LOW Pressure Hot APU Exhaust Gas Leakage
As shown in Reference 84, an APU gas generator leak into the APU
exhaust duct can produce exhaust gas temperatures as great as
1600"F without starving the APU turbine due to the loss of hot
gas flow. The APU exhaust duct, constructed of Inconel 600, is
qualified for a temperature of II60"F at sea level and 1000"F in
space (Reference 103).
Reference 98 shows that Inconel 600 suffers a fairly rapid decay
in strength at temperatures above 1200"F. It may be possible
that exposure of the APU exhaust duct to high temperatures
resulting from a gas generator leak, in combination with APU
vibration levels, could eventually lead to exhaust duct failure.
However, there is some confidence that the duct would survive at
least one flight in this condition without failure. It should be
noted that no testing has been done to verify this opinion.
The prime contractor currently recommends shutting down an APU
that shows a high exhaust temperature indicative of a gas
generator leak. However, NASA-JSC has eliminated exhaust gas
temperature as an indicator for APU shutdown due to the
unreliability of the APU's Exhaust Gas Temperature (EGT) trans-
ducers and to the availability of other indicators of APU health
(Reference 26). NASA-JSC also believes that the possibility
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of exhaust duct failure due to a gas generator leak is remote
(Reference 43). Again, the probability was considered negligible
as a simplifying assumption in this study.
_vionics Bay Damage
The APU exhaust plume consists of a mixture of N 2, H 2. and NH 3 gas
at an exhaust duct exit temperature of between 900"F and ll60"F.
At the exit points of any exhaust leak into the aft compartment,
the temperature will be no greater than !160"F.
The three aft avionics bays are located on the lower part of the
1307 bulkhead, below the APUs. The confiquration of the APU
exhaust ducts is such that few exhaust leak locations would result
in a leak plume being directed onto the exterior of one of the
avionics bays at close range. A leak of the APU 1 exhaust duct
in the worst possible location could result in the leak plume
impinging on the upper surface of Avionics Bay 4 at a distance
of about 6 feet. For other exhaust leak locations, the direct
line distance to the nearest avionics bay is 13 feet or more.
Reference 85 indicates that for the APU exhaust plume at sea
level conditions, the temperature at an axial distance from the
nozzle exit of 6 feet is less than 400"F. The temperature at an
axial distance of 13 feet is approximately 200"F. It is very
unlikely that any APU exhaust leak would direct more than a small
portion of the total exhaust gas flow, resulting in even lower
temperatures at comparable distances from an exhaust leak. It
should also be noted that the APU exhaust pressure is less than
i0 Pounds per Square Inch (psi), meaning that an exhaust leak
into the aft compartment is a diffused cloud of hot gas rather
than a directed jet of hot gas.
Yet another mitigating factor is that the avionics equipment in
question is enclosed within an aluminum honeycomb box (the
avionics bay itself) covered by a one inch thick insulation
blanket, and is cooled by freon circulating through cold plates.
In view of the above considerations, the chances of damage to
avionics bay electronics equipment due to direct effects of an
APU exhaust leak are considered negligible for the purposes of
this study.
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XPU Damage
Damage to electrical wiring in the immediate vicinity of the
exhaust duct is a credible event, particularly wiring for the
APU itself. The wiring insulation is Teflon with Kapton tape
wrapping, which is destroyed by sustained exposure to tempera-
tures of 500"F or above. Temperatures in this range are possible
due to an exhaust leak, but are still unlikely as they require a
substantial portion of the APU exhaust plume to be diverted into
the aft compartment.
It appears that the elbow joints of the exhaust duct or the APU
to exhaust duct seal are somewhat more susceptible to leaks.
In either case, the wiring susceptible to damage from the leak
is the wiring of the leaking APU. Thus, there may be a small
probability of loss of an APU with an exhaust leak, and a much
smaller probability of loss of one APU due to another APU's
exhaust leak. The latter applies to APUs 1 and 2 only; APU 3
is I0 feet away from the nearest other APU exhaust duct. The
probability of these events was considered negligibly small for
this study.
Another effect to consider is the effect of the leaking APU exhaust
on fluid lines of another shut down APU. The extreme consequence
of this could be detonation of fuel in the lines. Periods of
potential exposure of a stagnant fuel line in one APU to another
APU's leaking exhaust are limited to about 5 minutes during Flight
Control System (FCS) checkout and about 20 minutes during entry.
Rough calculations indicate possible detonation during the entry
timeframe if a high pressure, focused jet of APU 1 exhaust
impinges on APU 2 fuel lines before APU 2 start, or vice-versa.
As concluded earlier, such a high pressure, focused jet is of
negligible probability.
Orbiter Ift Compartment Ovezpreseurisation
A possible Orbiter damage scenario is overpressurization of the
aft compartment due to the accumulation of exhaust gas in the
compartment during the period of entry, before the vent doors open
at Mach 2.4. The vent doors are closed at the Software Major Mode
(MM304) transition (EI-5 minutes), so exhaust gas accumulation can
begin at this point. The exhaust gas pressure is approximately
10 psi in space, and only 0.3 psid pressure is required to cause
structural failure to the aft compartment.
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Calculations show that a leak rate of =10% of the total exhaust
gas flow, starting at MM 304 [Entry Interface (EI)], is required
to cause damage to the aft compartment structure before the vent
doors open. Such a leak rate would require a large hole in the
duct and a mechanism for diverting the flow out of the hole.
This event is also considered to be of negligible probability.
APU Exhaust Gas Ignition or Explosion
Yet another possible source of severe damage to the vehicle is
ignition of hydrogen accumulated in the aft compartment due to
an APU exhaust leak. This is not a concern during ascent or
orbit, because there is insufficient oxygen to suppo._:
combustion. It could be a concern during entry below 60,000
feet, where sufficient oxygen exists to support combustion.
Because of the extremely low likelihood of significant gas
leakage into aft compartment, and the considerations mentioned
above, this failure event is considered to be of negligible
probability.
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7.0 APU DATA DEVELOPMENT
This section describes in detail the process used to collect and
evaluate the failure data for the APU, and also the process used
to develop probability distributions for component failure rates
from this data.
A few comments concerning probability distribution are appropriate
at this point. Probability distributions are used in this context
to reflect the fact that component failure rates are uncertain.
The use of probability distributions provides a complete descrip-
tion of our state of knowledge about the failure rates of the
equipment in question, including any sources of variability among
similar components. By contrast, use of a single number, called a
point estimate, would tend to imply a degree of exactness that is
not justified by the data.
It is important to bear in mind that the existence of uncertainty
about component failure rates does not imply that the results are
inaccurate or that they reflect a state of ignorance on the part of
the analysts. Rather, uncertainty arises from a number of sources:
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The relatively small amount of data that is available on
many components
The possibility of missing data (e.g., failures that are
not captured by the data collection process)
Decisions about whether incipient failures should be
treated as failures in the data analysis
Estimation of the applicable exposure data (e.g., the
total number of hours that a component operated)
The application of data from one situation (e.g.,
checkout) to other situations such as actual flights
The assumption that failure rates are constant over
time
Differences in component reliability from one mission
to another (e.g., due to differences in refurbishment)
ho Differences in component reliability from one APU to
another, or between similar components in the same APU
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io The extrapolation of failure rate estimates developed
for other applications (e.g., aircraft) to the Space
Shuttle
j • The environmental factors that should be used in
adjusting failure rate estimates from one application
to another
The approach used in this study to describe and quantify such
uncertainties is the Bayesian theory of probability. In this
approach, each basic event frequency is described by a prob-
ability distribution specifying the various possible values for
that frequency and the likelihood of each. The Bayesian approach
is capable of taking into account both engineering judgment about
the event frequency, and also empirical data such as the actual
number of failures that were observed during operation of the APU.
In particular, a prior probability distribution is specified to
reflect all the available information on similar components in
other applications, as tempered by engineering judgment. This
distribution is generally then updated with the observed APU data
to yield a revised (i.e., posterior) distribution• In other
cases, the posterior, distribution is simply set equal to the
prior distribution, and no update is performed. This is done in
cases where little relevant information is available from other
sources• The available APU data is therefore used to develop the
prior distribution instead of to update it. In addition, no
update is performed in cases where no APU data is available for
use in the update; e.g., in modeling certain types of emergency
demands that have not occurred during the operating experience of
the APUs to date.
The use of Judgment is in keeping with the Bayesian theory of
probability, and the judgmen_ of an analysis group that is know-
ledgeable about equipment reliability is a valid form of evidence
for use in formulating distributions. Experience has shown that
the judgment of experienced analysts is often remarkably close to
actual data when the two have been compared. For example, several
studies of component reliability have found expert estimates of
component failure rates to be typically within a factor of two to
four from the observed failure rates.
Section 7.1 describes the raw data sources from which APU failure
data was obtained. These sources include such documents as
corrective action reports, anomaly reports, and so on. For most
spatial interaction events (SIEs), virtually no empirical data was
available. Therefore, judgmental distributions were developed for
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the frequencies of these events (e.g., the likelihood of damaging
an adjacent APU as the result of a turbine overspeed). The process
used for developing SIE distributions is described in Section 5.8
and the resulting judgmental distributions are described in
Section 7.6. These distributions were based on extensive know-
ledge of such events, and also on a number of analytical studies
performed specifically in support cf this PRA.
Section 7.3 presents tables summarizing the raw data that was
discussed in Section 7.1. These tables served as the basis for
the data analysis. However, several adjusuments were made to
the information in these tables. The guidelines and criteria
that were used to categorize the data according to component
type and failure mode, and also the criteria used for determining
which events (e.g., incipient failures) that would be considered
non-failures in this study are described in Section 7.4.
In general, the criteria specified in Section 7.4 are fairly
conservative. Conservative in this study means erring on the
side of overestimating the frequency of events. For example,
grouping several similar components into a single category for
purposes of data analysis can result in narrower uncertainty
bounds, by increasing the amount of data available for use in
estimating failure rates. Therefore, in this study, such
grouping was generally done only when the components in question
were virtually identical (e.g., for identical components on
different APUs, or for the two isolation valves on each APU).
The reason for this approach was to avoid inadvertently
attributing inapplicable data to particular components, since
otherwise an inappropriate failure rate distribution could
result. To give some indication of the kinds of problems that
can result from inappropriate grouping of components, consider
an example involving two distinct types of components. If one
type of component fails once every i00 hours and the second
type fails three times every I00 hours, then grouping the data
for these two components would give an average failure rate of
twice every i00 hours, which is not appropriate for either type
of component. Treating the two types of components separately,
as was done in this study, gives slightly broader but more
accurate distributions for the component failure rates.
Section 7.5 presents the actual prior and posterior distributions
that were developed for the categories of component failures
specified in Section 7.4. The sources of data used to update
the distributions for the various failure rates are indicated.
The Bayesian analysis that was used to develop the posterior
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a. TEST
b. SIMILARITY
- Development, Qual, Acceptance
- Parts nearly alike; built to same speci-
fications, same usage, same manufacturer
c. ANALYS IS Analytical evaluanion; e.g., large parts/
systems not lending themselves to tests of
such things as expected launch vibrations
do OBSERVATION - Actual use of components in flight or in
similar space environment
For example, test and checkout failure data was compiled as
determined from prelaunch FRFs, Hot Fires, and Confidence Runs
which may be compared to acceptance tests. Similarly, electrical
component failure rates and mechanical device failure rate data
were obtained from established historical sources, References 97
and 99, respectively, which parallel certification by similarity.
Along the same lines, analysis was employed during the develop-
ment of the probability distributions for the SIEs. The flight
time accumulated for many of the APU components, without failure,
is in keeping with certification by observation.
Three broad types of datalwere required: (i) exposure data indi-
cating how long the various APU components had operated; (2) data
indicating how many failures of each given component had occurred
over the corresponding exposure period; and (3) the failure modes
that were observed.
It was obvious that utilizing Qualification Test (Qual) data would
not produce reasonable failure rates. The failures associated
with the Qua1 test program phase would likely represent flaws in
the early design or manufacturing process. These failures would
not necessarily be indicative of the final flight or production
components or of later refinements in the manufacturing process.
An exception to the use of Qual test data was made in the
development of the Spatial Interactive Events (SIE). There was
no other available source of information from which to draw
conclusions about unlikely, but catastrophic, occurrences such
as an APUturbine wheel failing in overspeed.
The Acceptance Test (ATP) phase was the next level of component
development for which data was known to be available. This data
was considered to be of value in tracking failures from the time
of contractor component, or system delivery, to end-of-life.
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However, several difficulties were encountered that made it
necessary to exclude the ATP data entirely. They were: (1) the
lack of information on actual design changes resulting from ATP
failures, (2) the inability to screen out facility failures and
anomalies caused by facility or test setups, (3) the lack of time
and funding available in this study to assure that the failures
observed and documented in the ATP data were representative of
the flight configuration.
Launch checkout and flight data were selected as the most meaning-
ful data to support this analysis. This data represents the APU
system in the flight configuration and flight environment.
Moreover, it was judged that any valid failure modes identified in
Qual or Acceptance tests, and not corrected, would be reflected in
flight failure rates, thus reducing the effect of not including
data from these development categories.
Several sources of launch checkout and flight data were found
to be available and accessible during the study time frame and
are described below. With the exception of one source, this
data existed in paper form only. The exception, the APU
Subsystem Manager's database, was a computer resident file
with no hard copy printout available.
These sources were utilized to develop failure histories, and
flight histories dating from 1 January 1981 through flight #24,
which landed on 18 January 1986. Other sources such as NASA/
contractor test reports and discussions with knowledgeable
personnel were used primarily as an information base to assist
in the development of probability distributions for the Spatial
Interactive Events.
The information from all sources was analyzed using a specific
set of criteria necessary to track APU failures. The data was
assembled into computer files according to the criteria
established. For example, it was necessary to track APU serial
numbers, dash numbers, flight numbers, and flight dates to
prevent duplicating failure and anomaly entries.
The salient informationneeded to develop flight failure rates
and mission timing sequences was compiled as a basis for
developing model input data. The individual data sources and
their use in this study are provided and discussed below.
Re Johnson Spacecraft Center (JSC) Orbiter Full Problem Report
(FPR) (Reference 28)
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b. Shuttle Flight Data and In-flight Anomaly List (References
31 and 32)
C. JSC Mission Reports, Missions 1 thru 23 (References 1
through 24)
do The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) APU
Subsystem Manager' s Database
e. Study and test reports from NASA and contractor sources and
published technical documents
The FPR, the Shuttle Flight Data and In-flight Anomaly List, the
JSC Mission Reports and the study and test reports existed only in
paper form. The remaining source, the Subsystem Manager's data-
base, was resident in a Model 870 VAX computer located in Building
13 at JSC. These sources support various NASA functions, and as a
result, differed as to format and data content. The salient
information from each of the data sources was added to a personal
computer (PC) data base program that provided edit, sort, search,
and print capability. Conflicts found throughout the review and
data compiling process required resolution before a coherent set
of data could be developed. The individual sources are discussed
in the following paragraphs.
7.1.1 JSC Orbiter Full Problem Beport
The FPR was utilized as a prime source of APU failure data. Each
record in this document contained various types of information
such as Corrective Action Repo_c (CAR) numbers, APU serial numbers,
dates of failures, part numbers, and problem descriptions, which
were invaluable in tracking and comparing failures from different
sources. Also included were failure modes as well as analysis and
resolution comments. The following data fields were utilized to
develop a computer data file needed to compile the relevant data
for the study:
DESCRIPTION
a. Page Reference
b. Test Op
c. Failure Mode
d. Report Number
e. ParCName
f. Part Number
g. Serial Number
FPR page number
Test operation (FLT, CKO, ATP, QUAL)
Hardware failure
CAR number assigned to failure
Hardware Name
Hardware Number
APU serial number
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Date Detected
Problem Description
Analysis &
Resolution
Date anomaly first reported
Anomaly description
Recommendations made to correct
condition causing failure
One major data element was the report or CAR number. This
"common" number allowed failure correlations between JSC Mission
Reports and the Shuttle Flight Data and In-flight Anomaly List.
Based on the ground rules established in paragraph 7.1, only
Flight (FLT) and Checkout (CKO) records were selected for use
in this study.
Appropriate information from the FPR records was entered into the
PC database and sorted into FLT and CKO files. The FPR data could
then then be compared with data from other sources to assure that
failures were logged only once. By careful review, the first four
data sources discussed in Paragraph 7.1 were combined into one data
file to produce the Raw Data Tables as described in Section 7.3.
7.1.2 Shuttle Fliaht Data and In-Fliq_t Anomaly List
The Shuttle Flight Data and In-flight Anomaly List is a historical
report of flight related information. It also includes in-flight
anomalies and references to problems encountered during the STS
missions.
The report is divided into two sections. The first section,
entitled "Shuttle Flight Data," provided the following mission-
related information:
a.
b.
C.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
APU serial and dash number
APU position
Launch and launch scrub dates
Initial altitude and inclination
Flight sequence number, flight, and Orbiter number
Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) Separation time
Thrust bucket throttle times
Main Engine Cut-off (MZCO) time
Other flight related data
The second section, entitled "Shuttle In-flight Anomaly List",
provided a list of significant anomalies that occurred on STS
missions. The anomalies of interest for this study were for the
Auxiliary Power Unit under a Work Unit Code (WUC) designator V46.
The type of information gathered was a brief description of the
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anomaly, the STS flight problem number and/or the CAR number
associated with the anomaly.
APU failure data from these two sections were combined to make up
an "APU Flight" and "APU In-flight Anomaly" data file similar to
that used to compile the FPR data. This dana file was used as one
of the four data sources from which comparisons were made prior to
the development of the Final DaUa Tables. The flight related
portions of the data base, such as SRB separation time and thrust
bucket throttle time, were u_ _o develop a "Study" mission data-
base, combining mission sequence, flight, and Orbiter tail numbers
from the JSC Mission Reports.
7.1.3 The NASA Subsystem Manaaer's Database
This data source consists of three separate historical data files
containing information from Flights 1 thru 24, and is maintained
by the NASA APU Subsystem Manager (SSM). The three files are
entitled: (1) Flite 2, (2) Operational History, and (3) Hardware.
Only data files 1 and 2 were used for the APU study.
The Flite 2 data file is essentially a compilation of APU
anomalies tracked by the SSM. The data fields included were:
RB
b.
C°
d.
e°
f.
g.
APU position and serial number
Mission ID (STS Reference)
Anomaly date
Component name
Vehicle number
Anomaly phase and description
Action taken
The Flite 2 data file assisted in determining which specific APU
component (e.g., fuel pump, gas generator, relief valve) had
failed when the FPR data only listed the anomaly or failure as an
APU without regard to a part number.
The Operational History data file provided APU run times by APU
position and serial number. The data fields included were:
a.
b.
C°
d.
e.
APU Position and Serial Number
Run Time Event (FRF, STS Flight, Launch scrub, etc.)
Flight Date (Date of Run Time Event)
Run Time in Decimal Minutes
Pre/Post FLT Test (FLT or Test Time)
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This file provided the APU run times associated with Flight
Readiness Firings (FRF), Launch Scrubs, Confidence Runs (CR) and
Checkout Operations at Kennedy Space Center (KSC), and Checkout
at the Sundstrand facility.
These run times were divided into three categories: (1) Flight
(FLT), (2) Checkout (CKO), and (3) Not Applicable (N/A). The
flight run time corresponded to APU operation during past missions.
The checkout time corresponded to APU CRs, Hot fires, FRFs, and APU
operation during launch scrubs. All Sundstrand run times were
classified "N/A", as there was no means to determine the test
configuration. A Sundstrand test configuration, for example,
might not include a flight-qualified cont=oller or the APU flight-
type tank, lines and isolation valves. The test setups most
likely would not have included all of the flight instrumentation.
In other words, an accumulation of APU system component operating
times could not reliably be determined. Failure rates of
individual components comprising the APU were considered outside
the scope of this study.
The data was sorted to provide run times in the different
categories, and was compared with the APU flight run times as
obtained from the JSC Mission Reports (See 7.1.4). The CKO run
times were accumulated separately, to be used in conjunction
with checkout failures as obtained from the FPR data in
determining checkout failure rates.
I
i
7.1.4 JSC Mission Reports
The JSC Mission Reports were used to obtain mission related data.
These reports were also used as references when mission information
obtained from other data sources required further clarification.
The mission reports proved to be very valuable during the course
of this study. They were utilized to determine:
ao
b.
C.
d.
e.
f.
Lift-off (L/O) time
APU run times for ascent, orbit, and entry
Time of entry interface (EI)
Blackout end
Terminal area energy management (TAEM)
Touchdown (TD)
7-10
oh.
Wheelstop (WS)
APU deactivation time
Q
It was necessary to accumulate APU run times by flight phases to
determine the variation in _cz time during these periods. Since
the SSM's Operational History file did no_ separate nhese times
into the needed phases (ascent, orbit, and entry), the JSC Mission
Reports were used as the baseline source of APU on/off/duration
run times for the study. The total APU ruin times from the SSM's
database were compared to those obtained from the JSC Mission
Reports, and less than a 1% difference was noted. Therefore, it
was concluded that the APU run times extracted from the mission
reports would be adequate for use in the development of the
mission-related database as shown in Appendix B7.3.
7.1.5 Study Reports. Test Results. & Personal Com_.unications
Some of the failure modes under consideration during this study
have a very low likelihood of occurrence. Directly applicable
test data does not exist for some failure modes; e.g., some
catastrophic SIEs. In order to estimate these likelihoods,
information from a large number of study and test reports from
NASA and contractor sources and other technical publications
was utilized.
Valuable information used to supplement the written reports was
obtained through telecons with various knowledgeable people in
specialized fields at JSC and other locations. It was discovered
during the study that tests were in progress at White Sands
Proving Grounds on the properties of Hydrazine and its effect on
certain materials. The results of these tests may have had an
influence on some of the hydrazine use during this study.
However, the results were not available for consideration and
application for this study.
7.2 SPATIAL INTERACTIVE EVENT DATA
This section presents the APU SIE split fraction distributions
in the format used for entry into the PRA model. Table 7.2-1
presents the data relevant to ascent and Table 7.2-2 presents
the data relevant to entry. These distributions and the infor-
mation supporting their development are presented individually
in Section 7.6 and are presented here for clarity and convenience.
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7.3 RAW DATA TABLE DEVELOPMENT
This section summarizes the vast amount cf data collected to
support two basic needs of the study: (1) determination of
observed APU failure frequencies, and (2) establishment of a
typical mission time reference from which probabilities of
occurrence could be calculated. One example of the latter was
the need to determine the variation in Entry Interface (EI)
times to obtain the average time for the s_art of two APUs
during entry.
There were three sources of failure frequencies: (1) actual
flight experience, (2) failure rates based on similarity data
from accepted sources, and (3) failure rates derived from
engineering judgment, supported by limited historical data.
A commercial software database program was utilized to compile,
manipulate and format the data for sorting and printing. Two
separate databases were developed from the sources discussed
in the previous paragraphs: a failure history database and a
mission event database. These databases are discussed in
paragraphs 7.3.1 and 7.3.2. The failure rates of electrical
items are described in paragraph 7.3.3.
!:'
7.3.1 Failure History Database and OutDut
The Failure History database was developed to compile flight
failures and checkout failures from the sources identified
previously. This database consists of (1) the APU Flight
Failure data file, and (2) the APU Checkout Failure data file.
The Flight Failure Data Tables (Appendix B7.3-1) represent
records created from the APU Flight Failure Data file. The
data fields are categorized as (I) the mission sequence number
and mission ID number which define the mission on which the
failure was cited; (2) the APU position, serial number, and
dash number; (3) the component part number and name of the
failed hardware; (4) the failure mode and problem description
which provide descriptive information; and (5) a resolution and
additional comments for each failure. The data fields such as
problem number, JSC document number, CAR number, Boeing page
number, and source code are used only as reference material.
The "source code key" can be used as reference to identify the
source of the information contained in the record.
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The Checkout Failure Data Tables (Appendix B7.3-I) represent
records from the APU Checkout Failure data file. The data
fields of interest are: (1) the planned mission date and the
STS mission ID number; (2) the APU position, serial number, and
APU dash number; (3) the vehicle number; (4) the component part
number and nomenclature of the failed hardware; (5) the failure
mode and operational phase during which the failure occurred
(anomaly phase); (6) problem description and comments that define
the failure and subsequent resolution; (7) the date the failure
was cited; and (8) the CAR number and Boeing page number which
provide a reference to the information source.
The data was sorted according to part number/name to display the
failure modes and number of failures per component observed in
the historical data file. The next step in the data development
process was to categorize the data as discussed in paragraph 7.4.
7.3.2 Mission Related Database and Output
Early in the course of the study, it was thought that "flight"
run times of the APU's should be tracked separately from the
ground based "checkout" times. Two database files were generated
to track and accumulate this information.
The APU flight run times were taken from the JSC Mission Reports
for flights 1 through 23, since the reports listed the times
by mission phase. However, the mission reports did not list
"check-out" rum times. The SSM's database listed these times of
interest as Confidence Runs (CR), Flight Readiness Firings (FRF),
Launch Aborts (LA), and Hot Fires. This data included flight run
times but was not divided into mission phases. Therefore, it was
decided to use the SSM's data for the prime source of APU checkout
run time (CKO) and the JSC Mission Reports for the flight (FLT)
run time. Subsequent comparison of the flight run times between
the two sources indicated a difference of less than 1%.
Appendix B7.3-2 shows the APU flight run times by STS Mission and
mission phase. The total run time for all APUs was calculated to
be 6,258.96 minutes.
Appendix B7.3-2, pages 7 through 9, shows the checkout run times,
calculated to be 331.19 minutes. The sum of flight and checkout
run times, 6,590.15 minutes, was the basis for calculating
component failure rates for an operating APU.
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During the orbit period, when an APU is not operating, certain
failure scenarios are still valid. Leaks can occur or heaters
can fail "on" or "off". Appendix B7.3-2, pages ! and 2, shows
the accumulation of all mission times from APU start to APU
shutdown. This value of 3,671.1367 hours represents the
exposure time of a single APU to events such as leakage. The
total exposure time used in this study was three times this
value plus the time accumulated during checkout, for a total of
11,018.9299 hours. This represents the total exposure time of
a flight-configured APU to a leakage environment.
Additional mission related data is shown in Appendix B7.3-2, page
15, including mission timing parameters such as El, TAEM, Touch-
down (TD), and Wheelstop (WS). Appendix B7 3-2, page 16, shows
additional ascent mission related data.
7.3.3 Treatment of Electrical CompoDe_s
The APU electronic controller was treated as a "black box".
Controller failures, as found in the flight history data, could
be tracked only to the point that a problem required removal and
replacement of the controller itself. Excessive effort and time
would have been required to determine from the vendor what
individual component(s) within the box had caused the problem.
Therefore, failure rates were estimated for the box itself,
rather than for components within the box. References 71 and 74
were the source for development of the basic controller failure
rates, along with information gained from Reference 86.
There are electrical components external to the controller for
which failure rates were required. These components include
switches, diodes, hybrid drivers, and Remote Power Controllers
(RPC). The available flight history data did not reveal any
failures of these components in the APU system. In cases such
as this, other means can be employed to estimate failure rates.
MIL-HDBK-217D (Reference 97) and NPRD3 (Reference 99) were
utilized to estimate failure rates of electrical components.
The MIL-HDBK-217D provides the raw input data for determining
failure rates of electrical components external to the APU
controller. Fault trees (Reference 71) were developed to depict
the failure scenario between the components and the end items of
concern; e.g., the isolation valves. The result of this
analysis was used as one input to the development of probability
distributions for the failure rate of electrical components in
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the risk model. Development of the probability distributions is
discussed in Sections 7.4 and 7.5.
7.4 FAILURE HISTORY DATA CATEGORIZATION
A number of guidelines and criteria were established for the APU
data categorization task. They are discussed below.
l•
.
•
Q
Failures occurring before January i, 1981, were omitted
from t/%e data base on the grounds that the APU was still
undergoing design development prior to that time.
Failures occurring during qualification tests (QUAL) and
acceptance tests (ATP) were not included in the database
for this project. These tests were thought to be largely
inapplicable, on the basis that bench tests of individual
components or subassemblies might not reflect the actual
operation of a completed APU. In addition, since these
tests are often performed early in the process of readying
an APU for flight, they detect many types of failures that
would not be expected during an actual flight.
3. Failures occurring both during checkout tests (CKO) and
during actual flights (FLT) were included in the database.
It was recognized that some types of checkout failures
might not be expected to occur during flight. However, it
was decided to include checkout data in the APU database.
In particular, checkout tests occur far enough along in the
process of readying an APU for flight that they were judged
to reasonably reflect the condition of APUs during flight•
All checkout failures were carefully reviewed to determine
whether they would actually be applicable to flight
situations. In particular, an attempt was made to include
only those checkout failures that occurred during hot
firing of an APU (as opposed to bench tests of individual
components, helium leak tests, and so on). However, it
was not always possible to make this determination from
the available data. When in doubt, checkout failures were
conservatively included in the database.
Failures reported as having been detected during refurbish-
ment were not included in the data base unless it seemed
likely that they actually occurred during a previous flight.
The purpose of this ground rule was to avoid the inclusion
7-17
[-
I
i r
_°
jr-
1
i
I
.
•
•
•
i0.
of maintenance and refurbishment errors that were success-
fully detected and resolved before the completion of the
refurbishment process.
Failures arising from maintenance or refurbishment problems
were included in the data base if they were detected during
flights or hot firings (i.e., if they were not successfully
resolved before the completion of the refurbishment
process).
Incipient failures (e.g., lube oil contamination or turbine
blade cracking) were included in the data base only if
their consequences were judged to be of sufficient likeli-
hood and severity to be worth modeling• Examples of the
types of incipient failures excluded under this criterion
are: (1) unusually high gearbox heat retention that did
not result in excessive gearbox temperature, (2) unexpected
high vibration that did not exceed the redline level, and
(3) valve cover leaks that did not result in valve failure•
A similar guideline was applied to components operating
slightly outside of their intended specifications. Such
problems were included in the database for the APU risk
assessment only if they resulted in component failure,
interfered with a vital function, or violated established
flight rule limits. According to this rule, for example,
problems resulting in turbine speeds below 80% or above
129% would have been considered failures• Problems
resulting in a fluctuating turbine speed that nonetheless
remained within the above limits would not have been
considered failures.
Failures of noncritical components (e.g., temperature trans-
ducers or redundant valves) were included in the database if
situations could be identified where these components would
be important. For example, failures of the injector cooling
system were included even though the system is not used
during normal operation, since it is required for hot
restart of an APU.
Failures of some components that do not appear in our APU
model were nonetheless included in the database• This
was done if it was judged that the failure rates for these
components would be substantially the same as the failure
rates for other components that were being modeled. For
example, all pressure transducer failures were included in
the database, even though only the gearbox pressure trans-
7-18
ducer was actually modeled. Grouping similar components
in this manner resulted in narrower uncertainty bounds for
certain components, by increasing the amount of da_a avail-
able for use in estimating failure rates.
ii. Data for components that are significantly different in
design and/or operation were not grouped. For example, data
for the isolation valves was analyzed separately from data
for the gas generator valves, since the gas generator valves
experience pulsing operation. Analyzing such components
separately ensures that large amounts of inapplicable data
were not attributed to any paz_cicular component.
12. Even data for very similar components was not grouped if
the components in question have different failure modes.
For example, even though the primary and secondary fuel
control are of virtually identical design, the primary
valve is normally open while the secondary valve is normally
closed. Therefore, data for these two valves was generally
analyzed separately.
13. The adoption of corrective actions in response to particular
failures was evaluated on a case-by-case basis to determine
whether the action in question would actually be effective in
preventing a recurrence of the problem. For example, major
design changes such as the removal or addition of a valve
would definitely be taken into account. However, for many
corrective actions (e.g., improved cleanliness procedures),
it was not possible to determine with a high degree of confi-
dence that they would actually be successful in preventing a
recurrence of the problem. Therefore, a more detailed review
of corrective actions may prove worthwhile for those failures
that are found to be dominant contributors to the total risk
of APU failure.
Based on the guidelines and criteria established above, distri-
butions were developed for the frequencies of various types of
components and component failure modes. The components used for
the APU ascent and descent models are specified in Table 7.4-1.
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7.5 FAILURE RATES
Once the data has been categorized as a basis for determining the
components and failure modes for which failure rate distributions
will be needed, the next step is to specify prior distributions for
those failure rates. After that, one must specify the relevant
data for each component failure mode (i.e., the number of observed
APU component failures and the number of operating hours and/or
demands to which each component was subject). Finally, the data
must be combined with the prior distributions to yield posterior
distributions. The results of these three steps are presented in
the sections below.
7.5.1 Development of Prior Distributions
A number of sources were used as background information in develo-
ping prior distributions. These include the Nonelectronic Parts
Reliability Data (NPRD) handbook, prepared by the Rome Air Develop-
ment Center; MIL-HDBK-217D (used for electronic components); the
Reliability Engineering Data Series report on Fa±lure Mechanisms,
prepared by the Avco Corporation: NASA operating life limits for
the APU; and the engineering judgment of the analysis team (based
on previous risk assessments and data analyses).
In many cases, adjustments to the information obtained from these
sources were needed. For example, many of the failure rate
estimates obtained from NPRD were for components in aircraft or
ground-based environments rather than missile environments.
Environmental adjustment factors were judged to be a reasonable
way to account for many of these differences; factors for this
purpose were obtained from the Avco Failure Mechanisms report.
In addition, all the failure rate estimates in NPRD are presented
on a per-hour basis (H), while many of the failure rates for the
APU risk study were needed on a per-demand basis (D). In such
cases, the number of demands per hour in a typical application
was estimated as a basis for converting the failure rate to the
desired units.
In a few cases, estimates were not available from sources such
as NPRD or MIL-HDBK-217D, and the judgment of the analysis
team provided little guidance for the development of prior
distributions. In such cases, observed APU failure experience
was used in the development of the prior distribution. These
distributions were not subsequently updated, since the relevant
data had already been incorporated into the prior.
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Finally, after the initial assessment of prior distributions, the
distributions for similar components or related failure modes
were compared with each other as a reasonableness check. For
example, the failure rates for different types of rotating equip-
ment (e.g., the turbine, pumps, and gearbox) were compared to
assure that they were roughly comparable, and that T,he assigned
failure rates were consistent with engineering knowledge, such
as the differing speeds at which the various types cf equipment
operate. Similarly, the rates of leaks from pump seals, tanks,
and diaphragms were compared to ensure that the more vulnerable
components were assigned the higher leak rates.
This type of comparison was intended to assure that the various
failure rates reflected the correct relative ranking. The
comparison process, which was especially important since many
of the prior distributions were based on different data sources
and/or different applications, did result in the adjustment of
several distributions to correspond more closely with what the
analysis team considered realistic for application to the Space
Shuttle.
Table 7.5-1 presents the prior distributions that resulted from
this process. For each distribution, the table contains the
category of components to which the distribution applies, the
relevant failure mode or _odes, the 5th and 95th percentiles of
the prior distribution, and the sources used in developing that
prior distribution. Engineering judgment is nearly always used
in the development of distributions, because there is rarely
enough data to unambiguously specify a distribution.
Virtually all the prior distributions were assumed to be lognormal
in form, as is common practice in PRAs. For these distributions,
the medians can be found as the geometric mean of their 5th and
95th percentiles. The only exception to the assumption of log-
normality is the conditional frequency of leaks in the fuel
systems of additional APUs, given that one APU is leaking.
Because the 95th percentile of this frequency was quite high,
a lognormal distribution would not have been reasonable_ in
particular, it would have allowed conditional probabilities of
leaks to be significantly greater than 1.0. Therefore, a beta
distribution was used for this parameter instead of a lognormal
distribution.
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7.5.2 Specification of Failure Data
Once prior distributions have been developed for each category of
components and each failure mode, the nex_ step is to specify the
relevant data for each category (i.e., the number cf observed
component failures of each type, and the number of operating
hours (H) and/or demands (D) to which each component was subject,
which is referred to as exposure data).
-The estimation of exposure data is a difficult process. It
requires determination of whether t_he relevant failure mode is
likely to occur over time or on a per-demand basis; whether
the failure mode can occur at any time or only when the APU is
operating; and whether a failure would likely be detected if
one occurred. For example, failures of some types of redundant
components may not be detectable during normal APU operation.
As an illustration, the relevant exposure data for failure of
the APU fuel pump to run was taken to be Ii0 hours -- the total
amount of run time accumulated on all APUs to date during flight
and checkout (CKO) hot firings. For failures of passive compo-
nents (e.g., tank leaks), the relevant exposure data was taken
to be 11,019 hours. This is based on the total amount of run
time plus on-orbit time accumulated on all APUs to date during
flights, and also the small amount of run time involved in CKO
hot firings. Finally, for demand-based failures, the number of
demands experienced by a typical component during flights and
hot firings was calculated to be 217. This total assumes that
the component in question experiences exactly one demand during
each firing of an APU, and is made up of several contributions:
a. Two demands (one during ascent and one during descent) for
each of three APUs on 24 missions, for a total of 144 demands
be One additional demand for a single APU on each of the 24
missions (for the on-orbit checkout run), for a total of
24 demands
C. One demand for a single APU during each of the 46 CKO hot
firings, for a total of 46 demands
do One demand for each of the three APUs during the confidence
run (prior to the first flight), for a total of three
demands
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Care must be taken in applying these values to particular compo-
nents, however, to assure that they are applicable. For example,
the exposure data for isolation valves opening or closing on
demand was taken to be 434 demands instead of 217 demands, since
there are two isolation valves in each APU. Similarly, the expo-
sure data for the GGVM secondary valve leaking after successful
closure was taken to be only 10,909 hours instead of 11,019 hours,
because the secondary valve would have been open during the Ii0
hours of actual APU operation and thus could not have leaked
during that time. As a final example, it was assumed that there
was effectively no exposure data for loss of the automatic shut-
down signal from the APU controller, since a failure leading to
loss of the shutdown signal would most likely have gone
undetected unless a shutdown became necessary during flight.
Table 7.5-2 presents the prior distribution and the failure and
exposure data for each basic event included in the analysis. As
can be seen from that table, the prior distributions for some
events were not updated and were used directly as posterior
distributions, because all relevant failure data for those events
had already been used in developing the priors. For reference
purposes, Table 7.5-3 provides descriptions of the actual failures
indicated in Table 7.5-2. This provides a complete description of
the information that was input to the Bayesian updating process.
t
0
t.
7.5.3 Development of Posterior Distributions
The Bayesian updating process was performed using the RISKMAN 4
computer software on a desktop personal computer. The results
of this process are shown in Table 7.5-4. This table shows the
mean frequency for each basic event (based on the posterior
distribution obtained from the Bayesian update), and also the
5th, 50th and 95th percentiles.
In using the distributions An this table, one must keep in mind
that the two isolation valves in the APU are assumed to have
identical distributions for each failure mode, as are the three
MPUs. Thus, for example, the frequencies of the basic events
BAM2H and BAM3H (MPUs two and three, respectively, fail high at
start) are described by the distribution shown in Table 7.5-4 for
the basic event BAMIH (MPU one fails high at start). Similarly,
the frequency of the basic event BAVBO (isolation valve B fails
to open on demand) is described by the distribution for BAVAO
(isolation valve A fails to open on demand).
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As discussed in Section 7.0, the Bayesian analysis used to develop
the distributions show_ in Table 7.5-4 automatically assigns the
appropriate weights to the observed data and the prior distribu-
tion, respectively, based on the relative strength of the two
types of evidence in each particular situation. For example, when
a great deal of empirical data is available, the data will tend to
dominate the posterior. Similarly, when relatively little empiri-
cal data is available, the posterior distribution will tend to
resemble the prior distribution; in this case, the data is simply
not strong enough to override the information contained in the
prior distribution.
For most of the basic events shown in Table 7.5-4, relatively
little failure data was available -- at most one or two observed
failures, and often none. Therefore, most of the posterior dist-
ributions look fairly similar to the priors on which they were
based. However, a general trend can be seen. In cases where no
failures were observed, the posterior is slightly lower than the
prior. This is a result of the Bayesian inference process, and
is intuitively reasonable. This effect is greatest when the prior
distribution extends to include fairly high failure rates, which
are inconsistent with the lack of observed failures. Similarly,
in cases where one or more failures were actually observed, the
posterior distribution is generally slightly higher than the prior
distribution. With the small amounts of exposure data available
for most components, even a single failure is often sufficient to
suggest that the failure rate might be higher than is indicated
by the prior distribution.
The frequencies of a few basic events were described by point
estimates instead of distributions, usually on the basis that
their frequencies were negligible or were known very precisely.
Most of these events were considered to be negligible for the
purposes of this study, and were therefore assigned frequencies
of zero. The events in this category included the following:
ao Spurious activation of the isolation valve automatic
shutdown signal (basic events PACRA and PACRB during
operation, and BACRA and BACRB at star_-up). This
failure mode is considered extremely unlikely.
Do A number of APU start failures, which were considered
extremely unlikely: BAFTN (GN2 leakage into the fuel
tank at start); BAGGS (failure of the gas generator);
BALFB and BAPFB (plugging of the inline fuel filter and
the fuel pump filter); and BARVO (inadvertent opening
of the fuel pump relief valve).
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Co Common cause failure of two or more APUs due to causes
other than lube oil blockage (basic event DAOCC). The
frequency of other common cause failure modes was
considered to be dominated by the frequency of lube oil
plugging.
de Common cause failure of both fuel control valves in the
open position (basic event TACCF). This is considered
much less likely than independent failure of both valves
due to mechanical and/or control problems because one of
the valves fails in the open position upon loss of power
and the other one fails closed. The detached valve seat
single point failure is likewise considered to be of very
low probability.
e. Gearbox failure due to loss of lube oil: basic events
PALLL for a lube oil line leak and PAGBL for a gross
gearbox leak. The frequency of these failure modes was
considered to be dominated by the frequency of smaller
leaks resulting in repressurization, as modeled by basic
event PAAGL.
f. Basic event PAHSP (high speed operation selected during
ascent). High speed opera_ion would not be manually
selected by the shuttle crew during the ascent phase,
unless at least one APU had shut down.
go Valve leakage after closure at the end of the ascent
phase (PAVAZ and PAVBZ for the isolation valves, and
PASVZ for the secondary valve). Fuel depletion due to
valve leakage after closure is modeled in Stage A
(ascent), but is quantified in Stage B (orbit).
he Failure of the water spray boiler (basic event PAWSB).
The water spray boiler is out of scope for this analysis,
and is included in the fault trees only for completeness.
Additional events that were assigned point estimates other than
zero are as follows:
a. Basic event DARAT. This is a correction factor
reflecting the fact that if a spurious shutdown occurs,
only two APUs instead of three may be subject to turbine
overspeed and other failure modes. This basic event
was conservatively assigned a value of 1.0, which is
equivalent to ignoring the correction factor.
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Basic event PAOSK. Successful functioning of the overspeed
shutdown circuitry and successful closure of the secondary
valve. This event was assigned a likelihood of 1.0 in
the PA and PB fault trees because the chance of failure is
extremely small; a value of 1.0 is a highly accurate approxi-
mation of the probability of success.
The likelihood that automatic shundown is enabled (basic
event SAPEQ). The frequency of this condition is assumed to
be 1.0 in cases where no other APU failures have occurred,
since automatic shutdown would not be disabled in the absence
of a failed APU.
An order correction factor (basic event PALKF) for the condi-
tional probability that a gearbox leak occurs subsequent to
the failure of a component needed to respond to the leakage
(e.g., the GN2 valve). This order correction factor was
assumed to equal 0.5.
Order correction factors for the sequencing of spurious shut-
downs and other APU failures. The likelihood that the
spurious shutdown would have occurred first (basic event
SASSD) was assumed to equal 0.5. The likelihood of the other
failure occurring first (basic event SAOFO) was taken to be
one minus the frequency of SASSD (i.e., also equal to 0.5).
The conditional probability that a fuel system leak occurs
upstream of the isolation valves (basic event CIUSL). This
was estimated to equal 0.3, based on a ratio of the frequency
of tank leaks to the total frequency of all fuel system leaks.
The conditional probability that a fuel system leak occurs
downstream of the isolation valves, but upstream of the
secondary valve (basic event CIDSL). This was estimated to
equal 0.5 based on the locations of the observed fuel system
leaks to date.
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7.6 SPATIAL Ih_ERACTIVE EVENT DATA DEVELOPMENT
Based on the discussion of Section 6.6, two types of spatial
interactive events (SIEs) were identified as significant for
development of probability distributions.
a. Events related to APU turbine breakup
b. Events related to APU fuel (hydrazine) leakage
Each SIE, to be a meaningful input to the PRA, must be defined
as a conditional probability and described in the probability
of frequency format. However, the frequencies associated with
SIEs are less amenable to direct calculation than are those
associated with component failures, for which failure history
data is available. The approach to developing the probability
distributions was to collect and analyze, to the greatest extent
possible, all information relevant to the SIEs. Examples of
available sources were drawings, test reports, formal and
informal analyses, and telecons. Candidate probability
distributions were then proposed using the assembled _nd
analyzed data.
A group of systems experts, hereinafter referred to as the
"Group", whose function was discussed in Section 5.10, was
assembled to review the most significant SIEs and propose
probability distributions as a group.
There were some instances where test data or analyses were
available, but time constraints did no_ allow adequate melding
of opinion and the available data. For those cases, the final
probability distribution represents a judicious weighing of the
two sets of inputs.
Table 7.6-1 presents the split fractions required for input
into the APU PRA.
7.6.1 SIE Data Belated to APu Turbine Breakup
The following paragraphs present the probability of frequency
distributions developed to represent the conditional prob-
abilities related to APU turbine breakup, and discuss the data
that support these distributions.
7-60
TABLE 7.6-I
APU SPLIT FRACTIONS FOR SIEs
Namo Split Fraction
F1
F3
F3N
F5
FSN
F7
_12
FI3
FI5
FI7
Pr (APU Turbine Fail I Primary and Secondary Valves
Fail Open)
Pr (Uncontained Shrapnel I Turbine Breakup Due to
Overspeed)
Pr (Uncontained Shrapnel I Turbine Breakup at Normal
Speed)
Pr (Failure of Second APU or Flight Control Equipment
(FCE) I Shrapnel Due to Turbine Breakup at Overspeed)
Pr (Failure of Second APU or FCE I Shrapnel Due to
Turbine Breakup at Normal Speed)
Pr (Fuel Leak I Uncontained Shrapnel from Second APU)
Pr (APU fail I Small Leak in That APU
Pr (APU Fail I Small Leak in Another APU
Pr {2 APUs or FCE Fail I Small Leak in One of the
Two APUs
Pr {2 APUs or FCE Fail I Small Leaks in at Least Two
APUs
7.6. I.I Probability of Turbine Breakup at Normal Speed
The probability of turbine breakup at normal speed was developed
from military data (NPRD-3), Reference 99, as modified by
environment factors appropriate to missile launches. This prior
probability distribution is shown in the previous paragraph,
Table 7.5-2. The actual failure history of APU turbines (zero
failures in ii0 hours) was then used as the likelihood to arrive
at the posterior distribution also presented in the previous
paragraph, Table 7.5-4, via the use of Bayes' Theorem.
The information used for NPRD-3 is a compilation from diverse
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small, high speed turbines used in military applications. The
information did not provide the fraction of turbine failures
which actually yielded turbine hub breakup. Therefore, a large
uncertainty was assigned to the NPRD value to account for the
applicability of the NPRD source to APU turbine breakup. The
distribution used for this s_udy was a log-normal with a 5th
percenuile of 2.7 x 10 -5 failure/hour and a 95 uh percentile of
1.8 x 10 -3 failure hour. This distribution was used in the
evaluation of Top Events PA, PB and DB.
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7.6.1.2 Probability of Turbine Breakup Due to Overspeed
The Group discussed the likelihood that a turbine breakup would
result from an overspeed induced by failure of both the primary"
and secondary fuel control valves in the open position. If the
valves fail open, a high speed shutdown should be commanded with
automatic closing of the fuel isolation valves. This closing
would limit the supply of fuel to the turbine and thus limit
the peak rotation rate. It is not certain, however, that this
closing will prevent breakup due to overspeed, since overspeed
conditions are reached in approximately 300 milliseconds, and
the fuel line downstream of the isolation valve contains
sufficient hydrazine for 2 seconds of operation (about 7 pulses).
In view of the above, the Group judged that if the fuel control
valves fail open, there is a very high probability that the
turbine will break up. This is expressed in the following
discrete probability distribution.
Pr(fl)
fl
.5
!
0 .i .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1.0
Frequency of Occurrence (fl)
"rC 1-I 5 'l
fl .65 .75 .85 1-95
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This distribution was used in the evaluation of event tree Top
Events CA and CB following occurrence of TA and TB respectively.
P
7.6.1.3 Probability of Uncontained APU Shrapnel as a
Consequence of Turbine Breakup a_ Overspeed
The probability of having uncontained fragments as a result of
a turbine breakup is determined by the expected breakup speed
and by the ability of the APU structure to contain fragments
at the expected energy levels.
There have been four incidents of turbine hub breakup during
testing. These are shown in Table 7.6-2. In each case, breakup
resulted from overspeed.
TABLE 7.6-2
TURBINE KUB BREAKUP DATA
Unit Test
Actual
Breakup Speed
S/N 003
(Unnotched)
S/N 106
(Unnotched)
S/N 105
(Notched)
Rig Test
(Drilled)
107,520 rpm
(149.3%)
112,600 rpm
(156.0%)
84,240 rlDm
(117%)
99,700 rpm
(138.5%)
The data from three of the four turbine hub fragmentation
incidents were utilized to estimate the turbine hub breakup
likelihood as a function of turbine speed (Reference 61).
The S/N 105 unit breakup speed was adjusted to estimate the
unnotched breakup speed. The rig test data was not included
since no information was available about the configuration
or test conditions.
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The results of this analysis of test data indicate that a mean
turbine hub breakup speed of 108,000 rpm (150%) and a standard
deviation of 4,267 rpm should be used in evaluating the effects
of a turbine breakup due to overspeed. This analysis assumed
that breakup speed is normally distributed and that unit S/N
105, as modified, is a valid data point for the analysis. It
ignores the effect of life cycles on breakup speed.
Reference 25 presents calculations to estimate APU turbine
overspeed required to burst the containment ring and produce
shrapnel. Estimated speed for this event was 96,900 rpm or
134.6% of normal operating speed. Thus, the likelihood of APU
fragments being uncontained is the likelihood that the
fracrmentation speed will exceed 96,900 rpm.
The group of systems experts discussed the informaticn relating
to the fragmentation incidents and agreed that a breakup due to
an APU overspeed would certainly produce uncontained shrapnel,
and therefore assigned:
This value was used in the evaluation of event tree Top Events
CA and CB following occurrence of TA and TB, respectively.
f_
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7.6.1.4 Probability of Uncontained APU Shrapnel as a
Consequence of Turbine Breakup at Normal Speed
The information presented in paragraph 7.6.1.3 is also valid
for assessing the effects of turbine breakup at normal speed.
However, even though unit S/N 105 broke up at a speed below
that required to burst the containment ring, fragments bypassed
the containment ring and exited through the APU housing. This
was attributed to the effects of notches in the turbine hub
(Reference 96). The Group, in considering this failure, judged
that any turbine that broke up at normal speed would have to be
seriously flawed and, hence, assigned the following discrete
probability distribution.
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P(f3N)
f3N
.5 .5
] i
I I 1 I I I ._0 .I .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 • .8 .9 1.0
Fzequen¢ T of Ocmurren¢e
P(f3N) I .50 I .50
f3N I .85 I .95
This distribution was used in evaluating event tree Top Events
CA and CB following occurrence of PA and PB, respectively.
7.6.1.5 Probability of a Second APU or Flight Critical
Equipment Failure as a Consequence of Uncontained
Shrapnel from a Turbine Breakup at Overspeed
Given uncontained shrapnel from a turbine overspeed, the
likelihood that this shrapnel would cause a second APU or flight
critical equipment to fail is determined by three factors: the
energy level of uncontained shrapnel, the likelihood of an uncon-
tained fragment striking the equipment, and the vulnerability of
the equipment.
The energy of the uncontained fragments can be estimated as the
energy of the turbine hub fragments minus the minimum energy
required to burst the containment ring. The energy of the
turbine hub fragments was estimated by ex_ending the calculations
in Reference 25. It was assumed that the hub would break into
three 120" segments, each weighing approximately 0.9 pounds.
This breakup pattern is consistent with observed test failures
(Reference 96).
Using the approach of Reference 25, the minimum energy required
to burst the containment ring is calculated to be 19,359 ib-ft.
The energy of APU turbine fragments and the energy of resulting
uncontained fragments at various speeds are presented in Table
7.6-3.
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TABLE 7.6-3
APU UNCO2_TAINED FRAGMENT ENERGIES
|-
J
_v
Oper. Fra_nent Encontained
Speed W Energy Frag.Ener_y
(%) (rpm) (ib-ft) (Ib-ft)
I00 72,000 10,688 0
ii0 79,200 12,932 0
120 86,400 15,390 0
130 93,600 18,063 0
140 100,800 20,948 1,589
150 108,000 24,048 4,689
160 115,200 27,361 8,002
170 122,400 30,888 11,529
180 129,600 34,629 15,270
190 136,800 38,584 19,225
200 144,000 42,752 23,393
|
I
16
The likelihood of an uncontained fragment striking a given piece
of equipment must account for the fragment spray pattern and the
location of the equipment in the aft compal-tment relative to the
fragmentation source.
The fragment spray pattern that would result from an uncontained
APU turbine fragmentation is difficult to define analytically
because of the random nature of the particle paths, the lack
of failur_ data and the complex APU containment ring geometry.
Limited test data documentation, Reference 96, states that:
"The pieces of the turbine wheel (hub) that were not
contained by the [turbine] housing exited in a radial
direction. In the S/N 106 burst, the section of wheel
found in the aluminum heater panel exited within 15 •
of the true radial."
Based on this limited data, the possibility of fragments striking
equipment at angles of at least 15" above or below the plane of
the turbine wheel must be considered.
The expectation that the turbine will fragment into three 120" seg-
ments means that there is a 100% likelihood that any 120" arc of
the x-y plane will contain one fragment. The likelihood of a given
fragment direction within the 120" arc is uniformly distributed.
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To assess the likelihood of a fragment striking a piece of equip-
ment, a spatial analysis (Reference 61) was performed. This
analysis considered the item's location above and below the plane
of the turbine and its profile area. Table 7.6-4 lists equipment
considered susceptible to being struck by APU fragments within
±15" of the turbine plane of rotation.
TABLE 7.6-4
POTENTIAL TARGETS OF APU TUP_BINE FRJ&GMZNTS
EQUIPMENT APU I APU 2
LEFT OMS OXID TK
LEFT OMS FU TK
RT OMS OXID TK
RT OMS FU TK
LEFT RCS OXID TK
RT RCS OXID TK
RT RCS FU TK
APU 1 FU TK
APU 2 FU TK
APU 3 FU TK
AVIONICS BAY 4
AVIONICS BAY 5
HYD RES 3
APU 1 FU LINE
APU 2 FU LINE
APU 3 FU LINE
APU 1 LUBE LINE
APU 2 LUBE LINE
APU 3 LUBE LINE
APU 1 EXHST DUCT
SYS 1 HYD LINE
SYS 2 HYD LINE
SYS 3 HYD LINE
SSME L02 MANIF
SSM_ 1 LO2 FDLINE
SSME 2 LO2 FDLINE
SSMZ 3 LO2 FDLINE
SSME LH2 MANIF
SSMZ 1 LH2 FDLINE
SSME 2 LH2 FDLINE
SSME 3 LH2 FDLINE
WIREBUNDLES
X X X
X X
X X X
X X
X X X
X X X
X
X
X X
X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X X X
X X X
X X X
X X X
X
X
X
X
X
XX
X
X
X
X
X
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yThis table also lists "lines" and wirebundles that, because of
their location, are considered potential targets. Because of their
complex geometry, a subjective assessment of their susceptibility
was performed instead of a quantitative spatial analysis.
Given r_he fragment spray pattern described above and the proxi-
mity of the APUs to the 1307 bulkhead and sidewalls, it must be
considered that t_here is a very high likelihood than an uncon-
rained fragment will strike either the bulkhead or a sidewall.
To assess the vulnerability of equipment, it is necessary to
consider the penetration capability of the fragments relative
to the characteristics of the target equipment. Reference 105
discusses the effects of fragmentation of jet engine turbines.
The penetration capability of uncontained APU fragments was
estimated by using the analysis approach of Reference 105 and
the uncontained fragment energies presented in Table 7.6-3
above. All fragments were assumed to strike perpendicular to
the surface. The penetration depth in common material for
various overspeeds is shown in Table 7.6-5 below.
TABLE 7.6-5
PENETRATION CAPABILITY OF UNCONTAINED FRAGMENTS
I_
Ovmrspeed
(%)
130
140
150
160
170
180
190
200
W
(rpm)
93,600
100,800
108,000
115,200
122,400
129,600
136,800
144,000
Penetration Depth
(In=hem)
A1
0
0.36
0.61
0.80
0.96
i. Ii
1.24
1.37
Ti Steel
0 0
0.16 0.14
0.27 0.25
0.37 0.32
0.44 0.39
0.51 0.45
0.57 0.50
0.68 0.55
A1 - Aluminum Ti = Titanium
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The physical dimensions of selected equipment installed in the
aft compartment are presented in Table 7.6-6. As may be seen
by comparing the data of Table 7.6-6 with those of Table 7.6-5,
the theoretical penetration capability of uncontained fragments
significantly exceeds the panel thickness of the critical equip-
ment in Table 7.6-6, as well as portions of the 1307 bulkhead
and aft compartment side walls.
TABLE 7.6-6
WALL TEICKNESSES OF SELECTED EQUIPMENT
E_ulpment
Hydraulic Pressure
Lines
Hydraulic Return
Lines
MPS 17" LH2 Line
Vacuum Jacket
MPS LH2 Manifold
Vacuum Jacket
PiPS 12" LH2 Line
Vacuum Jacket
PUPS 17" LO2 Line
Vacuum Jacket
MPS L02 Manifold
Vacuum Jacket
MPS 12" L02 Line
Vacuum Jacket
APU Fuel Lines
APU GN2 Lines
1307 Bulkhead Pnl
Aft Comprt Sdwls
OMS Deck Panels
OMS Tanks
Avionics Bays
Diameter
(Inches)
1-1/4 to
1/4
7/s to 1/4
17
12
17
m--
12
1/2
3/8
_m
Wall
Thickness
(Inches]
.065 to .020
.026 to .020
.040
.025
.063
.040
.032
.040
.O5O
.040*
.080
Foam
.050
.040*
.025
.020
.050
•136 to .070
.070 & .063
.0759
i" Honeycomb
.020 Facing Sh
Material
Titanium
Titanium
Inconel 718
CRES 321
Inconel 718
CRES 321
Inconel 718
CRES 321
Inconel 718
CRES
Inconel 718
CRES 321
Inconel 718
CRES 321
Stnls Steel
Stnls Steel
Aluminum
Aluminum
Aluminum
Titanium
Aluminum
Aluminum
*OV 102 only. LO2 lines are foam insulated on other vehicles.
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In a discussion with a representative of the JSC Materials
Technology Branch, some test results were obtained in which
a i inch long cylindrical object was projected at a .05 inch
thick panel similar to the 1307 bulkhead panels. The panel was
penetrated by .5 lb. projectile traveling au I00 ft/sec. The
energy of the projecUi!e was 77.7 ib-ft, which is relatively
small by comparison with the estimated energies for turbine
wheel fragments in Table 7.6-3. These test results were not
yet published at the time this study was conducted.
Based on the theoretical estimates and the limited amount of
supporting test data, it must be concluded that all of the
e_uuipment items in Table 7.6-4 are vulnerable to being damaged
if struck by uncontained fragments of an APU turbine hub. A
comprehensive quantitative analysis pinpointing exact dimensions
and impact angles is not within the scope and budget of this
study.
In view of the significant number of critical equipment items
subject to damage, and the complex geometry of the aft compart-
ment, it must be concluded, for purposes of this PRA, that an
uncontained turbine hub breakup has a very high probability of
causing loss of a second APU or Flight Critical Equipment (FCE)
and, consequently, crew and vehicle.
The likelihood of puncturing the External Tank is estimated to be
zero. The centerline of the External Tank is parallel to the
plane of rotation of the turbine. A particle on a trajectory 15"
below the plane of turbine would have to penetrate a significant
portion of the Orbiter to strike the External Tank, including the
1307 Bulkhead, the payload bay (and payloads) and finally, the
Orbiter skin and tiles.
The Group discussed the likelihood that uncontained shrapnel from
a turbine overspeed would cause a second APU or flight critical
equipment to fail. In addition to failures caused by the shrapnel
per se, the group's considerations included the failure of another
APU or FCE as a result of the fuel leakage that would accompany
the breakout of shrapnel.
It was recognized that the conditional probabilities would differ
between ascent and descent. For example, during ascent the pre-
launch nitrogen purge in the aft compartment precludes combustion
from hydrazine sources. The main engine feedlines flowing large
quantities of liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen represent a severe
threat if struck by shrapnel. However, during descent the main
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engine feedlines are inert, but air not available during ascent,
enters the aft compartment, providing an environment which will
support combustion. This is relevant to the possibility of fire
resulting from a hydrazine leak.
After considering the factors discussed in the initial para-
graphs abcve, it was decided to use the following probability
of frequency distributions for ascent and descent.
P(zs)
Ascent - f5
[ i _ { 1 J i
0 .I .2 .3 .4 .5 .6
.50
•7 .8 .9 1.0
Frequency of Occurrence
,5)11f51f5 .75 .85 .95
This distribution was used in the evaluation of Event Tree Top
Event CA @fter the occurrence of TA.
P(f9)
Descent- f9
.50
40
0 .i .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1.0
Frequency of Occurrence
,))l[01lf9 .75 .85 .95
This distribution was used in the evaluation of event tree Top
Event CB after the occurrence of TB.
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7.6.1.6 Probability of a Second APU or Flight Critical
Equipment Failure as a Consequence of Uncontained
Shrapnel from a Turbine Breakup at Normal Speed
The data from Table 7.6-3 above indicates that the energy from
a breakup at normal speed would not be high enough to break the
containment ring. However, as explained in Section 7.6.1.4,
the Group, based on the S/N 105 test, judged that there was a high
probability that shrapnel would bypass the containment ring and
break through the APU housing. In considering this conditional
probability, they also recognized that the shrapnel would be of
a lower energy level and assigned the following distributions.
Ascent - fSN
.3
.25 .25
P(f5N) .i .i
0 .i .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1.0
Frequency of Occurrence
P(f5N)
f5N
.I
.i
.25
.7
This distribution was used in the evaluation of Top Event CA
after occurrence PA.
Descent - fgN
P(f9N) I
.15 I
m
I I i
0 .I .2
.35
L I°3° 15l)Iy
.3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1.0
Frequency of Occurrence
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P(f9N) I "15
fgN I .1
.35
.3
.30
.5
.15
.7
.05
.9
This distribution was used in the evaluation of CB following the
occurrence of PB.
7.6.1.7 Probability of a Hydrazine Leak as a Consequence
of Uncontained Shrapnel From Another APU
The Group considered this conditional probability to include
the possible effect of a fire which would certainly accompany
a turbine breakup. STS-9 dramatically illustrated how a leak
and fire from one APU can affect a second APU. Thus, while the
probability of an APU being struck by a fragment is the same
for ascent and descent, the likelihood of a fuel fire on descent
makes damage more likely during that phase. The Group assigned
the following probability distributions:
f7 - Ascent
pr (f7)
.05
.50
.40
.05
! ! I | | !
0 .05 .I0 .15 .20 .25
Fzequency of Occurrence
p(zT)
f7
.05
.05
.50
.i0
.40 I .05
.15 I .20
This distribution was used in the evaluation of event tree
Top Event FA after the occurrence of TA without the occurrence
of CA.
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In the event of a large hydrazine leak during entry, (e.g., the
contents of an APU fuel tank leaks into the aft compartment) the
experts surveyed believe that a large fire would result, leading
to loss of the crew and vehicle.
APU fuel leakage may ultimately lead to hydrazine detonation.
Hydrazine explodes when heated to a detonation temperature
determined by the surface material in contact with the hydrazine.
The detonation temperature may be achieved by heating the
hydrazine or by adiabatically compressing hydrazine containing
vapor bubbles.
Under adiabatic compression conditions, the threshold temperature
limit for explosive decomposition of hydrazine was between 2i7"F
and 195"F in containers made of CRES-321, Hastelloy-X, Haynes-25,
CRES-316, CRES-347 and CRES-304L. These metals are listed in order
of decreasing threshold temperature (Reference 92). Without comp-
ression, liquid hydrazine will explode at high temperature. Tests
performed at the NASA White Sands Test Facility indicate that
liquid hydrazine in a test chamber constructed of 304 stainless
steel may explode at temperatures above about 445"F (Reference 88).
7.6.2.1 Probability of APU Failure Given a Small Fuel Leak
in That APU
Several mechanisms contribute to the event of an APU failure
given a small fuel leak in that APU. A small contribution to
the frequency of this event arises from APU fuel leaking into
the solenoid cavity of a fuel isolation valve or gas generator
control valve and detonating, thereby interrupting usage of the
valve. A second small contributor to this event is leakage by
means of breakage of the carbon face of an APU fuel pump seal,
allowing the hydrazine to detonate because of metal rubbing
against metal, and thereby causing the fuel pump to fail.
Aside from fire, two additional mechanisms are relevant to hydra-
zine leakage into the aft compartment. These are: (1) stripping
of Kapton electrical wiring insulation leading to loss of GGVM
control, and (2) hydrazine decomposition initiated by some
catalyst in the environment. Hydrazine is known to dissolve
Kapton. However, the Group could not agree as to whether the
APU Kapton wiring insulation would be removed in the time
interval (about 8 minutes) between APU startup and attaining
an altitude at which hydrazine cannot exist as a liquid. With
regard to hydrazine decomposition, it is known that catalysts
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exist which cause hydrazine to decompose at room temperature.
An example of such a reaction is taken from Reference 91.
"When two or three drops of hydrazine were dropped onto
a layer of ferric oxide . . . at the nemperature of the
laboratory . . • in a nitrogen atmosphere, sparking
occurred, and the oxide became red hot, but flame did
not appear . . ."
Again the Group differed in their opinions regarding the possible
presence of such a catalyst in the Orbiter aft comparument.
After consideration of the opinions offered, the following
assignment was made for the distribution associated with APU
failure given a small fuel leak in that APU during ascent:
Pr(fl2A)
fl2A)
.15
.05
This distribution was used in the evaluation of event tree Top
Events Cl, C2 and C3 when no APUs had failed, and in the
evaluation of FA if an APU had previously failed.
Considering the increased risk due to fire on descent, the
following assignment was made for the split fraction associated
with APU failure given a small fuel leak in that APU during
descent:
Pr (fl2D)
fl2D
.I
.4 .2 1 .3.5 .6
.25
.7
This distribution was used in the evaluation of event tree Top
Events DI, D2, and D3 when no APUs had failed or in the evaluation
of FB if an APU had previously failed.
7.6.2.2 Probability of APU Failure Given a Small Fuel Leak in
Another APU
The probability of APU failure given a small fuel leak in another
APU was agreed by the Group to be much less during ascent than
the probability of APU failure given a small fuel leak in that
APU. Internal fuel leakage in another APU was considered to pose
a reduced risk since the resulting detonation could produce, at
most, low energy shrapnel.
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8.0 QUANTITATIVE RESUDTS oF THE APU PRA
The PRA model was constructed from the top down. The analysis
started with the major functions of the shuttle, loss of which
would cause loss of mission or loss of crew and vehicle. This
failure logic was documented in the Master Logic Diagrams. Those
diagrams were developed to the level of initial failure categories
of the APU that could lead to the damage states LOC/V, intact
abort, PLS, or launch scrub. By means of event sequence diagrams,
all significant scenarios that could lead from an initial failure
to one of the damage states were defined and described. The event
trees and split fraction models provided further detail of the
scenarios in a form that was also quantifiable. The level of
detail was commensurate with the data collected from various
sources throughout NASA, and was generally at a component or
subcomponent level.
Quantification, in contrast to model development, is performed
from the bottom up. Probability distributions that reflect
actuarial information about the APU, analysis, maintenance
procedures, and engineering judgment were developed for each
component, subcomponent, and event in the model. The minimal
cut sets of the split fraction models were obtained and the
appropriate probability distribution assigned to each basic event
in the cut sets. The RISKMAN software permitted the development
of algebraic equations representing each split fraction and use
of the assigned probability distributions to obtain the numerical
value of each split fraction in the APU event tree. Another
module of RISKMAN combined the split fractions to obtain the
frequency of each scenario. Since each scenario was associated
with a damage state (or the OK state), scenario frequencies were
summed, as shown in Section 5, to obtain the total damage state
frequency.
The results of this study are presented in terms of probability
distributions and the risk contributions that make up those
distributions. The probability distributions are discussed in
terms of the following:
ao Prelaunch and ascent (Stage A) risk profiles for each
damage state and the interpretation of the profiles
b. Entire flight (Stages A and B combined) risk profiles for
each damage state and the interpretation of the profiles
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The risk contributors are discussed in terms of the following:
a. Description of failure scenarios in order of their importance
to the risk profiles
b. Description of APU component failure modes in order of their
importance to the risk profiles
8.1 RISK PROFILES
8.1.1 Risk Profiles for Staue A: prelaunch and Ascen_
The probability distributions shown in Figure 8-1 represent the
study conclusions about (1) the frequency with which APU failures
would result in loss of crew or vehicle, (2) the frequency of
flights in which APU failures would result in launch scrub, and
(3) the frequency with which APU failures would result in intact
aborts during ascent. The time employed in the determination of
(i) and (3) above includes the period from lift-off to APU shut-
down after the OMS-I burn. The time employed in the determination
of (2) includes the period from prelaunch APU start to lift-off.
The frequency of launch scrubs includes only failures which
prevent APU start and those which prevent continued APU operation.
Those failure modes which represent only a violation of launch
commit criteria were omitted due to limited time and resources, in
order to simplify the model. The failure modes and failure
scenarios contributing to these risk curves are presented in Tables
8-1 through 8-8, and are discussed later. Figure 8-2 shows all
three probability distributions plotted on a common scale.
A great deal of information is contained in these distributions
even without looking further into what scenarios contribute most
to them. The results show that the range of possible frequencies
of LOC/V during ascent lies between 1 in 250 and 1 in i00,000
flights. That is, one should not expect an LOC/V before 250
flights, but LOC/V is almost certain within 100,000 flights. We
are 90% confident that the frequency with which APUs would cause
loss of crew or vehicle during ascent lies between 1 in about
42,000 flights (Sth percentile) and 1 in about 1,400 flights (95th
percentile). The median frequency of occurrence is 1 in about
9600 flights (50th percentile), and the average frequency of
occurrence is 1 in about 3800 flights (mean).
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From this study, one may conclude that very little risk is assoc-
iated with an APU causing LOC/V during ascent during the life of
the Shuttle program. Similarly, the results show that the range
of possible frequencies of APU-caused launch scrubs lies between
1 in about 13 flights and 1 in about 90 flights. We are 90%
confident that the fraction of flights in which APUs would cause
a launch scrub lies between 1 in about 68 flights (5th percentile)
and 1 in about 20 flights (95th percentile).
The average frequency with which APUs would cause a launch scrub
was estimated to be i in about 32 flights. This result is quite
consistent with the observed data of one APU-related launch scrub
in the first 25 flights. The average frequency with which a PLS
would be declared because of APU malfunctions was estimated to be
1 in about 120 flights. No probability distribution is provided
for the PLS case: however, the PLS risk contributors are presented
in Tables 8-1 and 8-6.
The study results show that the range of possible frequencies of
APU-caused intact aborts is between 1 in about 2000 ascents and 1
in about I0,000 ascents. That is, one should not expect an APU-
caused intact abort before 2000 flights, but an intact abort is
almost certain within 10,000 flights. We are 90% confident that
the frequency with which APUs would cause an intact abort during
ascent lies between 1 in about 6,600 flights (Sth percentile) and
i in about 1,700 flights (95th percentile). The median frequency
of occurrence is once in about 3,600 flights (50th percentile),
and the mean occurrence is once in about 3,000 flights. From
this study, one may conclude that there is little risk associated
with an APU causing an intact abort during the life of the
Shuttle program.
8.1.1.1 The Effects of APU Redundancy
The occurrence of a declared PLS associated with APUs is rela-
tively more likely than the other in-flight damage states. This
is because any permanent failure, any detected leak, or any other
malfunctions associated with declaring an APU lost after lift-off
would lead to a PLS in accordance with the Flight Rules. Since
one of these malfunctions on any one of the three APUs can cause
a PLS, the presence of three APUs, in effect, increases the
potential for a PLS.
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The risk model leads to an intact abort if any one of the three
APUs fail during the thrust bucket. This damage state also
derives no benefit from the fact that there are three APUs.
The occurrence of a launch scrub is also relatively likely
because any failure _o start an APU, any failure of an APU
to continue running during the 5 minutes before lift-off, or
virtually any other detected malfunction in an APU during this
time period would lead to a launch scrub. Again, redundancy
is not a benefit for this damage sta_e.
The frequency of the intact abort and PLS damaqe states is aggra-
vated by the predominately series nature of each APU. Only the
isolation valves and control valves exhibit some redundancy to
prevent an APU from failing during operation. In series systems
every component must succeed for the system to succeed. The
failure frequencies of components in series are summed to obtain
the system failure frequency. For the above damage states, all
of the components (or redundant component pairs) of all three
APUs are summed.
Redundancy does, however, benefit the frequency of loss of crew
or vehicle. All scenarios leading to this damage state involve
failure of at least two APUs or one APU and flight critical
equipment during ascent, unfortunately, the effects of cascading
damage from failure modes such as turbine fragmentation and the
occurrences of common cause failures limit the benefits of this
redundancy. Cascading damage effects are aggravated by the close
proximity of APUs 1 and 2 and the close proximity of these APUs
to flight critical equipment such as the liquid propellant lines
of the main engines. Without the common cause and spatial inter-
action effects the fraction of flights leading to loss of crew or
vehicle would be about one-half the current assessed value.
8.1.2 Mission Risk Profile
The probability distribution shown in Figure 8-3 represents the
study conclusions about the frequency with which APU failures
would result in loss of crew or vehicle from lift-off to APU shut-
down after wheelstop (whole flight). These data were derived from
the Stage A (ascent) and Stage B (orbit and entry) risk models
combined.
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Figure 8-3. Probability Distribution for LOC/V - Entire Mission
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The results show that the range of possible APU-caused LOC/V
frequencies lies between 1 in about 15 flights, and 1 in about
300 flights. That is, one should not expect an LOC/V before 15
flights, and an LOC/V is almost certain within 300 flights. We
are 90% confident that the frequency with which APUs would cause
loss of crew or vehicle lies between 1 in about 215 flights (5th
percentile) and one in about 35 flights (95th percentile). Inter-
pretation of the risk profile (Figure 8-3) suggests that, based
on this study, there is a substantial risk of an APU-caused LOC/V
during the life of the Shuttle program.
The average frequency with which APU-initiated failures would
cause a loss of crew or vehicle is ! in about 70 flights.
Comparison of this number with the one in about 3,800 for
ascent clearly shows that the risk of the APUs to the vehicle
occurs predominately after ascent. In fact, ascent accounts
for only 1.3% of the total risk to the vehicle during a flight.
The breakdown of the Stage B risk into scenarios, as will be
discussed in succeeding sections, tells us, further, that the
APU risk is predominately associated with entry.
The 1 in 70 flights is far more frequent than would be expected
from 2 APUs failing independently during the flight. If indepen-
dent failures were the only contributors to loss of vehicle, then
the frequency would be about I0 times lower. This indicates that
cascading effects across subsystem boundaries and common cause
failures play a very significant role in the risk profile.
The results show that small fuel leaks from the APUs into the aft
compartment initiate cascading effects that include fires and
hydrazine damage to wiring insulation. The consequential damage
to APUs or other flight critical equipment in the aft compartment
from these hydrazine effects is the most important cause of loss
of crew or vehicle. Leakage of fuel is one of the more frequent
malfunctions of the APUs. The database indicated that leakage
into the aft compartment could occur once in about 3,700 hours of
flight time for each APU. The APUs can develop a fuel leak any
time during the flight. A typical flight exposes each APU to
hydrazine for approximately 154 hours. Therefore, APU leakage
into the aft compartment can be expected on the average approxi-
mately once in every eight or nine flights. The information
presented in Sections 6.6 and 7.6 indicated that damage to two
APUs or flight critical equipment, given that hydrazine leakage
into the aft compartment has occurred, is very likely during
entry. The likelihood of loss of crew or vehicle because of a
leak occurring on orbit or during entry is, therefore, also high.
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The reasons that ascent represents a small portion of the risk
to the vehicle are related to the likelihood of leakage and
consequential damage from leakage. First, ascent represents
only about 0.1% of the total exposure time for leaks to develop.
Second, the aft compartment is purged with nitrogen to prevent
fires from occurring. Third, the concentra=ion of oxygen in the
atmosphere quickly becomes too low to suppcr_ combustion as the
vehicle ascends. And fourth, the accelera=ion vector during
ascent tends to force hydrazine to migrate away from ignition
sources and critical APU equipment. APU equipment malfunctions
also provide less of a contribution to risk during ascent because
of the shorter run time. Furthermore, failures of an APU to
start during stage A contribute to launch scrub and not to loss
of crew or vehicle. During entry, on the other hand, failures
to start do contribute to loss of crew and vehicle.
8.2 DESCRIPTION OF RISK CONTRIBUTORS
(
(
i.l
8.2.1 Failure Scenario Importance Rankina
Risk can be identified by two different means, each with its own
advantages. The first method is a ranking of failure scenarios
that contribute to each risk category; i.e., LOC/V, Loss of
Mission, Launch Scrub, etc. This method clarifies the sequences
of related or unrelated events that can lead to each damage state
of interest.
The second method is a ranking of individual component failures or
groups of components that contribute risk in one or more of the
failure scenarios. This second method focuses on the individual
component failures that contribute most greatly to the failure
scenarios. These are the component failures which, if eliminated
or reduced in frequency, can significantly lower the overall risk
to the vehicle associated with the APU.
8.2.1.1 Loss of Crew or Vehicle During Ascent
Three scenarios provide 98% of the risk of loss of crew and
vehicle due to APU failures during ascent (bear in mind that
ascent represents only 1.3% of the overall APU risk). These are
ranked and summarized in Table 8-1A. The most risk-significant
scenario (71% of the frequency of loss of crew and vehicle)
involves failure of an APU turbine such t_hat the turbine breaks
8-9
into high energy fragments while it is operating at normal speed
between lift-off and MECO. Breakup can occur either from a flaw
which could contribute to accelerated crack propagation, from
fatigue, or from other causes. Inspection of HPU turbines after
flight has consistently shown cracks in turbine blades, and
several incidents of turbine blade loss have occurred during APU
and HPU testing. To date, however, no turbine wheel h_b has come
apart at normal speed.
Turbine breakup, of course, guarantees the failure of at least
one APU. The turbine may fail in a way that causes it to wobble
on its axis of rotation such that when it comes apart, the pieces
are thrown out of the normal plane of rotation and miss the
containment ring. Tests have demonstrated that the portion of the
turbine housing that is not reinforced by the containment ring
cannot retain t_he fragments. These fragments could become high
energy projectiles capable of damaging other equipment in the aft
compartment, including other APUs.
Potential targets within the projected path of the shrapnel were
determined, and the strength of the materials that could be
struck was analyzed. Among the likely targets of the shrapnel
(as discussed in Section 6.6) are the liquid oxygen and liquid
hydrogen propellant lines that pass from the external tank
through the aft compartment to the main engines. It appears that
shrapnel could be energetic enough to pierce both the outer and
inner shells of these lines. Over-pressurization of the aft
compartment, as well as fire and explosion, are likely outcomes
of this event. Shrapnel could also hit and damage hydraulic
lines, electrical wiring, and other APUs. The APU fuel tanks are
within the spray pattern of shrapnel from APU 1 or APU 2. There
is also some chance that a substantial hydrazine leak from a fuel
tank could strip the Kapton insulation from electrical wiring in
the aft compartment, thus failing other APUs or flight critical
hardware despite the fact that the nitrogen purge of the aft
compartment prevents the hydrazine from igniting.
The next most significant scenario to loss of crew or vehicle
during ascent accounts for 23% of the risk. It involves
independent APU failures such that two APUs cease to operate
after lift-off. Even if the APUs should fail after MECO, it is
assumed that entry and landing cannot be successful on only one
APU. While the split fraction models described in Section 6.5
present numerous potential equipment failure combinations that
cumulatively provide the total frequency of failures of two APUs,
one of these combinations has been assessed as contributing about
70% of the frequency of this scenario. This combination entails
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common cause restriction of lube oil circulation in two APUs
during ascent. Inadequate lube oil circulation causes a rapid
overheat and failure of the bearings on the rotating equipment
in the gearbox. The restriction may be caused by hydrazine leak-
age from the fuel pump seal through the drain cavity and into the
gearbox via the gearbox shaft seal which shares the same seal
drain cavity, or it may be caused by foreign substances introduced
into the gearboxes during ground servicing. The APU flight
history database (see Section 7) exhibits several occurrences of
high lube oil pressure and partial blockage of the lube oil
filter. Two such occurrences were on the same flight, and
resulted in a launch scrub. The database also reveals several
incidents of contamination of the lube oil by H20, including
contamination of all three APUs on the same flight.
Hydrazine reacts with the lube oil to form a waxy substance that
collects on the lube oil filters and eventually blocks them.
Among the identified commonality of causes that covered two
APUs were choice of incompatible materials (lube oil and
hydrazine), design and fabrication of the seals and seal drain
system that allowed the two materials to intermingle, and
failure to adequately inspect and clean the filters between
missions. Although a flushing and inspection procedure has
been added to lube oil system refurbishment, the other two
causes remain for the baseline APU. This problem should be
eliminated by the Improved APU seal cavity design.
The third risk-significant scenario accounts for 4% of the
frequency of loss of crew and vehicle. This scenario involves
failure of both the primary and secondary fuel control valves in
the open position coupled with failure of the overspeed shutdown
function to close the secondary valve. If both the primary and
secondary valves fail open for more than about 200 milliseconds
beyond the normal pulse period, the turbine speed could increase
to a speed (about 108,000 rpm) at which the turbine hub would
come apart. The containment ring could not withstand the energy
of the fragments and the APU housing would be pierced, sending
high energy shrapnel through the aft compartment. Even if the
fuel isolation valves are closed by the overspeed shutdown
circuit, sufficient hydrazine remains in the lines downstream
of the isolation valves to power the turbine to overspeed. The
remainder of the scenario is as described above for turbine
rupture at normal speed.
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8.2.1.2 Launch Scrub
D
Table 8-1B shows that about 97% of the frequency of launch scrub
is provided by two scenarios. The most important scenario
contributes 87% of the launch scrub frequency. This scenario
represents those APU failures that occur upon attempting to start
the APUs at 5 minutes before lift-off. A ranking of the most
important start failures and their percent contribution is
presented in Table 8-1B.
The other scenario accounts for 10% of the launch scrub frequency.
This scenario involves failures of equipment in a single APU
during the 5 minutes of run time before lift-off. These are
failures that would cause the APU to cease operating. As noted
earlier, violations of launch commit criteria that allow the APUs
to continue operating were not included in the scope of this
study. It was assumed that the launch control center could
detect an APU failure and scrub the launch essentially right up
to the launch command. A ranking Of the most important
individual APU run failures and their percent contribution is
presented in Table 8-1B.
8.2.1.3 Intact Aborts and PLS
Failure of individual APUs to continue operating after launch are
the most important scenarios for these damage states. Tables 8-IC
and 8-1D summarize the most important APU run failures and their
percent contributions to the frequencies of these damage states.
8.2.1.4 Loss of Crew or Vehicle Over the Entire Flight
The scenarios most important to risk to the vehicle from lift-off
through APU shutdown after wheelstop are summarized in Table 8-2.
Six scenarios provide 61% of the risk. They involve leakage of
hydrazine from any one of the APUs or any two of the APUs in
combination. Twenty five percent of the risk of these scenarios
comes from combinations of two APUs leaking fuel during the same
mission. This reflects the in-flight experience in which two APUs
leaked fuel during the same mission (STS-9). The study assumed
that an APU could develop a leakage during orbit. Since the APUs
are shut down during orbit, the leak may not reveal itself until
after the APUs have started for entry. Even then a small but
dangerous leak could go undetected; this study assumed that such
leaks are not detected (as opposed to large leaks, which would be
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detected). Similarly, a small leak could develop any time during
entry. The study assumed that leakages or leakage-induced
failures that occur after wheelstop would not cause a loss of
crew or vehicle.
The damage caused by leakage of hydrazine stems from three of its
physical properties. First, hydrazine is corrosive to certain
materials. One such material is the Kapton wiring insulation
used extensively in the aft compartment. Second, hydrazine is
flammable in as little as about 4% oxygen. Hot spots on the APUs
themselves can provide an ignition source for a hydrazine-oxygen
mixture. Third, hydrazine will auto-decompose to nitrogen,
hydrogen and ammonia in an exothermic reaction when it comes in
contact with certain materials such as metal oxides, which may be
present in the aft compartment. Because of these properties, the
experience with STS-9, and the density of critical equipment in
the aft compartment, a high conditional probability (given that
a fuel leak has occurred) was assigned (by expert opinion) to
the event that a fuel leak in an APU would lead to loss of crew
and vehicle during entry. These conditional probabilities are
discussed in Section 7.6; they range between about 0.2 and 0.6.
The study recognized that fires cannot occur until the vehicle
is sufficiently low in the atmosphere. As a result, the study
assumed that neither an APU nor flight critical equipment would
fail above about 65,000 feet.
Another 16% of the risk of loss of crew of vehicle comes from 17
scenarios that involve hydrazine leakage either preceded by or
followed by an independent failure of an APU. Such failures could
occur upon starting the APUs for entry, while the APUs are running
during entry, or from a hydrazine leak into a solenoid cavity with-
in the gas generator valve module. Fuel leakage into a solenoid
cavity was assumed to trigger an auto-decomposition reaction that
causes a rupture of the valve cover and a loss of that APU.
Start failures, run failures, and heater failures of two APUs
during orbit and entry comprise about 9% of the risk. Table
8-2 summarizes and ranks the individual APU failures that are
important contributors to these scenarios.
About 4% of the risk was assessed to be initiated by hydrazine
leakage into the solenoid cavity of one of the fuel tank isolation
valves. If an auto-decompostion reaction and rupture of the valve
cover followed this leakage, then the contents of the hydrazine
tank were assumed to be dumped into the aft compartment. This
event, therefore, was assumed to lead to loss of crew and vehicle.
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The risk associated with turbine shrapnel from both normal speed
and overspeed conditions comprises about 4% of the total risk.
Occurrence of this incident during entry accounts for about four-
fifths of this 4%. Only about cne-twentieth of the risk from
shrapnel is attributable to turbine overspeed, as opposed to
turbine breakup at normal speed.
Only about 1% of the estimated risk to the vehicle due to APU-
initiated scenarios is associated with a first-day PLS enury
condition. These scenarios involve an APU failure during ascent
and another APU failure during the abbreviated remainder of the
mission (about 5.7 hours).
The remaining 5% of the risk is distributed among all other
scenarios modeled in the event trees.
8.2.2 Component Failure Importance Rank_nq
Another way to dissect the results is to perform sensitivity
studies on the importance of individual risk contributors to the
overall frequency of each damage state. This was done by numerous
requantifications of the APU risk model. For each requantification,
a specific failure was assigned a failure frequency of zero. In
other words, the component was assumed to be perfect with respect
to that failure mode. In general, the requantification yields
an estimate of the damage state frequency that is lower than the
base case. The following importance parameter was, therefore,
used to rank the individual failure modes:
Ij
BASELINE QUANTIFICATION - jth REQUANTIFICATION
m
BASELINE QUANTIFICATION
The results shown in Tables 8-3 through 8-8 are normalized by a
factor representing the summation of all Ij. The failures shown
in the tables represent 90% or more of their respective damage
state frequencies.
Table 8-7 represents the results of the first iteration of the
loss of crew/vehicle for an entire flight. The large (74.6%)
contribution from the general category of hydrazine leaks down-
stream of the isolation valves, and the desire to rank the risk
contributors to a finer detail, led to a second iteration. The
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second iteration results are shown in Table 8-8, and identifies,
more specifically, the risk points of leakage downstream of the
isolation valves. For example, 71.6% of this risk can be attri-
buted to the first three leak sources. Fuel leakage into the fuel
isolation valve remains high on the risk table. This second
iteration is a result of modifying the model to quantify individual
fuel leak sources and to eliminate the "MPU fail high" failures,
which were determined to be non-credible. This recalculation of
the results was facilitated by the capability of the PRA process
to readily support iterations of the results for a more detailed
examination of particular risk contributors or to incorporate new
information.
The iteration was performed by setting the likelihoods of the "MPU
fail high" failures to zero in the existing model, and by expanding
the fuel leak model to encompass specific leak sources. This
expanded fuel leak model took the form of a fault tree. The fuel
leak events were quantified by a Bayesian update based on a
combination of similarity data and Shuttle flight history data.
A second iteration was not performed to eliminate the "MPU Fail
High" failure modes, shown in Tables 8-3 through 8-4, due to time
constraints. However, it can be safely assumed that these
failures would drop from the top 99% category, and that other
failure modes would move up accordingly.
8.3 ASSESSMENT OF STUDY RESULTS
The contributions of this PRA pilot study are significant because
of the following achievements.
Re
b.
c.
The study was able to develop a multistage model that
identified and ranked scenarios leading from APU
failures to loss of crew or vehicle over the entire
flight from lift-off to APU shutdown after wheelstop.
The study identified and ranked scenarios leading from APU
failures to loss of crew and vehicle during ascent. Ascent
was found to represent only about 1% of the total risk of
loss of crew and vehicle.
The study identified and ranked scenarios leading from APU
failures to loss of crew or vehicle during orbit, entry,
and landing. The risk from entry and landing so dominated
the risk of the flight that the overall flight risk is
essentially equal to the risk from entry and landing.
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dl The study identified and ranked scenarios leading from APU
failures to other damage states, namely, launch scrub,
intact abort and first-day PLS entry.
e. The study identified and ranked the individual component
failures or groups of failures that c3ntributed to each
damage state. The results show that _he bulk of the risk
for each damage state is contributed by a relatively small
number of failures. The PRA results suggest that these
failures modes should receive additional autention in order
to achieve significant risk reduction.
f. The study discovered that spatial inueractions, failure
effects propagating within the subsystem, failure effects
cascading into other subsystems, and common cause failures
led to a risk that was far greater than from independent
APU failures alone.
go The study found that the proximity of the APUs to each other
and to flight critical equipment in the aft compartment,
coupled with the APUs' potential for releasing hydrazine and
shrapnel, and the requirement for two of three APUs for safe
flight, constitute the bulk of the risk of these subsystems
to the Vehicle.
The risk of loss of crew or vehicle from the APUs is clearly domi-
nated by leakage of hydrazine leading to propagating and cascading
effects of fire, hydrazine corrosion, hydrazine decomposition re-
actions, and possibly detonation. These effects were assessed to
lead to failure of two APUs or flight critical equipment during
entry and landing with a frequency between 0.2 and 0.6, given that
a leakage has occurred. The high conditional frequency of loss of
crew and vehicle given a hydrazine leak in an APU resulted from
the recognition that the aft compartment is crowded with equipment
that is susceptible to the effects of hydrazine and within very
close proximity to the source of hydrazine. There are no
effective barriers between the hydrazine source and much of the
equipment in the aft compartment. Unfortunately, the APUs them-
selves provide sufficient heat in the presence of oxygen to
ignite leaking hydrazine. The effects of hydrazine ignition were
dramatically demonstrated at the end of the flight of STS-9.
It should be noted that certain changes in APU design and
operations have been implemented, or are in the process of being
implemented, which should reduce the risk associated with the
APUs. These changes include:
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Improved fuel leak detection procedures during APU turnaround
operations
Turbine wheel crack mapping program
Fuel isolation valve redesign to elininate source of fuel
leaks into solenoid cavity
Chromized gas generator injector tubes to reduce likelihood
of fuel leaks
e. Redesign of fuel pump/gearbox seal cavity to eliminate fuel/
lube oil mixing
The PRA proof-of-concept study model was built and quantified
based on the pre-STS-51L configuration except where otherwise
noted, and does not reflect any of the changes noted above.
A design change that would further reduce the risk posed by the
APUs would be to erect barriers to isolate each APU from the rest
of the aft compartment. Properly designed, these barriers would
prevent or reduce the amount of hydrazine entering the compartment
due to leakage, and would also serve to reduce the detrimental
effects of shrapnel produced by turbine breakup during flight.
Another approach to reducing overall risk is to certify that the
vehicle is capable of operating throughout the flight envelope
(ascent as well as entry) on a single APU. A significant
reduction to the risk of LOC/V, as determined from this study,
would result since the study was heavily influenced by the
assumption that two APUs were required for safe flight.
I
I
i
t
8-17
TABLE S-IA
Page 1 of 8
IMPORTANCE RANKING OF APU FAILURE SCENARIOS
LOC/V - ASCENT
RANK FAILURE SCENARIO RISK CONTRIBUTORS
% CONT-
RIBUTION
1
2
Turbine failure leading to shrapnel induced failure
of second APU or flight critical equipment between
launch and M_CO
Contributors and % Contribution to Scenario I:
a. Turbine fragmentation at normal speed (100%)
Equipment failure of 2 APUs between launch and APU
shutdown after MECO
Contributors and % Contribution to Scenario 2:
ao Lube oil circulation restricted in two APUs,
causing bearing overheat and failure of rota-
ting equipment in gearbox from both common
cause and independent failures (73%)
bQ Lube oil circulation restricted in one APU and
_ndependent failure of primary fuel control
valve (stays closed while pulsing) (6%)
Co Two primary fuel valves in two APUs fail
closed while pulsing (5%)
de Either MPU 2 or MPU 3 fails high* in one APU
and a primary fuel valve fails closed in
another APU (3%)
ee Restricted lube oil circulation in one APU and
either MPU 2 or MPU 3 fails high* in another
APU (2%)
fo Turbine wheel failure in one APU and primary
fuel valve fails closed in another APU (1%)
70.5
23.4
Later information indicates that MPU fail high may not
be a credible failure mode
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TABLE 8-_ (Concluded)
FAZLUI_ SCENARIO RISK CONTRIBUTORS
Page 2 of 8
% CONT-
RIBUTION
j •
Isolation valve switch fails to open upon APU
shutdown in one APU and primary fuel valve
fails closed during pulsing in another APU (1%)
Turbine wheel fails in one APU and lube oil
circulation is restricted in another APU (0.7%)
Isolation valve drivers fail on upon APU shut-
down in one APU and primary, fuel valve fails
closed while pulsing in another APU (0.6%)
Combinations of MPU, primary valve, lube oil
circulation, spurious controller actuation,
turbine wheel failure, gas generator failures,
and isolation valve drivers and switches (6%)
Turbine overspeed leading to fragmentation of the
hub and shrapnel-induced failure of a second APU or
flight critical equipment
Contributors and % Contribution to Scenario 3:
ao MPU 3 fails low and secondary fuel valve fails
to close due to mechanical failure (44%)
bo Primary fuel valve fails open during pulsing
and secondary fuel valve fails to close on
demand due to mechanical failure (29%)
Ce MPU 3 fails low and secondary fuel valve fails
open due to mechanical failure during pulsing
(13%)
do Primary and secondary fuel valves fail open
pulsing due to mechanical failures (9%)
3.8
All Others
Total
2.3
i00.0
e Later information indicates that MPU fail high may not be
a credible failure mode
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TABLE S-1B
IMPORTANCE RANKING OF APU FAILURE SCENARIOS
Page 3 of 8
LAUNCH SCRUB - ASCENT
RANK
M
F_ZLURE SCENARIO RISK CONTRTBUTOR8
% CONT-
RIBUTION
1 Failure to start an APU at 5 minutes prior to lift-
off
Contributors and % Contribution to Scenario I:
ao Secondary fuel control valve leaks before
isolation valves are opened, leading to
elevated gas generator temperature (29%)
bo Secondary fuel valve fails to open on demand
at start (11%)
Cl Primary fuel _alve fails to close on demand
at start (11%)
d. MPU 1 fails low on demand at start (8%)
eo Electric power to secondary fuel valve is lost
(7%)
fo MPU I, 2, or 3 fails high* on demand at start
(5% each - 15%)
gm Fuel pump bypass valve fails to open on demand
at start (5%)
ho Fuel pump bypass valve fails to close after
normal pump pressure is reached (5%)
im Loss of electric power to fuel tank isolation
valve at start (4%)
j • Primary or secondary fuel valve controller
output fails off on demand at start (4%)
87.4
Later information indicates that MPU fail high may not be
credible _41 .... mode
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3
TABLE 8-1B (Concluded)
FAILURE SCENARIO RISK CONTRIBUTORS
Page 4 of 8
% CONT-
RIBUTION
Failure of an APU to continue operating after start
and before lift-off
Contributors and % Contribution to Scenario 2:
SEE FAILURE OF AN APUTO OPERATE UNDER INTACT ABORT
(TABLE 8-iC)
Spurious shutdown of any one APU after start and
before lift-off
Contributors and % Contribution to Scenario 3:
SEE SPURIOUS SHUTDOWN UNDER PLS (TABLE 8-1D)
9.5
2.6
All Others
Total
0.5
m
I00.0
J_
Later information indicates that MPU fail high may not be
a credible failure mode
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TABLE 8-IC
IMPORTANCE RANKING OF APU FAILURE SCENARIOS
INTACT ABORT - ASCZNT
FAILURE SCENARIO RIBK CONTRIBUTORS
Failure of an APU to operate while in the thrust
bucket
Contributors and % Contribution to Scenario I:
a. Primary fuel valve fails closed during
pulsing (43%)
b. Lube oil circulation restricted (26%)
c. MPU 2 fails high*, causing secondary fuel
valve to close (6%)
d. MPU 3 fails high*, causing primary fuel
valve to close (6%)
e. Turbine wheel failure (6%)
f. Fuel pump filter blocked (2%)
g. Gas generator fails to operate (1%)
h. Lube oil pump fails to run (0.8%)
i. Fuel pump fails to run (0.8%)
j. Loss of electric power to secondary fuel
valve (0.5%)
k. Secondary fuel valve controller output
failure (0.3%)
Page 5 of 8
% CONT-
RIBUTION
76.6
Later information indicates that MPU fail high may not be
a credible failure mode
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TABLE 8-1C (Ceneludod)
Page 6 of 8
) FAILURE SCENARIO RISK CONTRIBUTORS
% CONT-
RIBUTION
3
2 Spurious shutdown of any one APU while in the
thrust bucket
Contributors and % Contribution to Bcen&rlo 2:
SEE SPURIOUS SHUTDOWN UNDER PLS (Table 8-1D)
All Others
Total
20.7
2.7
i00.0
(
I
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TABLE 8-1D
IMPORTANCE RANKING OF APU FAILURE SCENARIOS
APU STAGE A (ASCENT)
PRIMARY LANDING SITE
Page 7 of 8
1
FAILURE SCENARIO RISK CONTRIBUTORS
Failure of an APU to continue operauing after
lift-off, excepU in the thrust buckeu
Contributors and % Contribution to Scenario i:
a. Primary fuel valve fails closed during
pulsing (40%)
b. Lube oil circulation restricted (24%)
c. MPU 2 fails high*, causing secondary fuel
valve to close (6%)
d. MPU 3 fails high*, causing secondary fuel
valve to close (6%)
e. Turbine wheel failure (6%)
f. Isolation valve switch fails to open upon
APU shutdown (4%)
Isolation valve drivers fail on (3%)
Fuel pump filter blocked (2%)
Gas generator fails to operate (1%)
Lube oil pump fails to run (0.8%)
Fuel pump fails to run (0.8%)
o
h.
i.
J.
k.
% CONT-
RIBUTION
77.1
Later information indicates that MPU fail high may not be
a credible failure mode
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Page 8 of 8
TABLE 8-1D (Concluded)
RANK
m
2
3
FAILURE SCENARIO RISK CONTRIBUTORS
Spurious shutdown of any one APU after lift-off
except in the thrust bucket
Contributors and % Contribution to Scenario 2:
ao MPU 1 fails low, causing underspeed trip
(_7_)
bo MPU 1 fails high*, causing overspeed trip
(22_)
All Others
Total
% CONT-
RIBUTION
20.8
2.1
i00.0
Later information indicates that MPU fail high may not be
a credible failure mode
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TABLE 8-2
IMPORTANCE RANKING OF APU FAILURE SCENARIOS
LOC/V - WHOLE MISSION
FAILURE SCENARIO RISK CONTRIBUTORS
Hydrazine leak downstream of fuel isolation
valves and into aft compartment during orbit or
entry that leads to failure of two APUs or
flight critical equipment
Contributors:
a. Leakage from any one APU (100%)
Hydrazine leak as above, but from two or three
APUs concurrently
Contributors:
a. Leakage from combinations of two APUs (91%)
b. Leakage from three APUs (9%)
Hydrazine leak from a single APU as above, with
an independent failure of another APU
Contributors:
ae Hydrazine leak in one APU, with equipment
failure of another APU while Funning (see
below for breakdown into APU failure modes)
(88%)
bl Hydrazine leak in one APU, with start
failure of another APU (see below for
breakdown into APU failure modes) (12%)
Equipment failure of two APUs during orbit,
entry, or landing (failures not related to APU
start)
ae Lube oil circulation restricted on two APUs
(16%)
be Primary fuel valve fails closed while
pulsing on one APU and fuel tank GN2 quick
disconnect leaks on another APU (7%)
Page 1 of 4
% CO._T-
RIBUTION
39.1
26.5
6.4
5.0
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TABLE 8-2 (Continued)
FAILURE 8CEIq'ARZO RISK CONTRIBUTORS
Page 2 of 4
% CONT-
RIBUTION
Lube oil circulation restricted in one APU,
and primary fuel valve fails open whale
pulsing on another APU (6%)
Primary fuel valve fails closed while
pulsing in two APUs (6%)
Primary fuel valve fails closed while
pulsing on one APU, and fuel tank diaphragm
leaks on another APU (4%)
Lube oil circulation restricted in one APU,
and fuel tank GN2 quick disconnect leaks on
another APU (4%)
ho
Fuel tank diaphragm leak on one APU, and
fuel tank GN2 quick disconnect leaks on
another APU (3%)
Next 36 scenarios have combinations of lube
oil circulation restricted, tank diaphragm
leaks, primary fuel valve closure, nitrogen
leak from fuel tank, MPU failures, turbine
failures, and loss of power to fuel tank
isolation valves (34%)
Fail to start one APU at TIG-5 in orbit and
equipment failure of second APU while running
Contributors:
LMPORTANT APU 8TART F&ILURES:
ao Secondary fuel valve fails to open on
demand to start (18%)
b. MPU 1 fails low on demand to s_art (14%)
Co Electric power to secondary fuel valve
fails at start (11%)
d. MPU 1 fails high* (9%)
4.0
Later information indicates that MPU fail high may
not be a credible failure mode
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TABLE $-2 (Continued)
FAILURE SCENARIO RISK CONTRIBUTORS
e. MPU 2 fails high* (9%)
f. MPU 3 fails high* (9%)
g. Fuel pump bypass valve fails closed (9%)
h. Fuel pump bypass valve fails open (9%)
i. Electric power to fuel tank isolation valve
fails at start (7%)
IMPORTANT APU EQUZPMENT F_ZLURES:
j. Primary fuel valve fails closed during
pulsing (19%)
k. Fuel tak GN2 fill quick disconnect fails
open (13%)
i. Heaters fail off by common cause (14%)
m. Lube oil circulation restricted (12%)
n. Fuel tank diaphragm leaks (8%)
o. Fuel tank nitrogen leakage (3%)
p. MPU 2 fails high* (3%)
q. MPU 3 fails high* (3%)
r. Turbine wheel failure (3%)
Hydrazine leaks into isolation valve solenoid,
auto-decomposes, ruptures valve cover, and
contents of fuel tank are dumped into aft
compartment
Contributors:
a. Leakage into solenoid cavity (100%)
Page 3 of 4
% CONT-
RIBUTION
3.8
Later information indicates that MPU fail high may
not be a credible failure mode
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TABLE 8-2 (Concluded)
FAILURE BCENARZO RIBK CONTRIBUTORS
Turbine comes apart at normal speed during
entry; shrapnel and hydrazine effecUs fail
a second APU or flight critical equipment
Contributors:
a. Turbine wheel comes apart and escapes
housing (100%)
Hydrazine leak from two APUs as above, with an
independent failure of another APU
Contributors:
am Leakage with equipment failure of APU while
running (100%)
Turbine comes apart at normal speed during
ascent; shrapnel effects fail a second APU or
flight critical equipment
Contributors:
a. Turbine wheel comes apart and escapes
housing (100%)
Equipment failure of one APU during ascent and
another during orbit or entry
Contributors:
ae Breakdown of APU failures provided
previously
All Others
TOTAL
Page 4 of 4
% CONT-
RIBUTION
3.1
1.9
0.9
0.9
8.4
I00.0
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TABLE 8-3
IMPORTANCE RANKING OF APU FAILURES
LOC/V- ASCENT
COMPONENT/ASSEMBLY
FAILURE RISK CONTRIBUTORS
% CONT-
RIBUTION
1
2
3
7
8
9
10
II
_.2
13
Turbine Wheel Failure
Lube Oil Circulation Restricted
Primary Fuel Valve Fails Closed During
Pulsing
MPU 2 Fails High*
MPU 3 Fails High*
Isolation Valve Switch Fails to Open
On Demand
Secondary Fuel Valve Fails to Close on
First Demand
Isolation Valve A Drivers Fail On
MPU 3 Fails Low
Fuel Pump Filter Blocked
Primary Fuel Valve Fails Open During
Pulsing
Gas Generator Fails to Operate
All Other Failures
45.09
22.67
20.48
2.50
2.50
1.65
1.28
0.88
0.85
0.39
0.36
0.i0
1.25
Total I00.00
NOTE: Proof-of-concept study results. Not approved
for design evaluation or flight certification.
* Later information indicates that MPU fail high may
,,_ be a __e failure mode
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TABLE 8-4
IMPORTANCE RANKZNG OF ),PU FAZLURES
LAUNCH SCRUB
COMPONENT/),SSF.HBLY
FAZLUI_ RISK CONTRIBUTORS
% CONT-
P.ZBUTZON
Secondary Fuel Valve Leaks Before APU Star_c 29.3
Secondary Fuel Valve Fails to Open On Demand 10.6
Primary Fuel Valve Fails to Close on the 10.6
First Demand
MPU 1 Fails Low 8.0
Loss of Electrical Power to Secondary Fuel 6.6
Valve
MPU 1 Fails High* 4.9
MPU 2 Fails High* 4.9
MPU 3 Fails High* 4.9
Fuel Pump Bypass Valve Fails to Open at APU 4.8
Start
Fuel Pump Bypass Valve Fails to Close After 4.8
APU Star_
Loss of Power to Fuel Tank Isolation Valves 4.0
Primary Fuel Valve Fails Closed During Pulsing 3.5
Lube Oil Circulation Restricted 1.9
Secondary Fuel Valve Controller Output Fails I.i
Off On Demand
All Other Failures 0.I
Total i00.0
NOTE: Proof-of-concept study results. Not approved
for design evaluation or flight certification.
* Later information indicates that MPU fail high may not
be a credible failure mode
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TABLE 8-5
IMPORTANCE RANKING OF _,PU FATLURES
INTACT ABORT
RANK
1
2
3
4
S
6
7
8
9
10
11
L2
13
14
COMPONENT/_B BEMBLY
FAILURE RIBK CONTRIBUTORS
Primary Fuel Valve Fails Closed During
Pulsing
Lube Oil Circulation Restricted
MPU 1 Fails Low
MPU 1 Fails High*
MPU 2 Fails High*
MPU 3 Fails High*
Turbine Wheel Failure
Fuel Pump Filter Blocked
Gas Generator Fails to Operate
Lube Oil Pump Fails to Run
Fuel Pump Fails to Run
Loss of Electrical Power to Secondary Fuel
Valve
Secondary Fuel Valve Controller Output
Fails Off
All Other Failures
CONT-
RIBUTION
34.1
19.5
17.0
5.0
5.0
5.0
5.0
2.0
I.I
1.0
1.0
0.5
0.5
8.3
Total i00.0
NOTE: Proof-of-concept study results. Not approved
for design evaluation or flight certification.
* Later information indicates that MPU fail high may not
be a credible failure mode
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TABLE 8-6
IMPORTANCE RANKING OF APU FAILURES
PLS
m
COMPONENT/ASSEMBLY
FAILURE RISK CONTRIBUTORS
Primary Fuel Valve Fails Closed During
Pulsing
Lube Oil Circulation Restricted
MPU 2 Fails High*
Fuel Tank Isolation Valve Switch Fails to
Open On Demand
Turbine Wheel Failure
Fuel Tank Isolation Valve Drivers Fail On
Over/Under Speed Control Circuit Spuriously
Closes Secondary Fuel Valve
MPU 1 Fails Low
Fuel Pump Filter Blocked
MPU 1 Fails High*
Gas Generator Fails to Operate
All Other Failures
% CONT-
RIBUTION
40.5
24.0
5.8
4.3
3.0
2.8
2.4
2.1
1.8
1.8
1.3
10.2
Total i00.0
NOTE: Proof-of-concept study results. Not approved
for design evaluation or flight certification.
* Later information indicates that MPU fail high may not
be a credible failure mode
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TABLE 8-7
IMPORTANCE RANKING OF APU FAILURES
LOC/V - WHOLE FLIGHT - Ist ITERATION
Page 1 of 2
RANK
1
3
S
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
COMPONENT/ASSEMBLY
FAILURE RISK CONTRIBUTORS
Fuel System Leak Into Aft Compartment From
Location Downstream of Isolation Valve
Leak Into Fuel Isolation Valve Solenoid
Cavity
Turbine Wheel Failure
Leak Into Primary Valve Solenoid Cavity
(GGVM Detonation)
Primary Valve Fails Closed at APU Start
Lube Oil Circulation Restricted
Fuel Tank GN2 Fill Q.D. Leakage (Low Fuel
Tank Pressure)
Any MPU Fails High at APU Start*
Fuel Tank Diaphragm Leakage
Secondary Fuel Valve Fails to Open at APU
Start
Heater Pair 116/117 Fails Off on Orbit
Any MPU Fails High While APU is Running*
MPU 1 Fails LOw at APU Start
Loss of Power to Secondary Fuel Valve at
APU Start
% CONT-
RIBUTION
74.6
3.8
2.4
2.3
1.8
1.3
1.2
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.7
0.6
* Later information indicates that MPU fail high may not
be a credible failure mode
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TABLE 8-7 (Concluded)
Page 2 of 2
i _
| :
RANK
f
15
16
17
18
19
2O
21
22
23
24
2S
COMPONENT/ASSEMBLY
FAILURE RISK CONTRIBUTORS
Loss of Power to Fuel Tank Isolation Valves
at APU Start
Fuel Tank GN2 Leakage
Fuel Pump Bypass Valve Fails to Close After
APU Start
Heater Pair lll/ll2 Fails Off On Orbit
Secondary Fuel Valve Controller Output Fails
Off at APU Start
Fuel Isolation Valve Fails to Close at APU
Shutdown (GGVM Large Leak)
Fuel Isolation Valve Leaks at Closure After
Ascent
Loss of Power to Secondary Fuel Valve While
APU is Running
Primary Fuel Valve Controller Output Fails
On While APU Running
Secondary Fuel Valve Controller Output Fails
Off While APU Running
All Other Failures
% CONT-
RIBUTION
0.6
0.3
0.I
0.08
0.08
"0.02
0.01
0.01
0.I0
Total 100.00
i.
NOTE: Proof-of-concept study results. Not approved
for design evaluation or flight certification.
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TABLE 8-8
IMPORTANCE RANKING OF APU FAILURES
LOC/V - WHOLE FLIGHT - 2nd ITERATION
Page 1 of 2
RANK
1
2
3
4
S
6
7
8
9
I0
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
COMPONENT/ASSEMBLY
FAILURE RISK CONTRIBUTORS
Leakage From Gas Generator Injector Tube
Leakage From Fuel Lines and Fittings
Leakage From Fuel Pump
Leak Into Fuel Isolation Valve Solenoid Cavity
Leak Into Primary Valve Solenoid Cavity (GGVM
Detonation)
Primary Valve Fails Closed While Pulsing
External Leakage From GGVM
Lube Oil Circulation Restricted
Fuel Pump Shaft Seal Detonation
Fuel Tank GN2 Fill Q.D. Leakage (Low Fuel Tank
Pressure)
Heater Pair 111/112 Fails Off On Orbit
Heater Pair 116/117 Fails Off On Orbit
Fuel Tank Diaphragm Leakage
Secondary Fuel Valve Fails To Open At APU
Start
MPU 1 Fails Low At APU Start Valves At APU
Start
Loss Of Power To Secondary Fuel Valve At APU
Start
Loss of Power To Fuel Tank Isolation Valves
At APU Start
% CONT-
RIBUTION
35.5
23.3
12.8
4.0
3.3
3.1
3.0
2.8
1.8
1.7
1.6
1.4
I.I
0.9
0.7
0.5
0.5
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TABLE 8-8 (Concluded)
COXPONENT/ABBF.JQLY
lr]_ZLUI_ RZBK CONTRTBUTOI:LB
Turbine Wheel Failure
Fuel Tank GN2 Leakage
Fuel Pump Bypass Valve Fails To Close After
APU Start
Subtotal
Leakage From Fuel Line Flex Hose
Secondary Fuel Valve Controller Output Fails
Off At APU Start
Leakage From Fuel High Point Bleed Q.D.
Leakage From Fuel Test Port Q.D.
Fuel Isolation Valve Fails To Close At APU
Shutdown
Fuel Isolation Valve Leaks At Closure After
Ascent
Loss of Power To Secondary Fuel Valve While
APU Is Running
Primary Fuel Valve Controller Output Fails On
While APU Is Running
Secondary Fuel Valve Controller Output Fails
Off While APU Is Running
All Other Failures
Total
Page 2 of 2
% CONT-
RIBUTION
0.4
0.4
0.3
99.1
0.30
0.09
0.05
0.04
0.04
0.04
O. 04
0.01
0.01
0.28
I00.00
NOTE: Proof-of-concept study results. Not approved
for design evaluation or flight certification.
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9.0 HPU SCENARIO PRESENTATION
The first step in perforning a Probabilistic Risk Assessment
(PRA) is the task of damage state and failure-sequence
definition, and system modeling. This task begins with a
definition of the objectives of the study and the ac_aisition
of a substantial amount of information on system design and
operation. It progresses through the generation of system
models, both inductive and deductive, to the identification of
the failure-initiating events, component failures, procedural
faults, and dependent-failure mechanisms that could cause these
failure sequences to occur.
In the subsections below, the methodology, described in Section
5.0 is traced step-by-step through an analysis of the HPU
Subsystem. The results of this analysis provide the framework or
model, which can then be evaluated using the failure frequency
data described in Section 10.0.
Section 9.1 details the damage states selected for the analysis.
Section 9.2 details the Master Logic Diagrams (MLDs) developed
to show HPU-related failure combinations which can lead to these
damage states.
The event sequence diagrams are presented in Section S.3. These
diagrams illustrate, in greater detail, how different damage
states can result as a consequence of various types of HPU fail-
ures. The breakdown of HPU failure types and different damage
states developed in the event sequence diagrams provide the frame-
work for development of the event trees, presented in Section 9.4.
The event trees establish the decision points for which specific
probabilities must be determined in order to arrive at overall
probabilities for the ultimate damage states. The event trees
are similar to flow charts; each decision point must be answered
by a yes/no question. Each path through the event tree results
in either a damage state or a state of no damage, based on system
insight gained through the preceding steps of the analysis.
Each decision point in the event tree must be assigned a prob-
ability, called a split fraction. Determination of each split
fraction depends on a logical combination of events, which is
expressed in the form of a fault tree. The top event of the fault
tree is the event for which the split fraction is to be determined.
Development of these fault trees, or split fraction models, is
presented in Section 9.5
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9.1 HPU DAMAGE STATES
The damage states represent the ultimate undesirable events for
this PRA. The damage states selected for this study were not
peculiar to the HPU under study, but were of a broad category
which would encompass any of the Space Shuttle's subsystems. In
addition, the damage states were selected to be consistent with
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Failure
Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) as defined in National Space
Transportation System Instructions for Preparation of Failure
Modes and Effects Analysis and critical Items List (CIL) (NSTS-
22206). The ultimate damage states selected are Loss of Crew
and/or Vehicle (LOC/V) and Loss of Mission.
Loss of mission implies that the ability to perform all or a sub-
stantial portion of the payload activities was lost. For the HPU
assessment, loss of mission is limited to "launch scrub" during
the pre-launch phase, which causes a launch delay representing a
missed window of opportunity for at least one payload. The loss
of mission damage state does not apply to the Ascent phase since
no HPU failures lead to an intact abort. Loss of crew and/or
vehicle is self-explanatory and applies to both the Prelaunch
and Ascent phases.
Not all HPU subsystem failure modes lead to either of these two
ultimate damage states. The analysis involves establishing which
failure sequences do lead to these damage states, and attaching
probabilities to them.
Once the ultimate damage states for the phases were defined, the
next step in the study was to develop a set of Master Logic
Diagrams (MLDs) using the damage states as the Top Events from
which to build failure scenarios.
9.2 MASTER LOGIC DIAGRAM (MLD) DEVELOPMENT
After the damage states have been established for each
mission phase, the next step in the analysis is to determine how
Hydraulic Power Unit (HPU) system failures can initiate scenarios
that lead to these damage states.
9.2.1 General Development process
The damage states represent the top events for the mission stages
being analyzed (see Appendix C9.2-i). A damage state is the
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outcome of a scenario. A damage state usually is an undesired
event selected because of a need to understand its frequency of
occurrence. The second level of each diagram was developed in
the form of broad categories depicting functional ways that might
lead to the top event or damage state. Not all of these Level II
events were developed further.
Level IiI of the MLD introduces failure modes that were judged to
be resul_s of HPU system failures, and succeeding levels break
them down into more specific functional paths until specific HPU
system failure modes appear at levels as low as Level VI. This
"top down" approach aids in identifying unanticipated failure
effects involving the HPU.
Many paths were developed that dealt with physical processes
about which there is some uncertainty. These physical processes
were flagged as technical issues to be resolved through in-house
analysis, technical references, and reliance on expert opinion.
These issues deal with failure effects from a hydrazine fuel
fire, detonation of hydrazine, shrapnel due to turbine wheel
rupture and the effects of hot gas due to an exhaust duct leak.
The detailed resolution of these issues is discussed in Sections
9.6 and 10.5.
9.2.2 MLD Descriptions
An MLD was developed for each damage state. The MLDs presented
in Appendix C9.2-1 and C9.2-2 are discussed individually below.
KLD #1 - Loss of Mission, Launch Sorub
This MLD documents HPU failures that can result in a launch
scrub by violating the Space Shuttle Launch Commit Criteria.
Any of the four HPUs can shut down, resulting in hydraulic
system performance degradation and Thrust Vector Control (TVC)
system malfunction which would result in an automatic launch
scrub. An HPU can exhibit a performance degradation due to
high or low turbine speed, fuel system, low pressure or
malfunction or loss of system instrumentation prior to launch.
Violation of these HPU performance redlines would cause an
automatic launch hold and launch scrub.
MLD #2 - Loss of Crew and Vehicle
MLD #2 documents HPU failures that lead to loss of crew and
vehicle during the prelaunch and ascent phases. The effects
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of HPU failures were determined to be associated with two of
the Level 2 major cause categories: (i) loss of control, and
(2) loss of vehicle structural integrity. Loss of vehicle
structural integrity applies to both the prelaunch and ascent
phases.
Loss of crew/vehicle scenarios for the prelaunch and ascent
phases involve loss of st_actural integrity due to high energy
detonations in the SRB aft skirt area. High energy release
caused by HPU failures must consider such scenarios as:
detonation of hydrazine caused by shrapnel from an HPU turbine
coming apart, fire from a random- or shrapnel-induced hydrazine
leak, an exhaust leak. These scenarios are spatial innature
and their effects on loss of crew/vehicle are discussed in detail
in Sections 9.6 and 9.2.
Loss of vehicle control leads to loss of crew/vehicle during
the ascent phase. The HPU failures which lead to loss of
control are: loss of 2 HPUs in either Solid Rocket Booster (SRB)
and subsequent loss of hydraulic power or loss of flight critical
equipment such as ATVC wiring or control electronics due to HPU
turbine shrapnel, hydrazine fire or HPU exhaust leak.
9.3 EVENT SEQUENCE DIAGRAM FOR HPU INITIATED SCENARIOS
Event Sequence Diagrams (ESD) illustrate sequences of events
leading from initial failure categories, defined by the master
logic diagrams, to damage states. They tell how an initial fail-
ure (i.e., failure mode) causes a damage state (i.e., effect).
When quantified by the use of event trees and fault trees, the
scenarios and the events within the scenarios can be ranked with
respect to their importance to a damage state such a Loss of
Crew/Vehicle (LOC/V).
9.3.1 Interpretation of the ESD
One ESD was developed to represent both prelaunch and ascent
stages of the Hydraulic Power Unit (HPU) mission, and is
presented in Figure 9.3-1. The model includes the time from HPU
start at Time of Ignition L/O -30 seconds to Solid Rocket Booster
Separation (SRB SEP) (about 2.1 minutes after launch).
The ESD was developed solely from the perspective of HPU perfor-
mance during the mission. Interfacing systems were out of scope,
as were scenarios that couple performance margins of other
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systems with the HPU. For example, coupling the scenarios of
Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) failures with HPU failures was not
attempted in this study.
The boxes in an ESD ask questions about the occurrence (or non-
occurrence) of a category of events. For example, the question
in Figure 9.3-1, "Hydraulic System OK?", may be viewed as askina.
a large number of questions. Each question would refer to a
component in the hydraulic system, for example, "Is the pump
OK?". An ESD is not meant to illustrate _he detailed logic that
is involved in determining combinations of failure modes that
lead to HPU failure. This is achieved in the split fraction
models described in Section 9.5. An ESD illustrates the overall
flow of events that lead from an initial HPU failure to Shuttle
damage states such as LOC/V and LOM.
9.3.1.1 Interpretation of Initial Failure Categories
The questions relating to the initial failure categories are
found in the boxes across the top of the ESD. The categories
are phrased as questions such that a successful event (i.e. no
initial failure) receives a "yes" answer to the question and a
horizontal line is then followed to the next event• For example,
the initial failure categories of equipment failure, turbime
overspeed, fuel leakage, and exhaust gas leak are represented
in Figure 9.3-1, as follows:
io
2.
3.
4.
No permanent HPU failures? (equipment failures)
Turbine speed control OK?(turbine overspeed)
Fuel boundary remains intact? (fuel leak)
Exhaust gas boundary remains intact? (exhaust gas leak)
The question "No hydraulic system failures?" is also asked, even
though the hydraulic system is out of the scope of this PRA, to
demonstrate how an ESD can diagram the interdependencies between
subsystems and include sequences of events that cross subsystems.
A line pointing downward from an initial failure category indi-
cates that an initial failure has occurred (i.e. a "no" answer
to the question). A sequence of boxes and lines that follow the
arrows from an initial failure to a damage state is called a
scenario. A success of the HPU occurs when, according to the
principles of scenario structuring described in Section 5, all
the answers to the questions across the top of the ESD are yes.
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Since the boxes across the top represent a complete set of
initiating failure categories, then in the absence cf initiating
failures the HPU must have operated successfully. Any scenario
that has a vertical (down) line must, therefore, be less than
completely successful. The actual damage of the scenario depends
on the number and type of subsequent failures and the timing
of these failures. The ESD explicitly shows cascading damage
associated with spatial interactions as well as functional
dependencies and independent failures.
9.3.1.2 Diagramming Dependencies in an ESD
An example of a functional dependency is shown in the sequence
initiated by a failure of the hydraulic system. The failure
mode is one that causes a hydraulic pump seizure. This
situation could potentially be caused by a sudden large rupture
of a hydraulic fluid line. Should a seizure of the hydraulic
pump occur, the kinetic energy of the system could possibly
cause a rupture of the HPU turbine rotor. This is represented
by the question "HPU' turbine remains intact?" in Figure 9.3.1.
Thus the HPU turbine functionally depends on the avoidance of
catastrophic hydraulic pump seizure. Of course, a more obvious
functional dependency is that the hydraulic system pump
operation depends on HPU operation.
An example of a scenario that includes cascading damage is shown
if the HPU turbine is not intact. A negative answer to the
question "HPU turbine remains intact?" means that the turbine
rotor has come apart and the pieces have not been contained.
In that situation, the HPU has failed and it allows hydrazine
to escape into the aft skirt. Questions about cascading damage
concern such items as whether there is sufficient oxygen in the
aft skirt to suppor_ combustion, whether other conditions
necessary for a fire are present, whether autodecomposition of
hydrazine will cause further damage, and whether shrapnel from
the rotor itself will cause further damage to the other HPU or
"flight critical equipment" in the aft skirt. The term flight
critical equipment is defined for this study to be any component
or groups of components that are not part of the HPU and whose
failure directly causes a LOC/V in conjunction with previous
failures in the scenario. More detailed discussions of phenomena
related to cascading damage are provided in Section 9.6.
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9.3.1.3 Modeling Spatial Interaction Events in an ESD
Spatial interaction events (SIE) denote potential failures of
equipment by virtue of their spatial proximity to the phenomena
such as shrapnel and hydrazine reactions that tend to lead to
cascading damage• The spatial interaction phenomenaconsidered
in this study are as follows:
i• Hydrazine reaction with materials in the aft skirt
causing deterioration of either wire insulation or other
material in the aft skirt following hydrazine leakage
• Exothermic hydrazine decomposition reaction in an oxygen
poor environment following hydrazine leakage
• Fire in the aft skirt caused by hydrazine combusticn
following hydrazine leakage is assumed to be of negligibly
small likelihood because the environment in the aft skirt
is made inert with nitrogen• Consideration of ground crew
failures, in particular, failure to purge the aft skirt is
beyond the scope of this study.
• Shrapnel caused by turbine rotor failure at either normal
speed or turbine runaway conditions
• Detonations caused by compression of hydrazine bubbles,
leakage into solenoids of the fuel isolation or control
valves, or hydrazine decomposition reaction caused
heating of hydrazine in the fuel tank or fuel lines
• Leakage of hot gas into the aft skirt caused by exhaust
duct failure
The ESD also recognizes that certain failures may cascade and
cause others. For example, shrapnel generated by turbine rupture
or hydrazine failures detonation could cause hydrazine leakage
into the aft skirt which, in turn, could result in a
decomposition reaction which, in turn, could cause another
detonation, etc. A more detailed discussion of the damage
potential of these events is found in Section 9.6•
Below the SIE in Figure 9.3-1 is a triangle with a Greek
character printed within. This denotes a transfer to another
place in the ESD that has another triangle with the same
character within. The SIE diagram asks questions concerning
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the number of HPUs that have failed and if flight critical
equipment has failed as a result of the phenomena contributing
to spatial interactions.
The ESD asks if spatial interactions have failed flight critical
equipment. Then the ESD asks if two HPUs have failed as a result
of the initial failure and the spatial inueraction. The model
assumes a LOC/V if either occurs.
Finally the ESD asks if two, one or no HPUs have failed as a
result of the initial failure, spatial interaction, and potential
independent failure of another HPU.
We have so far given examples of how an ESD diagrams functional
dependencies, cascading damage, and spatial interactions.
Independent failures are diagrammed in a similar manner.
Although the the combination of two or more failures occurring
independently is probably of lower frequency than dependent
failures, the ESD recognizes their potential. (The PRA
assesses the frequency of the scenarios by the use of event
trees, split fraction models, and data later in the study.)
Suppose, for example, that an HPU fails because of a problem in
the gearbox, but the remaining HPU is ok and able to support
both hydraulic actuators. That same HPU could also be leaking
hydrazine. The transfer triangle with a "I" within leads to the
next question, which is about whether the hydrazine fuel boundary
remains intact. A leakage in this scenario (that is, following
a gearbox failure but with no other failures) would be a second
failure of the same HPU, occurring independently; that is, not
caused by or related to the gearbox failure.
All scenarios in the HPU ESD ask if either hydrazine leakage or
exhaust gas leakage or both can occur, This recognizes that
virtually any HPU malfunction or failure can also be accompanied
by the initial failure categories of hydrazine and exhaust gas
leakage.
The ESD accounts for two HPUs in an SRB and diagrams scenarios
in which failures can occur in more than one HPU in the same
mission. The shadow boxes of the initial failure categories
across the top of Figure 9.3-1 illustrates the diagrammatic
device used to represent this. The diagram is read left to
right for each HPU. Scenarios for the HPUs of the two SRBs are
considered to be completely identical to each other but to
occur independently.
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In summary, an ESD is capable of exhibiting scenarios that
include failures, malfunctions, multiple subsystems, dependent
events, cascading damage, spatial interactions, human actions,
and damage states for each stage of the mission. The remainder
of Section 9.3 describes the events found in the HPU ESD. Since,
as discussed above, hydraulic system failures are included for
illustrative purposes only, the following discussion will not
include hydraulic system-initiated scenarios.
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9.3.2 HPU Scenarios from L/O-30 Seconds to SRB SEP
The ESD An Figure 9.3-1 covers the mission between L/O-30
seconds when the HPU starts and HPU shutdown at the time of SRB
SEP, about 2.1 minutes after launch.
9.3.2.1 Scenarios Initiated by Permanent HPU Failure Category
This initiating failure category includes a number of failures
of HPU equipment. It includes, for example, failure to start
the HPU, failures of the pump, valves, turbine, and gearbox to
continue running, plugging of the lube oil system and plugging
of the fuel line. A complete description of all initiating
failures included in the model of this category is found in
Section 9.5.2. This category does not include hydrazine
leakages to the aft skirt or into valve solenoids. It does
not include turbine runaway events.
The gearbox and the turbine, have been singled out for additional
attention in the diagram because certain failure modes of these
components could potentially lead to spatial interaction events.
The following describes the scenarios in Figure 10.3-1 that are
beneath the box with the question "No permanent failures?".
The next event beneath this category asks if the gearbox is OK.
This event includes all failure modes of the gearbox. A negative
answer to this question could mean that the gearbox has failed
in a way, that could cause rapid seizure of the turbine shaft.
The question "HPU turbine remains intact?" is, therefore, asked.
A negative answer means that the gearbox failure may (or may
not) have caused an energetic failure of the turbine rotor with
subsequent failure to contain the pieces within the HPU. If
the gearbox is OK, then the ESD asks about independent turbine
failure at normal turbine speed. If the HPU turbine remains
intact, then the diagram asks if the remaining HPU is OK and can
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adequately support both hydraulic actuators. A key contributor
to this question is whether the remaining HPU switches to high
speed mode.
If the turbine does not remain intact, the same questions related
to cascading failure phenomena and spatial interaction events as
those described in Sections 9.3.1.2 and 9.3.1.3 become relevant
in order to describe the various sequences of events that could
arise fro= turbine failure. Tracing through the ESD from page 1
of Figure 9.3-1 to page 2 of that figure, the diagram recognizes
that, indeed, further damage might not occur to other HPUs and
flight critical equipment, leaving only the initial failure of
an HPU. It is also recognized that subsequent failures occurring
as a consequence of shrapnel and hydrazine leakage could lead to
a LOC/V.
9.3.2.2 Scenarios Initiated by Turbine Speed Control Failure
Category
This initial failure category includes all failures that cause an
overspeed of the HPU turbine. The combinations of control valve,
controller, electric power and other failures contributing to
turbine overspeed are in the split fraction models described in
Section 9.5.2.1.
Unlike the APU, there is no HPU overspeed trip to prevent a tur-
bine runaway. Therefore, the next question to be asked is if the
HPU turbin_ remains intact (i.e., does not come apart or contains
the rotor pieces). If both the primary and secondary valves fail
open, then turbine speed would be expected to reach over 136,000
rpm in about 200 milliseconds. At this speed the HPU turbine is
unlikely to remain intac_c. The expected event is that the turbine
rotor would come apart in three pieces and the pieces would not be
contained by the containment ring mounted inside the turbine
housing. Shrapnel would enter the aft skirt, accompanied by
hydrazine, which would escape the HPU through the holes created by
the pieces ofturbine rotor. The shrapnel would tend to spray a
pattern subtending a 30 degree arc centered on the turbine rotor
plane of rotor plane of rotation. Some of the shrapnel could be
quite energetic, enough to damage flight critical electrical/
electronic equipment in the aft skirt, compartment bulkheads, and
HPU fuel tanks.
Hydrazine leakage would not be expected to cause a fire in the
aft skirt because the compartment is purged with nitrogen and
low atmospheric oxygen conditions are quickly attained as the
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shuttle gains altitude. Hydrazine is capable of an exothermic
decomposition reactionthat tends to strip insulation from wires
and could cause heatup and detonation of hydrazine in other HPUs.
The potential for LOC/V dramatically increases if a hydrazine
fuel tank is punctured, thereby flooding the area around the
HPUs with hydrazine. More detailed discussion about individual
phenomena is presented in Section 9.6.
9.3.2.3 Scenarios Initiated by Hydrazine Leakage Category
This initial failure category includes hydrazine leakage from
any part of the HPU into the aft skir_, into the fuel pump
seal drain line, and into the isolation valve or control valve
solenoids. The situation in which hydrazine contaminates and
causes blockage of lube oil flow is included within the perma-
nent failure category. Scenarios resulting from hydrazine
leakage follow a negative answer to the question "Fuel boundary
remains intact?". They are described below.
The notation "possible hydrazine attack" refers to the highly
corrosive property of hydrazine and its autodecomposition
property. Certain materials in the aft skirt such as wire
insulation serve as catalysts such that with sufficiently high
temperatures, hydrazine will decompose into its constituent parts
of nitrogen, hydrogen and ammonia. Unfortunately, operating HPUs
provide surfaces of sufficient temperature to initiate this
reaction. Furthermore, materials inside the aft skirt such as
Kapton wire insulation are subject to rapid deterioration under
contact with hydrazine.
A negative answer to "fuel boundary remains intact?", leads to
the question of whether the leakage is severe enough to deplete
the fuel before SRB SEP. In such a severe case, the ESD asks if
the remaining HPU can support the remainder of the mission. If
not, loss of SRB hydraulic control is assumed to cause a LOC/V.
For less severe leaks, and for the situation in which the
remaining HPU is adequate, questions about the potential adequate
conditions for fire are asked.
Whether or not a fire occurs (one would not be expected), the
ESD transfers to the SIE questions to decide on the potential
further damage caused by escaping hydrazine. This part of the
ESD was covered in Section 9.3.1.3. More discussion on the
damage potential of hydrazine is presented in Section 9.6.
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9.3.2.4 Scenarios Initiated by Exhaust Gas Leakage Category
This category includes failures in the exhaust gas duct that
allow hot gas to flow into the aft skirt. It also includes
failure of a small high pressure transducer line downstream of
the turbine. Damage to HPUs and flight critical equipment may
be caused by a large leak such that hot gas impingemenu on
electronic equipment may cause failures of componenUs. Such
situations are phenomena that are considered extremely unlikely.
Since exhaust duct leakage itself does not fail an HPU, the ESD
models all potential scenarios from this initial failure category
as spatial interaction events. These have been described in
Section 9.3.1.3.
9.3.2.5 Defining the Damage States for HPU Scenarios
The logic used to define damage states associated with HPU
initiated scenarios is summarized in the part of the ESD with
the designator "AD".
If any failures occur, any leakage detected or any redlines vio-
lated before launch, then the scenario would lead to a launch
scrub. If an HPU fails after launch (a yes answer to "After
launch?"), then LOC/V is assumed to occur if either a second HPU
fails or the second HPU fails to switch to high speed mode. These
scenarios and damage states apply to the two HPUs in either SRB.
9.3.3
Section 9.3 discussed the event sequence diagram used to develop
and illustrate scenarios that begin with initial failures of the
HPU and eventually lead to one of three damage states: OK, launch
scrub, and LOC/V.
Although ESDsare useful for the development and communication of
scenarios, they are not adequate for quantifying the risk of the
HPU. Event trees and split fraction models are used for this and
are discussed in the next two sections.
9.4 EVENT TREE FOR HPU INITIATED SCENARIOS
The ESD presented in the previous section was developed to
clearly describe the sequential flow of events for HPU-initiated
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scenarios that could lead to LOC/V, launch scrub or a successful
mission. An event tree was developed from the ESD to facilitate
quantification because computer techniques are available for
obtaining the frequency of scenarios expressed in the form of
event trees. Because quantification is the goal of an event tree,
the top events need not have a one-to-one correspondence with the
boxes in the event sequence diagram, and _he top events need not
be shown from left to right in their expected order of occurrence.
Instead, the top events represent either a group of boxes in
the ESD or a breakdown of an individual box. Their order is
established to best capture the inter-event dependencies and
facilitate the development of scenario dependent split fractions.
The construction of an event tree depends on the analysts' skill
and experience, knowledge of the data, and knowledge of the split
fraction models. The objective is to best utilize the available
data to obtain an accurate estimate of the frequency of each
scenario.
The HPU event tree is shown in Figure 9.4-1. It consists of the
initial event, which is the attempted start of the HPUs in one
SRB, followed by 13 top events, and ending with the damage state of
each sequence. The damage state is represented by an "X" beneath
one of four possibilities: loss of crew or vehicle (LV), launch
scrub (LS), one HPU failed but the mission successful (HP), and no
HPUs failed (OK). Taken together, a line of X's at the end of a
sequence is called a damage vector. Each sequence is associated
with a damage vector and two or more sequences can have the same
damage vector. A transfer in the tree (e.g. XFR1) means that the
dotted line is to be replaced by a previously defined group of
sequences with their associated damage vectors. For example, the
dotted lines that end with XFRI are to be replaced by the group of
sequences and their associated damage vector to the right of the
"XI" mark beneath top event "FH".
9.4.1 Relationship of ESD to Event Tree
Table 9.4.1 presents a summary description of each top event.
Table 9.4.2 relates each top event to one or more ESD questions.
9.4.2 Overview o_ the Event Tree
The sequences in Figure 9.4-1 may be thought of as falling into
five categories:
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io Sequences numbered 1 through 32 are characterized by
spatial interaction failures associated with hydrazine
leakages.
• Sequencesnumbered 33 through 56 are characterized by
spatial interaction failures associated with combinations
of hydrazine leakage and exhaust has leakage.
• Sequences numbered 57 through 78 are characterized by
equipment failures in one HPU combined with spatial
interaction failures associated with hydrazine leakage
and exhaust gas leakage.
• Sequences numbered 79 through 82 are characterized by
equipment failures in both HPUs or by turbine rupture in
one HPU causing a shrapnel or hydrazine induced failure
of the second HPU or other flight critical equipment.
. Sequences numbered 83 to 108 are characterized by turbine
overspeed induced shrapnel•
The assumptions, groundrules and approximations used to construct
the tree are:
. HPU failure is defined as the inability to power its
associated hydraulic pump to the extent that the second
HPU must operate at higher speed in order to provide
sufficient pressure to the hydraulic actuators.
• Two HPU failures in a single SRB lead to loss of crew or
vehicle (LV). A second HPU is considered failed if it
does not shift into high speed following failure of the
first HPU.
• The total frequency of each damage state for both SRBs is
assumed to be twice the frequency of that damage state
minus the damage state frequency squared, where the damage
state frequency is calculated from Figure 9.4-1.
• The event tree is to be quantified from TIG-30 seconds to
SRB SEP.
t Large hydrazine leakages are defined as leaks for which
the HPU will deplete all fuel and thereby, fail before SRB
SEP.
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TABLE 9.4-I
TOP EVENT DEFINITIONS-HPU EVENT TREE
SYMBOL
IE
HY
TH
PH
DH
CH
HH
GH
KA
KB
FH
BA
BB
BH
Demand for HPU Start
Hydraulic System Failure*
Turbine Overspeed
Equipment Failure of One HPU After it Starts
Failure of the Second HPU After it Starts
Failure of the Second HPU or Failure of Flight
Critical Equipment Due to Spatial Interactions
Initiated by Failure of the First HPU
Failure of One HPU Due to Exhaust Gas Leak
Failure of Flight Critical Equipment of the
Second HPU Due to Exhaust Gas Leak
Leakage of Hydrazine from HPU A
Leakage of Hydrazine from HPU B
Failure of Flight Critical Equipment or Two
HPUs Due to Spatial Interacnions Initiated
by Hydrazine Leakage
Hydrazine Leakage Causes Failure of HPU A,
Given That Two HPUs Have Not Failed
Hydrazine Leakage Causes Failure of HPU B,
Given That Two HPUs Have Not Failed
Failure of One or Two HPUs Upon Start or
While Running Before Launch
*This Top Event is Included to Show How an Event Tree
Can Include Scenarios that Cross Subsystem Boundaries.
Quantitative Evaluation of the Hydraulic System is
Out-of-Scope.
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(TABLE 9.4-2
REL_TIONSKIP OF TOP EVENTS TO HPU ESD
TOP EVENT
HY
TH,DH
PH,DH
CH
HH,GH
KA, KB
FH
BA, BB
BH
QUESTIONS FROM FIGUR_ 9.3-I
"Hydraulic System OK?" and All Boxes Beneath That Question
"Turbine Control OK" and All Boxes Beneath That Question
"No Permanent HPU Failure" and All Boxes Beneath That
Question
All Questions Following "SIE". They Include:
"SIE Does Not Fail Flight Critical Equipment"
"SIE and Initial Failure Does Not Cause Two HPUs to Fail"
"SIE and Initial Failure Does Not Cause the Second HPU to
Fail With One Already Failed"
The Questions Relate to Spatial Interactions That Could
Follow Failures Involving Shrapnel
"Exhaust Gas Boundary Remains Intact?" and All Spatial
Interaction Questions Beneath It. The Spatial Int_r-
action Questions Now Refer Only to the Damage Potentially
the Damage Potentially Caused by Exhaust Gas Release
"Fuel Boundaries Remain Intact"
All QUestions Following "SIE". The Spatial Interaction
Questions Now Refer to the Damage Potentially Caused by
Hydrazine in the Aft Compartment to Flight Critical
Equipment or HPUs
"Sufficient Fuel Left for HPU Ascent" and All Questions
Following "SITE". These Spatial Interaction Questions
Now Refer to the Damage Potentially Caused by Hydrazine
in the Aft Compartment to an Individual HPU
The Question "After Launch" and All Questions Following
It. This Top Event Determines the Fraction of Each
Scenario That Occurs Before or After Launch. It is Used
to Decide on Whether the Scenario Ends in Launch Scrub
or LOC/V
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All failures that occur before launch are assumed to lead
to launch scrub. The potential for HPU failures to cause
loss of crew or vehicle while sitting on the pad is
considered negligibly small.
The HPUs are assumed to be identical and spaUially
symmetrical to each other so that frequencies and
consequences are independent of which HPU has failed.
Therefore, HPU B has been assigned as the failed HPU
with no loss of generality or quantitative accuracy
when TH, PH, or HH fail.
The possibility of two HPUs failing independently in the
same flight from turbine overspeed is not modeled because
the frequency of this sequence is much smaller than the
frequency of sequences leading to loss of crew or vehicle
that involve one turbine overspeed with other failures.
The frequency of failure of a running HPU before launch
is approximated by the ratio of the time it runs before
launch to the total time from L/O-5 to SRB SEP. All
start failures are modeled as occurring before launch.
9.4.3 Descrim_Qn of ToE Events
A summary description of each top event and its relationship
to the rest of the event tree is provided in this section.
The detailed model that provides the basis for assessing the
frequency of occurrence of each top event split fraction is
provided in Section 9.5. The data required by these models
is described in Section I0.
Top Event_| _dLTauli= System Failure
This event is included as an illustration of how an event tree
can include scenarios that cross subsystem boundaries. A failure
of HY implies that its associated HPU is useless. The event tree,
therefore, treats HY failure as if an HPU had failed•
Top Event THz Turbine eye.speed
This event occurs if both the primary and secondary control valves
fail in the open position while the HPU is operating. Mechanical,
electrical and controller causes are included. Turbine overspeed
implies that the HPU has failed. It is then appropriate to ask if
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the resulting shrapnel and hydrazine escape have caused a second
HPU or other flight critical equipment in the aft compartment
(i.e., Top Event CH) to fail. The tree also asks if the other HPU
could have failed independently from the turbine overspeed either
by equipment failure (e.g., Top Event DH) or by leakages. Occur-
rence, of this event after launch and in v_he absence of other
failures leads to the HP damage state.
Top Event PH: HPU Equipment Failure After KPU Start
This event occurs if any piece of equipment or combinations of
equipment combine to prevent an HPU from providing sufficient
power to its hydraulic pump as defined above. For example, this
event includes failure of the turbine rotor at normal speed.
This event excludes, however, turbine overspeed, leakages, and
start failures. This top event does not include failures caused
by erroneous commands from sources external to the HPU (e.g., the
GPCs). Such failures are outside the scope of this study. The
combinatorial failures included in this top event are described in
detail in Section 9.5. Occurrence of this event after launch and
in the absence of other failures leads to the HP damage state.
Top Event DH: Failure of Second KPU After KPU Start
This event is asked if either PH occurs or TH occurs. It
occurs if the second HPU fails given that one HPU is known to
have failed. The same combinations of equipment failures that
contribute to PH are also relevant here. Occurrence of this
event after launch leads to loss of crew or vehicle.
Top Event CXz Spatial Interaction Failure of Second HPU or
Flight Critical Equipment
This event includes failure of the second HPU or flight critical
equipment due to shrapnel or hydrazine induced cascading damage.
It considers the possibility that shrapnel and hydrazine could
be produced by turbine rotor failure either in an overspeed or
normal speed condition. Occurrence of this event after launch
leads to loss of crew and vehicle.
Top Event _: Exhaust Gas Leakage Failm One KPU
This event includes the possibility, no matter how remote, that
exhaust gas leakage can fail an HPU. Occurrence of this event
after launch and in the absence of other failures leads to the
HP damage state.
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Top Event _E: Exhaust Gas Leakage Fails Second HPU
This event includes the possibility that exhaust gas leakage
fails a second HPU, given that one HPU is known to have failed
from exhaust gas leakage or from other causes. Occurrence of
this event after launch leads to loss of crew and vehicle.
Top |vent K_: _razine Leakage in KPU &
This event includes leakages of hydrazine from anywhere in HPU A
to the aft skirt.
Top Event D: HTdraline Leakage in EFO B
This event includes leakages of hydrazine from anywhere in HPU B
to the aft skirt. The event tree structure involving KA and KB
includes all combinations of HPUs leaking individually or together
in the same mission.
Top Event FE: Leakage Induced Failure of Both KPUs or Flight
Critical Equipment
This event includes those spatial interactions due to the presence
of hydrazine in the aft skirt around the HPUs which causes failure
of both HPUs or other flight critical equipment. Occurrence of
this event after launch leads to loss of crew and vehicle.
Top Event Bl: Leakage Induced Failure of EPU &
This event includes spatial interaction-induced failure of HPU A
from the presence of hydrazine in the aft skirt, given that two
HPUs have not failed. Occurrence cf this event after launch and
in the absence of other failures leads to the HP damage state.
Top Event BB: Leakage Induced Failure of EPO B
This event includes spatial interaction-induced failure of HPU B
from the presence of hydrazine in the aft skirt, given that two
HPUs have not failed. Occurrence of this event after launch and
in the absence of other failures leads to _he HP damage state.
Top Event BHz Failure Oc_s Before Launch
This event includes all combinations of start failures of either
or both HPU8. It also includes that portion of running failures
of either or both HPUs that occurs before launch. Occurrence of
this event leads to the launch scrub damage state.
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9.5 SPLIT FRACTION MODEL DEVELOPMENT
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9.5.1 Introduction
A guiding principle for the modeling and computational effort was
to place more emphasis and detail in those aspects of the model
that promised to be important to risk. This meant, for example,
that many scenarios involving large numbers of failure occur-
rences would not be important because of their low associated
probabilities. Such scenarios can be quickly estimated by a
preliminary analysis using a general knowledge of the model and
the basic event data. It was not difficult, for example, to
estimate the order of magnitude of the total LOC/V frequency
from a knowledge of the event tree, HPU design, and the failure
history database, without going through the formal computer
analysis. In some cases, however, knowledge to make such initial
assessments was not available to the team until late in the
study. It was necessary to include such events in the analysis.
One of the most prominent examples is the case of consequential
permanent failures resulting from exhaust gas leaks. Exhaust gas
leaks were identified in the master logic diagrams as an
initiating failure and were, therefore, included in the event
trees. Their frequency of occurrence and the conditional prob-
ability of consequential failure of an HPU was not assessed
until models were under development. Their contribution to risk
was determined to be negligibly small (less than 0.1 per cent of
the total LOC/V frequency). The exhaust models are, therefore,
more complex than necessary.
In developing the interrelated event tree and fault tree models,
it was also necessary to strike a balance in modeling complexity
between these two types of logic trees. This was an iterative
process that began by developing a simple first-cut event tree
and its associated fault trees. The fault trees were found to
be too complex to be analyzed easily. This led to a more
complex event tree, and the associated fault trees were found to
be much more tractable. This iterative process was continued
until a reasonable balance was achieved.
The fault tree construction was influenced by data availability.
As discussed in Section 5.0, it is pointless to model components
at a level below that for which data exists. Furthermore, the
availability of data in a particular form influences the way basic
events are expressed in the fault tree. The process of split
fraction modeling is iterative and highly interactive with the
event tree development and data analysis process.
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As indicated in Section 9.4, the event tree for HPU is a logic
diagram that shows the various admissible combinauions of top
event occurrences and nonoccurrences that constitute the various
scenarios to be analyzed. In order to be able to compute the
scenario occurrence frequencies, it is necessa_ to _mpute the
appropriate split fractions for the top events appearing in each
scenario. In some cases, these split fractions are single numbers
determined from all available evidence, as described in Section
5.0. In other cases, however, the top events represented a sub-
stantial part of the HPU, and the corresponding split fractions
were computed from fault tree analyses. The paragraphs thaU
follow describe the fault trees that were developed for calcu-
lating the split fractions for the event tree top events. The
outcome of the split fraction models when evaluated by the data
for the basic events is a set of split fraction cause tables as
described in Section 5.
Before describing the fault trees, it is appropriate to describe
some general ground rules, assumptions, and analysis consider-
ations that are fundamental to all of the fault trees. One of
the assumptions concerns the basic symmetry in HPU physical
locations. Because there is no fundamental probabilistic
importance associated with HPU location, there is no particular
significance to the name of an HPU that fails. That is, if an
unidentified, unnamed HPU fails in conjun=tion with one of the
top events in the event tree (call that event El), then that
failed HPU can be "named" HPU B without any loss of generality.
The actual name of that failed HPU is of no importance in
determining probabilities. Consider now some other top event
(call it E2) that appears to the right of event E1 in the event
tree. Fault tree models can now be constructed for event E2 in
which the failed HPU B does not appear. This represents a great
simplification in the modeling process. After some preliminary
modeling and quantification of exhaust duct leakage, it was
concluded that exhaust duct leakage would be extremely negligible
contributor to loss of crew and vehicle. The reason for this is:
i, The frequency of occurrence of exhaust duct leakage
either from shrapnel or from random failure is very low
(approximately 1E-5 per hour of HPU operation.)
2. Exhaust duct leakage does not constitute loss of an HPU.
• The probability of failing an HPU or flight critical
equipment in the aft skirt of the SRB as a consequence
of exhaust gas impingement is quite low (approximately
1E-3 per leak).
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• We would, therefore, expect that a LOC/V owing to exhaust
gas leak would occur approximately once in 100 million
missions.
Rather than produce a detailed quantification for such a remote
occurrence, we chose to simplify the effort and assess the
frequency of all scenarios associated with exhaus_ duct leaks as
negligible, even though a detailed model had already been
developed.
Prior analysis experience has shown that common cause failures
tend to be important risk contributors because multiple failures
can occur as a result of a single failure condition common to two
or more units• Usually this is at a substan_ially higher prob-
ability than that associated with multiple independent failures.
Hence, it was important to include such potential contributors
wherever they were indicated by the recorded APU and HPU failure
history database.
In most cases the fault trees are intended to provide prob-
abilistic results that serve directly as the split fractions
for their associated top events. In some cases, however, the
fault trees provide intermediate numerical results that must
be combined with the numerical results of other models to obtain
the required top event split fractions. For example, two con-
secutive top events in the event tree in Figure 9.4-1 are labeled
PH and DH. PH represents the event in which one or more HPUs have
a permanent failure, while DH represents the event in which both
HPUs fail given that at least one has failed. The numeric quanti-
fication of the fault tree for PH yields the associated split
fraction directly. However, the numeric quantification of the
fault tree for DH yields the probability that both HPUs fail.
To obtain the split fraction for the DH event, divide the DH
result by the PH result, thereby giving the probability of both
HPUs failing given that one or more failures are known to have
occurred. This type of analysis also applies to the top events
HH and GH in that same event tree.
Event trees are simply logic diagrams that indicate what specific
combinations of events occur and do not occur; such trees do not
ordinarily convey any information as to the order in which events
occur. Thus, the fault tree models have to be carefully construc-
ted to account for order when order is of concern. For example,
in the HPU event tree shown in Figure 9.4.1, there are top events
labeled TH and DH. TH accounts for the potential for a turbine run-
away, and DH accounts for the possibility of a second independent
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permanent failure of an HPU. Since the TH event appears first in
the event tree, the fault tree for it models the potential for a
runaway of one out of two HPUs. The DH event must then consider
the implications of the order in which the two events occur. If
the TH event occurs first (which is taken to occur with a prob-
ability of 0.5), then the TH analysis based on one HFU failing
out of two is correct, and the DH fault tree must consider the
potential for the one remaining HPU to fail (because the other
one, which is named HPU B, has already failed by runaway). How-
ever, if DH occurs first (with a probability of 0.5), then the DH
fault tree must be based on one out of two failing, and the TH
fault tree should be based on failing the one remaining HPU. Since
the TH analysis ks already based on one out of two, a correction
factor must be included in the DH fault tree to correct from the
one-out-of-two TH analysis to the proper one-out-of-one basis
needed for TH in this case. In summary, some complexity is added
to the fault trees to accurately account for the order in which
top events in the event tree could occur. Such correction factors
will be found below in a number of the fault trees, and the
"secondary" fault trees needed to cover the one-out-of-one case
for TH (and other such top events) are also presented below. The
specific TH/DH case mentioned here is discussed (with the appro-
priate fault trees) in Section 9.5.2.3. A special naming
convention has been used in all of the fault trees. The f_rst two
characters are the same as the two characters in the event tree
top event for which the fault tree was developed. For the basic
events, the third and fourth characters identify the type of
component being modeled, and the fifth character identifies its
particulam failure mode. For the gates, the third, fourth, and
fifth characters identify the level of the gate in the fault tree
and distinguish between gates at each level. The last (sixth)
character is A or B to identify the specific HPU in which the
component or gate resides. If the last character is a 0, then it
identifies a generic component or gate -- that is, something (such
as a common cause failure) not associated with any specific HPU.
The details about the first five characters in these designators
are given in Section 11.0.
To simplify the general appearance of the fault trees, they are
shown in full only for HPU A. That detailed development is shown
as a transfer with a label of the form XYA. The other HPU is then
represented as transfers in with a label of the form XYB. All
gates and basic events shown in subtree XYA that end with an A are
converted to a B in subtree XYB.
While there are quite a number of similarities between the Orbiter
APUs and the HPUs, there are a number of differences. These
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differences do not affect the overall methods, assumptions,
groundrules, or approaches to the analyses, but they do affect the
details of the analyses. The primary difference between the APUs
and the HPUs is that there are three APUs involved in the Shuttle
Orbiter, while only two HPUs are used for each of two SRBs. Since
only one SRB at a time is modeled, only two HPUs at a time are
modeled.
The primary gas generator valve provides the control for both
normal and high-speed operation of the HPU turbine (whereas the
secondary valve provides high-speed control for the APU). Over-
all, the GGVM control circuitry for the HPU is much simpler than
for the APU. In particular, no dedicated circuitry" is provided
to trip the HPU turbine in the event of an overspeed or under-
speed of the HPU turbine (although circuitry is provided to give
t_he secondary gas generator valve a backup controlling function
in the event that the primary valve fails to control at either
normal or high speed). Hence, there is no over/underspeed inhibit
circuit for the HPU. Also, the fuel tank has no diaphragm, and
there is only one fuel tank isolation valve (instead of the two
valves found in the APUs). No cooling water systems are provided
for the gas generator injector, the GGVM, the fuel tank or lines,
or the lube oil. Furthermore, there are no heater circuits for
the tanks or lines, but heater circuitry is provided for the gas
generator to permit control of GG temperature to within the limits
required for safe startup of the HPU during prelaunch operations.
All of these these simplifications in the HPU hardware result in
corresponding simplifications in the fault tree models developed
to quantify the HPU split fractions. The paragraphs that follow
provide a brief description of the fault tree models developed to
compute the split fractions for the top events in the HPU event
tree shown in Figure 9.4-1. In general, the HPU fault trees are
very similar to the corresponding APU fault trees described in
Sections 6.5.2 and 6.5.3. The primary differences arise from the
fact that the HPUs are simpler in design and operation than the
APUs.
9.5.2 HPU Fault Tree Models
Top Event TH
The first top event in the HPU event tree shown in Figure 9.4-1
is TH. This event represents a specific type of HPU permanent
failure -- namely, one involving turbine runaway, in which fail-
ures cause the turbine speed to increase above normal operating
levels. This particular failure mode has been separated from all
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of the other permanent failures because of the potential for con-
sequential failure of the other HPU or flight-critical equipment
due to the high-energy shrapnel generated by the overspeed.
The fault trees developed for TH are shown in Appendices C9.5-I and
C9.5-2. The first fault tree (labeled TH) covers the model for the
case of one runaway out of two HPUs, while the second one (labeled
TH-D) models the case of one runaway out of one HPU. The second
fault tree is provided to support top events to the right in the
event tree where the order in which events occur is a consideration.
Both fault trees model runaway in terms of having both the primary
and secondary control valves open. The numerical result computed
from fault tree TH in Appendix CI0.5-1 directly yields the
requisite split fraction for the top event TH in the event tree.
Top Event PK
The second top event in the HPU event tree shown in Figure 9.4-1
is PH. This event represents all but two contributors to the
permanent failure of at least one of the two HPUs, where the two
exceptions are: (I) the turbine runaway failures covered by TH,
and (2) the start failures, which are more conveniently analyzed
in the top event BH (the failures occurring before lift-off and
contributing to launch s_rub).
The fault trees developed for PH are shown in Appendices C9.5-3-I
through C9.5-3-4 and C9.5-4. The first fault tree (labeled PH)
models the permanent failure of at least one out of two HPUs,
while the second one (labeled PH-T) models the permanent failure
of one out of one HPUs. This second fault tree is provided to
support top events to the right of event PH in the event tree
where the order in which events occurs is a consideration.
Both PH fault trees model permanent failures in terms of the
following primary failure modes:
Fuel line blockage
Fuel pump failure
Low fuel tank pressure
Turbine fails to run
Turbine wheel shutdown failure
Gearbox fails to run
Gas generator run failure
Fuel tank isolation valve fails closed
Common cause failure of lube oil blockage
due to hydrazine leakage through a gearbox
shaft seal
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The numerical result computed from fault _ree PH in directly
yields the requisite split fraction for the top event PH in the
event tree.
Top Event DH
The third top event in the HPU event tree is DH. This event
represents all but two contributors tc the permanent failure cf
both of the HPUs, where the two exceptions are (I) the turbine
runaway failures covered by TH, and (2) the start failures, which
are more conveniently analyzed in the top even_ BH (the failures
occurring before lift off and contributing to launch scrub). The
only basic difference between this event and the event PH is that
DH accounts for both of the HPUs failing, while PH accounts for
at least one out of two HPUs failing.
The PH event represents the probability of an independent
permanent failure occurring in at least one HPU, and the DH
event represents the probability of an independent permanent
failure occurring in both HPUs given that at least one is known
to have occurred. The scenario in which PH occurs and DH does
not occur represents the case in which exactly one HPU has an
independent permanent failure. The scenario in which both PH
and DH occur represents the case in which both HPUs have
independent permanent failures. When the TH event occurs in the
event tree, only the DH event is questioned with regard to the
occurrence of a second permanent failure as a result of an inde-
pendent cause; that is, this case is not addressed via event PH.
This is simply an analysis convention that was adopted for con-
venience; this situation could have been addressed by using PH.
The fault trees developed for DH are shown in Appendices C9.5-5-1
through C9.5-5-3. Fault tree applies to the first (uppermost)
node for DH in the event tree and models the permanent failure
of both HPUs (for use in conjunction with event PH). Fault tree
applies to the second (lower) node for DH in the event tree. This
models the second permanent failure that occurs in conjunction
with the turbine runaway failure modeled by the TH event and also
models the case of the permanent failure of the one remaining HPU,
which is provided to support top events to the right of event DH
in the event tree where another failure occurs and the order in
which failures occur is a consideration.
Fault tree DH2 in is an illustration of the logic required to
account for the order in which events occur, as discussed in
Section 9.5.1. If event TH occurs first, then the TH one-out-of-
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two fault tree model is correct, and the DH logic must consider
one-out-of-one failure logic. This situation is shown on the
right side of the diagram in Appendix C9.5-5-6. If, on the other
hand, DH occurs first, then the TH one-out-of-two logic must be
corrected to one-out-of-one logic, and the correct logic for DH
is one-out-of-two. The correction factor represenned by the
basic event DHTCF0 is the ratio of the result from the TH-D tree
to that from the TH tree.
All of the fault trees needed for the DH event model permanent
failures in terms of the following primary failure modes:
Fuel line blockage
_el pump failure
Low fuel tank pressure
Turbine fails to run
Turbine wheel shutdown failure
Gearbox fails to run
Gas generator run failure
Fuel tank isolation valve fails closed
Common cause failure of lube oil blockage due
to hydrazine leakage through a gearbox shaft
seal
The numerical result from fault tree DHI must be divided by the
numerical result from fault tree PH to obtain the split fraction
needed for node 1 for the event DH; this split fraction is the
conditional probability of both HPUs failing by permanent failure
given that one or more permanent failures are known to have
occurred. The numerical result computed from fault tree DH2 in
directly yields the requisite split fraction for node 2 of top
event DH in the event tree.
Top lvent
The fourth top event in the HPU event tree is OH. This event
represents the consequential permanent failure of flight critical
equipment or of at least one HPU following the permanent failure
of the other HPU.
The CH fault tree is shown in two parts in Appendices C9.5-6
and C9.5-7. Fault tree OH1 applies to the first (uppermost)
node for CH in the event tree and models the consequential
failure of flight critical equipment or of the one remaining HPU
following the non-runaway permanent failure of one HPU (from
event PH). Fault tree applies to the second (lower) node for CH
in the event tree. This models the consequential permanent
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failure of flight crStical eauipment or of the one remaining HPU
following a turbine runaway failure (from event TH). Separate
fault trees are required because the potential for consequential
failure following a turbine runaway is higher than for other
forms of permanent failure. The numerical results computed from
both fault trees CHI and CH2 directly yield the requisite split
fractions for nodes 1 and 2 of top event CH in the event tree.
Top Event HH
i
j_
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The fifth top event in the HPU event tree is HH. This event
represents the failure of at least one HPU as a consequence of
an exhaust gas leak in at least one HPU. The model is based on
the realization that the potential for a non-leaking HPU to fail
is extremely remote. Thus, the model only accounts for failures
of HPUs that are themselves experiencing hot gas leaks. This is
also a very low frequency, as described earlier.
The fault tree developed for HH is shown in Appendix C9.5-8.
That fault tree (labeled HH) models the permanent failure of at
least one out of two HPUs as a consequence of exhaust gas leaks.
The numerical result computed from fault tree HH directly yields
the requisite split fraction for the top event HH in the event
tree. A subset of the HH top event deals with a path in which
one failure has already occurred. The Split'fraction for this
path is modeled as the HHT tree in Appendix C9.5-9.
Top Event GH
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The sixth top event in the HPU event tree is GH. This event repre-
sents the failure of at least two HPUs as a consequence of exhaust
gas leaks in both HPUs, given that at least one HPU is known to
have failed as a consequence of a gas leak. The model is based on
the realization that the potential for a non-leaking HPU to fail
is extremely remote. Thus, the model only accounts for failures of
HPUs that are themselves experiencing hot gas leaks.
The fault trees developed for GH are shown in Appendices C9.5-I0
and C9.5-II. The numerical results computed from those four fault
trees are used in the same basic manner as described above for
event DH to provide the requisite split fractions for the four
nodes of top event GH in the event tree.
Top Events KA, KB
The seventh and eighth top events in the HPU event tree are KA and
KB. These events represent the independent occurrence of a fuel
leak in HPU A and B. Rather than consider the logic for these two
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top events in terms of a fault tree or a set of two fault trees,
it was much simpler to express the logic in terms of a simple
event tree as a means of representing the probability values
needed for the various combinations of leakage occurrences. This
event tree is shown in Appendix C9.5-12. The split fraction to
be used for each node of each top event in the event tree is shown
at the appropriate node in this figure. Lambda represents the
failure rate with which independent leakage occurs, and "t" is the
time interval of interest over which the leak can occur. Beta
represents a common cause factor, which is a measure of the condi-
tional probability that a second HPU has a fuel leak given that
one is already known to be leaking. Lambda and beta can both be
estimated from t_he Shuttle experience data, as discussed in
Section ii.0.
An important characteristic of the split fraction formulas given
for the various nodes in Appendix C9.5-12 is that the scenario
probabilities shown for the two scenarios having exactly one HPU
leaking are both identical. Also, the sum of the probabilities
for all four scenarios is exactly one.
To use the leakage split fractions listed in Appendix C9.5-12, it
is simply a matter of matching the nodes in that figure with the
corresponding nodes in the event tree. That is, the split
fraction P21 for node 1 of the event KB is matched to all nodes
in the event tree for which KB occurs when KA does not occur.
Likewise, the split fraction P22 for node 2 of the event KB is
matched to all nodes in the event tree for which KA does occur.
Top Event FE
The ninth top event in the HPU event tree is FH. This event
represents the permanent failure of fligh_ critical equipment
as a direct consequence of a fuel leak in one or more HPUs.
No fault tree was constructed for this event since the requisite
split fraction is simply one number that depends only on the
specific leakage conditions for the scenario being analyzed.
The development of those single split fractions is discussed in
Section I0.0.
Top Events BA, BB
The tenth and eleventh top events in the HPU event tree are BA,
and BB. These events represent the consequential failure of
either HPU due to a fuel leak in one of the HPUs (the leak can
be in either HPU, the specific condition depending entirely on
the particular event tree scenario being analyzed).
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No fault tree was constructed for this event since the requisite
split fractions are simply single numbers _hat depend only on
the specific leakage conditions for the scenario being analyzed.
The development of those single split fractions is discussed in
Section I0.0.
Top Event BH
The twelfth top event in the HPU event tree is BH. This event
represents a correction factor to distinguish between failures
occurring before and after lift-off. The prior events in the
event tree account for all run failures, regardless of the
time at which they occur while the HPUs are running. Failures
occurring before lift-off ordinarily result in launch scrub,
while failures occurring afterward can result in either LOC/V
or success, depending on their severity.
The fault trees developed for BH are shows in Appendices C9.5-13
and C9.5-14. Two trees are shown: one labeled BH0 applies only
to the first node for the BH event in the event tree_ the other,
labeled BH, applies to all other nodes. The BH0 fault tree
accounts for all start failures which are not otherwise taken into
account in the fault trees developed for all other top events in
the event tree. Start failures, of course, all occur before lift-
off and are, therefore, all prelaunch failures that ordinarily
lead to launch scrub. Such failures should not be considered
elsewhere in the event tree logic. The BHn fault tree accounts
for the start failures and the proportion of run time that
constitutes the pre-lift-off period. This is a simple time ratio
prelaunch run time to the total HPU run time. The prelaunch run
time is 30 seconds, while the post-launch HPU run time is 2.1
minutes, yielding a ratio of R - 0.5/2.6 for scenarios in which
one HPU has failed. The ratio becomes 2R - R 2 for scenarios in
which two HPUs have failed. The numerical result computed from
fault tree BH directly yields the requisite split fraction for
top event BH in the event tree.
9 .6 SPATIAL INTERACTIVE EVENTS (SIEs)
An SIE is a cascading failure within one system that results from
an initiating failure or condition in another system. To be an
SIE, a consequential failure must also be initiated by means of
a physical interactive mechanism such as hot gas or shrapnel that
results from failure of or degraded operation of the system.
Thus, a detonation of fuel in an HPU Gas Generator Valve Module
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(GGVM) because of an exhaust leak in another HPU is a spatial
interaction event, whereas loss of an HPU because of a secondary
fuel valve failing in the closed position in the GGVM is not.
I
The split fraction representing an SIE is modeled as a conditional
probability distribution as described in Section 5.5. The SIE
split fractions discussed in this analysis are a subset of the set
of all split fractions defined by the node points on the HPU event
trees.
Three types of SIEs have been identified as significant for this
PRA. They are (I) events related to HPU turbine breakup, (2)
events related to HPU fuel (hydrazine) leakage, and (3) events
related to hot exhaust gas leakage. The three categories of SIEs
are discussed in the paragraphs below.
9.6.1 Events Related to HPU Turbine Break-am
The SIEs that result from HPU turbine breakup are identical in
nature to those for the APU discussed in Section 6.5.I. There
are, however, significant differences between the HPU and APU
design and their operating environment that affect the SIE
conditional probabilities. The frequency of SIEs initiated by
HPU turbine fragments are described by conditional probability
distributions defined in Section 10.5.1. The differences which
affect these probabilities are discussed below.
Conditional probabilities related to HPU turbine breakup are
affected by two design differences. First, the fuel control
valves in the HPU Gas Generator Valve Module (GGVM) are different
from those in the APU. The valves in the HPU are considered less
likely to fail open and thus cause an HPU overspeed. Secondly,
the HPU containment ring is 26% larger than the APU ring. This
means that there is a much lower probability of uncontained
fragments. It also means that any fragments that are uncontained
may be at a lower energy level and hence less likely to damage
other equipment.
The probability that an HPU turbine will break up at normal speed
is significantly lower than that for an APU because, the HPU only
runs 160 seconds during a mission, is not required to restart in
flight after liftoff, and is disassembled, inspected, and
refurbished after each mission.
The probability that an item of flight critical equipment will be
struck by a turbine fragment is lower for the HPU than for the
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APU for two reasons. There are fewer pieces of flight critical
equipment in the Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) aft section than in
the Orbiter compartment, and the location and orientation of the
HPUs are such that turbine fragments from an HPU cannot directly
impact a second HPU, its fuel line, or its fuel tank.
The location and orientation of the HPUs also preclude a turbine
fragment from directly striking the external tank.
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9.6.2 Events Related to HPU Fuel Lea_qe
The SIEs that result from HPU fuel leakage are those in which
leakage of HPU fuel leads to damage of flight critical equipment
or an HPU. This section presents information that is relevant
to the establishment of split fractions for the associated
conditional probabilities to be input to the Probabilistic Risk
Analysis (PRA) model. The frequency of SIEs associated with HPU
fuel leakage is reflected in conditional probabilities defined in
Section 10.5.
Leaking HPU fuel (hydrazine) can damage equipment by means of
corrosion, fire, or detonation.
9.6.2.1 Corrosion Damage Resulting from HPU Fuel Leakage
Hydrazine can dissolve Kapton used for wire insulation in the SRB
aft compartment. However the 160 seconds maximum possible
exposure of the Kapton to leaking hydrazine is believed to be too
short a period for serious damage to occur.
9.6.2.2 Fire Damage Resulting from HPU Fuel Leakage
Prior to HPU activation the SRB aft skirt area is purged with
nitrogen until the oxygen level is reduced to less than 4 percent
by volume (Reference 52). A hydrogen fire is not possible with
so little oxygen. A hydrazine fire is also unlikely under these
conditions (see References 88 and 89 for additional information).
A flexible barrier separates the SRB aft skirt area from the
external atmosphere. This skirt prevents the oxygen level from
increasing to an unsafe level during ascent.
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9.6.2.3 Detonation Damage Resulting from HPU Fuel Leakage
)
Since hydrazine combustion cannot occur in the atmosphere of the
SRB aft skirt area, no fire-induced hydrazine detonation can
result from HPU fuel leakage. But detonation damage resulting
from HPU fuel leakage inuo solenoid cavities of the fuel isolation
and control valves is still a potential problem which the HPU
shares with the APU. This was discussed in Section 6.6.2.2.
9.6.3 Events Related to Hot HPU Exhaust Gas Leakaae
The SIEs that result from hot HPU exhaust gas leakage are those
in which hot gas leakage damages Flight Critical Equipment (FCE)
or an HPU. This section presents informanion t_hat is relevant
to the establishment of split fractions for the associated
conditional probabilities to be input to t_he PRA model. Values
assigned to the split fractions are discussed in Section 11.2.
9.6.3.1 High Pressure Hot HPU Exhaust Gas Leakage
SIEs associated with high pressure hot HPU exhaust gas leakage
are identical in nature to those discussed in Section 6.6.3.1.
The possibility of damage from this event is considered remote
and as a simplifying assumption in the PRA, the probability was
considered negligible.
9.6.3.2 Low Pressure Hot HPU Exhaust Gas Leakage
Low pressure hot HPU exhaust gas leakage is a potential problem
common with the APU.
9.6.3.2.1 Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) aft area damame. - The
HPU exhaust consists of a mixture of N 2, H 2, and NH 3 gases at a
temperature which varies with time from HPU startup, with
positions along the exhaust duct, with altitude, and with the
rate of fuel flow. No insulation is employed to protect the
HPUs, the hydrazine fuel lines, or the hydraulic lines from
exposure to hot gas leaking from the uninsulated HPU exhaust
ducts.
Pressure and temperature of the exhaust are highest at the HPU
end of the exhaust duct mainly because of drag. Assuming the
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pressure in the aft skirt area is the same as that of the
environment into which the exhaust duct terminates, then the
pressure difference between the exhaust and the aft skirt area
is less than 5.4 Pounds per Square Inch (psi). The maximum
temperature of I035"F occurs only at the end of the 160 second
HPU run time when the SRB is at high altitude.
An exhaust leak at the point where the exhaust duct joins the
HPU could conceivably damage the HPU by damaging the associated
electrical wiring insulation. The wiring insulation is Teflon
with Kapton tape wrapping, which is destroyed by sustained
exposure to temperatures of 500"F or above.
The HPUs are protected by obstructions from direct exhaust leak
plume impingement unless the leak occurs immediately at the HPU.
The SRB nozzle actuators, the hydraulic lines, and the HPU fuel
lines are protected from thermal damage by the flow of a heat
absorbing fluid.
Exhaust leakage from an HPUmay impinge upon the associated Fuel
Supply Module (FSM) but not upon the FSM of the other HPU. Thus
an explosion of the FSM due to hydrazine detonation cannot occur
since since the associated HPU will first be disabled by the
internal detonation of hydrazine which has been heated to the
detonation temperaturewhen passing through the HPU itself.
9.6.3.2.2 HPU shutdowD due to hydrazine detonation. - An
analysis has been performed to gain insight regarding conditions
leading to hydrazine detonation given HPU exhaust leak impinge-
ment upon a FSM (Reference 83).
Gas flowing through the HPU exhaust duct is treated as being an
ideal gas flowing with constant friction in an adiabatic manner.
Hot gas leakage is assumed to occur at a location nearest the FSM
which would place the leak 24 inches from the exhaust outlet of
the 2 inch Inside Diameter (ID) duct. Dana from Reference 33
suggests a friction factor of 0.58 would be appropriate for the
exhaust duct. This value reflects a degree of roughness of the
exhaust duct which allows the use of a constant friction factor
over a range of Reynolds numbers resulting from a large variation
in mass flow rate and temperature. Temperature of gas flowing
past the leak point will vary roughly linearly as a function of
time between 78"F and 1006"F during the 160 second run of the
HPU.
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Reference 33 indicates that the maximum design inlet temperature
of hydrazine to _he APU is 150"F and the maximum operating
temperature of the GGVM is 200"F. Above 200"F hydrazine is known
to form bubbles which in principle could lead to detonation, if
adiabatic compression causes a local temperature in excess of the
autodecomposition temperature of about 445"F. Experiment will be
required to determine the actual maximum allowed temperature and
whether this maximum temperature can result from adiabatic com-
pression of bubbles or from the heating of hydrazine when passing
through the gas generator injection tube. In any case, one may
conclude that the temperature of the hydrazine increases by 50"F
between the inlet into the APU and the exit from the GGVM. Thus
the maximum allowed FSM temperature must liewithin the wide
temperature range of 150"F to 395"F.
The minimum distance between the FSM and the HPU exhaust duct is
about 3.75 inches. At high altitude the leaking exhaust gas
will lose energy by expanding and propagating a shock wave into
_he compartment atmosphere. The 15 inch diameter FSM occupies 25
percent of the solid angle in the hemisphere defined by the
nearest leak location and a line connecting the center of the
FSM. This is suggestive of a low efficiency of thermal transfer
between the leaking exhaust jet and the FSM.
Clearly, small HPU exhaust duct leaks (which are expected to be
far more common than larger leaks) will not lead to a loss of an
HPU. The most extreme leak -- diver_ing all of the HPU exhaust
flow would still need to transfer a significant fraction of its
thermal energy to the FSM in order to result in loss of the HPU.
Since the FSM has been covered with a foam insulation to a depth
of 1.25 inches. The insulation is, in turn, surfaced with
aluminized tape, even the largest exhaust leak is not expected to
lead to loss of the associated HPU by means of hydrazine
detonation.
The possibility of damage resulting from hot HPU exhaust gas
leakage is considered to be remote. The probability of such
damage was considered negligibly small.
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i0.0 HPU DATA DEVELOPMENT
This section describes the process used to develop probability
distributions for HPU component failure rates. Probability
distributions are used in this context to reflect the fact that
component failure rates are uncertain. The use of probability
distributions provides a complete description of our state of
knowledge about the failure rates of the equipment in question,
including any sources of variability among similar components.
By contrast, use of a point estimate would imply a degree of
exactness that is not justified by the data.
It is important to bear in mind that the existence of uncertainty
about component failure rates does not imply that the results are
inaccurate or that they reflect a state of ignorance on the part
of the analysts. Rather, uncertainty arises from a number of
sources:
al The relatively small amount of data that is available
on many components
be The possibility of missing data (e.g., failures that
are not captured by the data collection process)
Co Decisions about whether incipient failures should be
included in the data analysis
do Estimation of the applicable exposure data (e.g., the
total number of hours that a component operated)
eo The application of data from one situation (e.g.,
checkout) to other situations such as actual flights
f. The assumption that failure rates are constant over time
go Differences in component reliability from one mission
to another (e.g., due to differences in the quality of
refurbishment)
he Differences in component reliability from one HPU to
another, or between similar components in the same HPU
ia The extrapolation of failure rate estimates developed
for other applications (e.g., aircraft) to the space
shuttle
i0-i
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The environmental factors that should be used in
adjusting failure rate estimates from one application
to another
The approach used in this study to describe and quantify such
uncertainties is the Bayesian theory of probability. In this
approach, each basic event frequency is described by a
probability distribution specifying the various possible values
for that frequency and how likely each value is. The Bayesian
approach is capable of taking into account both engineering
judgment about the event frequency, and also empirical data
such as the actual number of failures and operating hours
accrued to date for the HPU.
In particular, a prior probability distribution is specified to
reflect all the available information on similar components in
other applications, as tempered by the engineering judgment of
the analysis team. This distribution is generally then updated
with the observed HPU data to yield a revised (i.e., posterior)
distribution. In other cases, the posterior distribution is simply
set equal to the prior distribution, and no update is performed.
This is done in cases where little or no HPU data is available
for use in the update; e.g., in modeling hourly failure rates for
failures that have not occurred to date.
The use of judgment is in keeping with the Bayesian theory of
probabilitg. In particular, the judgment of an analysis team
that is knowledgeable about equipment reliability is a valid
form of evidence for use in formulating distributions; experience
has shown that the judgment of experienced analysts is often
remarkably close to actual data when the two have been compared.
For example, several studies of component reliability have found
expert estimates of component failure rates to be typically within
a factor of 2 to 4 from the observed failure rates.
Section i0.I describes the raw data sources from which HPU failure
data was obtained. These sources include such documents as
MSFC Problem Assessment System reports, anomaly reports, and so
on. For most spatial interaction events (SIE), virtually no
empirical data was available. Therefore, judgmental
distributions were developed for the frequencies of these events
(e.g., the likelihood of damaging an HPU as the result of a
turbine overspeed).
The process used for developing SIE distributions and the resultin%
judgmental distributions are described in Section 10.5. These
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distributions were based on extensive knowledge of such events,
and also on a number of analytical studies performed specifically
in support of this PRA.
Section 10.3 describes the categories of component failures for
which data was collected, and the guidelines and criteria that
were used for determining which events (e.g., incipient failures)
would be considered failures in this study.
In general, the criteria specified in Section 10.3 are fairly
conservative. For example, checkout data was included in the
database on exactly the same basis as flight data. Despite this,
however, no HPU failures were identified in the flight and
checkout data reviewed in this study. Finally, Section 10.4
presents the actual prior and posterior distributions that were
developed for the categories of components specified in Section
10.3. The sources of data used to generate and update the
distributions for the various failure rates are also indicated.
The Bayesian analysis that was used to develop the posterior
distributions automatically determines the appropriate weights
to assign to the observed data and the prior distribution, based
on the relative strength of the two types of evidence in each
particular situation. For example, if the prior distribution
is extremely broad (reflecting a high degree of uncertainty on
the part of the analysis team)and there is a moderate amount
of empirical data available, then the data will tend to dominate
the posterior distribution. By contrast, if there is very little
empirical data available, then the posterior distribution will
tend to look similar to the prior distribution.
Due to the high reliability of the components and the extremely
limited amounts of flight and hot firing time accrued to date, no
flight or checkout failures were identified. The distributions
for the various demand failure rates were updated based on the
observed data of zero failures in the total number of demands
to date, using exactly the same procedure as would be used if
failures had occurred. The posterior distribution resulting from
this process tends to be somewhat lower than the prior, especially
when the prior distribution extends to very high failure rates,
which are inconsistent with the observation of zero failures.
Because of the very limited amount of flight and checkout
operating time accrued to date, it was clear that the posterior
distributions for hourly failure rates would look virtually
identical to the priors. Because of this, no updates were
performed for the hourly failure rates, but a great deal of
10-3
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effort was devoted to the development of the prior distributions
for these failure rates. In particular, available information
from many different sources of reliability data (e.g., the Non-
electronic Parts Reliability Data handbook prepared by the Rome
Air Development Cen_er) was used to guide the engineering judgment
of the analysis team.
i0.I HPURAW DATA SOURCES
The accuracy of any technical study or report is dependent on
the accuracy, quality, and availability of the input data. It
was recognized prior to the start of this study that collection
and validation of the HPU data would be important to the quality
and accuracy of the final results. Particular attention was
given to the use of engineering judgment in the data development
process, especially in light of the limited amount of HPU
operating experience accumulated to date.
Two basic types of data were required: (a) exposure data
indicating how long the various HPU components had operated;
and (b) data indicating how many failures each given component
had experienced over the exposure period. For those components
that did experience failures information would also be needed
on the failure modes that were observed.
It was judged that utilizing Qualification Test (Qual) data would
not produce reasonable failure rates. The failures associated
with the Qual test program phase would likely represent flaws in
the early design or manufacturing process. These failures would
not necessarily be indicative of the final flight or production
components or of later refinements in the manufacturing process.
The Acceptance Test (ATP) phase is the next level of component
development for which data was known to be available. This data
was considered to be of value in tracking failures from the time
of contractor component, or system delivery, to end-of-life.
However, it was decided to exclude the ATP data from the analysis
because of: (a) the lack of information on actual design changes
resulting from ATP failures, (b) the inability to screen out
facility failures and anomalies caused by facility or test setups,
and (c) the lack of Lime and funding available in this study to
ensure that the failures identified in the ATP data were
representative of actual flight configurations.
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Launch checkout and flight data were selected as the most
meaningful data to support this analysis. This data represents
the HPU system in the flight configuration and environment.
Moreover, it was judged that any valid failure modes identified
in Qual or Acceptance tests, and not corrected, would be
reflected in flight failure rates, thus reducing the effect of
not including data from these deveiopmenn cauegories.
Several sources of launch checkout and flight data were found
to be available and accessible during the study time frame;
these sources are described below. These sources were utilized
to develop mission time histories dating from 1 January 1981
through Flight #24. Other sources such as NASA/contractor nest
reports and discussions with knowledgeable personnel were used
as an information base to assist in the development of
probability distributions for the Spatial Interactive Events.
The information from all sources was analyzed using a specific
sen of criteria to track and identify legitimate HPU failures.
These criteria are discussed in Section 10.3.
The salient information needed to develop flight rates and
mission sequences was compiled as a basis for developing model
input data. The individual data sources and their use-in this
study are discussed below.
a. Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) Problem Assessment
System, Problem Reports
b. Shuttle Flight Data and In-flight Anomaly List
c. JSC Mission Reports, Missions 1 through 23
de Study and test reports from NASA and contractor sources
and published technical documents
i0.i.i MSFC Problem Assessment System
Each problem record pertaining to the SRB Thrust Vector Control
Subsystem was extracted from the MSFC Problem Assessment System
database and screened for applicability to the HPU. Review of
this data determined that no flight or Hot fire test anomalies
or failures were experienced. The fact that the HPU experienced
no flight or hot fire test failures represents, success, data
and the application of this data for establishing HPU failure
distributions is discussed in Section 10.3.
q_a_
_v 5
L
10.1.2 Shuttle Fliaht Data _nd Xn-Fliaht Anomaly List
The Shuttle Flight Data and In-flight Anomaly List is a histcrical
report of flight-related information. It also includes in-flight
anomalies and references to problems encountered during the STS
missions.
a. Initial altitude and inclination
b. Mission sequence number, flight and orbiter number
c. Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) Separation (SEP) time
d. Other mission-related data
The mission related portion of the data was used to develop a
mission timeline database, combining similar information from
contractor furnished HPU run times.
10.1.3 JSC Mission Reports
The JSC Mission Reports were used to collect mission-related
data. These reports were also used as a reference when mission
information obtained from other data sources required further
clarification.
10.1.4 Study RePorts. Test Results. & Personal Communications
Some of the failure modes under consideration during this study
have a very low likelihood of occurrence. Some are of such a
nature that directly applicable test data does not exist; e.g.,
some catastrophic SIEs. In order to estimate these likelihoods,
information from a large number of study and test reports from
NASA and contractor sources and other technical publications was
utilized.
Quite a lot of information used to supplement the written reports
was obtained through telecons with various knowledgeable people
in specialized fields JSC, MSFC, and other locations. Tests are
presently being conduoted at White Sands Proving Grounds on the
properties of Hydrazine and its effect on certain materials. The
results were not available for consideration and application for
this study.
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10.2 SPATIAL INTERACTIVE EVENT DATA
Table 10.2-1 presents the HPU SIE split fraction distributions in
the format used for entry into the PRA model. These distributions
and the information supporting their development are discussed
individually in Section 10.5 and are presented here for clarity
and convenience.
10.3 DATA CATEGORIZATION
A number of guidelines and criteria were established for the HPU
data categorization task. These are each discussed below.
a. Failures occurring before January I, 1981, were omitted
from the database on the grounds t_hat the HPU was still
undergoing design development prior to that time.
b. Failures occurring during qualification tests (QUAL),
acceptance tests (ATP), helium leak tests, or HPU assembly,
and refurbishment were not included in the database for
this project' These tests were thought to be largely
inapplicable, on the basis that bench tests of individual
components or sub-assemblies do not reflect the actual
operation of a completed HPU. In addition, since these
tests are often performed early in the process of readying
an HPU for flight, they detect many types of failures that
would not be expected during an actual flight.
Co Both checkout tests (CK0) and actual fllghts (FLT) were
considered relevant for inclusion in the database.
However, no applicable flight or checkout failures were
identified.
do Incipient failures (e.g., turbine blade cracking) were not
explicitly included in the database as actual failures.
However, the history of incipient failures to date was taken
into account qualitatively in establishing appropriate prior
distributions.
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eo Failures of components that are outside the scope of our HPU
model were excluded from the data base for obvious reasons.
For example, an HPU failure due to an erroneous signal from a
bite circuit was excluded from consideration for this reason.
fl Data for components that are significantly different in
design and/or operation was not grouped. For example, the
number of demands experienced by the isolation valve was
analyzed separately from the number of demands for the gas
generator valves, since the gas generator valves experience
pulsing operation and might therefore have a different
failure rate. Analyzing such components together might have
resulted in the use of inapplicable data for a particular
component.
Based on the guidelines and criteria established above, distri-
butions were developed for the frequencies of various types of
components and component failure modes. The components used for
the HPU model are specified in Table 10.3-1.
10.4 FAILURE RATES
Once the data has been categorized, as a basis for determining
the components and failure modes for which failure rate
distributions will be needed, the next step is to specify prior
distributions for those failure rates. After that, one must
specify the relevant data for each component failure mode; i.e.,
the number pf observed HPU component failures, and the number
of operating hours and/or demands to which each component was
subject. Finally, the data must be combined with the prior
distributions to yield posterior distributions. The results of
these three steps are presented in the sections below.
10.4.1 Development of Prior Distributions
A number of sources were used as background information in
developing prior distributions. These include the Nonelectronic
Parts Reliability Data (NPRD) handbook, prepared by the Rome Air
Development Center; MIL-HDBK-217D (which was used particularly
for electronic components); the Reliability Engineering Data
Series report on Failure Mechanisms, prepared by the Avco
Corporation; NASA operating life limits for the APU; and the
engineering judgment of the analysis team (based on previous
risk assessments and data analyses).
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In many cases, adjustments to the information obtained from
these sources were needed. For example, many of the failure
rate estimates obtained from NPRD were for components in
aircraft or ground-based environments rather than missile
environments.
Environmental adjustment factors were judged to be a reasonable
way to account for many of these differences; factors for this
purpose were obtained from the Avco Failure Mechanisms report.
In addition, all the failure rate estimates in NPRD are presented
on a per-hour basis (H), while many of the failure rates for the
HPU risk study were needed on a per-demand basis (D). In such
cases, the number of demands per hour in a typical application
was estimated as a basis for converting the failure rate to the
desired units.
In a few cases, estimates were not available from sources such
as NPRD or MIL-HDBK-217D. In such cases, observed APU failure
experience was to be used in the development of the HPU priors,
since no HPU failures were available to aid in quantification.
Finally, after the initial assessment of prior distributions,
the distributions for similar =omponents or related failure
modes were compared with each other as a reasonableness check.
For example, the failure rates for different types of rotating
equipment (e.g., the turbine, pumps, and gearbox) were compared
to assure that they were roughly comparable, and that the assigned
failure rates were consistent with engineering knowledge, such as
differing speeds at which the various types of equipment operate.
This type of comparison was performed to assure that the various
failure rates reflected the correct relative ranking. The
comparison process, which was especially important since many of
the prior distributions were based on different data sources and/
or different applications, did result in the adjustment of several
distributions to correspond more closely with what the analysis
team considered realistic for application to the space shuttle.
The process described above is the same process as was used to
develop prior distributions for the APU. Consideration was given
to adjusting these distributions to reflect the more extensive
testing and refurbishment performed on the HPU. This testing
includes the following steps:
a. Sundstrand bench tests (i.e., acceptance tests)
b. Inspection & checkout on receipt at Kennedy Space Center
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c. Helium leak testing
d. GN 2 spin test of the HPU turbine
e. Bite tests before hot firing
f. Hot firing of the HPU
g. Post-flight disassembly, refurbishment, and testing
The ex_:ent of post-flight disassembly and refurbishment in
particular are significant additions to the testing and
refurbishment that are performed on the APU, and might thus be
expected to result in lower HPU flight failure rates than for
the APU. However, these lower failure rates are counteracted
by the harsher environments experienced by the HPU -- in
particular, the immersion of the HPU in salt water after each
mission. It was judged that the competing effects of increased
testing and a harsher environment roughly canceled each other
out, and that the HPU prior distributions were within the range
of uncertainty of the APU priors.
Table 10.4-1 presents the prior distributions that resulted
from this process. For each distribution, the table specifies
the category of components to which the distribution applies,
the relevant failure mode or modes, the 5th and 95th percentiles
of the prior distribution; and the sources used in developing
that prior. (Engineering judgment is nearly always used in the
development of distributions, because there is rarely enough
data to unambiguously specify a distribution.) Virtually all the
prior distributions were assumed to be lognormal in form, as is
common practice in PRAs. For these distributions, the medians can
be found as the geometric mean of their 5th and 95th percentiles.
The only exception to the assumption of lognormality is the
conditional frequency of leaks in the fuel systems of additional
HPUs, given that one HPUis leaking. Because the 95th percentile
of this frequency was quite high, a lognormal distribution would
not have been reasonable; in particular, it would have allowed
conditional probabilities of leak significantly greater than 1.0.
Therefore, a beta distribution was used for this parameter instead
of a lognormal distribution.
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10.4.2 SPecification of Failure Data
Once prior distributions has been developed for each category of
components and each failure mode, the nex_ step is to specify
the relevant data for each category; i.e., the number of observed
component failures of each type, and the number of operating
hours (H) and/or demands (D) to which each component was subject,
which can be referred to as exposure data.
No actual component failures were identified for the HPU during
flight. The estimation of exposure data requires determination
of whether the relevant failure mode is likely to occur over time
or on a per-demand basis, and whether a failure would likely be
detected if one occurred.
The total amount of run time accumulated on all HPUs to date
during flights and hot firings is only about 23 hours - too small
to make a difference in the failure rate estimates used in this
study, which are mostly less than 10 -3 . Therefore, updates were
not performed for hourly failure rates.
For demand-based failures, the number of demands experienced by
a typical component during flights and hot firings was calculated
to be 603, due to the large number of hot firing tests performed
on the HPU. This total, assumes that the component in question
experiences exactly one demand during each firing of an HPU.
Care must be taken in attributing exposure data to particular
components, however. For example, failures of the normal speed
logic gate may not be detected unless a change to high speed is
required during a mission, and thus the relevant exposure time
for this particular failure is likely to be zero.
Table 10.4-2 presents the prior distribution and the failure and
exposure data for each basic event included in the analysis. As
can be seen from that table, the prior distributions for hourly
failure rates were not updated and were used directly as posterior
distributions, because of the small amount of exposure timeand
lack of failures for those events.
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10.4.3 Development of Postericr Distributions
The Bayesian updating process for demand failure rates was
performed using the RISKMAN 4 computer software on an IBM personal
computer. The resulting distributions for demand failure rates, as
well as the distributions for hourly failure rates, are shown in
Table 10.4-3. This table shows the mean frequency for each basic
event, and also the 5th, 50th and 95th percentiles.
The Bayesian analysis used to develop the demand-based distribu-
tions shown in Table 10.4-3 automatically assigns the appropriate
weights to the observed data and the prior distribution,
respectively, based on the relative strenq_h of the two types of
evidence in each particular situation. For example, when a great
deal of empirical data is available, then the data will tend to
dominate the posterior. Similarly, when relatively little
empirical data is available, then the posterior distribution will
tend to resemble the prior; in this case, the data is simply not
strong enough to override the information contained in the prior.
For of the basic events shown in Table 10.4-3, no failures were
observed, so the posteriors are slightly lower than the priors.
This is a result of the Bayesian inference process, and is also
intuitively reasonable. This effect is greatest when the prior
distribution extends to include fairly high failure rates, which
are inconsistent with the lack of observed failures. The fre-
quencies of a few basic events were described by point estimates
instead of distributions, usually on the basis that their
frequencies were negligible. For the purpose of this study these
events were assigned frequencies of zero. The events in this
category included the following:
a. A number of start-up failures, which were considered
extremely unlikely: GN2 leakage into the fuel tank at
start; failure of the gas generator at start; plugging of
the inline fuel filter and the fuel pump filter at start;
and inadvertent opening of the fuel pump relief valve.
b. Common cause failure of two or more HPUs due to a cause
other than lube oil blockage. The frequency of other
common cause failure modes was considered to be dominated
by the frequency of lube oil plugging.
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Co Common cause failure of both GGVM valves in the open
position. This is considered much less likely than indepen-
dent failure of both valves due to mechanical and/or control
problems, because one of the valves fails in the open
position upon loss of power and the other one fails closed.
The detached valve seat single point failure is likewise
considered to be of very low probability.
10.5 HPUSIE DATA DEVELOPMENT
Based on the discussion of Section 9.6, two types of SIEs are
significant for the HPUs as for the APUs, namely:
a. Events related to HPU turbine failure and fragmentation
b. Events related to HPU fuel (hydrazine) leakage
The approach to developing the Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) SIE data
for input into the Probability Risk Analysis (PRA) is discussed in
Section 7.6 is valid for HPU SIE data also. There are differences,
however, between the APU and HPU operation, design, and environment
that lead to differences in conditional probabilities. The HPU
starts once and runs for 160 seconds during ascent, then is dis-
assembled and refurbished after recovery; whereas, the APU starts
at least twice per mission is inspected after 20 hours run time
(approximately 14 missions). The HPU, since it only runs during
ascent in the nitrogen purge environment, is not subject to fuel
(hydrazin_ fires; whereas, the APU, as seen on STS-9, is subject
to hydrazine fires during descent mecause of air drawn into the
aft compartment. The HPU housing has a 26% larger containment
ring than the APU. Moreover, there is significantly less flight
critical equipment in the Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) aft skirt
area than in the Orbiter aft compartment.
Table 10.5-1 presents the split fractions required for input into
the HPU PRA. For each SIE conditional probability, the paragraphs
below discuss the probability of frequency distribution developed
for input into the PRA.
10.5.1 SIE Data Related to HPU Turbine Failure and Fragmentation
The following paragraphs present the probability of frequency
distributions developed to represent the conditional
probabilities related to HPU turbine breakup and discuss the
data that support these distributions.
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10.5.1.1 Probability of Turbine Failure at Normal Speed
The discussion of the probability of APU turbine failure at
normal speed in Section 7.1 is valid also for the HPU. The
analysis included the the fact that the HPU is disassembled and
inspected after each mission.
10.5.1.2 Probability of Turbine Failure Due to Overspeed
This probability is equal to unity. Since there is no overspeed
shutoff circuitry on the HPU to limit the overspeed peak rate
as on the APU, any condition that causes overspeed will cause
turbine breakup.
T_Io I0.5-i EPU Split Fractions
Name
F1
F3
F3N
F5
F7
FI2
FI3
Split Fractions
Pr (HPU Turbine Fail I Primary and Secondary Valves
Fail Open)
Pr (Uncontained Shrapnel I Turbine Breakup Due to
Overspeed}
Pr (Uncontained Shrapnel I Turbine Breakup at Normal
Speed)
Pr (Failure of Second HPU or FCE I Uncontained
Shrapnel)
Pr (Fuel Leak I Uncontained Shrapnel From Second HPU)
Pr (HPU Fail I Small Leak in That HPU)
Pr (HPU fail ] Small Leak in Another HPU
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10.5.1.3 Probability of Uncontained HPU shrapnel as a
Consequence of Turbine Breakup at Overspeed
As discussed in Section 7.6.1.3, the probability of having
uncontained fragments as a result of a turbine failure is
determined by the expected breakup speed and the ability of
the APU s_ructure to contain fragments at the expected energy
levels. The expected turbine failure speed of 108,000 RPM
(150%) presented for the APU is valid for the HPU as well.
Reference 25 presents calculations to estimate APU/HPU turbine
overspeed required to burst the containment ring and produce
shrapnel. However, the calculations in this reference are based
on the OVI01 APU/HPU containment ring design. Since the date
of this reference, the HPU containment rings were redesigned to
increase the HPU containment ring yield speed to 108,090 RPM
(150%). This increased the volume by 26%. Thus, the likelihood
of HPU fragments being uncontained is the likelihood that the
fragmentation speed will exceed 108',000 RPM. Since the expected
fragmentation speed presented is 108,000 RPM, the likelihood of
exceeding the HPU containment ring yield speed is 50%.
Allowing for uncertainty, this is expressed as:
P(f4)
0 .I .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1.0
Fzequen_ of Occurrence
P(f4)
f4
.3
.55 .65
This distribution was used in the evaluation of event tree top
event CH following occurrence of TH.
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10.5.1.4 Probability of Uncontained HPU Shrapnel as a
Consequence of Turbine Failure at Normal Speed
The information presented in 10.5.1.3 is also valid for assessing
the effects of turbine failure at normal speed. However, even
though unit S/N 105 broke up at a speed below that required to
burst the containment ring, framments bypassed the containment
ring and exited through the APU housing. This was attributed
to the effects of notches in the turbine hub (Reference 96). The
group, in considering this failure, judged that any turbine that
broke up at normal speed would have to be seriously flawed and,
hence, would bypass the larger containment ring. The same
discrete distribution presented in 7.1.4 was assigned for the
HPU. This distribution was used in the evaluation of event tree
top event CH following occurrence of PH.
10.5.1.5 Probability of a Second HPU or Flight Critical
Equipment Failure as a Consequence of Uncontained
Shrapnel from a Turbine Failure at Overspeed
Given uncontained shrapnel from a turbine failure at overspeed,
the likelihood that this shrapnel would cause a second HPU or
flight critical equipment to fail is determined by three factors:
the energy level of uncontained shrapnel, the likelihood of an
uncontained fragment striking the equipment, and the vulner-
ability of the equipment.
Using the approach of Section 7.1.5, the energy of the unoontained
fragments can be estimated as the energy of the turbine hub frag-
ments minus the minimum energy required to burst the containment
ring. Reflecting the fact that the HPU containment ring is 26%
larger than the APU containment ring, the minimum energy required
to burst the containment ring is calculated to be 24w048 1b-ft.
The energy of HPU turbine fragments and the energy of resulting
uncontained fragments at various speeds, are presented in Table
10.5-2.
The likelihoodof an uncontained fragment striking a piece of
equipment must consider both the fragment spray pattern and the
location of the equipment in the SRB aft skirt area. As in the
APU, the fragment spray pattern that would result from an uncon-
tained HPU hub fragmentation is difficult to define because of
the lack of data and the complex HPU containment ring geometry.
The HPU fragment spray pattern was assumed to be the same as that
for the APU discussed in Section 7.1.5.
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TaJDIo 10.5-2
HPU Uncontmined Fragnent Energies
Fra_ent APU Uncont.
Ope:. ! Bne:cJy Frag Ener_
Speed (]P_PW) (lb-ft) (lb-ft)
100 72,000 10,688 0
110 79,200 12,932 0
120 86,400 15,390 0
130 93,600 18,063 0
140 100,800 20,948 0
150 108,000 24,048 0
160 115,200 27,361 3,277
170 122,400 30,888 6,804
180 129,600 34,629 10,545
190 136,800 38,584 14,500
200 144,000 42,752 18,668
Much less information was available to support the assessment of
the likelihood of an uncontained HPU fragment striking flight
critical equipment and the vulnerability of the equipment. A
number of items of equipment are potentially subject to being
struck. However, most items are components of the HPU/Hydraulic
system containing the failed HPU and, hence, would contribute
little additional risk. The exceptions to this are the hydraulic
lines. An HPU turbine breakup has a finite likelihood of cutting
a hydraulic line from the second HPU. This possibility is judged
to be the predominant source of risk from an HPU turbine failure.
The following probability distribution was assigned.
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This distribution was used in the evaluation of event tree top
event CH after the occurrence of TH.
10.5.1.6 Probability of a Hydrazine Leak as a Consequence of
Uncontained Shrapnel from Another HPU
The occurrence of a hydrazine leak as a consequence cf uncon-
rained shrapnel from another HPU is considered an unlikely event.
Because of the locations and orientations of the HPU, it is judged
that this could only occur as a result of a fragment ricochet or
secondary shrapnel. This is expressed by assigning
PCf7)
f7 10 -5 I "
This value was used in the evaluation of event tree top event FH
after the occurrence of TH or PH without _e occurrence of CH.
• 10.5.2 SIE Data Related to HpU Fue_ _eakaqe
The following paragraphs present the probability of frequency
distributions developed to represent the conditional prob-
abilities related to HPU fuel leakage, and discuss the data that
supports these distributions. Only those split fractions which
proved significant to the model are discussed.
As indicated in Section 9.6.2 above, leaking HPU fuel (hydrazine)
can damage equipment by means of corrosion, fire, or detonation.
Due to the lack of oxygen in the SRB aft skirt area during
prelaunch and ascent, combustion cannot occur. Like the APU,
electrical wiring for the HPU has insulation consisting of an
inner layer of Teflon and an outer layer cf Kapton. Although
given sufficient time liquid hydrazine can dissolve Kapton, it
will not dissolve Teflon. In addition, the time available for
hydrazine to affect wiring in the aft skir_ area is very limited
before SRB SEP. Thus, corrosion is not considered a credible
mechanism by which hydrazine may damage the HPUs.
10.5.2.1 Probability of HPU Failure Given a Small Fuel Leak in
That HPU
HPU failure given a small fuel leak in that HPU is a potential
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problem shared by the APU. Development of the appropriate split
fraction for _he APU is discussed in Section 7.6.3.1. The ruling
out of possible hydrazine corrosion damage to the HPU is the most
significant difference between the two cases.
After consideration of the expert opinion, which was surveyed
at the 1 October 1987 meeting, the probability of frequency
distribution adopted for the spliU fraction associated with HPU
failure given a small fuel leak in that HPU has the following
characteristics:
Mean Frequency
5th Percentile Frequency
Median Frequency
95th Percentile Frequency
1.6140 x 10 -2
1.9024 x 10 -3
9.7847 x 10 -3
4.8681 x 10 -2
This distribution was used in the evaluation of event tree top
events BA or BB after occurrence of KA or RB respectively.
10.5.2.2 HPU Failure Given a Small Fuel Leak in Another HPU
The probability of HPU failure given a small fuel leak in another
HPU is less than the probability of HPU failure given a small
fuel leak in the same HPU. Internal fuel leakage in another HPU
poses a lesser risk since the resulting detonation will produce,
at most, low energy shrapnel. Risk resulting from thermal damage
to the HPU by catalytically-induced hydrazine decomposition is
less because of the distance between HPUs.
After consideration of the expert opinion, the probability of
frequency distribution adopted for the split fraction associated
with HPU failure given a small fuel leak in another HPU has the
following characteristics:
Mean Frequency
5th Percentile Frequency
Median Frequency
95th Percentile Frequency
5 7036 x 10 -3
9i5734 x 10 -43 9254 x 10 -3
1.5619 x 10 -2
This distribution was used in the evaluation of event tree top
events BA or BB after occurrence of KB or KA respectively.
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11.0 OUANTITATI%_ RESULTS 0FTHE _PU PRA
The Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) model was constructed
from the top down. It began with illustrating the major
functions of the Shuttle, interruption of which would cause
loss of crew or vehicle, in the Master Logic Diagram (MLD).
That diagram was developed to the level of initial failure
categories of the Hydraulic Power Unit (HPU) that could lead
to the damage states Loss of Crew/Vehicle (LOC/V) after launch
or launch scrub before launch. Event sequence diagrams were
used to define and described all significant scenanios that
could lead from an initial failure to one of the damage states.
The event trees and split fraction models provided further
detail of the scenarios in a form that is also quantifiable.
The level of detail was commensurate with the data that was
collected from various sources throughout the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and was generally
at a component or sub-component level.
Quantification is performed from the bottom up. Probability
distributions that reflect actuarial information about the
HPU, analysis, maintenance procedures and engineering judgment
were developed for each component, sub-component, and even£
in the model. The minimal cut sets of the split fraction
models were obtained and the appropriate probability distribution
assigned to each basic event in the cut sets. The RISKMAN soft-
ware facilitates the development of algebraic equations that
represent each split fraction and using the assigned probability
distributions, obtained the numerical value of each split
fraction in the HPU event tree. Another module of RISEMAN
combined the split fractions to obtain the frequency of each
scenario. Since each scenario was associated with a damage
state (or the OK state), scenarios frequencies are summed, as
shown in Section 5.10, to obtain the total damage state
frequency.
The results of this study are presented in terms of the
following:
a.
b.
Risk profiles of each damage state and the interpretation
of the profiles
Description of scenarios in order of their importance to
the risk profiles
ii-i
Co Description of HPU component failure modes in order of
their importance to the risk profile
II.I RISK PROFILES
The probability distributions shown in Figure ii.i-i represent
the state of knowledge abzu% the fraction of missions in which
HPU failures on either Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) would result
in loss of crew or vehicle, and the fraction of missions in
which HPU failures on either SRB would result in launch scrub.
The former fraction includes the time from launch to SRB SEP.
The latter fraction includes the time from L/O -30 seconds to
launch.
A great deal of information is contained in these distributions
even wiuhout looking further into what scenarios contribute most
to them. The results show that it is ex"cremely unlikely that
HPUs would cause a loss of crew or vehicle more often than once
in about 3300 missions. On the other hand, it is extremely
unlikely that HPUs would cause a loss of crew or vehicle less
often than once in about 4 million missions. The 90% confidence
bounds are that the fraction of missions in which HPUs would
cause loss of crew or vehicle lies between one in about i.I
million missions and one in about 17,600 missions.
Similarly, the results show that it is extremely unlikely that
HPUs would cause a launch scrub more often than once in about 17
missions. On the other hand, it is extremely unlikely that HPUs
would cause a launch scrub less often than once in about 143
missions. The 90% confidence bounds are that the fraction of
missions in which HPUs would cause a launch scrub lies between
1 in about 88 missions and 1 in about 28 missions.
It is sometimes convenient to talk about probability distri-
butions in terms of a measure of central tendency. The mean of
the distribution is used as this measure. The mean fraction
of missions in which HPUs would cause loss of crew or vehicle
Was estimated to be one in about 52,000 missions. The mean
fraction of missions in which HPUs would cause a launch scrub
was estimated to be one in about 44 missions. It was also
estimated that 97.6% of mission will be accomplished with all
HPUs operating throughout.
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The occurrence of loss of crew or vehicle associated with HPUs is
quite unlikely. This is consistent with. data collected during
this study that indicated HPU components did not fail during
flight nor during hot fire tests. The low frequency is also
indicative of the prelaunch countdown procedure in which HPU
malfunctions that are detected before launch would automatically
scrub the launch. Indeed, an HPU associated malfunction was the
cause of a launch delay although the cause was a circuitry error
leading to a command shutdown rather than a malfunction in the HPU
itself. (Modeling this kind of circuitry malfunction was outside
the scope of this study.)
Three general factors lead to the low frequency of HPU caused loss
of crew or vehicle. The first is the very short duration of the
mission. The HPUs are required to operate for a much shorter time
before being disassembled, inspected and refurbished than the
Auxiliary Power Units (APUs). Equipment with the same failure
rate is, therefore, far less likely to fail during the short HPU
mission than during a longer APU mission.
The second is design specification. The HPUs are to be designed
with specifications similar to the APUs. The HPUs have a far less
taxing mission not only in terms of duration, but in terms of the
environmental extremes that must be endured during a mission and
still operate. It is appears that the HPUs have a substantial
design margin from a reliability standpoint. The third factor
is the extensive disassembly, inspection, refurbishment and
testing that takes place for each HPU component between flight.
We believe that this process (described in Section 10.4.1) is
largely responsible for the low incidents of failures during hot
fire tests before launches despite the immersion of the HPUs in
sea water at the end of each mission.
11.2 DESCRIPTION OF RISK SIGNIFICANT SCENARIOS
11.2.1 Loss of Crew or Vehicle
Over 99% of the risk of loss of crew and vehicle due to HPUs
is attributed to two scenarios. These are summarized in Table
II.2-1A. The most risk significant scenario (56.8% of the
frequency of loss of crew or vehicle) involves loss of two HPUs
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on the same SRB from equipment malfunctions after launch and
before Solid Rocket Booster Separation (SRB SEP) on the same SRB.
While the split fraction models described in Section 9.5 present
numerous potential equipment failure combinations, one of these
combinations has been assessed as contributing over 99% of the
frequency of this scenario. This scenario is common cause
blockaqe of the l_be oil flow path. L_be cil flow path blockage
causes a rapid overheat and failure cf the bearings on the
rotating equipment in the gearbox. The blockages may be caused
by hydrazine leakage from the fuel pump seal through the drain
cavity and into the gearbox via the gearbox shaft seal. The
gearbox shaft seal shares the same seal drain cavity.
Hydrazine reacts with the lube oil to form a waxy substance that
collects on the lube oil filters and eventually blocks them. The
identified commonality of causes that covered two HPUs were choice
of incompatible materials (lube oil and hydrazine), and design and
fabrication of the seals and seal drain system that allowed the
two materials to intermingle. The recorded data from APUs for this
event (Table 7.5-3) indicated that three APUs had suffered flow
blockages during flights, two of which were on the same APU
during the same flight. This was one of the more significant
contributors the loss of crew and vehicle frequency in the APU
analysis for ascent.
Unlike the APUs, the recorded HPU failure history database of the
HPUs did not exhibit symptoms (such as high lube oil pressure)
to indicate flow blockages in HPUs. Nevertheless, because of the
similarity of the HPU design to that of the APU in this area, the
possibility of this event occurring on the HPU could not be ruled
out. However, the probability distribution for the frequency of
common cause failure of two HPUs due to lube oil flow blockage was
appropriately reduced to reflect the lack of incidents and the
shorter mission time. Although the percentage contribution is
high, the frequency of the event has been assessed as being very
small for the HPU (once in about 99,000 missions).
The other risk significant scenario accounts for 43% of the
frequency of loss of crew or vehicle. It involves failure of
an HPU turbinesuch that the turbine breaks into high energy
fragments while it is operating at normal speed. Breakup can
occur either from a flaw which could contribute to accelerated
crack propagation, from fatigue, or from other causes.
Inspection of HPU turbines after each flight have consistently
shown cracks in turbine blades.
q q
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TABL3 11.,2-1A
IMPORTANCE RANKING OF TTpu FAILURE SCENARIOS
1
LOC/V
m
FAILURE BCE]bDtl_O P.ZBK CONTRZBUTORB
Equipment failure of 2 HPUs on the same SRB
between launch and SRB SEP
Contributors and % Contribution to Scenario I:
a. Common cause restriction lube oil flow
causing bearing overheat and failure of
rotating equipment in the gearbox (99%)
CONT-
RIBUTION
56.8
2 Turbine failure leading to shrapnel induced
failure of a second HPU or other flight
critical equipment between launch and SRB SEP
Contributors and q Contribution to Scenario 2=
a. Turbine fragmentation at normal speed (100%)
43.0
3 All Others 0.2
TOTAL I00.0
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Turbine breakup, of course, guarantees the failure of at least
one HPU. The turbine may fail in a way that causes it to wobble
on its axis of rotation such that when it comes part, the pieces
are not thrown precisely radially outward on the normal plane of
rotation and therefore, miss the containment ring. Tests have
demonstraued that the portion of the turbine casing that is not
reinforced with the containment ring does not retain the fragments.
These fragments become high energy projectiles capable of damaging
other equipment.
The potential path and range of energy of the shrapnel was
analyzed along with the strength of the materials that could be
in its path. There is a chance that the shrapnel will pierce
the hydrazine tank of the same HPU that suffered the turbine
failure. The subsequent release of large amounts of hydrazine
could damage the insulation of wiring associated with the other
HPU, thereby, failing the second system. Wiring Insulation
material of the HPU is made of teflon which is resistant to the
corrosive property of hydrazine. A very low distribution was
assigned for the frequency of failing the second HPU or some other
flight critical equipment in the aft skirt. The distribution
estimates that about 1 in I00 turbine failures would result in
shrapnel-induced damage leading to loss of crew or vehicle. The
overall frequency of this scenario is about one in 128,000
missions.
II. 2.2 Launch Scrub
Table 11.2-IB shows that over 99% of the frequency of launch
scrub is attributed to two failure scenarios. The most important
scenario involves 98.4% of the launch scrub frequency. This
scenario represents those HPU failures that occur upon attempting
to s_art the HPUs at L/O -30 seconds.
The other scenario comprises 1.5% of the launch scrub frequency.
It involves run failures of equipment in a single HPU during the
30 seconds before launch. These are failures that would cause
the HPU to cease operating. Violations of launch commit criteria
that allow the HPUs to continue operating were not included in
the scope of this study.
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TABLE II°2-1B
IMPORTANCE RANKING OF HPU FAILURE SCENAEIO8
LAUNCZ BCRUB
FAILURE 8_ENARIO RIBK CONTRIBUTORS
% CONT-
RIBUTION
Failure to start an HPU at Lift-off -30
seconds
Contributors and % Contribution to Scenario I:
a. Secondary control valve leaks before
isolation valve is opened (11%)
b. Fuel tank isolation valve fails to open
at start (mechanical failure) (11%)
c. Primary control valve fails to close
at start (mechanical failure) (11%)
d. Secondary control valve fails to open
at start (mechanical failure) (11%)
e: Failure of electric power to isolation
valve (10%)
f. Failure of electric power to secondary
valve (10%)
g. MPU 1 fails high at start (9%)
h. MPU 2 fails high at start (9%)
i. Fuel pump bypass valve fails to open
(6%)
J. Fuel pump bypass valve fails to close
(6%)
k. Primary valve controller fails off (2%)
i. Secondary valve controller fails off
(2%)
98.4
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TABLE 11.2-1B (Concluded)
L_PORT_NCE RANKING OF HPU FAILURE 8CEl_k_ZO8
L_UNC_ BCRUB
FAILURE 8CE]KAI_O ]_8K CONT]tZBUTOR8
Failure of the HPU to continue operating
after start and before launch
Contributors and % Contribution to Scenario 2:
a. Primary control valve transfers closed
and stays closed while pulsing (27%)
b. Lube oil flow path blocked (27%)
c. MPU 1 output fails high (13%)
d. MPU 2 output fails high (13%)
e. Turbine wheel fragments while running
at normal speed (8%)
Fuel pump filter blocked (3%)
Gas generator fails (2%)
fe
g.
Page 2 of 2
% CONT-
RIBUTION
1.5
f"
!
3 All Others
TOTAL
0.I
:LO0.0
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11.3 FAILURE MODE IMPORTANCE RANKING
Another way to dissect the results is to perform sensitivity
studies on the importance of individual failure modes to the
overall frequency of each damage state. This was done by
numerous requantifications of the HPU risk model. For each
requantification a different failure mode was assigned a failure
frequency of zero. In other words, the component was assumed to
be perfect with respect to that failure mode. In general, the
requantification yields an estimate of the damage state frequency
that is lower than the base case. The following importance para-
meter was, therefore, used to rank the individual failure modes:
BASELINE QUANTIFICATION - jth REQUANTIFICATION
Ij -
BASELINE QUANTIFICATION
The results shown in Table 11.2-2 are normalized by a factor
representing the summation of all Ij. The failure modes shown
in the Table represent over 99% of their respective damage
state frequencies.
11.4 INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS
Loss of crew or vehicle associated with HPU-initiated scenarios
has been assessed as highly unlikely relative to the risk to the
vehicle from APU-initiated scenarios. This is primarily because
of the much shorter HPU mission duration. It appears that the
extensive refurbishment and pre-flight checkout procedure of the
HPUs effectively compensates for their immersion in sea water at
the end of each flight.
Only two HPU failure modes contribute about 98% of the frequency
of loss of crew or vehicle. These are restricted lube oil
circulation and turbine wheel failure.
The results indicate that the APU should receive much higher
management attention for resource allocation to reduce the risk
to the vehicle than should the HPU.
For those resources that are, nevertheless, allocated to the HPU,
the above two items should receive a far higher priority than all
other failures. Although other failures can also lead to loss of
crew and vehicle, they have been estimated to be of such low
frequency that fixing them would provide negligible reduction of
risk.
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RANKING
1
T]LBLE 11.2-2
IMPORTANCE RANKING OF ][PU
FAILURE MODE8
L088 OF CREW OR VFJ[ZCLZ
COI(PO_/]4BBEXBLY
RZBK CONTRIBUTORS
Lube oil circulation restricted
Turbine wheel failure
Primary control valve transfers
closed while pulsing
Page I of 2
|
CONT-
RIBUTION
55.0
43.0
1.0
]
)i
I
All other failures
TOTAL
1.0
100.0
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)T_,BLE 11.2-2 (Concluded)
IMPORTANCE I_1LNF_NG OF KPU
FAILURE MODE8
Page 2 of 2
LADNCX BCRUB
RANKING
COMPONENT/ASSEMBLY
RIBK CONTRIBUTORS
% CONT-
RIBUTION
1
2
3
4
7
8
g
10
11
Secondary control valve leaks before
isolation valves open
Fuel tank isolation valve fails to
open on demand
Primary control valve fails to close
when HPU star_ed (mechanical failure)
Secondary control valve fails to open
when HPU started (mechanical failure)
Loss of electric power to isolation
valves
Loss of electric power to secondary
control valve
MPU 1 fails high on start
MPU 2 fails high on start
Fuel pump bypass valve fails to open
on star_
Fuel pump bypass valve fails to close
on demand when pump is operating
All Other Failures
12.0
12.0
12.0
12.0
10.5
10.5
9.0
9.0
6.0
6.0
1.0
TOTAL 100.0
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To reduce the likelihood of risk associated with the HPUs, we
would recommend the following actions:
a. Change the design of the seal leakage cavity such that the
flow path from the fuel pump seal to the gearbox shaft
seal is eliminated.
bQ Continue thorough flushing and cleanup of the lube oil
lines and filter.
Cm Investigate and determine the cause cf turbine wheel blade
cracking. Change design or operation to eliminate the
cause.
The study results indicate that resources spent on other failure
modes to be of far less benefit.
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The following are the references used in the development of this
study. The JSC documents are listed first, followed by the MSFC
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13.0 PROOF OF CONCEPT STUDY ACRONYM8 LIST
AFB
A1
AOA
APU
ARCS
ASSY
ATCS
ATO
ATP
ATT
ATVC
AV
BITE
C&W
CAL
CAR
CB
CIL
CKO
CKT
CL
cls
CMD
CNTL
CNTLR
CO
CO2
C/O
CR
ORES
CRIT
CRT
D&C
D
D/o
delta P
DFI
displ
DIST
DMD/HR
DOD
DSC
EGT
EI
Elec
ENA
- Air Force Base
- Aluminum
- Abort-Once-Around
- Auxiliary Power Unit
- Aft Reaction Control System (Subsystem)
- Assembly
- Active Thermal Control Subsystem
- Abort-To-Orbit
- Acceptance Test Procedure
- Attitude
- Ascent Thrust Vector Control
- Avionics
- Built-In Test Equipment
- Caution and Warning
- Calibration
- Corrective Action Reports
- Circuit Breaker
- Critical Items List
- Checkout
- Circuit
- Close (Closed)
- Closes
- Command, Commander
- Control
- Controller
- Carbon Monoxide
- Carbon Dioxide
- Checkout
- Confidence Run
- Corrosion Resistant Steel
- Criticality
- Cathode-Ray Tube
- Displays and Controls
- Demand
- Deorbit
- Differential Pressure
- Development Flight Instrumentation
- Display
- Distribution
- Demand per hour
- Department of Defense
- Dedicated Signal Conditioner
- Exhaust Gas Temperature
- Entry Interface (400,000 ft. During Entry)
- Electrical
- Enable
_
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XCP.,OIq'_ (Continued)
EPDC
EPS
ESD
ET
Exh
Exhst
F
FA
FCE
FCS
FDLINE
FDA
FDF
FF
FIV
FLT
FM
FMY.A
FPL
frog.
FRCS
FRF
FPR
FSM
FSSR
FSW
ft
FU
FWD
G
GB
Gen
GFE
GG
GGVM
GN2
GNC
GND
GO2
GPC
GPM
GSE
H
H2
H20
HA
- Electrical Power Distribution and Control
- Electrical Power System
- Event Sequence Diagram
- External Tank, Event Tree
- Exhaust
- Exhaust
- Fahrenheit
- Flight Aft
- Flight Critical Equipment
- Flight Control System
- Feed Line
- Fault Detection and Annunciation
- Flight Data File
- Flight Forward
- Fuel Isolation Valve
- Flight
- Failure Mode
- Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
- Full Power Level (Main Engine @ 109% Rated Thrust)
- Fragment
- Forward Reaction Control System (Subsystem)
- Flight Readiness Firings
- Full Problem Record
- Fuel Supply Module
- Flight Systems Software Requirements
- Flight Software
- Feet
- Fuel
- Forward
- Gravity
- Gearbox
- Generator
- Government Furnished Equipment
- Gas Generator
- Gas Generator Valve Module
- Gaseous Nitrogen
- Guidance, Navigation, and Control
- Ground
- Gaseous Oxygen
- General Purpose Computer
- Gallons per Minute
- Ground Support Equipment
- Hours
- Hydrogen
- Water
- Hazard Analysis
13-2
iI.
ii
[
T-
L
I°.
I_
HDC
He
HEX
Hg
HPU
HW
HYD
IA
IEA
ID
ID
IFM
INS
IOA
ISO
ISOL
JSC
Kft
KSC
L
LA
ib
L/O
L/OFF
LF
LH
LH2
LL
LO2
LOCV
LOM
LOX
LPS
LR
LRU
LS
LT
LUBE
LV
NAN
MANF
MCC
MDAC
MDAC-ES
MDF
ACRONYMS (Continued)
- Hybrid Driver Controller
- Helium
- Heat Exchanger
- Mercury
- Hydraulic Power Unit
- Hardware
- Hydraulics
- Intact Abort
- Integrated Electrcnics AssemDly
- Identifier
- Inside Diameter
- In-Flight Maintenance
- Insertion
- Independent Orbiter Assessment
- Isolation
- Isolation
- Johnson Space Center
- i000 Feet
- Kennedy Space Center
- Left
- Launch Abort
- pound
- Lift Off
- Lift Off
- Launch Forward
- Left Hand
- Liquid Hydrogen
- Launch Left
- Liquid Oxygen
- Loss Of Crew/Vehicle
- Loss of Mission
- Liquid Oxygen
- Launch Processing System
- Launch Right
- Line Replaceable Unit
- Launch Scrub
-Light
- Lubrication, Lubricating
- Loss Of Crew or Vehicle
- Manual
- Manifold
- Mission Control Center (JSC)
- McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company
- McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company-
Engineering Services
- Minimum Duration Flight
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ACRONYMS (Continued)
MDM
HE
MECO
KET
MLD
MLG
MM
MMH
MEC
MN
MON
MPL
MPS
MPU
ms
MSFC
MTR
MUX
N2
N2H4
N204
N/A
NA
NASA
NC
NGTD
NH3
NLG
NO
NPRD
NRA
NSTS
NW
NWS
02
OFT
OI
OMI
OMS
OP
Oper
OPS
OXID
P/L
PC
Pc
- Multiplexer/Demultiplexer
- Main Engine
- Main Engine Cutoff
- Mission Elapsed Time
- Master Logic Diagram
- Main Landing Gear
- Major Mode
- MonomeUhyl Hydrazine
- Master Events Controller
- Main
- Monitor
- Minimum Power Level (Main Engine @ 65% Rated Thrust)
- Main Propulsion System (Subsystem)
- Magnetic Pickup Unit
- Millisecond
- Marshall Space Flight Center
- Motor
- Multiplexer
- Nitrogen
- Hydrazine
- Nitrogen Tetroxide
- Not Applicable
- Not Applicable
- National Aeronautics and Space Administration
- Normally Closed
- Nose Gear Touch Down
- Ammonia
- Nose Landing Gear
- Normally Open, Number
- Nonelectronic Par_s Reliability Data
- Numerical Risk Assessment
- National Space Transportation System
- Nose Wheel
- Nose-Wheel Steering
-Oxygen
- Orbital Flight Test
- Operational Instrumentation
- Operational Maintenance Instructions
- Orbital Maneuvering System
- Open
•- Operation
- Operations Sequence
- Oxidizer
- Payload
- Personal Computer, Printed Circuit
- Chamber Pressure
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XC2OL"_ (Continued)
.°
[
_L
PF
PI
PL
PLB
PLG
PLS
PLT
PM
PNL
POS
PRA
PRCS
PREP
PRESS
Prin
psi
psia
psid
psig
PWR
QC
QD
QRA
QUAL
R
RCS
Ref.
REV
RF
RH
RPC
RPL
RPM
Rt
RTLS
S/N
scfm
SD
S/D
SEC
SEP
SFOM
SFP
SIE
SPEC
SR
- Payload Forward, Permanent Failure
- Principal Investigator •
- Primarf Landing Site Entry
- Payload Bay
- Pickard, Lowe and Garrick, Inc.
- Primary Landing Site
- Pilot
- Project Manager
- Panel
- Position
- Probabilistic Risk Assessment
- Primary Reaction Control System (jet)
- Preparation
- Pressure
- Primary
- Pounds per Square Inch
- Pounds per Square Inch Absolute
- Pounds per Square Inch Differential
- Pounds per Square Inch Gage
- Power
- Quality Control
- Quick Disconnect
- Quantitative Risk Assessment
- Qualfication Test
- Right, Roll
- Reaction Control System
- Reference
- Revision
- Recoverable Failure
- Right Hand
- Remote Power Controller
- Rated Power Level (Main Engine @ I00% Rated Thrust)
- Revolutions Per Minute, Rotations Per Minute
- Right
- Return to Launch Site
- Serial Number
- Standard Cubic Feet per Minute
- Shutdown
- Shutdown
- Secondary
- Separation
- Shuttle Flight Operations Manual
- Single Failure Point
- Spatial Interaction Event
- Specification
- Stop Roll
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ACRONYMS (Concludsd)
SR&QA
SRB
SRM
SSM
SSME
SSSH
STS
SW
SYS
T-0
TAEM
TAL
TD
Ti
TIG
TK
TPS
trans.
TVC
uncont.
U.S.
USBI
VAX
VDC
VERN
VLV
VRCS
WONG
WOW
WS
WSB
WUC
XDCR
Xo
XFR
Y
- Safety, Reliability and Quality Assurance
- Solid Rocket Booster
- Solid Rocket Motor
- Subsystem Manager
- Space Shuttle Main Engine
- Space Shuttle Systems Handbook
- Space Transportation System
- Switch
- System
- Time Zero (Also Commonly Used for L/Off)
- Termianl Area Energy Management
- Transatlantic Abort Landing
- Touch Down (Vehicle)
- Titanium
- Time Of Ignition
- Tank
- Thermal Protection System
- Transducer
- Thrust Vector Control
- uncontained
- United States
- United Space Boosters Inc.
- A computer manufactured by Digital
Equipment Corporation
- Volts, dc
- Vernier
- Valve
- Vernier Reaction Control System (jet)
- Weight on Nose Gear
- Weight on Wheels (Main Landing Gear)
- Wheel Stop
- Water Spray Boiler
- Work Unit Code
- Transducer
- X-Axis of Orbiter
- Transfer
- Yaw
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